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1 Legalising land rights in Africa, Asia and Latin
America: An introduction
Janine Ubink
The potential of legalisation of land assets
Millions of people live and work on land that they do not legally own
in accordance with enforceable state law. Secure land rights are a basis
for household food security and shelter, and provide a safety net in case
of unemployment or retirement. The absence of state recognition for
local property rights is considered to affect people’s tenure security,
which in turn impinges on people’s social-economic security and im-
pedes development. People who are not secure in their property rights
will not invest labour and other resources in the fertility and productiv-
ity of their agricultural land, the improvement of their houses built on
the land, and the infrastructure of their neighbourhood. Tenure inse-
curity also hinders the provision of services and infrastructure by the
government. Furthermore, people are unable to acquire formal loans,
as they cannot use their land or houses as collateral. The lack of state-
guaranteed documents moreover inhibits the ability to make transac-
tions of land and houses with strangers who are not familiar with local
ownership structures, which will restrict the land market.
Traditionally, endeavors to legalise or formalise extra-legal land ten-
ure have focused on state-led individual titling and registration.1 This
was based on the assumption that individual property rights would im-
prove access to credit and thus increase the ability of landholders to in-
vest in their land. Furthermore, individual titles would remove disin-
centives to invest through an increase of landholders’ confidence that
they would not be deprived of their land. This paradigm was broadly
supported by legal scholars as well as by those in other disciplines as
diverse as economics and land surveying.
There has been some success with titling and registration. Feder et
al. (1988) and Li, Rozelle, and Brandt (1998) argue on the basis of data
from Thailand and China that private property increased security, in-
vestment, and productivity. Deininger (2003:47) has reported increases
in land values and agricultural investment following registration pro-
grammes in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Venezuela. However, in several
other countries, especially but not exclusively in Africa, no significant
relationship was found between tenure regimes on the one hand and
security, credit use, and productivity on the other (Atwood 1990; Bruce
and Migot-Adholla 1994; DFID 1999; Gerschenberg 1971; Migot-Ad-
holla et al. 1993; Oue´draogo et al. 1996; Varley 2002). Registration
programmes have proved to be ‘slow, expensive, difficult to keep up-to
date and hard for poor people to access’ (Cotula, Toulmin, and Quan
2006:20). As a result, very little land has been registered, and ‘where
titling and registration have been implemented, greater agricultural in-
vestment has not necessarily materialised’ (id.). Empirical evidence
shows that land titling and registration of private property can create,
rather than reduce, uncertainty and conflict over land rights (Atwood
1990:663). ‘Latent disputes can flare up when local actors realise that
registration will bring about final adjudication of land rights’ (Cotula,
Toulmin, and Quan 2006:20). Unsuccessful attempts to substitute
state titles for customary entitlements – and according to Cousins not
one attempt has been fully successful – may even reduce security by
creating normative confusion, which the powerful may take advantage
of (Cousins 2000:171; cf. Atwood 1990:663-5; Bruce, Migot-Adholla,
and Atherton 1994:260; Coldham 1979:618-9; DFID 1999:11; Lanjouw
and Levy 2002). ‘Many registration programmes had negative distribu-
tive effects, as those with more contacts, information and resources
were able to register land in their names, to the detriment of poorer
claimants’, and holders of secondary land rights are often expropriated
(Cotula, Toulmin, and Quan 2006:20. See also Atwood 1990; Lund
1998; Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994:20-1; Nyamu-Musembi 2006:19-
22; Platteau 2000; Van den Brink et al. 2006:12).2 Research has also
shown that registration does not improve access to credit where high
transaction and other costs hinder credit supply, and that many poor
families are unwilling to borrow for risk of being unable to repay and
losing the land through foreclosure (Cotula, Toulmin, and Quan
2006:20; Durand-Lasserve and Selod 2007:10, 12; Gilbert 2002:14-20;
Home and Lim 2004; Van den Brink et al. 2006:13). Field and Torero
even suspect that titling may reduce the banks‘ ability to foreclose as
the latter could anticipate that governments who promote titling will
also protect borrowers. This would deter them from lending (Field and
Torero 2006, quoted in Durand-Lasserve and Selod 2007:25).
The failures of state-led individual titling and registration (ITR) pro-
jects coincided with research showing that some property rights which
are only informally agreed on and enforced can be very secure (Bruce
and Migot-Adholla 1994). This is a recurring theme in more recent lit-
erature. Gilbert (2002:7) for instance states that in urban squatter areas
in Latin America, evictions are only likely to occur when settlements
threaten powerful vested interests, for example through their geogra-
phical proximity to elite residential areas, or when military or authori-
tarian governments are in power. In sub-Saharan Africa, according to
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Durand-Lasserve (2006:3-4), communal or customary land systems
guarantee a reasonably good level of security, even when these are not
formally recognised by the state. At the same time, many authors also
stress the limitations of this security. Durand-Lasserve (id.) points out
that the customary arrangement can deteriorate due to, for instance,
conflicts between those who allocate the land and other members of
the group, or when a major conflict arises between customary owners
and public authorities about the ownership and the use of the land, or
about the legitimacy of the customary claim. Other research and policy
papers point to the decreasing security of tenure in the face of land
shortage and competition and express new worries about increasing in-
equity of informal, including customary, land tenure. They emphasise
issues of unequal power relations within communities and point out
that local institutions are vulnerable to power plays of elites, as well as
to politics of exclusion (Amanor 2001:11-20; Carney and Watts 1990;
Cousins 2002:77; Lavigne Delville 1999; Moore 1998:42; Oomen
2002; Peters 2002:48; Toulmin, Lavigne Delville, and Traore´ 2002:15).
The disappointment with ITR approaches to formalisation, together
with the realisation that some state regulation is desirable to prevent
the usurpation of rights by local power holders – whether customary
leaders, local politicians, or criminal big men such as mafiosi – have
led to a widely supported search for ‘a third way’ or ‘a new paradigm’
which ‘does not prescribe a specific approach to land reform‘ but is
based on pluralism (Toulmin and Quan 2000b:5). According to this
new approach, existing property rights often do not seem to be in need
of a wholesale replacement with new property rights regimes. Alterna-
tive policies from titling are needed to strengthen security of tenure,
and must build on local concepts and practice rather than importing
one-size-fits-all models (Otto 2004:8). This entails, among other
things, recognition by the state of local land rights and increased for-
malisation of those systems (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Cotula,
Toulmin, and Quan 2006:21; Van den Brink et al. 2006:5). ‘Land regis-
tration may still be a useful component of a broader tenure security
strategy, particularly where customary systems have collapsed, where
land disputes are widespread’, and in areas with high competition for
land (Cotula, Toulmin, and Quan 2006:21. See also Bruce, Migot-Ad-
holla, and Atherton 1994:262; Van den Brink et al. 2006:13-15).
Probably the most prominent proponent of legalisation is Hernando
de Soto. In ‘The Mystery of Capital’ (2000) he recommends that to
combat poverty, the poor should quickly move their assets from an un-
productive extra-legal sphere into the legal sphere where these assets
could turn into ‘capital‘. He heavily criticises the standard legalisation
projects and the lack of progress in land tenure reform. In a chapter
on ‘the mystery of legal failure’, De Soto blames lawyers for being un-
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willing and unable to construct the ‘bridges’ that would enable the poor
to enter the realm of law and capital. He proposes a twofold alternative
strategy for legalisation: first, the ‘discovery’ and analysis of informal
‘social contracts’ that presently regulate human-land relations; and sec-
ond, a legal and political strategy for designing ‘bridges’ to connect, har-
monise and integrate those rules with the formal legal system. He
claims that this twofold strategy will speed up the legalisation of land
tenure. The ease with which De Soto promotes ‘discovering’ the infor-
mal ‘social contracts’ suggests a limited awareness with the many well-
documented difficulties of doing so. Unfortunately, his writing does not
answer the question of how such exercises should be undertaken (Otto
2004:9, 2009, forthcoming). De Soto‘s choice of wording, referring to
the building of bridges between customary, informal, or illegal assets
and the formal legal system – although it remains largely an abstract
notion – seems to fit well at face value with the ‘new paradigm’ noted
by Toulmin and Quan. On second look, however, it becomes clear that
he sees titling and registration of individual property rights as the only
way to reach his goal of transforming property into collateral, collateral
into credit, and credit into income (Woodruff 2001:1219).
Most people are glad to receive a title deed. It is this popularity that
explains why many governments have taken up this option, especially
in urban areas (cf. Gilbert 2002). Recently, however, as a result of the
shift in thinking and the ‘new paradigm’, several land policies and laws
present important innovations compared to their predecessors. A num-
ber of countries have provided for the registration of customary rights
(e.g. Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Niger, and Namibia). In Mozam-
bique, customary use rights are even protected when they are not regis-
tered. And several titling programmes have issued titles not only to in-
dividuals but also to families (e.g. Nicaragua and Brazil) and to groups
or communities (e.g. South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, and the Phi-
lippines) in rural as well as urban areas (Cotula, Toulmin, and Quan
2006:21. See also Durand-Lasserve 2006:10; IIED 2006:7-8).
This book hopes to contribute to the ongoing quest for a new para-
digm in land tenure regulation that will reconcile state perspectives of
a programmatic, national and legal nature with local land rights and al-
location processes. The material in this book arises from an interna-
tional, comparative research project on the potential of legalisation of
land assets.3 The main objective of the book is to obtain an overview
and in-depth insight into legalisation policies that have evolved in Afri-
ca, Latin America, and Asia. It contains eleven case studies in eight dif-
ferent countries that deal with urban, peri-urban, and rural land, and
focus on agricultural as well as residential land use. These case studies
examine the different designs of land tenure legalisations, the justifica-
tions and objectives for the legalisation processes, and their effects on
10 JANINE UBINK
tenure security and on the vulnerability of smallholders to losing their
land rights. They furthermore identify the winners and losers of the le-
galisation processes and the challenges that need to be addressed to
improve the tenure security of smallholders.
Only with sufficient knowledge of both the local socio-legal contexts
and the particularities of the various land tenure regimes can the docu-
mented attempts at legalisation be understood.4 Given the broad scope
of countries studied and the great diversity within and between coun-
tries and continents, it was considered necessary to supplement the
case studies of legalisation projects and programmes with overview stu-
dies of the land tenure regimes of the countries in which they were si-
tuated. Land law often forms an arena for struggle between different
ideologies and interests, including: enabling a free market for land,
providing security for the poor, keeping government agents in control,
democratic decentralisation, and respecting the customary traditions of
the region (McAuslan 1998). National regimes vary according to the
priority attached to these goals (Otto 2004:9). The countries selected
for this book include various degrees of recognition of customary law,
of democratic decentralisation, of state interventionist control as well
as different colonial legal backgrounds. These criteria, combined with
the backgrounds of the research group, have led to the selection of the
following countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, Bolivia, Mexi-
co, China, and Indonesia.
The integration of extra-legal tenure
Land tenure may be defined as the terms and conditions on which land
is held, used and transacted (Adams, Sibanda, and Turner 1999:135). It
designates the rights individuals and communities have with regard to
land, and should thus primarily be viewed as a social relation involving
a complex set of rules that governs land use and land ownership (Dur-
and-Lasserve and Selod 2007:4). In practice, a continuum in land ten-
ure rights can be observed, especially in developing countries where
different sources of law and different ownership patterns may coexist
(Payne 2002, quoted in Durand-Lasserve and Selod 2007:4). There is
thus a diversity of tenure situations, ranging from the most informal
types of possession and use to full ownership (Durand-Lasserve and
Selod 2007:4).
From the viewpoint of the state, three main situations of ‘extra-legal’
land tenure can be distinguished. First, many people have rights in
land on the basis of customary law; when customary law and custom-
ary rights are not recognised by the state, this creates an extra-legal si-
tuation (according to state law). Second, a large number of people occu-
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py public or private land against the wishes of the legal owner. Third,
there are a number of people who have acquired land from a legal or
customary owner but reside on unauthorised land developments, for
instance where land is subdivided and sold illegally by informal develo-
pers – because the required permission for land subdivision was not
obtained or because it violates zoning or planning regulations. This si-
tuation can also occur when the new occupants of the land have not
gone through the compulsory procedures for registration or titling or
have not acquired the right permits for settling or building (see also
Gilbert 2002:6-7). Rural areas mainly display the first type of extra-leg-
ality, based on customary rights in land that are not recognised by the
state. This is not an exclusively rural affair, though. Research shows
that also in urban and peri-urban areas, land transfers and acquisitions
often depend on customary rights and relations (see Hesseling and Ei-
chelsheim, this volume; Reerink, this volume). The second and third
types of extra-legality are mainly urban and peri-urban occurrences.5
Legalisation is a process by which extra-legal tenure is integrated
into the national legal system.6 Obviously, this can be done in many
different ways. Tenure legalisation programmes are influenced by the
approaches and orientations to legalisation as defined by governments,
funding agencies, and implementing agencies. They also depend on a
set of legal, social, administrative, and political factors that include the
constitutional, legal, and regulatory framework, the political balance of
power at the central and local government levels, the state of demand
for tenure formalisation, political will and commitment, pressures
from civil society, the perception of the legitimacy of the extra-legal ten-
ure situation by governmental institutions and the population, the fi-
nancial and human resources available for implementing tenure for-
malisation, the administrative apparatus available for implementation
including checks and balances and accessible administrative justice to
control the abuse of administrative powers, and the extent of legal em-
powerment of local stakeholders (cf. Durand-Lasserve and Selod
2007:15). The local diversity of these factors results in a range of differ-
ent legalisation policies. These policies can for instance be geared to-
wards any of the three categories of extra-legal land tenure mentioned
above (customary tenure, occupation against the wishes of the legal
owner, or unauthorised land developments); they can aim to deliver
personal rights or real rights to individuals or collectives; and they can
focus on rural, peri-urban, or urban areas, and on residential or agri-
cultural land. Together these policies form a whole spectrum ranging
from recognition of land administration of certain groups to individual
titling and registration of extra-legal property. The case studies de-
scribed in this book deal with legalisation projects and programmes
throughout this whole spectrum, and include the recognition of cus-
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tomary land rights and communal land management rights, adminis-
trative recognition of occupation, often in the form of permits to occu-
py or short-term leaseholds, and the delivery of property rights through
titling and registration.
Tenure security
One of the main stated objectives of legalisation programmes is the en-
hancement of tenure security. Various definitions of tenure security cir-
culate in the literature.7 Some of these definitions focus on the ele-
ment of certainty of land rights. Certainty is mostly seen as a function
of two elements: (1) assurance in exerting rights, and (2) the costs of
enforcing these rights, which should not be inhibiting (Place, Roth,
and Hazell 1994:19-21). Durand-Lasserve and Selod (2007:6), for in-
stance, define tenure security in urban areas as the right of all indivi-
duals and groups to effective protection by the state against forced evic-
tion. In contrast, insecure tenure should be viewed as a risk of forced
eviction (cf. UN Habitat 2004:31).8 FAO, in a study on rural land ten-
ure, defines tenure security as ‘the certainty that a person’s rights to
land will be recognised by others and protected in cases of specific
challenges’ (FAO 2002:18). Other definitions not only encompass the
certainty of land rights, but also the extent or breadth of these rights –
which refers to the quantity and quality of the land rights held – and
their duration – the length of time for which these rights are valid.9
For instance, Migot-Adholla and Bruce (1994:3) have defined tenure se-
curity as the perceived right by the possessor of a land parcel to man-
age and use the parcel, dispose of its produce, and engage in transac-
tions, including temporary or permanent transfers, without hindrance
or interference from any person or corporate entity, on a continuous
basis. Place et al. (1994:19) have in similar fashion defined land tenure
security as existing when an individual perceives that he or she has
rights to a piece of land on a continuous basis, free from imposition or
interference from outside sources, as well as the ability to reap the ben-
efits of labour and capital invested in the land, whether in use or upon
transfer to another holder.
Most authors agree that, rather than defining land tenure security as
something that either exists or does not exist, it is more accurate to
think of it as a continuum. The first group of authors then posits that
it can be measured by the amount of certainty. The second group
claims that it can be measured by three criteria: extent or breadth,
duration, and certainty. This second definition of tenure security, with
its three elements, provides more details with regard to the position of
the landholder. As such it is a valuable instrument of measurement
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and information. On the other hand, Van Rooij (this volume) shows
that higher values of land resulting from increases in breadth and
duration might lead to intensified struggles over land and therefore to
decreased certainty of the bundle of rights. This poses the question of
how to weigh these various factors. Has tenure security increased or
decreased when farmers hold bigger bundles of rights for longer peri-
ods but with less certainty? Besides, as Lund cautions, when the extent
and duration of rights determine the measure of tenure security, this
seems to imply that private property has the highest tenure security
possible. However, while increasing exclusivity may produce more ten-
ure security for the excluding party, the opposite will be the case for
the one who is being excluded. Thus, increasing tenure security for
one usually correlates with decreasing tenure security for another
(Lund 2000:16). In individual titling programmes of communal lands,
for example, claims of subordinate right-holders to conditional, partial,
or common access tend to be neglected (Atwood 1990:661; Cotula,
Toulmin, and Hesse 2004:2; Lund 2000:16; Shipton and Goheen
1992:316). In the same vein, individual titling of family lands can lead
to the exclusion of vulnerable family members such as women, youth,
and the elderly (cf. Hesseling and Eichelsheim, this volume). When
talking about increasing tenure security, one should thus always ask
whose security is increasing. Safitri (this volume) furthermore shows
that in her case-study area in Indonesia, the willingness to invest and
the effects on poverty reduction were not so much determined by the
extent of rights bestowed in the legalisation scheme, but rather by the
kind of lands targeted and especially the level of their productivity.
FAO (2002:19) points out that ‘equating security with transfer rights to
sell and mortgage is true for some parts of the world but it is not true
in many others. People in parts of the world where there are strong
community-based tenure regimes may enjoy tenure security without
wishing to sell their land, or without having the right to do so, or hav-
ing strictly limited rights to transfer’. A restriction of transfer rights
may even protect people from distress sales. The provision of full pri-
vate title might in such cases rather lead to loss of land than to higher
tenure security. Finally, the predilection for private property rights
ignores the preferences of households, who may value some tenure ca-
tegory above freehold tenure (Payne 2002, quoted in Durand-Lasserve
and Selod 2007:29). It might be for instance that the lack of formal ti-
tles is a price which the poor pay to gain access to plots which they
could otherwise not afford (Payne 2000:9). Or it might be that the
members of a community fear the loss of communal cohesion when
community members can individually determine to transact their
rights to outsiders (see Duhau, this volume).
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Two of the four definitions above mention that tenure security is a
perceived quality. Other definitions do not incorporate people’s percep-
tions, but distinguish between people’s real tenure security and their
perceived tenure security. There is no consensus, however, among re-
searchers about the correct indicators of this real tenure security. In
empirical studies, researchers therefore often rely on perceptions of
tenure security. For instance, research may report that households
seeking legalisation state that their motivation is to increase their se-
curity of tenure, or that legalised households tend to believe their ten-
ure is more secure than that of extra-legal households. Even research-
ers using definitions focusing on some kind of concrete element, such
as the extent of protection against eviction, often have no choice but to
focus on people’s perceptions in their empirical research. They might
for instance be unable to measure the threat of eviction but can ask
people whether they believe they are at risk of being evicted. The incor-
poration of perception in the definition of tenure security can thus
partly be explained by the methodological difficulties of measuring real
tenure security. A second explanation can be found in the often sup-
posed relationship between tenure security and willingness to invest in
land. This link indeed presupposes that the people perceive their ten-
ure situation to be secure; it is their perception that will make people
act. On the other hand, the relationship between tenure security and
the collateralisation of land rather depends on the perception of the
money-lender with regard to the security of tenure of the borrower,
and the willingness of governments to upgrade settlement areas de-
pends on their perception of the permanency of the settlement.
Besides a distinction between real and perceived tenure security, an-
other valuable division is the one between de jure and de facto tenure
security. People’s perceptions of the security of their tenure are not
only formed by their legal position, they are equally formed by the
practical situation they find themselves in. Have there been many evic-
tions and demolitions of buildings or destruction of crops lately? Has
their land occupation been acknowledged by the local authorities, for
instance through the payment of taxes to local government10 or tribute
to traditional authorities, or through the servicing of residential areas?
Have local authorities made any statements about the security, legiti-
macy, or legality of their occupation? When the de facto tenure security
of an informal tenure situation is high, legalisation may be ‘a less effi-
cient engine of change’ than its supporters suppose (Varley 2002:455).
The above discussions of the literature pose the question of where
this book stands. With regard to the various defining elements of ten-
ure security – certainty, extent, and duration – the studies in this book
make an effort to combine a focus on the element of certainty of land
rights with careful attention to the possible existence of restrictions
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with regard to the elements of extent and duration of rights. Where re-
levant, they discuss the latent consequences of the existence or other-
wise of such restrictions. In many case studies, the extent of de jure
tenure security and of de facto tenure security are distinguished, com-
pared, and explained. Most case studies in this book focus largely on
the local perceptions of tenure security, which they regard either as a
defining part of tenure security or as an indicator of tenure security. In
this book, we do not take the relationship between formalisation and
tenure security as a given, but rather regard it as the main object of
study. The various case studies explicitly pose the question ‘tenure se-
curity for whom?’ and include an analysis of the effects of legalisation
programmes on smallholders and urban/peri-urban poor. Notwith-
standing its focus on the link between legalisation and tenure security,
this book also recognises that tenure formalisation may have a series
of objectives other than that of providing security of tenure to house-
holds living on informal land. These other objectives – which often in-
clude improving the efficiency of land and housing land markets, pro-
moting private investment through the use of land as collateral, im-
proving the property tax base, and increasing public sector influence
over land and housing markets (Payne 2000:6-9) – are also an object
of study in this book.
In the following section I shall describe the legalisation programmes
and policies that are analysed in the case studies, and the lessons that
can be drawn from their implementation. As stated before, this book
also contains overview studies of the land tenure regimes in the eight
countries in which these legalisation policies are found. These rich and
detailed country studies not only add value to and offer a necessary
background for understanding the case studies, they are also valuable
instruments for comparing state land tenure regimes. However, as
their level of detail and diversity do not easily allow for short descrip-
tions, I shall limit myself in the following section to a discussion of the
case studies, and focus on the main debate in this book: the relation-
ship between legalisation on the one hand, and tenure security, legal
security, investment, marketisation, and productivity on the other.
The scope of the case studies in this book
Ethiopia
Dessalegn Rahmato (chapter 3) describes a programme of rural land re-
gistration that has been undertaken in Ethiopia since 2003, with the
goal of issuing every rightful holder of farmland a certificate of use
rights and having his/her plots recorded in a registry. The registration
programme was expected to enhance tenure security and reduce the
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number of land disputes. The author shows that although the number
of land cases in the Social Courts has declined, the number of disputes
in the localities has not. It seems that they have rather been rerouted
to other dispute settlers, mainly the Land Administration Committees.
It cannot be concluded therefore that land registration has allayed the
prevalence of rural conflict and antagonism on account of land dis-
putes. An additional argument the author makes is that the employ-
ment of local techniques and familiar methods of measurement and
demarcation – often considered a success due to their low costs – in
fact has not delivered accurate, consistent, and reliable results, and is
therefore likely to lead to disputes and conflicts. Additionally, the local
authorities do not have the capability to update the information in the
land registry, which makes the whole undertaking far from sustainable.
With regard to conflicts between peasants and the government, the
average peasant feels that there is no legal mechanism for the redress
of grievances. Despite the registration programme a majority of the
peasants still believe that the government can take away their land if it
wants to, for development projects for instance or to redistribute land
to accommodate the increasing numbers of landless people. Although
most peasants believe that they will receive some governmental com-
pensation in such cases, they worry that it will not be adequate. As pea-
sants attribute their tenure insecurity to a large extent to actions by the
government and believe that these actions cannot be challenged in
court, the author concludes that the peasants’ perception of tenure in-
security cannot be removed merely by issuing user certificates. The
construction of strong tenure security for peasants needs to involve
measures in the political sphere and the sphere of governance, includ-
ing empowerment of the poor. At the moment it is only rarely that pea-
sants contest the decision of local officials. Empowerment cannot come
about without rights awareness, which includes not only knowledge
about land and property regulations but also about political-juridical
rights and ways to use them in the interest of the poor.
Ghana
Kojo Amanor (chapter 5) focuses on the impact of new wealth created
in the cashew and timber sectors in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana.
In the first sector, the Forestry Service has developed a programme of
informal mechanisms for registering teak plantations. However, the
costs of registration are high, and the benefits of registering are not
clear or tangible, as government has not been able to develop a pro-
gramme of loans to support the development of teak plantations. These
factors, combined with an unwillingness to take long-term risks, are
important factors which presently hinder the capitalisation of teak
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plantations. In contrast, within the cashew sector an institutional fra-
mework for the disbursement of loans to small farmers has been devel-
oped, which eschews linking land to collateral, since this would result
in high transaction costs resulting from poorly developed land markets
and information systems. The loans programme for cashew forces
farmers to bear the transaction costs of a tedious programme of farmer
group monitoring which combines peer group pressure, threats of re-
moval of extension, and financial support with more coercive measures
including police action. This does not translate into the easy capitalisa-
tion of assets by independent farmers developing their own investment
strategies, but into forms of dependent accumulation in which support
to farmers is conditional upon them following the prescriptions of agri-
cultural banks, agricultural extension services, and agribusiness. Dis-
cussion of agricultural policies in these two sectors shows that security
in land does not necessarily translate into collateral, unless particular
types of land can be capitalised and the risk of investment in these sec-
tors is low. When the assets of farmers are not easily capitalised, the
disbursement of loans may occur through other forms that do not use
land as security. Thus, the assumed relationship between registration,
tenure security, and capitalisation are not supported by this evidence
from Ghana. Amanor’s case study furthermore points to the intricacies
of legalising customary tenure situations. Customary relations are of-
ten contested and subject to power struggles over the control and defi-
nition of land rights. When the contested nature of customary relations
and power relations is not recognised by the state, attempts to legalise
informal arrangements frequently accommodate the interests of the lo-
cal elite, and in the process the rights of the poor are eroded. Addition-
ally, the pressures of commodification within customary systems often
result in conflicts between notions of user rights and fungible assets.
Since processes of legalisation are often concerned with the creation of
clearly defined rights in fungible property, this easily results in the ero-
sion of forms of property based on dynamic land use and the strength-
ening of fungible assets, which transforms the nature of customary
property. This becomes particularly clear in the case of tree plantations.
A first example lies in the requirement that the documentation needed
for the registration of teak plantations be signed by chiefs and family
elders, which opens up potential avenues for monies to be exacted
from planters by chiefs for recognition of their land rights and acquisi-
tion of documentation. A second example can be found in the under-
mining of the bush fallowing system of small food farmers with the
development of tree plantations that permanently remove land from
the recycling system of bush fallowing. This expansion of tree planters
with registered holdings often ultimately undermines and erodes the
base of the food crop farmers and of their system of land use. While
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tree planters usually constitute the richer segments of the population
with surplus capital to invest in hiring labour, they paradoxically consti-
tute a major clientele for poverty reduction programmes concerned
with security of customary land tenure and securing land rights for the
poor, since tree plantations are fungible assets, which are easily
mapped and demarcated, unlike the mobile resource base of bush fal-
low cultivators. This shows that notions of customary tenure are selec-
tively constructed to mould and fashion the customary to fit contem-
porary policy agendas, and exclude elements that are not considered
compatible. This process is carried out through the legalisation, forma-
lisation, and recognition of customary land tenure.
The second chapter on Ghana, by Janine Ubink, similarly stresses
the intricacies of legalising customary tenure situations (chapter 6).
Her case study deals with quite an indirect form of legalisation,
through constitutional recognition of customary land management and
of the position of chiefs. She describes how in peri-urban areas the
new value of land has triggered a multitude of struggles and negotia-
tions, mainly between chiefs on the one hand and villagers on the
other, for the rights to allocate land and share in the revenue. Despite
high local resistance, the chiefs in a number of case-study villages per-
sisted in their style of land management, which was highly lucrative
for themselves and sometimes for other selected members of the com-
munity – such as elders or royal family members – but extremely detri-
mental to the livelihoods of the poor majority. The farmers’ tenure se-
curity was severely corroded by the chiefs’ actions. Practices such as
multiple sales and allocation of land unsuitable for residential purposes
also threaten the tenure security of the new lessees. The author points
to the behaviour of government to explain how chiefs are able to con-
tinue acting contrary to the wishes of the majority of the villagers, both
old and new. Despite the constitutional provision that customary land
should be managed on behalf of and in trust for the people, the gov-
ernment hardly steps into local land management issues. State institu-
tions established to check upon chiefly land administration do not in
reality exercise effective control. They currently provide hardly any
checks and balances on local land administration. Their discourse as
well as their actions rather point towards the existence of an informal
‘policy of non-interference’, inspired by the political power of the chiefs
and the alliance between traditional and state elites. The fact that the
government continually emphasises the sovereignty of the chiefs and
that land administration rests exclusively in their hands gives addi-
tional legitimacy to the chiefs and provides them with ample leeway to
administer land the way they please. The National Land Policy and the
Land Administration Programme (LAP) do not seem to promise any
change in this respect in the near future. On the contrary, despite the
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formulation of goals like equity and accountability, the government has
not actually imposed any such requirements on the chiefs in the imple-
mentation process of the LAP so far. In combination with a progressive
erosion of local checks and balances, the chiefs have a free hand to de-
termine their own position in customary land management. It seems
that this has given chiefs the power to overstretch the somewhat dy-
namic nature of customary law by manipulating it to suit their needs
and legitimise their claims, resulting in the described detrimental ef-
fects on the tenure security of the people. Any substantial change in
this situation requires two intimately connected transformations: the
organisation and empowerment of local farmers, and a different atti-
tude of the government towards chiefly rule and customary land man-
agement. Similar to Amanor’s chapter, Ubink’s chapter thus brings to
the fore that legalisation of customary tenure arrangements without at-
tention to the contested nature of customary relations often furthers
the interests of the traditional elite and damages the rights of the poor.
Namibia
Marco Lankhorst and Murie¨l Veldman (chapter 8) analyse the Flexible
Land Tenure Bill, an innovative form of legalisation of extra-legal land
tenure, which for some years now has been awaiting passage into law
in Namibia. This bill is innovative in two ways. First, recognising that
the executive branches of most developing countries lack the capacity
and resources to manage the complex procedures involved in legalisa-
tion and subsequent upkeep of the registration system, this bill simpli-
fies and thus reduces the costs of the registration process. Second, ac-
knowledging the financial constraints of the target group, it allows
those who seek to acquire title to share the costs of registration
amongst each other, as members of a group. The study focuses on the
town of Otjiwarongo, and compares the costs and benefits of both flex-
ible titling and extra-legality for its inhabitants, as these factors will to-
gether determine whether flexible titling provides settlers incentives to
join in a scheme and to continue to respect its regulations. The main
cost of extra-legality lies in the threat of future relocation without com-
pensation. Such relocations of extra-legal settlers have occurred with
some frequency. One of the central objectives of the bill is to provide
secure tenure. In the two neighbourhoods studied in Otjiwarongo,
however, the majority of the plots do not adhere to the provision in the
National Housing Development Act prescribing that plots have a mini-
mum size of 300 square metres. Another problem is that in the cur-
rent layout of these settlements, there is no room for public services to
be provided. To remove the need for further relocations and thereby en-
hance tenure security of its inhabitants, the registration scheme should
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be supplemented with the design of a layout for the area. According to
the authors, however, the same result could be achieved by (1) design-
ing a layout, or requesting central government for dispensation from
the problematic layout requirements, whilst postponing titling, or (2)
dropping the prospect of titling altogether. Put differently, the same re-
sults can be achieved under extra-legality. Another expected benefit of
the Flexible Land Tenure Bill is that it enables registered landholders
to engage in transactions such as sale or rental. The data reveal, how-
ever, that plots are already sold and sub-rented with some frequency by
extra-legal holders. The absence of third-party-encroachment problems,
which is related to the existence of a registry and the fact that plots are
pegged and fenced, suggests that current arrangements enable such
transactions in a way that would appear to fairly effectively shield
buyers from competing claims. Therefore, the provisions in the Flex-
ible Land Tenure Bill that enable holders of a title to engage in transac-
tions neither constitute an advantage or a drawback. In fact, if we in-
clude in the analysis (1) the fees incurred in registering transactions,
and (2) the various limitations on the freedom to engage in such trans-
actions that the bill makes, we see that extra-legality may even consti-
tute the more attractive alternative. With respect to the third expected
benefit of the bill, viz. the opening up of access to credit, the chapter
also states it as unlikely that landhold titles will in practice be used as
collateral. Micro-financing programmes and saving groups may offer
settlers better prospects. The authors therefore conclude that it is
doubtful whether the Flexible Land Tenure Bill could achieve its objec-
tives, at least in Otjiwarongo’s extra-legal settlements. They plead for a
careful selection of zones where conditions for implementation are
more favourable than in Otjiwarongo and for implementation of the re-
gistration scheme in those areas only. It is crucial that policymakers
take into account the perspective of the settlers because their coopera-
tion is indispensable to the success of legalisation. Settlers’ lack of in-
terest will lead to non-compliance and continued extra-legality. In areas
where cooperation cannot be expected, bolstering existing extra-legal ar-
rangements might provide a more promising way of improving tenure
security.
Senegal
In their chapter Gerti Hesseling and John Eichelsheim describe re-allo-
cation programmes that have been undertaken since the 1970s in the
Senegalese town of Ziguinchor (chapter 10). These programmes were
intended to replace the earlier land tenure situation based on Diola
customary law. In reality, they created a new, hybrid system that com-
bined a continued emphasis on the Diola patron-client (adjiati-ad-
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jaoura) relationship with a role for new actors involved in municipal
town planning. In this new urban constellation, the position of the pa-
tron became more and more politicised. This expansion of his role was
acceptable for the members of the traditional society as long as the po-
litical ambitions of the patron did not result in him neglecting his obli-
gations towards his indigenous clients in favour of the interests of his
other, ‘immigrant’, followers. When the patron starts to answer to poli-
tical demands that hurt his inner circle, he loses his authority, and his
clients turn against him and his political associates. In Ziguinchor, this
resulted in high tensions between locals and ‘outsiders’ and even in
violent clashes. The authors discuss the effect of this new hybrid sys-
tem on people’s tenure security. They show that most people in the
study area feel quite secure in their tenure. This is partly based on an
erroneous belief that their ‘tickets’ or other documentary evidence pro-
vide a legally sound title. However, people who know that they do not
possess a valid legal title still have quite a strong perception of tenure
security. This is based on their experiences with administrative agents,
who rarely tear down houses without state compensation. People trust
this state of laissez-faire to continue and expect to be protected by poli-
tical strong men, through their relationship with their patrons, or with
people involved in the municipal land planning system. This chapter
also brings to the fore the effect of the individualisation of family land
on marginal family members. The case of the Sagan plots shows that
the issuance of personalised ‘tickets’ enhances tenure security of some
people – the people whose names appear on the ‘tickets’ – but usually
coincides with the erosion of that of others. In this way, the drive for
individualisation of tenure can significantly increase the vulnerability
of people who lack knowledge of urban legislation and who are depen-
dent on family relations. The authors therefore end with the warning
that when the effects of re-allocation programmes on tenure security
are discussed, one should thus always ask the question, whose tenure
security?
Bolivia
Diego Pacheco discusses two areas in the Bolivian department of Santa
Cruz where local indigenous/originary groups have demanded formali-
sation of their rights to common-property areas (chapter 12). Following
the 1995 constitutional mandate of recognising legal pluralism and cer-
tain territorial rights in order to ensure collective tenure security for in-
digenous peoples, Bolivia has constructed new legal arrangements for
indigenous territorial autonomy allowing indigenous peoples to govern
themselves, within a certain territory and to a specific extent, according
to their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal systems.
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Despite these official arrangements, the two cases in this chapter show
that such formalisations involve lengthy and complicated procedures
riddled with uncertainty. The chapter analyses the contextual, motiva-
tional, and informational hurdles obstructing the titling of common-
property areas, and the effects of the regularisation processes on peo-
ple’s tenure security. In the cases studied, indigenous people’s tenure
security, in areas that were considered to be in their de facto possession,
actually decreased as a result of the starting of the titling process. In
both case-study areas, the land regularisation seems to have triggered a
more rapid expansion of non-indigenous individual land owners into
the areas because they saw it as a last chance to claim ownership rights
in those areas which in their view were ‘open access areas’, despite
their de facto use and occupation by indigenous people. This process of
last minute land-grabbing by ‘third parties’ can largely be explained by
three factors: power asymmetries between medium- and large-scale
non-indigenous landowners claiming forestland and indigenous people
claiming communal property rights; limited capacity of indigenous
peoples to develop relationships of trust with the technicians involved
in the regularisation processes; and the inadequate supervision of pro-
fessionals operating at the local level by their principals. Tenure secur-
ity is also affected by the actions of the indigenous people themselves,
through land transactions between indigenous people’s leaders and ille-
gal intruders which are then ratified by the government. In particular,
indigenous people located in well-endowed natural resources areas are
more often inclined to follow their own self-interest, which erodes the
tenure security of the community as a whole. Conversely, indigenous
people with less incentive to resign the common good may gain some
local power as a result of the regularisation process. In cases of both
externally induced tenure insecurity and internally caused tenure inse-
curity, the problems are intertwined with the lack of control on the im-
plementation bureaucracy, which delays and distorts the titling process
through mismanagement and corruption.
Mexico
In Mexico, more than half of the national territory is held by ejidos and
comunidades agrarias (agrarian communities), agrarian property institu-
tions regulated by the Agrarian Law involving collective as well as indi-
vidual property rights. They were created in the context of agrarian re-
form and the process of land redistribution, which was one of the main
outcomes of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917). The exercise of ejidal
or communal property rights implies the mediation of a collective en-
tity or corporation made up by the group of duly recognised and regis-
tered ejidatarios or comuneros in each agrarian nucleus (i.e. each ejido or
LEGALISING LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 23
comunidad). While two-thirds of lands granted to ejidos and comuni-
dades are held collectively, individuals in most ejidos and many comuni-
dades have long-term use rights to particular parcels that they cultivate
independently. Prior to the 1992 constitutional reform, rights over eji-
dal lands were non-transferable and largely inalienable. Despite these
legal rules of non-marketability, irregular/illegal transactions of ejidal
rights were common. These transactions created a class of landholders
that did not have formally recognised agrarian rights and therefore
were in a precarious tenure condition. In chapter 14, Emilio Duhau fo-
cuses on an ejido in a peri-urban area of Mexico City‘s Metropolitan
Zone and analyses the impacts of the post-1992 legal reforms that lar-
gely removed the restrictions on transfer and alienability of ejidal lands
and that included the legalisation of some of the property rights that
have arisen out of formerly illegal transactions. The author shows that
the current agrarian legislation has considerably enhanced the certainty
and protection of ejidatario’s property rights. Mexican peasants have
seized without much reticence the advantages offered in those respects
by the agrarian rights certification process and the possibilities opened
to them by the enhancement of their property rights. At the same time,
however, just like in the great majority of the ejidos, the Ejidal Assembly
in Duhau’s case study has so far not opted to adopt a regime of free-
hold tenure. Although many younger and better informed ejidatarios
desire such a change, older ejidatarios fear that this will invoke specific
burdens such as the payment of property taxes and drinkable water
fees, and that this will change their way of life and their ability to de-
fine and adopt collective strategies and in general to form a meaningful
local community. This brings to the fore that farmers‘ interest in en-
hancing the security of their tenure does not always run parallel with
their interest in acquiring full individual property. The author explicitly
stresses the limited knowledge and awareness among ejidatarios of the
existing legislation and the competences of the municipality on the
one hand and the autonomy and jurisdiction of the Ejidal Assembly on
the other. These generalised confusions and misunderstandings ex-
plain why many ejidatarios fail to comply with and also fail to profit
from the optimal strategies within their reach. Additionally, it makes
them susceptible to manipulation by their better informed colleagues.
China
Benjamin van Rooij (chapter 16) describes two recent Chinese laws,
the 1998 Land Management Law and the 2003 Rural Land Contract
Law, that have increased the breadth (more rights of transfer) and the
duration (from fifteen to 30 years) of land use rights. Although the
awareness of the new laws is high and many land contracts have been
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signed and land certificates issued, farmers‘ security in exercising their
new rights is threatened by the widespread and often illegal taking of
their land without satisfactory compensation. The sharp rise in such
land loss conflicts warns that Chinese land tenure still lacks certainty.
These conflicts find their roots in unclear legislation, weak checks and
balances on local governments and Village Committees, and the resul-
tant weak implementation of law. Changes in legislation alone will
thus not be sufficient to decrease current land loss conflicts. It seems
rather that legislative changes should be combined with measures that
help to enhance implementation. Such measures should be a combina-
tion of improving state law enforcement action against violations of the
law and increasing possibilities for access to justice for aggrieved farm-
ers. Behind the weak checks and balances are not so much legal or so-
cio-legal problems, but rather political problems related to the existing
power relations. At its heart, the current land loss crisis is thus one of
power, involving weak farmers and strong elites. Future reforms
should be directed at such power imbalances and, as with any institu-
tional change adopted, the risk of elite co-optation should be consid-
ered. Enhancing land tenure security in China therefore involves em-
powerment of the weak and poor. Such empowerment first requires
enhancing their access to the legal system, strengthening the role of ci-
vil society, while work should also focus on general development activ-
ities such as literacy training, strengthening community organisation,
and legal awareness promotion.
The second case study on China, by Jianping Ye and Jian Wu (chap-
ter 17), also reports the increasing amount of illegal land use and land
loss conflicts. The authors blame these occurrences on the existing du-
alist tenure system, with government-regulated collective land and mar-
ket-based, state-owned land tenure regimes, which necessitates a te-
dious land conversion process to legally change farmland into land for
residential or commercial construction. The case study describes two
different responses of the Chinese government to the irregularities.
The first part of the chapter portrays a programme to formalise and re-
cognise illegal land use and constructions in Shenzhen city, Bao’an
District. Due to the large profits to be made through illegal land uses
and to the ineffectiveness of the state regulatory apparatus, illegal land
use and illegal buildings have become a permanent feature of the peri-
urban landscape over a period of more than a decade. The high admin-
istrative and social costs of demolition have made it virtually impossi-
ble to re-convert the land to agriculture. The Bao’an government felt it
had no other alternative than to recognise the illegal land use. This is
done under certain strict conditions, to prevent encouragement of
further illegal behaviour. The second part of the chapter refers to a
‘Land Exchange Programme’ in Tianjin Municipality, Dongli District.
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Rather than a restorative response after the creation of illegal land use
and buildings, this programme entails a pro-active strategy to avoid the
creation of such illegal land use and construction. The main plan is to
move farmers out of their rural houses into high-rise buildings that al-
low for a much more intensive land use. As a result, the total cultivated
land area can be maintained while more construction land can be re-
leased. As the Land Exchange Programme converts all land at once, it
prevents commercial land users from circumventing the tedious land
conversion process, and thus decreases the incidence of illegal land
use. This programme does not change the total agricultural land area,
therefore tenure security of farmers’ agricultural land is guaranteed.
Nevertheless, the authors opine that the ease with which the govern-
ment unilaterally decides to requisition collective Rural Residential
Land (RRLS) and rural houses in the Land Exchange Programme may
serve as an alarm bell for tenure security, as there is no reason to be-
lieve that agricultural land may not one day also be requisitioned by
the government for one reason or another. One of the supposed bene-
fits of the programme lies in the capitalisation of residential land.
Whereas the sale of rural residential land to non-members was prohib-
ited, the new high-rise apartments can be transacted freely, thus bring-
ing dead capital alive. However, an important comment is made in this
regard by the authors when they explain that rural housing was only a
‘dead’ asset because of the legal prohibition of free circulation. It is
therefore nothing but the state and the property rights arrangement it
imposes that make rural houses illiquid. The authors furthermore criti-
cise the lack of participation from farmers in this top-down administra-
tive programme, and the fact that they are largely excluded from shar-
ing the economic benefits arising from economic development taking
place on the formerly collective peri-urban land. Despite these criti-
cisms, the authors acknowledge the innovation of the programme and
its attempts to dismantle institutional rigidities and barriers that have
bred illegal land use.
Indonesia
Gustaaf Reerink discusses a systematic registration programme under
the Land Administration Programme (LAP) Indonesia (chapter 19). He
shows that although systematic titling programmes such as LAP have
been able to overcome financial, bureaucratic, and time constraints of
sporadic registration programmes and related negative perceptions of
the people regarding the registration process, they nonetheless fail to
reach the kampong dwellers with the lowest incomes. This limited
reach can be explained by the fact that the LAP is only implemented in
locations where registration is relatively easy, which means that loca-
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tions where many low-income dwellers reside are ignored. Besides,
some of the same obstacles occurring in cases of sporadic land registra-
tion remain in place, namely the stringent evidence requirements for
initial registration and a lack of political will to grant new rights to in-
formal landholders. The author draws two important conclusions from
his case study with regard to tenure security. First, that registration
does not always enhance the legal security of the landholders. Land re-
gistration programmes in Bandung contributed little to the legal secur-
ity of kampong dwellers, due to the fact that they often do not meet
other legal requirements such as the obligation to obtain spatial plan-
ning related permits or to perform derivate registration after a change
in the legal status of the land. Additionally, registration of land only of-
fers limited legal security for two reasons: first, a land certificate is not
regarded as conclusive but only offers strong evidence regarding a land
right which can be disputed by a third party during the five years after
the certificate has been issued, and second, the issuing of double land
certificates by the NLA – due to maladministration and corruption – af-
fects the reliability of the land register and the extent of protection a
certificate offers. In his second main conclusion, Reerink challenges
the fact that legal security is often equated with tenure security. Further
data from his research show that in Post-New Order Bandung, both
the de facto tenure security (measured by interference from third par-
ties) of low-income kampong dwellers holding land certificates (but of-
ten not fulfilling other legal requirements) and the perceived tenure se-
curity of these people are stronger than among those who do not have
such documents. This for instance also means that the former invest
more in their land and housing than the latter. These data thus show
that legal security is not always a determining factor for de facto and
perceived tenure security.
In the second Indonesian case study Myrna Safitri describes the ef-
fects of two different legalisation processes in Langkawana, a village in
the forest frontier of Lampung (chapter 20). The first involved the re-
gistration of individual property rights in residential non-forest land.
Although this legalisation enhanced the legal status and the tenure se-
curity of the land, it did not lead to an increased use of the land as col-
lateral for loans, nor to a higher number of land transactions. Despite
the legalisation, Langkawana villagers considered their residential land
as an asset that needed to be held onto at all costs, not as a marketable
commodity. This legalisation did not enhance investment in the land
and did not change the people’s level of poverty. The second legalisa-
tion process involved the granting of a community forestry license on
forest land. Although this did not provide the villagers with individual
titles, it did enhance their (perception of) tenure security, i.e. the extent
to which the villagers felt assured of their ability to access their land, to
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manage and use it, and to effectively exclude others. As a result, people
invested more time and labour in their forest gardens, diversified their
crops, and planted more perennial and cash-producing crops. This led
to a significant improvement in the people’s quality of life. After the
granting of the community forestry license, the number of market
transactions decreased, which contradicts the theory that enhanced ten-
ure security will lead to more land transactions. This case on the con-
trary shows that villagers prefer not to sell secure and productive land.
The greater the profits that can be expected from land, the less willing
people are to transfer their land. The less tenure security, the less one
can count on profits from the land in the future, and the more willing
people will be to transfer the land. This case thus shows that legalisa-
tion of land rights does not always lead to marketisation. People’s deci-
sions to take part in land transactions are determined by their percep-
tion of the value of the land and the contribution of the land to their
household economy. The legal status of land is merely one factor, but
not the major one, in determining land transactions. This case further-
more shows that the relationship between legalisation of land tenure
and poverty reduction will be determined not only by the kind and ex-
tent of rights – individual or communal rights, ownership or use rights
– granted to the people but also by the kind of lands on which these
rights are granted. In other words, it will have a greater effect on pov-
erty reduction to target lands that are highly productive than to target
lands that are unproductive.
Concluding remarks
The case-study chapters of this book provide rich descriptions of pro-
jects and programmes of legalisation of extra-legal tenure ranging from
the recognition of communal ownership to the creation of full private
title and various forms in between. They draw grounded conclusions
on the relationship between legality, tenure security, investments, and
marketisation. This section does not aim to produce a full enumeration
of all the lessons learnt, but wishes to stress some of them with regard
to the book’s main object of study, viz. the relationship between the var-
ious programmes of legalisation and tenure security. The tendency of
several scholars to equate extra-legality and tenure insecurity and pre-
suppose a causal link between tenure legalisation and tenure security
improvement has already been criticised in the literature. This book
provides additional scientific underpinning for this refutation, and pro-
vides new details of the circumstances under which certain kinds of
formalisation may fail to increase tenure security and may sometimes
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even decrease it. Some of the lessons to be learnt from the case studies
in this regard include the following:
1) The de facto tenure security/insecurity of informal land varies con-
siderably. It depends on a multitude of factors including the norma-
tive basis of the land interest, the legitimacy of the informal claims,
the identity of the land user and of the original owner, the location
and market value of the land, the alternative uses of the land, the
nature and attitude of the government and of the local power
holders, and their relationship. When the de facto tenure security of
informal land is high, a programme of formalisation may not have
the effect of increasing it. Additionally, when people have a highly
limited legal awareness – as many poor people do – changes in the
legal situation may not have much effect on people’s perception of
their tenure security (see Dessalegn Rahmato; Hesseling and Ei-
chelsheim; and Reerink, all this volume; cf. Gilbert 2002:8; Varley
2002:455).
2) When threats to tenure security find their roots not only in weak le-
gal positions but also in the weak implementation of legislation,
changes in legislation alone will not be sufficient to enhance tenure
security. When the tenure insecurity is caused by political problems,
the response needs to involve the creation of effective checks and
balances on implementing bureaucrats, improving state law enfor-
cement action against violations of the law, and increasing possibili-
ties for access to justice for aggrieved farmers, and in general the
empowerment of the weak and poor (see Dessalegn Rahmato; Pa-
checo; Reerink; and Van Rooij, all this volume).
3) Certain formalisation processes can create conflict over land rights,
due to the finality of the process (Pacheco, this volume). Similarly,
the enhanced value of the land expected to result from the legalisa-
tion process may raise the number of conflicts about such land
(Van Rooij, this volume).
4) Limited awareness of the poor of legislation, procedures for legalisa-
tion, and division of regulating competences can lead to easy ma-
nipulation by the better informed, whether local elite, street-level
bureaucrats, or national politicians (see Duhau, this volume; cf. Co-
tula, Toulmin, and Quan 2006:20; Cousins 2000; Durand-Lasserve
2006:10; Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994:20-21; Van den Brink et al.
2006:12).
5) When the contested nature of local (customary) relations and power
relations are not recognised by the state, attempts to legalise infor-
mal arrangements frequently accommodate the interests of the local
elite and erode the rights of the poor (Amanor; Ubink, this vo-
lume).
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6) When legalisation processes are too complex for the bureaucracy or
too complicated, time-consuming and costly for the intended bene-
ficiaries, formalisations will only occur sporadically, and mainly by
the wealthier section of communities. The poorest households in
particular may not have the means to pay their share of the formali-
sation costs. Additionally, these households may not be entitled or
eligible for tenure formalisation (Reerink, this volume; cf. Durand-
Lasserve and Selod 2007:10).
7) The regularisation of urban or peri-urban plots may not always lead
to legally secure positions due to the fact that the newly formalised
households often cannot comply with additional regulation invol-
ving planning and construction norms and standards (Lankhorst
and Veldman; Reerink, this volume).
8) Formalisation can give incentives to landowners to try and evict sec-
ondary rights holders, usufructuaries, or tenants in order to value
their land in a more profitable way (Amanor; Ubink, this volume;
cf. Durand-Lasserve 2006:7; Durand-Lasserve and Selod 2007:11;
Payne 2000:9).
9) Registration and titling in the name of an individual will create
higher tenure security for this individual but can simultaneously
decrease the tenure security of people dependent on this person
(Hesseling and Eichelsheim, this volume).
10)When the insecurity of extra-legal property or the restrictions on
transactions of such property are caused by the state, the state could
as easily remove them in a different way than through legalisation.
Lankhorst and Veldman (this volume), for instance, state that the
main threat of relocation comes from the fact that the settlers in
their study areas do not conform with certain stringent lay-out re-
quirements and plead that a change of those requirements would
have a greater impact on the tenure security of the settlers than a
registration scheme. Similarly, Ye and Wu (this volume) stress that
the restrictions on transactions of rural residential land result from
state legislation, which could be changed without the whole process
of ‘Land Exchange’ that the Chinese government is now piloting.
Notes
1 See for an overview of the main international publications and policy statements con-
cerning land tenure legalisations, Assies 2007.
2 Several ex post evaluations of the state-imposed tenure conversion program in Kenya
have observed that individualisation has led to land concentration, increased margin-
alisation and landlessness as people in positions of economic and political power take
advantage of the less powerful, deepening tenure insecurity instead of lessening it
(Coldham 1979; Okoth-Ogendo 1976; Quan 2000:35-7).
30 JANINE UBINK
3 This project was originally entitled ‘The Mystery of Legal Failure? A critical, compara-
tive examination of the potential of legalisation of land assets in developing countries
for achieving real legal certainty’. It was funded by the Dutch Council for Scientific
Research (NWO/WOTRO), and managed jointly by the Universities of Leiden, Am-
sterdam, and Nijmegen, and the African Study Centre (Leiden), see Otto 2004.
4 The project will also produce a second book, entitled “Legalising Land Rights: Law, ten-
ure security and development“. This book will discuss the more general and theoretical
debates surrounding the issue of legalisations. It will also compare the lessons from
the case and country studies presented in this book. Publication is expected in 2010.
5 Whereas we use the term ‘extra-legal’ to denote all property rights that are not recog-
nised by the state, FAO (2002:11) uses it only for property rights that are not recog-
nised by the law but also not against the law.
6 Instead of legalisation, many authors use the term formalisation, which refers to
changing a situation of ‘informality’. We wish to avoid using this term as it is unclear
and inherently confusing. According to some authors, it carries with it a vision of
squatters on urban lands. Such a situation can often easily be formalised, especially
when the landowner is the state, which can agree to give land to squatters with zero
or low compensation. Unlike urban squatters, many customary landholders do not
hold land informally, but according to an alternative, community-based formality.
This makes formalisation – in the sense of replacing this situation of community-
based formality with state-based formality – a completely different exercise (Van den
Brink et al. 2006:12). Others rather understand informal as customary or traditional
rights and formal as statutory rights, but this distinction ignores the fact that in some
countries customary rights have been given formal legal recognition (FAO 2002:11).
Additionally, formalisation seems to imply a linear evolution from informal to formal
situations, ignoring the fact that in reality situations of informality are often the re-
sult of new laws, as people who cannot or do not want to observe them are thereby
brought into a situation of informality. As Durand-Lasserve and Selod (2007:6) put
it, tenure informality is the end result of legal, political, and economic exclusion me-
chanisms. Formalisation thus creates new situations of informality. Admittedly, this
last critique could also be waged against the term legalisation. See for a critique on
the distinction between legality and illegality, Varley 2002.
7 For an overview of donor understandings of what defines land tenure security, see In-
ternational Land Coalition 2006:6-7.
8 They distinguish four interrelated factors that together determine the level of tenure
security: tenure status (unauthorised commercial developments or squatter settle-
ments); the primary tenure rights of the land (public, private, or customary-owned
land); the occupancy status of the dwelling (owners, tenants, etc.); and the political
and legal context (Durand-Lasserve and Selod 2007:6).
9 In general, as duration lengthens, tenure security improves. However, duration need
not be perpetual to create an adequate incentive framework for land investments and
improvements; see Ping et al., this volume.
10 In many countries, including Egypt, India, and Columbia, tenure security is achieved
over time through the accretion of various documents relating to property taxes and
other formal documents (Durand-Lasserve 2006:10).
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2 Peasants and agrarian reforms: The unfinished
quest for secure land rights in Ethiopia
Dessalegn Rahmato
Introduction
The last 50 years of the twentieth century were momentous years for
Ethiopia, particularly regarding its political and agrarian history. The
period was marked by revolutionary changes in state and class struc-
ture and in tenure relations and agrarian institutions. In these turbu-
lent and often bloody years, the country experienced far more radical
changes than at any time in its recent history, and nowhere were these
transformations more profound than in the agrarian sector. From feu-
dal monarchy to military-communist dictatorship, to ethnic-based fed-
eralism: such were the major political changes that succeeded each
other in this short half-century, each accompanied by radical agrarian
and economic reforms.
The populist uprising of the mid-1970s, initially spearheaded by
militant elements from the urban population, and subsequently led by
military officers who came to be known as the Derg, brought down the
government of Emperor Haile Selassie and put an end to the centu-
ries-old institution of crown and monarchy. The military regime of the
Derg replaced imperial rule rapidly and successfully carried out one of
the most radical land reforms in the world, and won for a time a great
deal of popularity among the peasantry as well as the urban popula-
tion. But the honeymoon between the state and the peasants lasted
only a brief period and was replaced by increasingly bitter resentment
on the part of the latter on account of the damaging and unpopular po-
licies pursued by the Derg, including collectivisation, forced resettle-
ment and villagisation, and grain requisitioning. As the Derg turned
the country into a hard-line Communist state, opposition to it intensi-
fied, culminating in the second half of the 1980s in a full-scale civil
war which engulfed the greater part of the country. The seventeen
years of military-communist rule, lasting from 1974 to 1991, were one
of the bloodiest periods in the country’s history, and the civil war,
which was fought in the countryside, took a heavy toll on peasant lives
and property (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993; Dessalegn Rahmato 1996).
The Derg was finally overthrown by a me´lange of insurgent forces,
some of whom had been fighting for independence since the 1960s.
The end result was the secession of Eritrea, the province on the Red
Sea coast which had been incorporated into Ethiopia in the second part
of the 1950s, and the establishment of an ethnic-based federalist state
in the rest of the country.
Yet, despite all the political upheaval and social and agrarian trans-
formations, some significant institutions and practices remained un-
changed; chief among them, and of particular relevance to us here, are
the relationship between the peasant and the state on the one hand,
and the nature of property rights – especially peasants‘ rights to land –
on the other. Neither the revolution of the 1970s and the radical agrar-
ian reforms that accompanied it, nor the rural engineering attempted
by the current federalist state, has succeeded in satisfying the deeply
held aspirations of the country’s peasantry for secure rights to land.
Thus, while the particulars have changed and the terms of the dis-
course are different, the central problem of the land system today re-
mains the same as in the past, namely secure rights of access to land
for smallholders and the poor.
In this study I shall examine the land reforms that were attempted
by the three successive governments and their intended and unin-
tended consequences, taking land tenure security as my focal point for
analysis and focusing only on land rights among settled farmers in the
highlands.1 To this end, I present the results of land reforms in each
particular period. I briefly discuss, first, the modernisation of land leg-
islation during the Imperial period, and second, the radical land re-
forms under the Derg. The third part of the study will be devoted to the
land laws and policies of the present government. In the conclusion, I
try to point out why land reform in the three periods under discussion
failed to serve the basic interests of smallholder farmers.
The imperial regime: Tax and tenancy reforms (1942-1972)
Let me begin with a brief outline of the land tenure system before the
Revolution and of the reform initiatives attempted at the time.2 The
distinctive aspect of the tenure system during the imperial regime was
that the tenure holder, indeed the land itself, was encumbered with a
bundle of obligations, contrasting sharply with modern land systems
where tenure confers on the holder a bundle of rights. While the im-
perial regime did bring about some significant changes, the legacy of
the past was still strong and continued to define a great many aspects
of the system throughout the lifetime of the regime (see Crummey
2000 for a historical review). Tenure rights were predominantly condi-
tional rights of use and not of ownership in the capitalist sense of the
term, and the obligations in question included tax, tribute, and labour
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on the one hand, and personal, military, administrative, political, and
ecclesiastical service on the other. Tenure rights conferred mostly lim-
ited rights of transfer (e.g. to siblings by inheritance, to tenants for
temporary use), and absolute transfer rights such as sale or purchase
were not widespread. In the case of transfer to siblings, the heirs inher-
ited not so much the land per se but the obligations on it. In the south-
ern regions of Ethiopia a different system existed, marked by the co-ex-
istence of forms of individual ownership, free from many of the obliga-
tions noted here, along with tenancy; such forms of tenure also
existed, in pockets, elsewhere. Most of the lands in question were small
in size and worked by owner-cultivators, but local landowners, mem-
bers of the local gentry, owned larger tracts of land which they rented
out in parcels to tenant farmers.
The imperial land system began to undergo fundamental but limited
changes from the 1960s, when conditional tenure based on tribute,
personal, and military service was abolished (at least by law), and there
was a gradual evolution towards rights of private and transferable own-
ership. This shift was spearheaded by the state itself, which encouraged
holders of land it had granted as a reward for loyal service, which ordi-
narily was held under conditional tenure, to convert part of it to free-
hold. At the same time, side by side with changes in the tenure regime
came reforms in the rural tax regime, and this had two major implica-
tions: one was that new taxes were added to existing ones (education
and health tax), and second was that the tax burden fell, in practice,
not on the landholder but on the cultivator of the holding in cases
where the two were not one and the same, which was often the case.
We may classify tenure rights under the imperial regime broadly
into three categories: land under what I call reversionary rights, land
under private ownership, and state domain land. I submit that the
greater part of the land in the country at the time was held under rever-
sionary and usufruct rights, which were rights of temporary use in
which the final decision rested with someone other than the user or
immediate holder. Tenancies, semon (Church) lands, many of the var-
ious forms in which state domain land was operated, and some of the
land held by members of the landed nobility fall under reversionary
tenure. Even land under the rist system may be described as reversion-
ary, since the individuals had only use rights over their holdings, which
they could not transfer to others by sale. The rist system, in its generic
form, was a system in which land was held by a descent or village
group whose members had equal use rights to the land, and in which,
in some localities, there was periodic reallocation of holdings.
A common approach in the literature has been to view the system
on the basis of a North/South divide, where rist tenure was said to be
prevalent in the north of the country and tenancy widespread in the
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south. This approach, while adequate for some purposes and often fa-
voured by the imperial government’s own agency, the Ministry of Land
Reform and Administration (MLRA), hides some of the complex as-
pects of the land system, and in particular tends to leave out the size-
able population of small owner-cultivators and the immense holdings
under government control frequently described as state domain land.
The main sources of tenancy were lands held by the nobility, the local
gentry, and the state. It was also not uncommon for owner-cultivators
to rent out some of their land to tenants, but this form of tenancy did
not pose a significant problem, because ultimately it was a tenancy
among equals or almost equals and was largely free of relations of
domination and subordination that characterised the relationship be-
tween tenants on the one hand and the landed nobility and local gentry
on the other. The nobility, who were almost always absentee owners,
held large tracts of land, particularly in the southern provinces, almost
all of which were parcelled out for rent to tenant cultivators. The local
gentry, by contrast, owned much less land in comparison and often re-
sided in the vicinity of their property.
Tenancy was an onerous institution, putting immense burdens on
tenant cultivators, siphoning off their surplus and causing a great deal
of uncertainty among them. It was common for tenants to hand over
half, or more, of their harvest to the landlord in the form of rent, and
to provide labour and personal services to him or her as part of their
obligations. What made matters worse was the fact that, for most pea-
sants, the terms of their obligations were not contractual but based on
oral agreements which were subject to arbitrary interpretations favour-
able to the landlord. More than 50 per cent of all holdings in the coun-
try as a whole were operated by tenant farmers, while in some of the
southwestern provinces the figure was much higher.3
A significant aspect of the imperial land system was the decisive
power of the state, both as a landlord in its own right and in the
authority vested in it by the Constitution, to claim land that was
deemed to be ‘ownerless’ by the laws of the country. Such land in-
cluded land held by pastoralists and others under customary owner-
ship. Article 130 of the 1955 Constitution holds that ‘all property not
held in the name of any person, natural and juridical, including all
land in escheat, and all abandoned properties, as well as all forests and
grazing lands’ are state domain. Article 31 states that the ‘Emperor also
makes grants from abandoned properties, and properties in escheat,
for the purpose of recompensing faithful service to the Crown’ (Consoli-
dated Laws of Ethiopia 1972). On the basis of this, all land utilised by
pastoralists in the country fell under state domain which, according to
Wetterhall (1972), would give the state control over nearly 65 per cent
of the land area of the country. Wetterhall estimates that, excluding the
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nomadic areas, the government held nearly 17 million hectares of land,
of which 11 million was considered arable, which was equal to 57 per
cent of the arable land of the country. Of the total arable land under
state domain, some twenty per cent was committed, consisting in the
main of land occupied by tenants and squatters, land allocated to large-
scale mechanised concessions, and land given out in the form of im-
perial land grants. It is clear that while the tenure regime here cannot
be described as one based on state ownership, as it was to become fol-
lowing the Revolution (and still is), the imperial state was a powerful
landlord and had a strong influence in shaping the land system at the
time.
State domain was to be a cause of insecurity and resentment among
a large population of pastoralists and peasants alike, especially from
the second half of the 1960s, because of large-scale evictions of cus-
tomary users. Many of the beneficiaries of imperial land grants either
evicted the peasants and herders already on the land or turned them
into tenants subject to the payment of rent. The threat of eviction hung
over not only such peasants but others as well because many landlords
were encouraged by the government policy promoting mechanised
agriculture at the time. Tenants on government land faced the same
difficulties and the same kind of exactions as other tenants. Insecurity
was also a serious problem in other reversionary forms of land rights,
in particular for peasants in the rist system. Hoben (1973) has shown
the high degree of insecurity among land users in his study of the sys-
tem in Gojjam. He argued that the system fostered endemic competi-
tion, conflict, and litigiousness among rist holders; it was, he says, a so-
cially disintegrative force. Litigation to get access to more land both by
the lowly holder and by the local gentry was rife – indeed, Joireman
(2001) suggests that litigation was the chief means of getting access to
more land for the gentry, as the existing judicial environment favoured
the well-to-do over the poor and the disadvantaged.
There were many voices urging the imperial government to carry
out reforms to modernise the land system. These included not just ra-
dical students, progressive elements within the civil service, business-
men, and professionals, but also donor agencies, international organi-
sations, and foreign friends of the country. There was, however, strong
opposition from the landed classes to any measure that would threaten
their property, and they considered reform of the tenure structure as
anathema. Such was the power and influence of these classes that the
regime turned a deaf ear to the demand for change. But while the re-
sult was far from adequate, a number of initiatives to change aspects
of the agrarian system were undertaken with varying degrees of suc-
cess during the lifetime of the imperial regime, the principal one being
the reform of land taxation.
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Haile Selassie had been a reformist in the past, and on three differ-
ent occasions he had taken measures aimed at restructuring land taxa-
tion and revenue collection. Historically, it was the form of tax and
other obligations attached to the land that defined the tenure system.
In other words, the tenure regime was a tax regime, and therefore land
tax reform was considered to be equivalent to land reform. In the pre-
reform period, i.e. the period before the 1940s, the cultivator was bur-
dened with a wide variety of taxes, corvee labour, and personal service
to the state and the landlord. The cultivators’ burden was made more
onerous because taxes were determined arbitrarily, and the demand for
corvee labour and personal service was unlimited. The more burden-
some taxes and corvee obligations were abolished in the 1920s and
1930s. However, in the circumstances of the second half of the twenti-
eth century, the tax reform was woefully inadequate in meeting the
needs of economic development or the demands of social equity.
The country’s traditional land tax system was noted for its great di-
versity and complexity. It was a cause of conflict between the landlord
and the tenant cultivator on the one hand, and the landlord and the
state on the other. In the latter case, the conflict arose in part because
much of the land in the country was unmeasured and unregistered,
giving rise to disputes over how much tax the governors of the various
provinces and sub-provinces had raised, since they were responsible
for collecting taxes which they were obliged to transfer to the imperial
treasury after retaining a given percentage for their own administrative
expenses, and how much they had transferred to the state.
The main effort at tax reform was in the post-Italian period when
several pieces of legislation were initiated, the most important of which
for our purposes being the land tax proclamation of 1942, which was
repealed by another proclamation issued in 1944 (Consolidated Laws of
Ethiopia 1972 for this and what follows). These reforms introduced a
relatively improved tax system that was centrally administered. Agricul-
tural land in the southern provinces, which were the predominantly te-
nancy areas, was classified into three categories depending on the ferti-
lity of the soil (fertile, semi-fertile, and poor), and a uniform rate of
land tax and tithe was levied on each class of land. In the north, the rist
areas, the tax system was based on the tribute system in which villages
and communities were responsible for collecting a fixed tax from their
residents and members and handing it over to the government. Two
additional taxes, the education tax of 1947 and the health tax of 1959,
were introduced later. In 1967, a new legislation abolished the tithe
(rather tax-in-lieu of tithe) and replaced it by the agricultural income
tax. This legislation was to be responsible for the rural revolts in Goj-
jam and Wollo provinces in northern Ethiopia (Dessalegn Rahmato
1996). On paper, the tax regime that evolved out of these reforms ap-
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peared to be equitable and modern, but in practice it was anomalous
and a burden on the very cultivator it was meant to benefit. The land-
owner who was legally responsible for paying all taxes levied on the
land (and there were several) escaped paying by shifting the burden
onto the tenants and others (Lawrence and Mann 1966).
The tax reforms introduced in the 1940s remained largely un-
changed for almost 35 years. The World Bank considered the tax re-
forms as ‘Ethiopia‘s most successful single land reform measure’
(1973:Annex 12:20), but as Lawrence and Mann (1966) and others
more knowledgeable about the imperial land system have argued, tax
reform kept many aspects of the land system intact with all its ineffi-
ciencies and injustices and was not able to address the strong aspira-
tions of the labouring peasant for secure rights to land. Considering
three and half decades of uninterrupted rule, the effort of the imperial
regime in the sphere of agrarian change was woefully inadequate.
I now turn to the story of the moderate land and tenancy reform in-
itiative that was prepared and presented for legislation to Parliament in
the 1960s, but which, after much delay, was defeated in the legislature
by the combined weight of the landed classes and the monarchy in the
waning years of the imperial regime. The beginning of the reform in-
itiative goes back to 1961, when a proposal for improvement of the
landlord-tenant relationships was presented to the government for con-
sideration by a special inter-governmental committee set up for the
purpose. The proposal also recommended a cadastral survey and land
registration on the one hand, and the imposition of a surtax on large
holdings on the other. This was shelved without serious debate, and in-
stead the MLRA was charged with preparing a land reform proposal
that would be acceptable to the decision-makers, as well as the power-
ful landed elements in Parliament. MLRA was strongly in favour of
smallholder farming, as opposed to large-scale agriculture, which it be-
lieved would lead to greater eviction of peasants from the land. The re-
form measures it was keen to promote from the last quarter of the
1960s consisted of the following: a) tenancy reform to lighten the bur-
den of the tenant and to provide tenure security; b) allocation of gov-
ernment land to small cultivators, rather than to civil servants, military
officers, and the well-to-do, as was the case at the time, with plots not
exceeding two to five hectares; c) land registration to promote security
of holding; and d) limiting the size of land held by big landlords and
distributing the excess to the landless and the needy. Of these, only te-
nancy reform was presented to Parliament for enactment (MLRA
1972).
The tenancy reform was drafted in 1968, revised in 1970 and 1971,
and finally presented to Parliament in 1972. The most important provi-
sions in the original draft were the introduction of written agreements
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between landlord and tenant, the payment of a fixed rent instead of the
customary share rent, rent control, and compensation by the landlord
for improvements made on the land by the tenant in the event of ter-
mination of tenancy. The final draft bill submitted to Parliament was a
watered down version, and only the compensation provision was re-
tained, thus leaving the tenant in the same inferior bargaining position
as before (MLRA 1968, 1972; see also Stahl 1974). Nevertheless, MLRA
lobbied hard among MPs in the Chamber of Deputies (the Lower
House) to get the reform approved, and according to Zegeye Asfaw, for-
mer senior expert in MLRA,4 the great majority of them were willing
to vote in favour. However, the bill was not brought to a vote because
of the strong opposition of some of the powerful landlords in Parlia-
ment and the personal intervention of the Emperor. Such was the igno-
minious end to the one and only ‘land reform‘ initiative ever attempted
during the imperial regime. Both monarchy and landlordism were to
perish two years later following the popular uprising and the seizure of
power by the Derg.
Radical land reform under military-communism (1975-1990)
In early 1974 the Imperial regime was shaken by a series of mass pop-
ular protests, occurring first in the major urban areas, but later spread-
ing to the countryside. These protests were accompanied by unrest in
the armed forces, leading to a number of mutinies by soldiers and ju-
nior officers in several military camps. The committee of officers that
emerged through these agitations, known widely as the Derg, even-
tually assumed the leadership of what came to be the Ethiopian Revo-
lution. The aging Emperor was deposed in September of that year, and
the Derg assumed power without much serious opposition. One of the
Derg’s thorough-going measures to dismantle the political and econom-
ic power and institutions of the old regime was the radical land reform
of March 1975. I have dealt with the land reform, its implementation
and consequences at some length elsewhere, and I shall not repeat the
arguments here (Dessalegn Rahmato 1984, 1993). I shall try instead to
examine some aspects of the radical land reform which are relevant for
my purposes here, and which have not received much treatment so far.
The radical land reform was launched on 4 March 1975, but the leg-
islation did not appear in the Negarit Gazeta (the official legal gazette)
until the end of April. Formal implementation began in some areas in
May, but in others this was several months later; in some of the more
remote areas implementation was delayed for a year or more. There is
very little information about how the legislation was drafted and took
its final form. We have no evidence that the military officers who as-
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sumed the leadership had any plans to undertake a redistribution of
rural property before they had deposed the Emperor and assumed
power. Moreover, the Derg did not promote any public debate on land
reform, nor did they seriously seek expert opinion or the views of inter-
est groups or peasant representatives. In fact, for the entire period the
Derg was in power, it was secretive about most of its reform legisla-
tions, on the grounds that prior knowledge would, it believed, give the
losers of the reforms opportunities to sabotage the measures. One of
the most radical measures of agrarian restructuring in the country’s
history was thus legislated in circumstances that can only be described
as secretive. Nevertheless, when the legislation was formally an-
nounced, it was received with great enthusiasm by a cross-section of
society, with a great number of peasants participating in demonstra-
tions of support in subsequent weeks and months.
The land reform was one of the most radical measures undertaken
anywhere in the developing world at the time and may be compared in
thoroughness and impact to the Chinese and Vietnamese reforms of
the 1950s. The reform abolished all customary and formal rights to
land and vested in the state the power to redefine property rights and
access to land. The core of the legislation is the provision that gives the
state, as the trustee of the people, the right of ownership of all rural
land and other resources and that prohibits private ownership of land.
Rights holders were allowed only use rights over the land they were
cultivating, which they could not sell, mortgage, lease or contract out.
Moreover, only under certain circumstances could the holder pass it on
to siblings, as the legislation provided that young peasants who came
of age had the right to a plot of land in their kebelle.5 Rights to land
thus came to be rights of usufruct. Tenancy and other forms of subor-
dination based on land ownership were done away with. The reform
put great emphasis on the self-labouring peasant household and pro-
hibited tenancy or the hiring of labour. The reform abolished landlord-
ism, and this, in my view, is its enduring legacy and its greatest
achievement. All property belonging to landlords, gentry, and landed
nobility alike was expropriated without compensation. The smallhold-
ing peasant thus came to constitute the sole social force of the rural
class structure. Reform also swept away all customary tenure arrange-
ments, though local dispute settlement, land transaction, and mutual
aid institutions remained resilient and continue to function to this day.
Land distribution took place among households organized in Peasant
Associations (PAs) in each kebelle. Political power at the local level was
restructured, with the PA assuming authority at the kebelle level, and
‘progressive’ minded officials newly appointed by the Derg replacing
the gentry at the level of the woreda and above. Membership in the PAs
was open to peasants only, and landlords were barred from participa-
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tion, thus closing off any chances such persons may have had of get-
ting control of the organisations and using them for their own pur-
poses. A Judicial Tribunal consisting of peasant lay ‘judges’ was also es-
tablished at the kebelle level (later at the level of the woreda) whose task
was to resolve disputes – especially disputes arising from land mat-
ters – within peasant communities; this undercut the authority of the
judiciary, enabling peasants to deal with their own problems in their
own way.
This radical reform was implemented under rather unusual circum-
stances. At the time of implementation, the new regime had no strong
presence in the rural areas, and it is a measure of the political euphoria
of the time that such a far-reaching reform was initiated without giving
serious thought to the practicalities of its implementation. Very little
thought was given to the problems that would arise in implementing it
under the diverse and complex circumstances of the country at the
time. There was ample evidence that the landed classes would try to
undermine the reform. While many of the powerful nobility were
quickly neutralised through arrests and executions at the outset of the
Revolution, the local gentry were firmly entrenched in the rural areas
and were a force to be reckoned with. However, all through the first
two years of the Revolution, the new regime conducted a virulent poli-
tical campaign against what it termed ‘counter-revolution elements’,
which at this time was a reference to the landed classes. Members of
the aristocracy, retired generals, and wealthy personages were arrested
in large numbers, and their property was confiscated. Some of these
men were later executed. The nationalisation of urban land and rental
houses in July 1975, a reform aimed primarily at humbling the proper-
tied classes, including the gentry, further sealed the fate of these
classes.
When reform came to the countryside, it came together with what I
have called ‘rural activators’ elsewhere (Dessalegn Rahmato 1996), con-
sisting of zemach students (i.e. students from higher educational insti-
tutions deployed in the rural areas to spread the gospel of the new re-
gime), local development agents, and newly appointed public servants
at the district and lower level. These were the principal reform agents
of the Derg. In place of the disciplined and experienced party cadres
who played such a critical role in the successful implementation of the
radical land reforms in China and Vietnam (see Moise 1983), the Derg
had to make do with a young, inexperienced, and ill-disciplined but
zealous force of rural activators, hastily assembled and deployed in the
countryside. These agents of the Derg were different from anyone the
peasants were familiar with: they spoke a different ‘language’ and ex-
pressed solidarity with peasants, the poor, and the down-trodden –
something previously unheard of in rural communities. However, they
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had no coherent guidelines for the tasks they shouldered, and no clear
objectives to aim for. In consequence, the implementation of the re-
form was a chaotic affair for the first two years. But it is my view that
without the energetic efforts of these activators, it is doubtful whether
the reform process in the countryside would have been successfully un-
dertaken. Indeed, I submit that though not quite aware of it them-
selves, these activators succeeded in drawing the peasantry into the
agrarian struggle and fanned the flames of the Revolution. It was these
rural activators who organised the peasantry, and who enabled it to car-
ry out land redistribution.
Although the Derg’s reform possessed a good number of positive ele-
ments, it was flawed in several respects that undermined its overall
benefits to the peasantry. First, reform had a selective impact; that is,
not all peasants benefited equally. For landless peasants the reform
provided access to land, while for tenants it removed the burden of ex-
ploitation by landlords; but small owner-cultivators, who made up a
quarter of all rural households, lost some of their land during distribu-
tion. Second, as was noted above, landholders had restricted rights over
their plots, and this had a dampening effect on peasant initiative and
entrepreneurship.6 Third, rights to land was based on residency, i.e.
peasants’ access to land was conditional on continued residence in
their kebelle, and absence from their land, except for a very short period,
would jeopardise their rights. Reform thus blocked rural out-migration
because of peasants’ fear of losing their allotments, and this gave rise
to growing pressure on the land and the diminution of household plots
through fragmentation and sub-division. But the most damaging im-
pact was the insecurity of holding that it gave rise to. The promise of
land to all meant that periodic redistribution was unavoidable to ac-
commodate new claimants. In the 1980s, there were three to four re-
distributions in many rural communities in which those said to hold
larger plots were deprived of some of their land, which was given to
others. Reform thus brought with it a dynamic process of levelling
down.
The initial legislation was soon followed by a number of new legisla-
tions and policy directives. In the second half of the 1970s, there were
several laws to restructure PAs and redefine their tasks and responsibil-
ities. Thereafter, new laws and directives to launch collectivisation, jus-
tify grain requisition, promote villagisation, and undertake resettlement
were issued in quick succession. The 1980s was thus a decade of in-
creasing institutional instability which created uncertainty and mistrust
among the rural population. Due to space limitations, I shall not dis-
cuss these programmes in-depth but will look briefly at collectivisation,
which came to pose a major threat to peasant enterprise and individual
rights to land.7
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The earlier reform legislation was driven by what may be called radi-
cal populism. At this early stage, the overriding concern of the Derg
was to break the back of the old order and its supporting pillars,
namely the monarchy, the landed classes, the exploitive system of prop-
erty relations in the rural areas, and what was broadly referred to as
feudalism and underdevelopment. The language of the government at
this time was pitched to the ‘popular masses’ with a strong appeal to
nationalism and justice to the poor. The ideal society in the countryside
was viewed as being made up of self-labouring peasant farmers who
had sufficient means (land, livestock, and income) for a livelihood
based on the rustic values of hard work, honesty, and cooperation. But
this populist phase was short-lived, soon replaced by the doctrinaire
ideology of Soviet-style communism accompanied by hard-line rural
policies, including agricultural socialisation.
The shift to collectivisation was decided upon soon after the radical
land reform, with heavy investment in state farms, followed by the
push for what were known as peasant producer cooperatives. The gov-
ernment’s ambitious plan was that the ‘transition to socialist agricul-
ture’ would be largely completed by the first half of the 1990s, i.e.
some fifteen years after the process of collectivisation was launched. By
then, the socialist agricultural sector was to become dominant, operat-
ing over 60 per cent of the cultivable land. Decision-makers favoured
producer cooperatives, in particular, which were expected to cultivate
50 per cent of the farm land in the country in this period, because they
were believed to be more efficient and more cost-effective. The govern-
ment’s justification for accelerating collectivisation was that it would
greatly increase agricultural production and thus promote food secur-
ity, pave the way for the modernisation of farming, particularly the in-
troduction of new technology, and improve the livelihood of the rural
people. All through the 1980s thousands of peasants were forced into
hastily organised producer cooperatives, thereby losing their individual
rights to land, and state agriculture was encouraged to expand its op-
erations through increased investment. However, both enterprises con-
tinued to perform poorly, frequently below the smallholder sector, and
to absorb a disproportionate share of state revenue. In the end, collecti-
visation failed to achieve any of the goals expected of it and instead
wasted immense resources, remaining a cause for resentment and in-
security among individual smallholding peasants. By the close of the
1980s, the drive for collectivisation was halted as the government came
to realise that the high cost of collectivisation was unsustainable, and
the programme was finally brought to an end in 1990 with the an-
nouncement of the Mixed Economy reforms, a dramatic turnaround
which was forced on the Derg as much by the failure of the programme
as the escalation of the war by insurgents against the government. Pro-
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ducer cooperatives were thoroughly dismantled by peasants, and indivi-
dual rights to land were restored immediately following the announce-
ment of the new policy.
I conclude this brief review by noting that the radical rural reforms
of the military regime were a success in some respects and a dismal
failure in others, especially from the standpoint of secure rights to
land. The initial land reform transformed rural Ethiopia into a society
of self-labouring peasants whose livelihood became increasingly precar-
ious on account of the dynamics of the reform itself, which under-
mined peasant confidence and exacerbated tenure insecurity. The legis-
lation redefined the land system in a radical way, but in doing so, and
in its practicalities, it made insecurity of property rights an enduring
element. It replaced the landlord with the state and provided the latter
greater hegemony over the peasant.
Reforming the reform: Land rights and legislation since 1995
Following the overthrow of the military government in 1991 and the
seizure of power by the insurgent forces, united in a coalition of eth-
nic-based parties called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front (EPRDF), the country was divided into what are called kill-
ils (regions or states) drawn along ethnic lines. The Constitution that
was subsequently adopted established a federal political system with
the killils as the component elements. The administrative structure of
the country currently consists of the killil, below which is the zone
(comparable to a province), the woreda (district) and the kebelle (sub-dis-
trict). As part of the devolution of power within the federal framework,
the killils were given wide administrative and legislative powers, includ-
ing the power to issue legislation to administer land and natural re-
sources. This and other legislation issued by the killils is expected to
conform to federal laws.
The federal government’s land policy is quite similar to that of the
Derg described above, and hence the discussion of the details of the
current legislations will have to be brief.8 There are, however, a num-
ber of differences and several new initiatives which I shall note below.
Federal and killil legislations pertaining to land include the Constitu-
tion issued in 1995, the federal law of 1997, which was repealed and
replaced by a similar law issued in 2005, and a law on land expropria-
tions and payment of compensation (FDRE 2005a). Killil legislations
on land, the most recent of which were issued in 2002 (by Oromia)
and 2004 (Southern killil), have been superseded by the latest federal
law, and all killils are now in the process of preparing new laws as a
consequence. At present, government land policy is enshrined in the
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Constitution, which promises each adult in the rural areas who wishes
to live by farming ‘land sufficient’ for his/her livelihood; access to land
for rural persons is thus a right. Land is here defined as the property
of the people but is administered on their behalf by the state. This
principle is reproduced in all killil constitutions. In effect, land is state
property, and peasants thus have only use rights over plots they have
in their possession which cannot be sold, exchanged, or mortgaged.9
There are several factors that have added to tenure insecurity among
landholders. The first is the absence of a clear justice system for set-
tling land disputes. During the imperial regime, the local courts were
the only authority (outside traditional institutions) that had the compe-
tence to hear cases involving land disputes. The main criticism of these
courts at the time was that they were thoroughly corrupt and almost in-
variably ruled against the poor and in favour of the rich and privileged.
The Derg deprived these courts of the power to try land cases and
vested such powers in the newly created Judicial Tribunals, which were
a part of Peasant Associations and consisted of peasant lay ‘judges’. All
land matters at the kebelle level were brought before the Judicial Tribu-
nals (Dessalegn Rahmato 1984). The present government has abol-
ished these tribunals and established what are called Social Courts –
formal state courts at the kebelle level comprised of official judges.
These courts are empowered to hear land cases. However, land or other
disputes that are beyond their competence are frequently referred to
the woreda courts. To the average peasant, the woreda is too far away
from his/her locality, and taking one’s case there is inconvenient, time-
consuming, and costly. Moreover, peasants have little confidence in
either the Social Courts or woreda courts, and instead prefer to take
their cases to customary dispute settlement institutions (Dessalegn
Rahmato 2004).
The second factor is the authority given to different government
agencies to intervene in land matters. The local Development Agent
(DA),10 the kebelle council, and officials from the Offices of Agriculture
and of Environment Protection can make decisions that may threaten
an individual household’s rights and access to land. This has given
state officialdom at the local level immense power over the peasant. In
fact, a recent federal law (FDRE 2005a) gives the local authority addi-
tional discretionary power to dispossess peasants of their land. Under
this law, the woreda administration is empowered to expropriate farm
land if it deems the land will be more useful if allotted to a public or
private investor, cooperative society, or others, or if it is needed for pub-
lic purposes. Once the landholder is served with an eviction order by
the woreda, he/she has no recourse to appeal and must vacate the land
within 90 days. The holder is offered compensation, but this is often
far below the market price of the property involved.
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The third factor is what I call the lack of legislative awareness by
both peasants and local officials. Copies of legislation and policy docu-
ments are rarely provided to the local DA, the kebelle, or woreda authori-
ties, nor are these officials adequately briefed about government deci-
sions. Thus, officials who have the closest contact with the peasant
farmer interpret the law or government policy not according to what it
actually says, but what they think it says, and there is often a big gap
between one and the other. At the same time, peasants are equally ig-
norant of the law and their rights, and consequently are powerless to
voice their dissent or defend their rights. A fourth factor is the frequent
revisions of the law, which as in the case of the Derg, has given rise to
institutional instability. Frequent changes to the law have created great-
er uncertainty among peasants who have come to lose faith in the legal
system and in government policies.11
I noted earlier that the factors that exacerbated tenure insecurity dur-
ing the Derg were periodic land redistribution, as well as the fact that
land rights were tied to continuous residence in one locality. The latest
federal legislation has removed neither the threat of redistribution nor
the residency requirement (FDRE 2005b, see art. 9). While the Derg
did not, by law, expressly provide for periodic redistribution, this legis-
lation and other federal policy instruments include provisions that do
so, though they are hedged with a number of conditionalities. In this
respect, the Oromia killil’s land law of 2002, which expressly put an
end to both periodic redistribution and the residency requirement, is
much better, and revising it to work in harmony with the new federal
law will be a step backward for peasants in this killil. An improvement
on earlier legislation is that holders can now pass on their rights to
their heirs freely and without conditions; in some killils the right to in-
herit was formerly subject to a number of conditions. Land renting is
allowed but, as previously, is subject to conditions, including approval
and registration at the local government office. There are several new
measures that have been introduced by the latest federal legislation
(FDRE 2005b), and one of them provides for land measurement, topo-
graphical mapping, and registration as part of a measure of user certifi-
cation. Another is the requirement that in the event of land realloca-
tions, inheritance, and land rentals, the size of the land in question
should not fall below the minimum plot size, though what exactly the
minimum size should be is not specified. A third is the choice of reset-
tlement and villagisation as new programme options to promote im-
proved land use and management practices. Land users are still obli-
gated to ‘use the land properly’ and are liable to penalties, including
the loss of their rights to the land, in the event of improper use, result-
ing in what the document calls ‘damage to the land’ (FDRE 2005b). In
brief, while some improvements have been introduced, the new federal
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law has still not adequately addressed the root causes of tenure insecur-
ity hanging over all rights holders.
The government’s justification for its land policy is based on what
may be described as social equity. The Constitution and all other gov-
ernment documents pertaining to land declare that every rural indivi-
dual has a right to a plot of land sufficient for his/her livelihood and
should claim the right in his/her kebelle when he/she reaches the age
of maturity. Moreover, the government argues that private ownership
will give rise to peasant dispossession through distress sale or evic-
tions, high concentration of rural property in the hands of a few – in
particular, in the hands of the urban bourgeoisie – and widespread pov-
erty and landlessness. These arguments are based on unsubstantiated
fears, and very little hard evidence is available to support them. There
is no evidence in this country or elsewhere to show that in the absence
of the restraining hand of the state, peasants will readily sell their land
at the first opportunity. Though flawed in many respects, the recent
study by the Ethiopian Economic Association found that most peasants
were not keen to sell their land if they were given the chance (EEA
2002; see also Dessalegn Rahmato 1994).
A result of the equity principle is the expectation that state owner-
ship will do away with the problem of landlessness, but the reality on
the ground is the reverse. Since the initial land reform of the Derg in
the mid-1970s, landlessness has become a problem of the young.
Young people who were not old enough to benefit from the last redis-
tribution end up landless when they become adults. The main instru-
ment employed to deal with landlessness so far has been periodic re-
distribution. Other means include the expropriation of landholders
who fail to meet the obligations specified in each killil’s land legislation,
and the distribution of their plots to the landless. A recent measure
that has also been employed for the same purpose is the ‘privatisation‘
of hillsides. In both Amhara and Tigrai killils, degraded hillside has
been divided up and distributed to members of the surrounding com-
munity. This was originally an environmental rehabilitation measure,
but officials are now using it as a measure to tackle the problem of
landlessness. Under present circumstances, landlessness is a dynamic
problem: each generation that comes of age is landless and demands
rights to land. In some localities the end result of accommodating its
demands is increasing land fragmentation and the progressive levelling
down of holdings. In others, these measures do not generate enough
land and not all young people receive land.
A third element of the equity principle is the promotion of social
equality in rural society. State ownership, it is argued, will ensure that
the gap between the rich and the poor is narrowed and that inequal-
ities of wealth and property leading to social antagonism and class con-
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flict will be minimised. True, the existing land system discourages ru-
ral differentiation based on land size. As a result of periodic redistribu-
tion and other measures imposed by the dictates of the land system,
differences in land ownership among households is narrowing. Equal-
ity of holdings is being achieved in a two-fold process: a) larger holders
are losing some of their land through a process of unilateral levelling
down; what is taken from them does not lift smaller holders up but
goes to benefit some of the landless; b) larger holders are losing some
of their land, and smaller holders are gaining as a result. The term
‘large’ and ‘small’ holder should be taken in its relative sense: com-
pared to the situation in other African countries, the largest holder in
Ethiopia would be a small holder elsewhere in the continent. At any
rate, social equality has come at a heavy price, in that the equality that
is unfolding in the countryside is equality of poverty.
As we can see from the distribution of holdings in the country,
shown in Table 2.1, more than a third of households operate what can
only be described as micro-holdings, namely 0.5 hectare (ha) or less.
The majority, i.e. nearly 56 per cent, hold 0.1 to one ha, and 87 per
cent operate two ha or less. Medium-sized holders, i.e. those farming
two to five ha, constitute a little under twelve per cent of households,
while only one per cent may be considered large holders with over five
ha of land. The distribution of micro-holdings is more severe in the
Southern killil, where the figure for those holding 0.1 to 0.5 ha is 56.4
per cent, followed by Tigrai with 40.5 per cent. All farmers in the coun-
try except those in the Southern killil are engaged predominantly in the
cultivation of cereal crops, and an average family would, under normal
circumstances, require between 2.5 to 3.5 ha of good quality land to
produce enough food to feed itself for one harvest year. By this yard-
stick, only about thirteen per cent of holdings are capable of sustaining
their owners, and the rest face food shortages on a regular basis. The
figures in Table 2.1 show quite clearly the depth of poverty and land
hunger in the rural areas. It may be worth noting here that under cir-
cumstances of shrinking land resources and high population pressure,
the promise of the right to land given in the law to any citizen in the
rural areas can only be described as misguided and counterproductive.
Table 2.1 Percentage distribution of holdings by size (in ha)
Killil < 0.1 0.1 – 0.5 0.51-1.00 1.01-2.00 2.01-5.00 < 5.01
Tigrai 7.0 33.5 29.9 21.4 7.6 0.4
Amhara 7.6 22.0 25.8 30.5 13.6 0.5
Oromia 5.9 24.6 25.3 26.2 16.1 1.9
Southern 9.9 46.5 25.4 14.2 3.8 0.2
National 7.6 29.5 25.7 24.3 11.9 1.0
Source: (CACC 2003)
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A brief discussion of informal land transactions is in order here. De-
spite restrictions and prohibitive legislations, peasants have continued
to engage in the informal ‘land market’. Even at the time of the Derg,
when almost all forms of land transfer were prohibited, peasants found
ways to bend the rules to suit their needs. The informal land market,
although at the time severely circumscribed, continued to play a vital
role in helping peasants cope under the most difficult circumstances.
There were numerous forms of land transfer during the Derg.
Though these differed from one locality to another, they included land
rentals, sharecropping, joint use, short-term contracts, and occasionally
mortgages – all of course undertaken clandestinely. If we add to these
the numerous arrangements which peasants employed to get access to
oxen or labour (for example short-term ‘leases’, land loans, exchange,
etc.), the diversity of the practice becomes obvious. Land was also trans-
ferred through inheritance and marriage endowment.
Current land policy allows short-term land transfers, although in
some cases these are encumbered by conditionalities. Nevertheless, the
present system is more flexible in this regard than the previous one.
Land transfer practices are just as complex at present as they were in
the past. Currently, the most common forms of short-term land trans-
fer are sharecropping, rentals, land loans, and limited ‘leases’ (Ahmed
et al. 2002). Long-term transfers include inheritance and endowments.
There are several kinds of endowments, the most common of which is
the marriage endowment. Since land cannot be sold, mortgaged or ex-
changed on long-term bases, these forms of transfer are not part of the
land market, although there is some evidence to suggest that peasants
are engaging surreptitiously in such transfers, including land sales, in
some areas (Bruce, Hoben, and Dessalegn Rahmato 1994).
As noted above, the government has embarked on new measures to
try to promote greater tenure security and to address, in part, the ser-
ious food crises that the country continues to face despite increased
food aid and new agricultural development programmes. These mea-
sures, as we saw, include land certification and registration on the one
hand and resettlement on the other. In view of space limitations, I
shall briefly examine certification and registration only, leaving out the
subject of resettlement for now (see Dessalegn Rahmato 2004 on this).
The Ethiopian government has pinned its hopes on land certification
to provide tenure security to peasant farmers and to deflect criticism of
its rural development policies by local civil society groups, academics,
and the donor community. Land certification and registration, which
were launched cautiously in a limited number of localities a few years
ago, have been turned into a massive programme undertaken at an ac-
celerated rate throughout the country since the beginning of 2003. In
a recent paper, a government official claims that by the end of 2005
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over six million of the country’s 13 million-plus rural households had
received what is known as first-level user certificates. I believe this fig-
ure is somewhat inflated, and the true figure may be a good deal less.12
The paper goes on to note that the remaining households will receive
similar certificates in the next five years (Solomon Abebe 2006). The
programme has been implemented, for the most part, without the use
of modern surveying, mapping, and cadastre technology, and the regis-
tration system in place at the moment is cumbersome and does not al-
low timely updating and efficient management, both of which are of
crucial importance if the goal of an effective and secure system of land
administration is to be achieved. There are a few pilot schemes, sup-
ported by donor agencies, in which high or intermediate cadastral and
registration technology has been employed; in the next three years a
quarter of a million households are expected to receive certificates ac-
companied by cadastral maps of their plots in the pilot areas supported
by donor agencies (USAID 2006a). But the cost and technical and in-
stitutional capacity implications are currently being assessed to deter-
mine whether or not, and how soon, this approach will be standard
practice in the next phase of the certification programme.
Government officials and their supporters expect land certification
and registration to achieve the following objectives: provide secure
rights of tenure and protect the rights of vulnerable groups such as wo-
men; reduce land disputes and litigation; facilitate land use planning
and management of community and state lands; and increase small-
holders’ investment in, and output from, their plots. It will be some
time before we have sufficient evidence to assess whether or not these
objectives have been achieved.
The evidence indicates that certification has been undertaken with a
great deal of haste, and that there have been considerable difficulties
faced by implementing authorities. Nevertheless, it has been given a
good deal of support by donor organisations and seems to be well re-
ceived by many peasants at the moment. But these are early days, and
it would be unrealistic to base one’s judgment on current opinion. Fu-
ture plans include introducing dramatic improvements by employing
modern methods of plot identification, boundary demarcation, and re-
gistration through the use of high or intermediate technologies for
land surveying, index mapping, and establishing a land information
system (LIS) to enable the efficient updating of land registers. While a
number of donors (including the World Bank and USAID) have shown
a willingness to support the new initiative, the cost implications and
the institutional capacity of the public offices at the local level where
the land registers are to be maintained are major hurdles whose short-
or long-term impact has not been seriously considered as yet.
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Many peasants interviewed in several killils for an earlier study were
happy to receive land certificates, though a few were uncertain and cau-
tious in their comments (Dessalegn Rahmato 2004). There is a feeling
among many that the documents will provide holders with greater se-
curity than was possible in the past. Many of those who gave favour-
able opinions pointed to numerous conservation practices that peasants
have been forced to abandon because of tenure insecurity – such as fal-
lowing, soil protection measures, crop rotation and green manuring –
which they thought would be resumed now. However, certification has
been undertaken under the existing legal and policy framework, and
holders thus do not have any more rights than they had before. While
the measure may have helped reduce some problems, new problems
and hence new conflicts will arise in the future unless modern techni-
ques are employed to improve the system now in use.
My recent review of the available documentation on the country’s
brief experience in land certification and registration reveals a mixed
picture (Dessalegn Rahmato 2006a). The works discussed were divided
on the question of whether certification has led to greater tenure secur-
ity. While some were positive, others were sceptical (Berhanu Adenew
and Fayera Abdi 2005; Mitiku Haile et al. 2005). A work commis-
sioned by USAID (2004) notes that landholders do not have strong
tenure security even with certification, as this would not prevent the
government from undertaking periodic land redistribution. The 2005
federal land legislation discussed above, which provides for land certifi-
cation and which was issued while certification was being undertaken
in many parts of the country, includes a provision for land redistribu-
tion, though there are conditions attached to it. As far as land disputes
are concerned, the findings are even more disturbing: it appears that
certification has either had no discernable impact on land conflicts or,
as in the Amhara case, has aggravated conflicts (Berhanu Adenew and
Fayera Abdi 2005). The World Bank (2005) says that the kebelle Social
Courts reported a decrease of cases of land conflict after certification,
but we need a more careful study of the results of the programme be-
fore concluding that land disputes have indeed become less frequent
now. In many parts of the country, land disputes are often handled
through customary dispute settlement mechanisms rather than
through the Social Courts. With regard to the impact on women‘s land
rights, the recent evidence reviewed in my earlier work shows mixed
results, some works noting that women were at risk during the process
of certification, others arguing that women were one of the main bene-
ficiaries of the programme (Askale Teklu 2005; Berhanu Adenew and
Fayera Abdi 2005; see discussion in Dessalegn Rahmato 2006a). Evi-
dence was not available as to whether certification has led to increased
opportunities for credit services or increased incentives for investment.
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On the other hand, there is broad agreement that there is insufficient
institutional capacity at the local level, where certification and registra-
tion are processed and managed. The efficient management of land
registers and the constant updating of land information require not
only the installation of a modern information system but a well trained
and motivated staff, without which certification and registration can be-
come counter-productive and a cause of increased conflict (Solomom
Bekure et al. 2006).
One area which has not been given sufficient attention is the impact
of population pressure on secure rights to land. The agricultural popu-
lation of the country has been growing at a high rate for many decades,
with the current rate estimated to be more than three per cent per year.
The evidence suggests that the rural population has more than doubled
in the last three decades: it was put at 26.3 million in 1970 but grew to
52.7 million in 2001 (CACC 2003; Marcos Ezra 1990). Moreover, the
demographic movement out of the rural areas is fairly limited, far less
than the rate of population growth, which means that the land re-
sources of the countryside are under extreme pressure. There is a high
rate of land fragmentation and sub-division, and land which is margin-
al and was used in the past mainly for grazing purposes has been
brought under cultivation. For this and other reasons, environmental
degradation is taking place at an alarming rate. These conditions can
ultimately neutralise the benefits of certification.
To sum up, while the programme of land certification and registra-
tion is a step in the right direction, its implementation and the ap-
proach that has been adopted leave a lot to be desired. Moreover, such
a programme does not rule out the need for a more sound legislation
on the one hand and greater rights awareness on the part of the poor
and labouring peasants on the other. The literature on African land
tenure suggests that even under the best of circumstances, certification
by itself will not be sufficient to ensure full tenure security (Bruce and
Migot-Adholla 1994), and the Ethiopian case is not expected to be an
exception.
Conclusions
Despite the radical reforms of the past and the significant changes that
have occurred, there are also close similarities in the land systems of
the pre- and post-Revolution periods. First, in both systems, the state
had immense power over landed property: in the past the state was
both a landlord in its own right and had a strong say over land not for-
mally under its control. At present, the state has power over all landed
property. Second, a majority of peasants in the past had only use rights
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over the land they cultivated, and such land was not transferable in any
form on a long-term basis except through inheritance by siblings; this
is almost identical to the rights peasants have under the present sys-
tem. In brief, the tenure system in this country over the last 50 years
may be described as one in which, in one way or another, the state has
defined or has had a decisive say over rights of access to and disposal
of rural land. This power became total with the nationalisation of land
after the Revolution and in the period since then. Under both sets of
circumstances, the cultivator remained subordinate and dependent on
public authority for his/her very livelihood.
Moreover, both in the imperial past and at the present time, the land
system has failed to provide land users with secure rights of tenure
that are robust and not subject to arbitrary revocation by others, includ-
ing the state. In the past, the tenant, the rist holder, as well as the own-
er-cultivator, were all subject, in one form or another, to the loss of
their holdings or restrictions in their use. As noted above, the problem
of the first two categories of cultivators is obvious, but while better off
in many ways, the owner-cultivator was not free from uncertainty and
fear. First, there were a number of powerful landlords who held high
positions in government and who were notorious for engrossing land
by unscrupulous methods. Such landlords often used their authority to
expropriate land belonging to owner-cultivators with minimal compen-
sation. The courts at the time were so thoroughly corrupt that redress
of grievances through the justice system was out of the question for
the average cultivator. Second, due in part to the fact that there was no
cadastral survey and that only a small portion of the land in the coun-
try was measured and registered, there were frequent land disputes
especially over plot boundaries, but also over inheritance and transfer
rights. Such disputes could drag on through the courts for many years
and could cause financial ruin and even family breakups among liti-
gants on occasion. Finally, in the past, before Haile Selassie’s land tax
reforms, the owner-cultivator, known as gebbar (literal meaning: tribute
payer), was burdened with many of the same obligations as the tenant,
including dues in the form of labour, personal service, and duty during
military campaigns.
The degree and extent of land insecurity thus varied from one politi-
cal (and ownership) regime to another; nevertheless, it is widely recog-
nised that it was a threat hanging over a majority of peasant cultivators
in the imperial period which also became a danger affecting all pea-
sants in the period since then. While before the radical land reform
over 50 per cent of the farming population was under tenancy and de-
pendent on the landed classes and the state, at present all peasants are
‘tenants’ of the state (though not in the full sense of the word) and all
of them suffer a high degree of tenure insecurity. Insecurity of tenure
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was responsible, in the past as well as today, for the lack of long-term
investment on the land and of effective environmental measures, and
this, coupled with other factors too numerous to deal with here, contin-
ued to aggravate the poverty of rural society (Dessalegn Rahmato and
Taye Assefa 2006).
Yet there are other factors that have a strong bearing on the question
I wish to deal with here, viz. the effect and effectiveness of land re-
forms. These include state-society power relations and the process of
reform legislation itself. The relation between the state and the peasant
has always been an unequal one and reflects, at each particular occa-
sion, the hegemony of the ruling power. Despite differences in a num-
ber of important aspects, the three regimes under discussion share
many things in common, and may be described as intrusive. Each in
its own way has been driven by the desire to regulate, manipulate and
mobilise rural society for its own ends. As we have seen already, one
important weapon in this endeavour has been the control of land re-
sources. The modern state has always made strenuous efforts to inter-
vene in and exercise control over the rural sector, and agrarian change
has taken place within this overriding concern. It has narrowed the
gap between the public and private sphere and succeeded in becoming
virtually the only active force in rural society, with all other actors
merely shadows. The peasant has thus been left little room for inde-
pendent initiative and self-actualisation.
Over the years, Ethiopian peasants have expressed their dissatisfac-
tion with the existing form of property and power relations in various
ways, though unlike Latin America or pre-modern China, peasant up-
risings have not been part of the country’s agrarian history13. The mas-
sive show of support by the rural population for the new military state
and its overthrow of the imperial regime, and later for the proclama-
tion of land reform, was a clear statement of peasant alienation from
the imperial system, which they saw as one based on exploitation, and
their acceptance of the present order of things. One is doubtful if the
reform would have been successfully implemented, or the military
state itself would have survived for long, without the active participa-
tion of the peasantry in reform implementation and in the struggle
against landlord opposition. The Derg lost the support of the peasantry
in subsequent years with its unpopular and ruinous rural policies; the
result was that the rural population either refused to come to the aid of
the state in its hour of need, or gave its tacit backing to the insurgent
forces fighting against it, which paved the way for the eventual collapse
of the Derg. Under the current government, millions of peasants ex-
pressed discontent with existing policies and practices by casting their
vote against the ruling party and in favour of opposition candidates in
the national elections of 2005.
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The process of legislating changing itself that was briefly noted ear-
lier has a significant bearing on the final outcome and is thus impor-
tant to examine. All the reforms we have examined, whether conserva-
tive, radical, or moderate, have been reforms from above, relying for
the most part on the instrumentality of the law to effect change. They
reflect a technocratic approach to social or agrarian transformation.
The legislations in question were formulated without consultation or
the participation of either the intended beneficiaries or the wider stake-
holders. They were implemented in most cases by technocratic and ci-
vil servants except in the case of the Derg’s land reform of 1975, which
was issued under exceptional circumstances. But legislating reform
from above is undemocratic and, as is clear from the Ethiopian experi-
ence, invariably fails to satisfy the intended beneficiaries or to meet its
stated objectives. The decision-making process in all the three regimes
has been undemocratic, with the power to initiate and shape policy
concentrated in a few hands at the top. Laws and policies were pre-
pared by a few technocrats and sometimes, as in the case of the Derg,
in complete secrecy. All the political leaders in question viewed partici-
patory decision-making as a challenge to their authority and were hos-
tile to any effort to democratise the institutions of policy-making (An-
dargachew Tiruneh 1993; Pausewang, Tronvoll, and Aalen 2002).14
Thus, all through the period under review, the Ethiopian peasant has
been the object of reform and a passive recipient of state ‘beneficence’.
Reform from above often reflects the assumptions, values, ideologi-
cal orientation, and class and political interests of the authors in power.
The law is not a neutral instrument of change, at least not in matters
of property and agrarian relations in the Ethiopian context. The agrar-
ian issue in this country, as in many others, has always been a political
issue. The chief resource of the country still remains the land, and ac-
cess to it has invariably been fiercely contested both by the land user
and by hegemonic forces that have often sought the economic benefits,
as well as social and political dominance, this would confer. The con-
trol of the land and its products has been the source of class power
and the basis of the hegemony of the state. In all three regimes, the
state employed its hegemony to redefine rights of property, to siphon
off the rural surplus, to manage or manipulate rural production, and to
ensure peasant subordination. Reform from above, undertaken in par-
ticular in circumstances where the intended beneficiaries have not
been involved in its formulation nor have been given the instruments
by which to defend the benefits contained in the reform, will neither
serve their interests nor be sustainable in the long run.
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Notes
1 Ethiopia has a fairly large pastoral population located in the lowlands of the country.
Land tenure in pastoralist communities is, however, different and complex. For an ex-
tensive literature on pastoralist land rights see Helland 2006. This study will also
not encompass a discussion of urban land tenure for the same reasons.
2 See for a more detailed examination of the imperial land system, Dessalegn Rahmato
1984 and references in it.
3 There are conflicting figures on the extent of tenancy. Dessalegn Rahmato (1984) gi-
vers lower figures; CSO (1967) suggests that 55 per cent of peasants in the country
were tenants; Bahru Zewde (1991) argues that 50-65 per cent of holdings in the
country was operated by tenants.
4 Interviewed in 2000.
5 The kebelle here is equivalent to a sub-district and the woreda to a district.
6 Dessalegn Rahmato 1984, 1993.
7 For discussion of all these programmes, particularly collectivisation, see Dessalegn
Rahmato 1993.
8 For an extended discussion see Dessalegn Rahmato 2004.
9 The key articles in the Constitution regarding land tenure are: article 40, sub-articles
3, 4, 6, and 7; and article 52, sub-article (d) (FDRE 1995).
10 The DA is the government’s rural extension agent found in each kebelle.
11 For the magnitude of institutional instability since the 1970s, see Annex in Dessa-
legn Rahmato 2004.
12 The World Bank (2005) puts the number of households which have received certifi-
cates at between five and six million. Yet, at the end of 2004, in Amhara, one of the
largest killils, where registration was begun much earlier than in Oromia and the
Southern killil, registration had been completed in only 30 per cent of the kebelles.
13 See Dessalegn Rahmato 1996 for a discussion of this.
14 For more references on the authoritarian political tradition in Ethiopia, see Dessalegn
Rahmato 1996.
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3 Land rights and tenure security: Rural land
registration in Ethiopia
Dessalegn Rahmato
Introduction1
In 2003, the Ethiopian government undertook a programme of rural
land registration, and by 2006 more than half the country’s farm
households had received what are commonly referred to as land certifi-
cates. Initially, land certification was expected to be completed by the
year 2010, but the implementation of the programme was greatly ac-
celerated following the elections of 2005, and it now appears that the
completion date will be much earlier. The goal is to issue every rightful
holder of farm land a certificate of use rights and to have his/her plots
recorded in a registry kept at the local kebelle office. The main objective
of the programme is to address the problem of tenure insecurity and
to establish an effective framework for land administration at the local
level. Land registration is expected to reduce land disputes and litiga-
tion, to bring about the empowerment of women, and to lead to in-
creased investments in the land (see Solomon Abebe 2006). The docu-
ments issued vary in form from one killil to another: in Tigrai, land-
holders are given a piece of paper which resembles a certificate, while
in Amhara, the documents issued look like a bank book and are re-
ferred to as ‘user books’. It is arguable whether the programme in pro-
gress can be called title registration, but for the purposes of this study
I shall assume that what is being undertaken in rural Ethiopia is a
form of title registration.
This study explores the relationship between land rights and title re-
gistration and the extent to which the latter has contributed to pea-
sants‘ security of rights to land. It is based on the findings of field in-
vestigation in two locations in the north and south of the country un-
dertaken in 2006 and early 2007. The analysis presented will rely
mainly on the information gathered in Dessie Zuria woreda, South
Wollo zone, Amhara killil, northern Ethiopia, but for the purpose of
comparison I shall make use of the results of my field work in several
woredas in Wollaita zone, southern Ethiopia. The two locations are very
different in most respects, such as agrarian history, farming systems,
and cultural practices; but the most important difference, which has a
bearing on the subject under study and which has not been given suffi-
cient attention in the relevant literature, has to do with demographic
pressure. Wollaita is perhaps the most vulnerable area in southern
Ethiopia, due in large part to high demographic pressure and acute
land shortage. The demographic stress in the area has been increasing
in severity for well over half a century and is responsible to a great ex-
tent for high levels of rural destitution and frequent food and health
crises. In the rural communities where we conducted our interviews,
the population density is over 500 persons per km2, and a household
which has 0.25 ha of land here is considered fortunate. In contrast,
Dessie Zuria, while very populous by the standards of Amhara killil,
has a population density of about one-third that of Wollaita, and aver-
age land holdings measure over 0.70 ha.
The extent and variety of the instruments I used to gather informa-
tion in the two locations differed. In Dessie Zuria, the instruments
consisted of the following: a field survey undertaken on a selected sam-
ple of certificate holders in two kebelles; interviews with key peasant in-
formants and about a dozen local public officials; case histories gath-
ered from a number of household heads; and information relevant to
land certification collected from public records (including police and
court records) and the woreda databases. In contrast, the field work in
Wollaita was less extensive: though I did not conduct a field survey
here, I held the same kind of interviews, though with a smaller num-
ber of peasants and local officials. I was unable to gather information
from public records about the certification programme but did collect
socio-economic data useful for the study.
The different approaches in my field work are partly due to differ-
ences in the scope of implementation of the certification programme
in the north and south of the country. In the two kebelles in Dessie Zur-
ia woreda, land certification is almost complete, having been launched
in 2003 and implemented with a good deal of care and resource expen-
diture. More than 90 per cent of landholders have received certificates.
The woreda as a whole has been designated by the authorities as one of
two pilot woredas in the killil selected for special attention through the
support of Sida, the Swedish donor organisation, as well as to serve as
a model for other woredas. By contrast, in Wollaita the certification pro-
gramme got under way very recently, and in 2006 when I did the field
work, less than half the rural households had received their docu-
ments. In Wollaita and the Southern killil in general, the programme
has been dogged with difficulties, delays, and a shortage of resources.
Land certification has aroused a great deal of enthusiasm and has
raised considerable expectations among the population in the rural
areas, although this varies in degree from one part of the country to an-
other. Compared to the situation in the recent past, i.e. before the certi-
fication programme was launched, there has been considerable im-
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provement in peasant attitudes with respect to tenure security and land
transactions. Most peasants say they now have a greater sense of secur-
ity in their holdings than in the past. A majority of the respondents in
our sample survey in the north of the country said they were more con-
fident in renting out their land to others. A surface reading of the evi-
dence suggests that there are relatively fewer land disputes at present,
and certification is given as the main reason for this apparent decrease.
In all, land certification is seen by a majority of peasants as a welcome
measure, although neither the beneficiaries nor the public officials at
the local level had any say in its inception, planning, or method of im-
plementation.
The initiative has also raised considerable interest among the coun-
try’s major donors as well as within academic circles. Donor groups
such as USAID and the World Bank, in particular, are favourably im-
pressed and are quite keen to provide support to the programme in
one form or another.2 A new survey report prepared by a World Bank
team makes a highly positive assessment of the registration pro-
gramme. It argues that large-scale land certification has been underta-
ken rapidly and successfully, with low cost, in a participatory manner,
and with positive results. It suggests that ‘elements of Ethiopia‘s certifi-
cation process, with modification as needed, could serve as a model for
other African countries’ (Deininger et al. 2007). There is now less criti-
cism than previously of the government’s land policy, and the govern-
ment itself is quite satisfied that it has finally addressed the problem of
tenure insecurity for the rural population.
And yet, a careful and more nuanced reading of the evidence from
the field clearly indicates that the issue is much more complex than it
appears at first glance or is made out to be. As I shall show in the
pages that follow, land certification is certainly a step in the right direc-
tion; nevertheless, the kind of robust tenure security that would allow
individuals greater freedom of choice and action with respect to their
property and livelihoods still eludes the country’s hard pressed pea-
sants. Security of rights to land in the proper sense of the term is an
important basis for peasant empowerment, but there was no evidence
to suggest that the peasants in our study had gained any sense of em-
powerment and autonomy or that their subordinate attitudes towards
the state and state officials had changed in any way. Indeed, it was evi-
dent from our field experience that some of the institutional changes
at the grassroots level that accompanied land certification have en-
hanced the authority of the state over the farm household.
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Formalisation of property rights: A brief review
There is a considerable body of recent works on law, property rights,
and economic development, and both academics and donor groups
have drawn attention to the importance of these concepts and their re-
lationship to tenure security and poverty reduction (De Soto 2000;
Mwangi 2006; Toulmin and Quan 2000b; World Bank 2003d). The
basic argument is that economic pursuits and relationships require an
effective and inclusive legal system with clearly defined rules securing
rights to property, determining the obligations of state and individuals,
and governing commercial and contractual relations. Such a legal sys-
tem promotes efficiency, increased investment, and entrepreneurial
drive.
The work of Hernando de Soto, in particular, places greater empha-
sis on the poor, on the one hand, and formalisation of property law as
an instrument of poverty reduction, on the other. De Soto holds that
property rights codified in law, and the recognition of such rights made
manifest in the form of title and registration, provide full security for
disadvantaged populations in both rural and urban settings, and are es-
sential conditions for poverty reduction and broad-based economic de-
velopment. His work has stimulated considerable debate and interest
among academics and the donor community, as well as international
organisations. Though his ideas have been enthusiastically received
within some donor circles, they have aroused strong criticism from
within the property rights school, as well as among practitioners and
scholars engaged in the development field. De Soto contends that to be
poor does not mean to be asset-less; on the contrary, he shows that the
poor hold immense assets and wealth in the form of land, houses,
buildings, and small businesses, which if properly recognised would
enable them to pull themselves out of poverty. The problem is that
these assets are not valued because they are neither properly documen-
ted nor provided legal protection. Giving formal property rights to the
poor transforms these assets into living capital, enabling them to ac-
cess credit and allowing them to invest in their business and improve
their earnings. De Soto is convinced that once their immense wealth is
‘unlocked’ through an inclusive property law and adequate formalisa-
tion, such as title registration, the entrepreneurial drive of the poor will
energise the formal economy, leading to high rates of growth and de-
velopment.
De Soto‘s work has been criticised for many shortcomings and from
a variety of perspectives, and I shall briefly look at those relevant to this
study.3 In the first instance, his conception of property law is said to be
narrowly constructed: he recognises only formal written law and indivi-
dual/private property and leaves out other legal forms and property sys-
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tems. In the African context, especially, land rights are subject to multi-
ple legal systems, since both customary and private/individual tenure
is accepted in many countries in the continent. There are those who ar-
gue that legal pluralism is not well suited to formalisation measures
such as title and registration, while others suggest that customary ten-
ure does not require formalisation to ensure protection of rights and
security of holdings. De Soto and his supporters would argue that cus-
tomary legal and property institutions, and the social and cultural net-
work in which they are embedded, make formalisation a futile exercise,
and that hence there is a strong need for institutional reform. Second,
the argument that formalisation of property rights opens up opportu-
nities for access to institutional credit is not supported by the empirical
evidence. In fact, in Ethiopia as well as in many African countries, the
poor as well as non-poor rely to a large extent on customary saving and
credit institutions rather than the formal financial sector because the
former are easy to access, do not require collateral, and provide quick
and efficient service. The issue of collateral is frequently not the main
reason that the formal sector is shunned, even by those who can pro-
vide collateral. Third, formalisation of land rights has been highly un-
successful in Kenya and other African countries where titling and re-
gistration programmes have been undertaken since the 1950s and
1960s. As Sara Berry (1993) and others have shown, the enduring
strength of customary tenure and the practice of ensuring claims to
land through systems of social, political, and kin networks and negotia-
tions have meant that formal records and title play an insignificant role
in either access to land or dispute settlement.
To these arguments I will add the following three points which I be-
lieve are significant in light of the Ethiopian experience, and which the
critical literature has either ignored or given much less attention than
they deserve. To begin with, by over-emphasising the determinant role
of property law and its legalisation, de Soto adopts a state-centric view
of property rights and its guarantee for the poor. But, as we shall see la-
ter, formalisation of the law by itself provides no robust guarantee, and
where such guarantee has been achieved, it has been the result of
struggles by the poor themselves and non-state agents. Moreover, for-
mal property law, he argues, and the conversion process in the law al-
low the poor to convert their assets into capital. Under capitalism, he
states, the legal infrastructure is hidden in the property system, and
the formal property system converts assets into value (De Soto
2000:45-46). But de Soto fails to recognise that the formal property
system of capitalist societies is a product of a long historical process
and the outcome of competing (often warring) economic interests, so-
cial classes, political parties, and sectional groupings.4 Hidden in the
formal property law of a capitalist country is a small slice of its social
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history. Where this kind of pluralist struggle is absent or weakly mani-
fested, as is the case in many developing countries, property law comes
to reflect the interests of one dominant group or, as in Ethiopia, those
of the state and its mandarins. Here property law is not inclusive but
restrictive, prohibiting disadvantaged populations the freedom and op-
portunity to get the full value of their assets. It is enough to cite apart-
heid South Africa as an extreme example of legal exclusion, and the
‘feudal’ imperial state of Ethiopia as a case of restrictiveness. As we
shall see in the discussion below, title registration in such circum-
stances at best only formalises the restrictive rights in question and
does not expand their scope.
Second, de Soto reflects a narrow conception of property rights in
two particular respects. First, he anchors such rights in property law,
and thus covers them in legalist costume; and second, he does not
make allowances for rights protection outside the statutory framework.
The legalist approach is inadequate because property rights will be of
limited value if they exist in isolation, and must rather be part of a poli-
tical legal system incorporating rights to justice, human rights, and
good governance. Property rights should thus be understood in the
broader, political legal sense, since only then can we measure the real
significance of formalisation and registration. On the other hand, as
the contemporary and historical experience shows, where the poor are
concerned, property as well other rights have to be continually de-
fended, otherwise there is the danger that they will be eroded or nulli-
fied by powerful forces, including the state itself seeking to maximise
its own interests. Rights protection outside the formal legal system,
through poor people’s own organisations or through political and
rights advocacy groups, has made it possible for the poor to benefit
from existing formalisation programmes, as has been shown by a
number of recent works on Asian and African countries.5
Third, de Soto has very little to say about rights awareness and the sig-
nificance of this to the poor. In fact, the literature on property rights in
general has not paid sufficient attention to this subject except for brief
references here and there to the ‘accessibility’ of the law, by which is
meant whether the law is written in comprehensible language and
whether it is in the public domain. By rights awareness I mean knowl-
edge and voice: knowledge of rights through some form of rights educa-
tion or advocacy, and the ability of the poor to voice their demands in de-
fence of their rights. Since the state is frequently not a disinterested
party, the transmission of such awareness is best accomplished either di-
rectly by individuals having access to the sources in question, through
poor people’s organisations or rights advocacy groups. I hold that rights
awareness is an important element of the empowerment of the poor,
and a reference to customary institutions illustrates this point. Where
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customary institutions function effectively, they do so because indivi-
duals have clear and direct knowledge of the rules and responsibilities,
they are able to voice their views when disputes arise, and there is direct
access to dispute settlement mechanisms. There have been many exam-
ples where tenure reform implementation and land rights formalisation
measures have failed because public agents and others paid scant atten-
tion to the importance of legal awareness (Palmer 2000).
While not directly addressing de Soto‘s arguments, the ‘legal em-
powerment‘ school may be cited as one example where legal literacy
and the provision of legal support services to the poor has been em-
ployed as an instrument of empowerment in programmes of agrarian
reform, poverty reduction, and improvement of women‘s rights in a
number of Asian countries (Golub 2003; Manning 1999). Legal em-
powerment here means knowledge of the relevant law and is slightly
less inclusive than the concept of rights awareness which I have de-
fined above. In this connection, mention must be made of the recently
established international forum called the Commission on Legal Em-
powerment of the Poor,6 which holds that the institutionalisation of a
legal system that is inclusive of the poor provides empowerment and is
an important condition for poverty reduction. It views functioning
property rights as an important element of good governance. The legal-
ist approach that is evident here as well as in the works noted earlier
puts strong emphasis on the poor using the law to improve their eco-
nomic interests and to hold secure rights to property.
The political legal framework
The political setting
The year 2005, when the federal government issued an important land
law in which land certification featured prominently, was also the year
when the country held its most hotly contested parliamentary elections.
The 2005 elections were different from previous elections because for
the first time in the country’s electoral history, a large number of oppo-
sition candidates were allowed to participate, some running as inde-
pendents and others under the umbrella of loosely formed coalitions
and united fronts. Significantly also, the state-controlled media were
opened up, allowing access to the opposition as well as the party in
power. The opposition was able to contest nearly 80 per cent of the 523
seats in Parliament, competing vigorously not just in the urban centres
but also in the rural areas. For the first time ever, peasants all over the
country with access to the radio were able to listen to live debates be-
tween the government and the opposition and to campaign speeches
by candidates highly critical of government policies and programmes.
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There was thus a massive grassroots interest, as well as high expecta-
tions within rural areas in particular, that had not been apparent in
any of the preceding elections. Figures provided by the country’s Na-
tional Electoral Board (NEB), a government body, shows that nearly 80
per cent of the population eligible to vote registered, of which 90 per
cent turned out to cast their ballots on Election Day. Measured by voter
registration and the turnout on ballot day, Election 2005 was a re-
sounding success. The final results of the elections were fiercely con-
tested by the opposition, as well as some international observer groups,
both claiming that the government lost the elections by a good margin,
while figures released by the NEB some three months after the ballots
were cast gave the victory to the government. Even if we go by the offi-
cial results, it is quite clear that the opposition faired immensely better
in this election than at any time in the past. In 2000, it was able to
win only twelve per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives
of the Federal Parliament, whereas the official count declared by NEB
shows that it won 40 per cent of the seats in this election, with the
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) as the strongest contending
party winning twenty per cent. Opposition successes in the killil elec-
tions were equally impressive.7 Significantly enough, this success re-
sulted from massive support by urban and, more importantly, rural vo-
ters.
There are a number of issues and events connected with the elec-
tions that are significant for our purposes, and I would like to go over
them briefly here. First is the fact that the land issue, while not consid-
ered a burning issue in the campaign, was taken up for debate by a
number of candidates and some of the bigger political parties. The gov-
ernment came in for some strong criticism on its land policy, and
some of the front runner candidates let it be known that if they were
elected to Parliament they would propose changing the policy in favour
of a more secure form of ownership. This greatly concerned the gov-
ernment, for whom the existing system of state ownership was almost
sacrosanct and one of the main pillars of its political and economic
strategy for the country. The government’s strong commitment to state
ownership had ideological roots, but it was also an instrument which
enabled it to have greater leverage over land allocations and greater he-
gemonic intervention in rural society.
The second issue had to do with the government’s expectations re-
garding the outcome of the elections. State officials were confident that
the ruling party would win the elections handsomely but conceded that
Parliament after the elections would be different from the outgoing
one and that a good number of the seats in it would be taken by the
opposition. Their assessment was that in large measure they would
lose the urban vote, while the rural vote would be massively behind
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them. As ballot day approached, however, and the turn of the electorate
towards the opposition became apparent, the confidence of the authori-
ties came under severe strain; nevertheless, they still remained con-
vinced that victory was theirs, even though the massive majority they
had expected would not materialise. This led to a spate of decisions by
the government, and in its dying days a series of legislations were
rushed through Parliament, which was to be a cause of bitterness and
recrimination between the governing party and the opposition. Since
they have a bearing on our discussion, we shall look at two of these de-
cisions.
The first was the passing of two important land laws in July 2005,
nearly two months after the elections were held. The public was so agi-
tated following the elections – by what they regarded as undue delay in
the announcement of the results – that not many voices were raised to
question the propriety of the old Parliament continuing to sit and pass
laws weeks after the people had voted in new legislators. The most im-
portant act was the rural land administration law, but another law was
also passed in the same month, which dealt with land expropriation
and the payment of compensation; a law that has not received much at-
tention in the debate here. The other decision worth noting was the
passing of legislation to change the Parliamentary rules of procedure,
which was rushed through the House about a month later. One of
these approved rule changes made it impossible for any party in Parlia-
ment, except a party with a majority seat, to initiate legislation, repla-
cing the old rule in which it was sufficient for twenty MPs to propose
legislation for it to be considered by the House. The aim of the govern-
ment was to effectively paralyse the opposition in Parliament and re-
move any risk that some of its cherished policies, including those on
land, would be reversed in the post-election period.
The post-election period was marked by high political and social ten-
sion, and there were a good number of protests and strikes in the ur-
ban areas. These protests were forcibly put down by the security forces,
culminating in the death of scores of protesters and the arrest and de-
tention of thousands of people. Most of the leadership of CUD, a large
number of its campaigners, as well as journalists and civil society acti-
vists were arrested and charged with attempting to overthrow the Con-
stitution by violent means and genocide.8 In the rural areas the situa-
tion was different, and here the government adopted what may be de-
scribed as a carrot and stick approach. On the one hand, many local
authorities conducted considerable harassment of peasants suspected
of voting for the opposition, and on a few occasions, peasants who re-
sisted harassment were reported to have lost their land allocations. On
the other hand, land certification programmes were accelerated, cover-
ing a large number of households in a short time. Respondents in the
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two localities in the north and south of the country where we did field
work informed us that many in their communities had voted for the
opposition, but while they themselves had not suffered any serious
consequences, they had heard of such harassment in other localities.
The aim of speeding up land certification was to win back the sup-
port of the rural population and to undermine the chances of the oppo-
sition. This was important for the governing party, because elections
for kebelle and woreda assemblies, which were planned for 2006 but
postponed, would soon be taking place. These local elections are critical
for the governing party, because losing them would erode its power
base in the countryside and, given that the urban areas are a hotbed of
opposition, this would mean running the risk of losing the general
elections scheduled for 2010. The ruling party is now busy in the rural
areas, holding numerous meetings for political and organisational pur-
poses, involving both active and non-active peasants. It is quite evident
that the party is conscious of the latent power of the peasantry and that
it needs to gain its support if it is to stay in power. This is where the
land question assumes immense significance.
Institutional setting
The most important institutional change in the last half decade is the
woreda (or district) level decentralisation, which was initiated in 2001
and is now almost complete. Decentralisation here is aimed at bringing
development programme management closer to the community and to
make service delivery more efficient and effective. Under this new sys-
tem, woredas will receive block grant transfers from the government
which they are expected to manage themselves. They also have the
power to prepare their own budgets and annual plans, to generate in-
come from their own resources and use the income for their own pur-
poses, and to recruit and hire staff (see Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher and
Kassahun Berhanu 2006). In effect, the woreda has now become the
focal point of local-level planning and programme implementation. Be-
low the woreda is the kebelle, which is responsible for needs assessment
and service delivery, as well as law and order; it is expected to establish
close and direct links with the rural household. Both structures are
governed by elected councils and thus are expected to be democratic in-
stitutions. Local-level democracy, which is the other objective of decen-
tralisation, obviously opens up immense opportunities for all commu-
nity-directed programmes. Such an institutional set-up is supposed to
enable peasant communities and individual households to express
their preferences, needs, and demands. In turn, programme planning
and implementation will benefit by greater bottom-up participation
and better opportunities for monitoring and evaluation.
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On the other hand, there are at present considerable hurdles that
need to be overcome. The decentralisation programme has been largely
completed, including the shifting of staff from both the killil and zones
to the woredas. However, the institutional capacity of a great majority
of the woredas is a cause for great concern at present. Many woredas
lack basic infrastructure, capable and trained staff, proper equipment,
and resources, and so their capacity falls short of the duties and re-
sponsibilities they have been burdened with. As a result, decentralised
planning and programming has been severely constrained, and the op-
portunities for local-level democracy have been limited. Weak institu-
tional, resource, and staff capacity has been aggravated by high rates of
staff turnover and institutional instability. Public employees who have
higher qualifications are especially less likely to stay in the woreda.
Staff turnover has badly impacted programme planning and imple-
mentation, raising issues of sustainability and programme quality.
Also, changes and reforms in government bodies have been quite nu-
merous, and this has contributed to institutional weakness.
There are important institutional changes at the kebelle and lower le-
vels, and as we observed in Dessie Zuria woreda, this has come about
partly as a consequence of land certification. The kebelle is divided into
three sub-kebelles and ten gotts (which are large precincts); below these
are ‘communes’ which are development units of 35 to 50 households.
These lower units have direct links to the executive leadership of the
kebelle, thus lines of communication as well as control now extend to
the household level. The elected kebelle council, which is the decision-
making power in the kebelle, elects several standing committees, of
which the Executive, Land Administration, and Crime Prevention com-
mittees are the most important ones. There are ad-hoc ‘task forces’
formed from time to time, such as the Food Security and Environment
task forces, but they are temporary bodies and are disbanded when
they complete their tasks. In each particular case, it is the Executive
which selects the committee members (as well as magistrates to the lo-
cal Social Courts) and presents them to the Council for approval. In
both kebelles we studied, the Executive leadership consisted of members
of the ruling party, and party membership is a factor, though not an
overriding one, in being elected to committee posts. All officials elected
were male, but in one of our study kebelles we found one woman who
was a member of the 14-strong Executive Committee.
A word is in order here on the status of the Social Courts. Social
Courts were established by law in all killils, and their competence ex-
tends only to minor cases with a pecuniary value not exceeding 1000
Birr (see Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) 1997). These are in
effect ‘community’ courts and in a sense a replacement for the Judicial
Tribunals of the Derg. The magistrates of the courts are selected from
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the kebelle and have no legal training, and their formal education does
not extend beyond the rudimentary level. The magistrates my team in-
terviewed in Dessie Zuria woreda were all members of the ruling party.
While the choice of magistrates from within the community is a posi-
tive measure, there is cause for concern with regard to the indepen-
dence of the courts and impartiality of the magistrates. The Social
Court has not been established as an independent body, and this may
in the long term compromise its credibility. The change of magistrates
every five years that is required by the law is ill-advised, since this will
mean losing valuable experience and knowledge gained through the
training given to the magistrates. While most peasants interviewed in
Dessie Zuria as well as Wollaita were quite satisfied with the work of
the Social Courts, the courts are reported to be corrupt and unpopular
in some parts of the country.
An important issue that needs to be raised here is the dominant role
of the ruling party in local affairs. The structure of rural governance is
in fact much more complicated than meets the eye. While there has
been administrative decentralisation, providing the woreda and to some
extent the kebelle more responsibility and authority than in the past, in
terms of ‘party politics’ there is a strong system of centralisation and
upward accountability. The ruling party operates on the principle of
what in the old Soviet communist system used to be called ‘democratic
centralism’. At the local level, party and government are closely linked
with little or no separation between the two. As was noted above, the
leadership of the kebelles, including active members in committees, are
members of the party; this is also more or less true in the woreda. The
members of the elected Councils in both cases are either party mem-
bers or have been supported by the party. Thus, there is very little op-
portunity for alternative voices to be heard. Local officials depend on
instructions from above, and there is a hierarchical cadre system, and
as a result, the party has immense influence in decision-making and
programme management.
The practice in many local communities during the certification pro-
cess was to elect from among the participating households an ad hoc
committee called the Land Administration Committee (or LAC) to be
entrusted with the task of recording the boundaries of individual hold-
ings, measuring them, and registering the owners and their household
members. The LAC was intended to be a temporary body and was to
disband once the certification process was over. This situation has
changed, and the LAC has become a standing committee elected by
the Council whose responsibilities now include serving as a first in-
stance body for hearing and resolving land disputes. The LAC consists
of seventeen members, but at each weekly sitting four members of the
Executive Committee attend the deliberations. LAC members are a mix
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of peasant party activists and local elders who are known to have a
good reputation in the community. There is thus an attempt to com-
bine modern and customary dispute resolution practices. We shall re-
turn to this presently.
The legal framework
Here I am concerned more with the process of legalisation of the feder-
al laws noted above than their contents, since I have discussed the laws
in an earlier work (Dessalegn Rahmato 2006b). As was noted above,
the federal legislation was submitted to Parliament and approved un-
der contentious political circumstances. The land administration law,
which was prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment, was submitted to Parliament at the end of March 2005. The
Ministry says that the draft was sent for comments to senior govern-
ment officials both at the federal and killil level, but there was no at-
tempt to invite public debate on it nor to solicit the opinions of particu-
lar stakeholders, such as NGOs and civil society organisations, the aca-
demic and research community, or rural development experts. The
draft was not accessible to the public. The government-controlled med-
ia noted only the submission of the draft law to Parliament but was
careful not to seem to encourage public discussion of it. There was at
the time widespread understanding among government bodies, the do-
nor community in the country, and informed opinion that the land is-
sue was almost taboo, and senior government officials were known to
have discouraged any public debate on the subject (see Dessalegn Rah-
mato 2004). The draft law was sent to the Rural Development Stand-
ing Committee of the House in April, with the Committee returning
the draft to the full House in June with suggestions for some minor re-
visions which were mainly of an editorial and non-substantive nature.
At the time of the final debate in the House, a dozen or so representa-
tives from civil society organisations as well as officials from concerned
government departments and other guests were invited to attend the
proceedings. Since the ruling party controlled more than 90 per cent
of the seats in the House, the draft law was approved without any ser-
ious debate by MPs; it was finally published in the official gazette in
late July. This law replaces the federal law issued in 1997 and requires
all killil land laws to be revised to be in harmony with it, since federal
law supersedes all legislation issued by lower bodies.
Before turning to the revised Amhara killil land law which came out
in May 2006, I would like to say a few words about the frequency of
changes to the law having to do with rural land, its administration, and
use. While the basic principle defining land rights is contained in the
Federal Constitution of 1995, there have been numerous laws issued at
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both the federal and killil level pertaining to tenure, administration,
and use, and this has contributed to the problem of institutional/legal
instability noted above. In the Amhara killil in particular, laws to pro-
vide for land redistribution were issued in 1996 and 1997; the land
use and environmental protection authority, which is responsible for
land matters in the killil, was established by law in August 2000; and
the law to define land administration and use was issued in October
2000. It is this latter law which has now been revised following the
federal law of 2005. Policy directives on land use and environmental
protection, which are as binding on landholders as the formal laws,
have been issued on a number of occasions in between these laws.
There are at the time of writing only two killils which have issued land
laws to harmonise with the federal law, Amhara and Tigrai, both of
which published their legislation in 2006. Oromia, whose land law
was issued in 2002, and the Southern killil, which brought out a simi-
lar law as recently as 2004, are in the last stages of completing their re-
spective revisions; however, we cannot discuss either one because they
have not been officially published. We should note here that all four of
these killils are territorially extensive, having large peasant populations
mostly found in areas inaccessible by modern transport. The dissemi-
nation of the contents of any law to the peasantry is thus a long and
difficult process. Many peasants in the South, for instance, do not have
knowledge of the 2004 land law which is now being revised.
The Amhara land law draws heavily on the federal law; it is thus suf-
ficient to present here the main provisions that are relevant for our
study (Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) 2006). As in the feder-
al case, the killil law affirms the principle of state ownership of land
which prohibits its sale, mortgage, or exchange, with the holder having
only the right of use, a right dependent on residency in the rural area
and engagement in agricultural pursuits. Use rights are also dependent
on a host of conditions, of which most have to do with what is de-
scribed as ‘proper’ land and environmental management practices.
Holders who do not follow these practices are subject to a variety of pe-
nalties, including the loss of their right to the land. What these ‘proper’
practices consist of is not stated precisely, such that they might be leg-
ally challenged; they are only broadly stated and thus provide ample
discretionary power to state officials. Holders may also lose their right
if they are absent from their farms and the land is left idle for three
consecutive years or more. The right to rent out land is allowed but
only for a short period of time; longer periods have to be registered in
the kebelle. Future land redistribution has not been entirely ruled out
but now is subject to the consent of a majority of the landholders in a
given locality. Articles 22 to 24 (with 21 sub-articles combined) describe
the process of land titling and registration. The kebelle plays a signifi-
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cant role, since it is empowered to administer land in its jurisdiction
and to issue land certificates and maintain a land registry.
The settlement of land disputes is left vague, but a previous law is-
sued in 1997 defines the powers, duties and responsibilities of the ke-
belle-based Social Courts (Amhara National Regional State (ANRS)
1997). This is the lowest court in the country’s judicial system and is
empowered to hear and decide on a wide variety of petty cases brought
before it by kebelle residents, including land cases. Its power extends to
cases where the monetary claims in any decision do not exceed 1000
Birr (a little over 100 US dollars). The judges to the court are selected
from the community and approved by the Council upon recommenda-
tion by the kebelle executive; they have the same term of office as both
the Council and the executive. While the choice of judges from within
the community is a positive measure, there is cause for concern with
regard to the independence of the courts and impartiality of the magis-
trates. The Social Court has not been established as an independent
body, and this may in the long term compromise its credibility. Dispu-
tants may either take their case to the higher, woreda court directly, if
they think the case is beyond the competence of the Social Court, or
may appeal to the woreda court if they are not satisfied with the deci-
sion of the Social Court.
A brief examination of the legal landscape in the rural areas is in or-
der here to place the arguments presented in this study in their proper
perspective. The federal and killil constitutions provide the broad basis
for human, democratic, and property rights. On paper, rural as well as
other citizens enjoy a wide variety of such rights, though in practice
the reality is much different. The variety of land laws noted above de-
termine rights of access to land, and set out the legal framework for
the administration, registration, and management of farm and non-
farm land. Peasants do not have direct access to the constitutional or
legal instruments, however; indeed, in the urban areas also, legal docu-
ments are hard to come by for most citizens. Even if they have access
to them, peasants often have no education and cannot read and under-
stand legal documents. More than two-thirds of our sample in Dessie
Zuria, for instance, were illiterate and only ten per cent had enough
formal education to be able to understand such documents. Moreover,
there are no voluntary organisations or individuals in the rural areas
that provide free legal service to peasants, neither are there active pea-
sant organisations that farmers can turn to if they wish to get legal ad-
vice or aid. Indeed, there are hardly any independent legal service orga-
nisations in the country, though a few human rights groups based in
Addis Ababa, the capital, are now beginning to provide legal aid to a
limited number of poor people. Ethiopia is far behind in this respect
compared with other countries in Africa and Asia (Manning 1999).
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The agricultural cooperatives that are active in most rural areas are
handmaidens of the government and are engaged primarily in the pur-
chase and distribution of farm inputs to farmers. They do not under-
take legal advocacy work, although they would be best placed to provide
legal services were they to become free of government tutelage. There
were 27 people who had been issued with permits to practise law in
Dessie Zuria woreda, but they are professional lawyers based in Dessie
and mostly inaccessible to peasants because of the high fees they
charge. Most rural woredas do not have as many professional lawyers,
and the high number here was due to the fact that Dessie is a large
and important regional town.
Thus, in brief, the state acts both as a player and the referee. The
task of determining land rights and interpreting the laws rests with lo-
cal public officials, but – and this is an important point – since the gov-
ernment is both the juridical owner of the land as well as the source of
the laws, officials are more prone to present a positive interpretation
and to give a favourable reading of the law, and the chances that such
a reading may hide as much it reveals are quite high. In a politicised
environment, such as we have at present, the law is more likely to be
read less objectively and less accurately by local authorities.
Land certificates and registration
The local context: Dessie Zuria woreda
With Dessie, one of the largest and oldest towns in northeast Ethiopia
at its centre, Dessie Zuria woreda, the district in which our main re-
search was undertaken, is the most populous district in South Wollo; it
has a population of 261,000 inhabitants. Aba Sokotu and Gelsha, the
two kebelles where we conducted field work, are located close to Dessie
on the main east-west highway, and peasants here have benefited from
the economic and market opportunities the town provides. The town
has now expanded into the rural areas, and in the west, two of the rural
kebelles adjacent to Aba Sokotu, which were the site of the first pilot cer-
tification programme, were incorporated into it. This caused consider-
able conflict between the peasants, the land administration authorities,
as well as the town officials. We shall return to this shortly.
Peasants in our two sites are quite atypical in a great many respects:
their proximity to a major urban centre, relatively better transport ser-
vices, and their frequent travels to Dessie have opened up opportunities
for improved employment and income on the one hand, and for great-
er social and political awareness on the other – opportunities denied to
other peasants in more remote and less urban surroundings. Peasants
here sell a wide variety of agricultural goods, as well as livestock, tim-
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ber, and firewood in the Dessie market, from which they purchase in
return a range of basic goods and services. Some peasants are half
farmers and half traders, and as individual plots have shrunk and the
land available for farming has decreased more and more, peasants turn
to petty trading to earn income and maintain their families. But the
town also provides many other benefits: greater chances for social in-
teraction, for increased access to information and the media, and the
expansion of one’s horizon and experience.
Proximity to a major provincial and district capital also means that
rural communities are more accessible and hence benefit from in-
creased visits by development officials, both from the public and volun-
tary sector, and improved service delivery. Schools, improved health fa-
cilities, veterinary posts, farmer training centres, and agricultural exten-
sion posts have been constructed and function in both sites. Because of
the special nature of the woreda, peasants here have also received more
attention than those in other locations. In addition, peasants benefit
from micro-finance institutions, the services of the main farmers’ coop-
erative (which is now the main channel through which farm inputs are
distributed), and access to half a dozen or so development NGOs which
run a variety of health, education, and environmental rehabilitation
programmes in the woreda.
An important public support programme recently launched in many
parts of the rural areas, called the productive safety net programme
(SNP), has been underway in Dessie Zuria and the two research sites
since 2005, and in the district as a whole nearly 30 per cent of house-
holds are beneficiaries of the programme. The programme identifies
chronically food-insecure households, predominantly in the rural areas,
and provides them with employment and the opportunity to earn in-
come on a regular basis. Designed to be part of the government’s food
security strategy and planned to run for at least five years, the pro-
gramme was initially aimed at benefiting some 5 million chronically
poor households in the country, but the number has gone up to 7 mil-
lion at present. The main employment schemes are public works, en-
vironmental rehabilitation, and construction of service-giving institu-
tions. Beneficiary households are also eligible under the programme
for a variety of assistance schemes delivered through a package ap-
proach to help them diversify their sources of income and to build up
their assets. SPN is an on-going programme in which considerable re-
sources are transferred to participating households (to the tune of
nearly USD 200 million a year nationwide) through the employment
schemes, the package approach, or both (MOFED 2005). Local officials
are responsible for selecting beneficiary households, preparing the em-
ployment and package schemes, managing the programme, and distri-
buting resources. This has been an unexpected ‘windfall’, as it were, to
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local authorities because it gives them considerable power and influ-
ence over peasant farmers.
A major event that has shaped public opinion in the area is the land
redistribution programme carried out in Amhara killil in 1997, in
which many peasants who were considered large owners by the autho-
rities were stripped of large portions of their holdings and the land dis-
tributed to the landless or land poor. While it was welcomed by those
who stood to gain, redistribution caused a good deal of turmoil in the
rural areas, was bitterly resented by those who lost their property, and
became a source of anxiety to others (Ege 1997). The programme was
carried out in full in many areas, but there were a few districts where
it was either not implemented at all or implemented only partially.
Both Aba Sokotu and Gelsha fall in the latter category, in which a small
number of households lost their land and a few landless peasants re-
ceived small allotments.
Land certification
Among the first recipients of land certificates9 issued by Amhara killil
in early 2005 were peasants in two kebelles in Dessie Zuria located adja-
cent to our research sites. This was a pilot scheme and the culmination
of a long process of preparation, going back to 2003, both in the office
and on the ground. The purpose of the scheme was to test the feasibil-
ity and cost of using modern technology, and the experiment employed
GPS techniques to demarcate kebelle and individual plot boundaries.
However, the certification process was halted halfway through, when
the land administration authorities realised that the two locations in
the programme had been absorbed into Dessie town as a result of a de-
cision by higher authorities to allow urban expansion in the killil to a
fifteen km radius. This was poor planning on the part of all public offi-
cials concerned, and the pilot scheme in the district was abandoned
with considerable wastage of resources. The decision caused a good
deal of disquiet among the peasant households involved: those who
had received their certificates did not know how secure they would be
in the new circumstances, and those who did not, and they were many,
were afraid of being dispossessed without fair compensation by the ur-
ban authorities since they did not have any proof of rights to their land.
Urbanisation poses a serious risk of land expropriation, as service in-
frastructure, housing, and other buildings will be constructed as part
of the process of urban growth. It will also mean peasants will have to
give up farming and face the risk of unemployment, since there will be
few opportunities for alternative livelihoods available to them. Angry
protestations were made by peasants to the authorities concerned, in-
cluding to the visiting Minister of State for Agriculture and Rural De-
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velopment, but without any results, and at the time of our field work
the case was still unresolved.
Another cause of peasant disquiet that accompanied certification was
the road building project that is being undertaken in the west of Dessie
Zuria district. The highway linking the town of Dessie with the wes-
tern part of South Wollo zone is being upgraded and expanded to ac-
commodate much heavier traffic, but in the process many peasants
have lost their farm land, houses, and some common land which was
used by the surrounding community for grazing and other purposes.
The authorities responsible were willing to pay compensation to some
but not to others, on the grounds that the land adjacent to the highway
was by law the property of the highway department; as justification
they cited an old and obscure law issued in 1944, which few people
outside the highway bureaucracy were aware of. They also argued that
the commons were no man’s land and not eligible for compensation.
Peasants were angry because they felt cheated: they had been farming
those lands for over a generation and had their certificates as proof of
ownership, yet they were denied the fair treatment that they were pro-
mised by the certification programme. The compensation offered for
the houses and buildings on the land was seen as quite adequate, but
holders were offered only small payments for the land itself, because
the authorities argued it was public property. I should note here that
the certification programme excluded common lands, which was a
cause of dissatisfaction among many peasants.
These incidents may be seen as minor glitches in the certification
programme, caused largely by poor planning and the incompetence of
local officials, rather than as inherent flaws in the programme itself.
This is true in part, but it does show that peasant insecurity is more
deep-rooted and cannot be removed merely by issuing user certificates.
Peasants are dependent on local officials for interpreting the law, and
interpretation is frequently made to suit the given circumstance. This
is one of the factors for peasant subordination, and insecurity cannot
be cured without addressing the causes of subordination.
Before we turn to the full story of land certification, we need to look
at the issue of compensation and its payment. The right to compensa-
tion for land taken away by public authorities or private interests has
priority in the minds of peasants we interviewed in Dessie Zuria. The
most important benefit that land certification has brought with it, ac-
cording to most respondents, is the right to compensation. In the past,
land was taken away for public purposes without adequate compensa-
tion. The justification public officials use when they wish to take some-
one’s land is limat, which may be loosely rendered as ‘development‘.
There have been and still are numerous limat initiatives under way
(too numerous to list here) in the rural areas, and each initiative re-
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quires its own limat office in the kebelle and at times in sub-divisions of
the kebelle as well. For instance, water harvesting is one of the limats
underway all over the district, and this has its own office in the kebelle.
There are two kinds of compensation: in kind (i.e. a plot equal in size
to the one lost is offered in return), or in cash. Peasants often note that
compensation in kind often means ending up with a plot poorer in
quality and frequently more distant than the plot taken away. Land is a
scarce commodity, and there are no unused plots that are of good qual-
ity anywhere.
The compensation payment in cash on the other hand may be rela-
tively better, but it has its own faults. First, it was only in 2005 that a
compensation law was issued by the federal government; to date there
are no comparable laws at the killil level, and local officials on the
ground simply make ad hoc improvisations, and as result there is a
good deal of inconsistency. Strictly speaking, the compensation that the
federal law provides is compensation for displacement and does not in-
clude the value of the land, hence it is not fair payment for those who
lose their holdings. The justification is that land is public property and
is not subject to compensation. A second cause for concern for pea-
sants, particularly in peri-urban areas, is the expropriation of their land
for investment purposes. This is not a particularly pressing problem in
either Dessie Zuria or Wollaita at present, although we have seen the
repercussions on peasants resulting from the decision to allow urban
expansion into the rural areas. The federal law provides that the local
authorities have the power to remove any peasant from the land if that
land is required by a private investor to establish an agricultural or in-
dustrial enterprise (see Dessalegn Rahmato 2006b for details). In this
case, the government pays compensation, and the landholder does not
negotiate directly with the private investor; he/she would have gained
more if he/she had the right to do so.
Let us now examine the process and outcome of land certification
based on our findings from our research sites.10 For peasants, the pro-
cess begins with an announcement in the kebelle calling on all land-
holders to attend a meeting on a specific date to discuss land and ten-
ure issues. This was true in Dessie Zuria as well as in Wollaita. In Gel-
sha, one of our survey sites, the formal announcement was preceded
by rumours that individual plots were to be measured and land reallo-
cation would take place. At the meeting, woreda and kebelle officials
give a briefing about the purpose of the meeting. Peasants are then
asked to elect four individuals from each of the ten gotts (or precincts)
of the kebelle to the Land Administration Committee (LAC). In both
our sites, there were no women elected to the Committees, which con-
sisted of 40 members each. After a brief training, the LAC, supported
by kebelle and woreda officials, assumes responsibility for the main pre-
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paratory tasks of certification and registration, which include identifica-
tion of individual plots, demarcation and boundary marking, measure-
ment of plots, and recordings of personal details to be included in the
land registry and certificate, such as the holder’s name and that of his/
her spouse, names of siblings and heirs, and other pertinent facts. Dis-
putes may arise at each stage of this process, and the LAC either at-
tempts to resolve them on the spot or refers the case to the kebelle of-
fice. Four LAC members and two to three officials from the woreda and
the kebelle office are deployed in each gott (or precinct) to undertake the
preparatory tasks.
The first order of business is to identify the kebelle boundary. In the
absence of maps or permanent boundary markings, and due to the fact
that kebelle boundaries have been redrawn on numerous occasions, this
is not an easy task and has been the cause of conflict among peasants
as well as among officials of different kebelles. In our case, the kebelles’
area and boundary coordinates were determined using GPS techni-
ques, which is not common practice, and was only possible here be-
cause Dessie Zuria is a pilot district and has benefited from donor sup-
port. This was the only stage in which modern technology was em-
ployed; all the other tasks were carried out with the use of traditional
techniques and crude tools. In Wollaita, some kebelle boundaries had
trees and shrubs planted on them, and these were accepted as being
adequate to demarcate one kebelle from another. Each landholder had
to be present on his/her plots during individual demarcation and
boundary marking. The identity of one’s land is determined in relation
to the adjacent plots owned by other peasants. This is the most conten-
tious stage of the process, as farm plots in Ethiopia do not customarily
have permanent boundary markings, and there are often disputes
among adjacent holders about the exact extent of each other’s plots.
While the dispute may be settled during the demarcation process, this
is often temporary, and the dispute frequently flares up soon after.
In the steeper lands in Wollo as a whole and in Dessie Zuria as well,
peasants use a traditional structure called wober as a plot boundary.
This is a bund constructed along the contour and allowed to build up
over several years, employed also as a soil conservation measure. The
structure is temporary, however, and peasants plough it over to get ac-
cess to the soil collected underneath which they think is rich in nutri-
ents. The wober is then constructed elsewhere, and since it is not un-
common for peasants to encroach on the neighbours’ plots in doing
so, this has become a cause of constant conflict among farmers. A
common method of demarcation used by the LAC was to place stones
and lumps of soil on the boundaries, but these are moveable objects
and in many cases proved to be inadequate to prevent disputes.
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The measurement of individual plots was the most unsatisfactory
part of the certification process, and many peasants interviewed were
critical of the manner in which their plots were measured. Plot mea-
surement is fraught with difficulties in many parts of the country, be-
cause even the simplest measuring tape is not available in most places,
and different traditional methods are used by different officials in dif-
ferent places, thus giving rise to inaccuracies and inconsistencies. Two
different methods of measurement were employed in the two kebelles
in our study. In Aba Sokotu, LAC officials used what may be described
as visual measurement to determine the size of farm plots. This con-
sisted of the head of the Committee estimating the size of a plot by
sight: no measuring tools were employed, and some peasants consid-
ered it as no better than guess work. Surprisingly enough, there were
no protests during the measurement, as the results rarely went against
peasant expectations; nevertheless, this was to cause disputes among
holders after the certificates were handed out. In Gelsha, LAC officials
employed ropes, strings, and sticks to measure plots. A piece of rope or
stick, measured by the arm, was taken to be equivalent to a given
length in the metric system, and this was the chief measuring tool in
the kebelle. At each precinct the arm measurement was carried out by
the head of the LAC for that precinct, thus no two measuring ropes
were of the same size. This was to be a cause of discontent here be-
cause, as we shall see later, land measurement was accompanied by
land reallocation. In Wollaita, in contrast, regular tape measures were
used to measure plots, though I have been informed that in some of
the lowland areas, traditional methods were employed. However, infor-
mants here noted that a good number of plots were neither demarcated
nor measured because of the disputes over them involving claims and
counter-claims.
The final task for the LAC in each precinct is the recording of the
personal details of landholders and their families. Each certificate
should contain the names and addresses of the household head, his/
her spouse, and siblings or other relations in the household, in addi-
tion to the physical and positional details of the land. While there are
no specific rules on the matter, peasants have been told by local offi-
cials that relations whose names do not appear in the certificate will
not have the right to inherit the land. These same details are recorded
in the land registry, copies of which are kept in the kebelle and woreda
office. The certificate also contains brief summaries of the rights and
obligations of landholders and the conditions under which certificates
may be withdrawn. In most cases it took about a year from the time
the preparatory tasks were completed to the time the user certificates
were finally distributed to individual holders. In contrast, landholders
80 DESSALEGN RAHMATO
in Wollaita got their certificates one or two months after the end of the
process.
It has been argued by some that the country’s land titling and regis-
tration programme was a success in part because local authorities em-
ployed low cost techniques and familiar methods to complete the pre-
paratory tasks (Deininger et al. 2007; World Bank 2005). But this is a
misunderstanding of the whole point of the programme: title registra-
tion is meant to provide security and to minimise disputes, and this
can only be possible if the programme is credible in the eyes of the
beneficiaries concerned. The use of low cost traditional tools and tech-
niques is not a problem in itself, but such techniques do not deliver ac-
curate, consistent, and reliable results and are therefore liable to give
rise in the end to disputes and even bitter conflicts. Moreover, the sys-
tem that has been employed is a static rather than a dynamic one be-
cause it is not designed to be sustainable in the long run. This funda-
mental flaw will, in my opinion, seriously undermine its credibility
among peasants. Sustainability means the capability by local authori-
ties, particularly at the kebelle level, not only to physically maintain the
land registry, but to update the information in it, as well as in the certi-
ficates in the hands of landholders. All records must be updated and
kept current, as changes in land holdings, plot boundaries, and land
transfers occur in the kebelle. This requires considerable capacity both
in terms of investment in modern equipment and trained human re-
sources, none of which was visible on the ground. Moreover, there are
costs to be incurred to manage a sustainable record system, but the
land administration authorities do not seem to have given sufficient at-
tention to this matter.
Land rights and tenure security
Rights awareness
I shall discuss here the significance of the main findings from my field
survey undertaken in the north of the country. The findings are based
mainly on data gathered from 110 questionnaires administered on a
randomly selected sample of certificate holders in Aba Sokotu and Gel-
sha, but I shall supplement this information with data from in-depth
interviews with key peasant informants as well as with kebelle and wore-
da officials. The in-depth interviews add flesh to the bare bones of the
questionnaires and give better insights about many of the issues of
concern to us here. Readers are reminded of the point raised earlier in
this study, namely that the peasants of Dessie Zuria have had the bene-
fit of economic, social, and political interaction with the urban world
and are therefore more aware than the average peasant.
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As was noted earlier in this study, property rights will provide secur-
ity that is robust when they are an integral part of other basic political
and democratic rights enjoyed by citizens and when they can be de-
fended through the instrumentality of these rights. In our case, the le-
gal instruments having to do with property and basic rights consist of
the constitutions (federal and killil) and the various land laws issued
and currently in force. Rights awareness is an important element con-
tributing to the robustness of security of tenure and is the basis for the
empowerment of the poor. De Soto has very little to say on this subject
and its significance.
One of the aims of our field investigation was to try to find out the
extent to which peasants were aware of their rights under the law. Pea-
sants in Dessie Zuria were asked if they were aware of the existence of
the constitution and laws that defined basic political, human, and prop-
erty rights and governed access to land and other property. The intent
was not to test peasants’ legal knowledge in the deeper sense of the
term but to find out about legal literacy at the primary level. What we
thought were simple questions in the survey, however, proved to be
quite involved, since many peasants were not quite clear what a consti-
tution actually was or that rights to land were also governed by specific
land laws. Even after careful explanation, quite a number of respon-
dents failed to understand the terms adequately. One of our key pea-
sant informants, for instance, who has more formal education (fifth
grade) than most peasants, listed five constitutions that he was aware
of: the federal, killil, zonal, and woreda constitutions, and the constitu-
tions of lower and higher courts. He obviously mistook ‘constitution’
for administrative rules or rules of procedure. Some of the peasant in-
formants interviewed thought many peasants in their community had
a good deal of legal awareness, while the others were of the opinion
that this was not the case and that there was only limited awareness in
the community. The former opinion is based on the fact that the land
certificates contain a few statements setting out the benefits of the
documents and the obligations holders have in respect of their land.
These are by no means the full extent of rights to land contained in
the relevant legal documents.
The findings from our survey provide a different picture. A little over
28 per cent of our sample had not heard about any of the country’s
constitutions, only twenty per cent knew about the existence of the Fed-
eral Constitution, and 34 per cent were aware of the killil constitution.
On the other hand, nearly 32 per cent of our sample did not know of
any laws governing rights to land, only twelve per cent were aware of
the federal land law, and 28 per cent were aware of the killil land law.
For all practical purposes, peasants‘ rights to land are governed by the
killil law, and it is quite revealing that 72 per cent of our respondents
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were not aware of it. Table 3.1 gives a breakdown of the figures regard-
ing peasant awareness of existing land laws. In Wollaita, on the other
hand, all except one informant said they had no knowledge of the laws
or constitutions or knew any specific rights provided in either docu-
ment.
Women, who made up 30 per cent of our sample, were proportion-
ally more ignorant of the law than men, but the margin of difference
between the two, ten per cent, was not very wide, considering the fact
that both communities were predominantly Muslim. Peasants were
asked how they came to be aware of the law, and the majority stated
that it was through local state officials, with a significant number
pointing to friends and relatives as their source of information, and a
lesser number to the mass media.
Given that there are no rights advocacy organisations in the rural
areas, the task of raising rights awareness poses difficult problems. For
reasons that I have noted above, this task cannot be left to the govern-
ment if the goal is the empowerment of the peasantry. The NGOs
based in the area – and there are over 30 of them in South Wollo as a
whole – are engaged in service delivery and limat programmes and do
not undertake advocacy work. They play no role either in the legislative
effort or the certification process. Since the great majority of peasants
here (as well as in Wollaita) are not literate, providing copies of the re-
levant laws to individual households would not only be too costly but
would be counter-productive. Public officials at the kebelle level them-
selves did not have access to all the relevant legal documents, except
for a few photocopies of the recent killil land law. They usually get to
learn about new killil or federal policies and legislations through peri-
odic training workshops and briefings at the woreda office or occasion-
ally at the killil capital in Bahr Dar. When we arrived for our fieldwork
in Dessie, a team from the Amhara killil land administration authority
had just completed a briefing programme in Dessie for kebelle and wor-
eda officials on the new killil land law. This kind of briefing is not com-
mon practice in all localities; the exception in Dessie Zuria woreda re-
sulted from its special status, as noted above. Amhara is quite large,
made up of 106 woredas and over 2900 kebelles, and to hold regular
Table 3.1 Peasant awareness of land laws (Dessie Zuria)
Yes No
No. % No %
Federal law 13 11.8 97 88.2
Killil law 31 28.2 79 71.8
Federal & Killil laws 28 25.5 82 74.5
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training sessions in all these localities and for all these officials would
be a costly undertaking.
Peasants in both Dessie Zuria and Wollaita expressed a strong faith
in the law as an instrument of security of property and of tenure.
Nearly 94 per cent of respondents in our field survey believed that laws
can provide a guarantee for rights to land. Moreover, many believed
that knowledge of the law was as important as the law itself. Peasants
with whom we held extended interviews in both locations were of the
opinion that raising rights awareness and providing legal literacy
would help to empower title holders, enabling them to defend their
rights and to promote their interests. A number of the informants in
Dessie Zuria thought it would be best to employ, for this purpose, the
services of community organisations and religious leaders who have a
good reputation among the people, since they would be less costly and
more accessible to them.
Land disputes and dispute settlement
It is often argued that the three most important benefits of title registra-
tion are guarantee of ownership and security of tenure, reduction of
land disputes, and improved access to credit from financial institutions
(Marquardt 2006). The World Bank (2005) found that the immediate
benefit of land certification in the country was the reduction of land
cases in the kebelle courts, which are known as Social Courts. To what ex-
tent does the evidence we collected in our survey support these claims?
At one level, it does appear that land disputes and the burden on the
Social Courts have been reduced. To the question about land disputes
in our questionnaire, a great majority of respondents answered that
there have been fewer land disputes in the community since the certifi-
cates were distributed. The chief judge of the Social Court in Aba Soko-
tu, who was interviewed for this study, stated that there had been fewer
land cases brought before his court now than before certification. Al-
most all woreda and kebelle officials interviewed were of the opinion
that land certification has succeeded in reducing disputes among farm
households. The most frequently cited causes of disputes were conflicts
over plot boundaries, inheritance, divorce, blocking access paths or
transit corridors, planting certain tree species on boundary lines, and
crop damage. The argument of those interviewed was that the land cer-
tificate clearly defines the boundaries of each holder, and there is thus
documentary evidence to make going to court irrelevant or unwise. But
as we noted earlier, the boundary markings that were employed were
for the most part movable objects and not permanent ones, hence this
has not ruled out boundary conflict. The second point is that many of
the cases of conflict that were cited are not directly related to the re-
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cords that appear in the certificates or land registry; they do not, in
other words, carry documentary evidence.
A closer examination shows that the issue is quite complex, and
there is ample cause for concern. To begin with, there are two kinds of
land dispute that are relevant to our subject: disputes among peasants
on the one hand, and disputes between peasants and the government
on the other. In terms of incidence and court case load, the first form
of dispute is by far the most pervasive. There are a number of options
available to disputants. At the simplest level, they can come to a settle-
ment through the intervention of close friends and relatives; however,
the most common practice is to take the case to customary dispute set-
tlement institutions, i.e. elders, religious leaders, etc. When asked
where they would take their case first if there were land disputes, 80
per cent of respondents said they would first approach local elders and
community leaders. As a second option, 94 per cent said they would
take their case to the kebelle office, and as a third option, 67 per cent
chose the local court. There is thus a strong tendency to avoid formal
institutions in favour of customary ones. Aware of this preference for
community institutions, decision-makers are now attempting to incor-
porate these institutions into the formal sector. The new killil land law
now recognises customary dispute settlement mechanisms as first-line
options for disputants.
However, as was noted above, there have been significant institu-
tional changes that have accompanied land certification, one of which
has been to give the land administration committees the additional re-
sponsibility of resolving land disputes. LAC members include local el-
ders who are selected specifically for this purpose. Thus, at the grass-
roots level, there are now initiatives to combine the formal and the in-
formal. The new procedure followed when parties to a land dispute
bring their case to the kebelle is to send the case not to the Social Court
but to the LACs which are established at the gott level. If the dispute is
settled there, that ends the matter; if not, the committee transfers the
case with its written decisions to the Social Court. This has reduced
the case load of the local courts, but it does not necessarily mean that
there are fewer disputes now than before. The chief judge referred to
above noted that even now, land disputes constitute the largest number
of cases in his court.
Our findings in Wollaita present a slightly different picture. Prior to
certification, peasants sought the services of traditional elders to settle
land disputes. At present, however, all informants said disputants take
their case to the LACs that have been established in each sub-kebelle. If
the dispute is not resolved here, the case is referred to the kebelle Social
Court, and from here it may be taken to the woreda court. The evidence
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suggests that fewer people now rely on customary institutions to han-
dle land disputes.
On the other hand, the information we gathered from the Dessie
Zuria woreda court and police station in Dessie, the woreda capital, re-
veals a more troubling picture. The court is responsible for civil cases,
while the police handle criminal cases. Cases are brought before the
district court from all 31 kebelles directly by litigants or are referred, or
sent on appeal, by the Social Courts. The chief officer of the district
court, whom we interviewed in his office in Dessie, said he was very
distressed by the high and growing number of cases coming before his
court from the rural areas. He noted that in the great majority of in-
stances these are cases in which land disputes play an important role
in one form or another. The two most important land-related cases
were marital disputes and inheritance (of land) disputes. In the last
one and half years alone, that is in the period when land registration
and titling were taking place in the district, the court heard nearly
1,250 such cases, which is much higher compared with a similar peri-
od in the past. He pointed out the increasing number of appeal cases
brought to the court from the kebelles. Our investigation at the district
police station tallied more or less with the information from the district
court. The chief inspector of police, whom we interviewed, thought
there was a rise in land cases brought to the attention of police. In the
year 2005/2006, there were 1,153 criminal cases involving land dis-
putes recorded at the station, and this, according to the chief inspector,
was a high figure for one year. In the last six months of 2006 alone,
land cases numbered 550. Thus, if we add up the case loads in the dis-
trict police station and court, the number of cases in which land was at
the centre of the dispute is very high for one district.
Both the court officer and the chief inspector pointed out that in
cases originating from the rural areas, the line separating the criminal
and the civil is a thin one. If you scratch a criminal case, they wanted
to say, you will find a civil cause for it. Both officials were quite con-
cerned by it, and they gave us several examples to illustrate the compli-
cated nature of rural cases. For example: a case of assault involving two
peasants is brought to the police station because it is a criminal of-
fence. Upon investigation it turns out that the cause is a dispute over
land. The court officer in fact believed that almost all rural cases,
whether criminal or civil, are at bottom caused by land disputes.
Thus, the picture that emerges here is of a rural society rife with
conflict and antagonism primarily on account of disputes over land
which title registration has not allayed. These disputes and their preva-
lence are indicative of a deeper social malaise and confirm the widely
held view that resource conflict is more common among disadvantaged
populations than among the better-off. They reveal profound insecuri-
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ties about basic livelihoods and property rights, insecurities which have
been aggravated by growing rural poverty, population pressure, and
scarcity of land, and limited opportunities for alternative sources of in-
come. In these circumstances, one can speak of the structural embedd-
edness of land disputes and their pernicious effect on community rela-
tions. From time to time such disputes turn into violent conflict, taking
on a religious, ethnic, or clan form, as is happening in some parts of
rural Wollaita at present. There has been a spate of violence that has
flared up between clan groups here in which lives have been lost and
property damaged. The initial cause was minor disputes over land
among individual peasants or neighbours.
The second type of conflict, i.e. between the peasant and the govern-
ment, is of a different nature altogether. Peasant displeasure with the
government may arise due to decisions that lead to the expropriation of
peasant land, to the imposition of an unpopular cropping, land man-
agement or environmental regime, or forced labour or financial contri-
butions for public schemes – all of which are not uncommon. The
average peasant knows that there is no mechanism, legal or constitu-
tional, for redress of grievances when the government is a party to the
dispute. The government is too powerful to be challenged, and besides,
all magistrates and judges are government employees, and there are
few opportunities for a fair hearing. There is an old saying which re-
veals the state’s unchallenged power in the minds of the poor: just as
one cannot touch the sky, so one cannot take the ‘king’ to court (the
king here means the state). We did ask all persons we interviewed
whether they thought the government should be taken to court if pea-
sants felt aggrieved by its decisions. Many did think the government
should be taken to court, but upon closer scrutiny we realised that
many of these people understood the government to be the public ser-
vants who hold government posts rather than the government as an in-
stitution. There have been a few cases in which government officials
have been taken to court by peasants, but the disputes were between
the two individuals rather than between a peasant and a government
agency. In Wollaita, on the other hand, almost all informants thought
the government could not be taken to court. As one informant put it:
land is held by the government, and the government is also responsible
for issuing the laws and appointing the judges to the courts, so what is
the meaning of taking the government to court? The chief judge of the
Social Court of one kebelle interviewed for this study agreed: he thought
it was not possible to take the government to court.
Access to free legal services was a subject on which we had extended
discussions with key informants, peasants, and public officials. In the
survey, we asked respondents whether access to free legal services
would help peasants defend their rights better, and 71 per cent an-
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swered in the affirmative, but 26 per cent thought it would not. The
provision of free legal service to the poor was considered by all infor-
mants as a capital idea, but there were differences among them with
regard to who should provide it and whether or not it would be ac-
cepted by the courts. Some thought the service would be acceptable by
the courts if it was provided by the government, with a few suggesting
that it should be provided only by the public sector. Some of the higher
officials on the other hand thought there would be difficulties and that
the courts would not be willing to accept it if such a service were pro-
vided by the voluntary sector. Some peasant informants, who did not
have a positive view of the courts, and who considered them as corrupt
and biased in favour of the privileged, thought legal services, especially
legal representation on behalf of the poor by advocacy organisations,
would be strongly resisted by the courts as well as local government
bodies because it would be a challenge to their authority.
Land certificates and tenure security
As was noted above, peasants do not have rights of ownership over the
land, they have only use rights. Land rights here, in other words, are
rights of usufruct only. Land registration and certification merely con-
firm the right of use of the land for the households’ livelihood, and the
documents handed out to peasants are strictly speaking user certifi-
cates and not land certificates in the proper sense of the term.
While land registration has been well received by peasants in both
our research sites in the north and south of the country, and there are
changed attitudes regarding land renting and leasing as a result, a
good deal of uncertainty and insecurity remains, and this becomes evi-
dent when one probes the matter a little deeper. Everyone is certain
that they will receive compensation in the event they lose their land;
however, not everyone is sure whether the compensation will be fair
and commensurate. When land is expropriated by local authorities for
public purposes or limat – and this is not infrequent – compensation is
often paid in kind, i.e. the peasant receives land which is supposed to
be of equal value to the land he/she has lost. Local authorities simply
do not have the financial resources to be able to pay compensation in
cash. However, there is scarcely any farm land to distribute in either of
our research sites, hence peasants are offered land which is of poor
quality and in some cases not really suitable for farming. Cash pay-
ments for compensation are offered only if land expropriation is under-
taken at the request of a private investor, or if the land is needed for
large-scale public projects such as roads, dams, or urban housing, etc.
88 DESSALEGN RAHMATO
Peasants are also not sure of future government intentions and
plans: whether there will be new land redistributions or new infrastruc-
ture projects that may involve land alienation are questions that are on
the minds of many. There is no tradition of consultation with rural
communities when new initiatives are planned; on the contrary, the
common practice under the present and previous governments has
been for new programmes to be imposed from above, frequently with-
out even local authorities concerned being informed or adequately pre-
pared. Peasants are almost always the last to know, and they are in-
formed only when implementation is to be undertaken. Almost all pea-
sants in our two research locations said they heard about land
registration when they were called to attend a general meeting to elect
the committee that was to be responsible for implementing it. Admin-
istrative decentralisation, briefly noted above, has given local authori-
ties a little more freedom to act in terms of programme management
and implementation, budget preparation, and use; nevertheless, it has
not done away with top-down decision-making, because lower-level offi-
cials are still dependent on higher authorities for development and
other programme initiatives as well as financial resources.
There is another issue that is important but is often ignored, namely
demographic growth and resource scarcity. The subject of population
pressure as a factor in aggravating insecurity of rights to land, with or
without formalisation, has not been given sufficient attention in the
current debate. Unrelenting population growth and increasing scarcity
of land, which are really two sides of the same coin, is a serious con-
cern to many peasants in the country, but it is an immediate and press-
ing danger in Wollaita, in particular where the severity of the demo-
graphic stress is approaching catastrophic levels. Here, household plots
are shrinking in size, the fertility of the soil is declining steadily, and
farm incomes are getting smaller – but at the same time there are
more mouths to feed every year (Bush 2002; Eyasu Elias 2002). Hun-
ger is widespread, and starvation is a constant danger but has been
averted thanks to timely interventions by the government and the vo-
luntary sector (in the form of food aid and safety net schemes). The
threat of the loss or erosion of rights to land hangs over most peasants
in Wollaita on account of poverty made worse by micro-holdings and
decreasing household income. This fear has not been mitigated in any
significant way by land certification. Distress sales of agricultural pro-
duce, including the harvest, are widespread; similarly, distress sales of
land, which are carried out surreptitiously, are known to take place oc-
casionally. Distress land transactions, not uncommon in the past, still
persist, where the poor are driven to give up a good deal of their rights
to the land for a small return. There are strong pressures on holders
with small plots to transfer their land to others either temporarily or
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for longer periods. The size of the landless population is higher here
than in many other places, and this is a cause of apprehension and in-
security for landholders, because they fear that the government will im-
pose land redistribution on them to accommodate the landless.
Partly as a result of the demographic danger, peasants in Wollaita
are less enthusiastic about land certification than those in Dessie Zur-
ia. Asked about the most pressing problems in their community, Wol-
laita peasants cited population pressure and land shortage on the one
hand, and soil fertility decline on the other as being paramount. While
all are in favour of title registration, some are sceptical about its long-
term benefits in the light of the demographic stress and the increasing
vulnerability of households. A few of our informants here were appre-
hensive that the benefits of the certificates would soon be eroded by de-
mographic pressure. The problem is compounded by customary inheri-
tance rules. In most parts of Wollaita, partible, pre-mortem inheritance
is the rule: i.e. household heads divide up their land equally and distri-
bute it to male siblings during their own lifetime (and not after their
death). This means a family may divide its possessions to four or more
male heirs and end up landless in the process. In this situation, land
certificates are of little value.
We asked respondents in our survey in Dessie Zuria whether they
thought future land redistribution was likely now that they had received
their certificates and the registration programme had been completed.
The answers we received were quite revealing of their apprehensions:
more than 44 per cent thought redistribution was likely, while 29 per
cent were of the opposite mind. The details are given in Table 3.2 be-
low. It could be argued that those who said they were not sure were not
expressing full confidence, and if we add this group to those who said
redistribution is likely, we find a very high degree of uncertainty among
peasants in the survey. On the other hand, many kebelle and woreda offi-
cials believed land redistribution was unlikely, though a significant
minority, including higher officials, thought that redistribution could
take place in the future if there were good grounds for it. In Wollaita,
despite title registration, nearly half of our informants thought the gov-
ernment would take away their land if it wanted to.
Table 3.2 Peasant views on future land redistribution (Dessie Zuria)
Views Number Percentage
Not Applicable 1 0.9
Redistribution likely 49 44.5
Redistribution unlikely 32 29.1
Do not know/Not sure 28 25.5
Total 110 100.0
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Land redistribution did in fact take place along with land certifica-
tion in Gelsha kebelle, one of our survey sites. There was no legal basis
for it, nor was it an integral part of title registration; on the contrary, it
was undertaken at the discretion of local officials. The kebelle authori-
ties here decided that no household should possess land that was more
than sufficient for its subsistence, which was determined by adopting a
minimum holding size of 0.49 ha. A household’s land size was based
on this minimum, with allowances made for the number of registered
members in it, and any land in excess was taken away and distributed
to the needy. The size of the land of each household was measured
using the crude methods described earlier. While we do not have exact
figures, it was clear that a good number of households were dispos-
sessed. There were also land relocations: households said to have large
holdings and in distant locations were offered land nearer to their
homes in exchange for giving up their distant plots. On occasions,
however, the land offered in exchange was of poorer quality. One of
our peasant informants in Gelsha told us that he had two ha of land
before registration, but the authorities took away half of it and gave
him one hectare of land near his homestead. He was disappointed but
did not complain and thanked his stars because the land he was of-
fered was of good quality. He said others were not as fortunate.
Another important question that was included in our survey had to
do with the likelihood of land expropriations. We asked respondents if
they thought their land would or would not be taken away from them.
Table 3.3 shows the answers we received. Half of our respondents were
of the opinion that their land may be taken away from them in the fu-
ture, even with the certificates, but 42 per cent were more confident
this would not happen. There have been frequent instances when pea-
sants had given up their land on the authority of local officials, accept-
ing the decisions without much protest. On a few occasions, however,
such decisions have been contested by peasants. The following case is
interesting because it combines many issues together: land expropria-
tion, improper use of authority, and gender discrimination.
The case involves a peasant woman and an official of the land ad-
ministration unit in Aba Sokotu kebelle whom we shall call TA. TA ear-
Table 3.3 Peasant views on whether land will be taken away (Dessie Zuria)
Views Number Percentage
Not applicable 1 0.9
Likely to be taken 55 50.0
Unlikely 46 41.8
Do not know/Not sure 8 7.3
Total 110 100.0
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lier gave up his land because the authorities said it was needed for the
school being built in the kebelle. In return, he was offered land which
was taken away from a peasant woman who was declared to be in pos-
session of more land than she needed for her subsistence. Her plot
was chosen for expropriation, according to the officials, not only be-
cause she was a large holder but because it was as good as the land TA
had given up. This reallocation took place after land certification,
which meant the authorities took back the woman‘s certificate and
gave her another one. The woman formally complained to the kebelle
office which ruled that TA was justly compensated, and she had no
case to pursue. The woman then took the case to the district court in
Dessie. At the time of our field work, the case was pending in the
court, and TA was called on one occasion to give evidence. We were un-
able to interview the woman because she was not available, but we
were given to understand that she would appeal to a higher court in
the event the district court’s decision was unfavourable to her.
This was an unusual case for several reasons. There is a great deal
of discrimination against women in the rural areas. There were no wo-
men in any of the important committees or offices in the kebelle in
either Dessie Zuria (except one) or in Wollaita. It is not infrequent for
women household heads to lose part of their land on the grounds that
they cannot manage it adequately; women are not supposed to plough
the land, or do any of the more strenuous physical work. In most
cases, women accept decisions that are discriminatory because of
strong cultural pressures. The population in Dessie Zuria is predomi-
nantly Muslim, and women are not expected to shoulder public roles
or engage in argument with men in public. In practice, however, wo-
men are quite active and often participate in public gatherings. The
head of the district Women’s Association based in Dessie interviewed
for this study bitterly complained about the treatment of rural women
by both local officials and the courts. She said women-headed house-
holds were unfairly treated during land reallocations, and the courts
are known to be partial to men in cases involving divorce and property
settlement. What makes this case exceptional is that in the first place it
is only rarely that peasants contest the decision of local officials. The
common practice is to accept government decisions with at best some
verbal complaints and show of disappointment. In the second place,
the persistence of the woman to see the case through the courts, de-
spite the odds against her and the costs involved, makes it worthy of
note.
Finally, a word on tenure security. I have argued elsewhere that real
and full security of tenure is affirmed when: a) the landholder has a
right to the land on a continuous basis for good or for long enough to
have an incentive to improve or invest on it; b) the landholder feels as-
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sured that his/her rights are not arbitrarily overridden by others, in-
cluding the state; c) the holder has the freedom to use, dispose of, or
transfer the land free from interference by others, including the state
(Dessalegn Rahmato 2004:35). Measured in these terms, land certifica-
tion has failed to assure peasants the robust security for which they
have been searching for generations.
Conclusion
What I have attempted to argue in the preceding pages is that land
rights go beyond the legal construct and extend into the political
sphere and the sphere of governance. The formalisation of land rights,
in the form of registration and title, as in our case, cannot by itself
guarantee robust security, especially for the poor who are severely dis-
advantaged in economic, social and political terms, and who do not
have visibility, voice, or negotiating power. The relationship between
the state, which is responsible for formalisation, and the poor is a rela-
tionship of hegemony and subordination, and this relationship will
have to change to enable the poor to secure and defend rights to prop-
erty. The first step in this direction is the empowerment of the poor
through their own effort and, as has been shown in some Asian and
Latin American countries, the effort of social movements and advocacy
organisations.
Empowerment cannot come about without rights awareness: this is
not just knowledge about the law having to do with land and other
property but also about political-juridical rights and ways to make use
of them to ensure poor people’s interests. Rights awareness must help
the poor to enhance their visibility and voice: it must enable them to
speak for themselves, to contest unfavourable decisions and to defend
their rights. Such awareness can be promoted not by government agen-
cies but by the poor themselves and by independent third parties. The
enhancement of rights awareness cannot be left to the government be-
cause, as we have argued above, that would in the end be counter-pro-
ductive.11
What is missing in de Soto and the conventional property law debate
is the connection between rights on the one hand and the empower-
ment of the poor on the other. Without the latter, legalisation will be a
remedy without effect because it will not address the special circum-
stances of the poor; if secure property rights are to be guaranteed, lega-
lisation must go hand in hand with empowerment. In Ethiopia, as we
have seen, the subordination of the peasant to state authority is mani-
fest in many forms and has been an enduring element of the relation-
ship between the one and the other; it was in this context that land cer-
LAND RIGHTS AND TENURE SECURITY 93
tification was undertaken. Formalisation has not questioned the basis
of the relationship but has assumed it to be normal and justified,
hence its failure to guarantee security of tenure.
Moreover, there is no sign that the empowerment of the rural poor
is underway or is even a possibility in the near future in the commu-
nities we studied; the same may be said of peasant communities in
other parts of the country. As I showed earlier, the level of rights aware-
ness, even of rudimentary legal literacy, is very low. Since peasants
have barely any legal representation and are hardly capable of negotiat-
ing or lobbying, they continue to be voiceless and excluded from the
decision-making process. In these circumstances, land certification can
only be of limited benefit, and indeed, as some of the general literature
on land titling indicates, it may even be counter-productive in the long
run (see Dessalegn Rahmato 2006a).
Notes
1 The meaning of local administrative terms is given in the appendix at the end.
2 For a review of works on land certification and donor attitudes, see Dessalegn Rah-
mato 2006a.
3 See Nyamu-Musembi 2006 for the range of De Soto criticisms. For the legal plural-
ism argument in the African context, see articles and references in Mwangi 2006.
4 See the classic study of Moore (1966) for the historical perspective; Aston and Phil-
pin (1985) for the debate.
5 See Franco 2005 for the Philippines; the experience of Land Alliances in supporting
the rural poor in some African countries appears in Mwangi 2006; on legal advocacy
groups in Africa and Asia, see Golub 2003, Manning 1999.
6 De Soto is joint chairman of the Commission; visit http://legalempowerment.org.
undp for publications.
7 For comparison with earlier elections see Dessalegn Rahmato and Meheret Ayenew
2004; for the 2005 elections see Dessalegn Rahmato and Meheret Ayenew 2006.
For figures from NEB, visit www.electionsethiopia.org. I should note that the ruling
party is made up of a coalition of ethnic parties in power in each of the killils.
8 Several western governments and a number of international human rights groups
condemned the government for the use of excessive force in suppressing the pro-
tests. An inquiry committee set up by the government to investigate the events con-
cluded that 196 people were shot and killed by the security forces.
9 The documents are known here as holders’ books because they look like bank books,
but we shall refer to them as certificates for convenience.
10 See Solomom Bekure et al. 2006 for articles about experiences in other parts of the
country.
11 USAID in Ethiopia is trying to support a program of public information and aware-
ness, the aim being to inform landholders ‘of their land use rights and obligations’.
It appears the program will rely on state agencies to achieve its end (USAID 2006b).
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Appendix
Administrative terms
Killil: Autonomous administrative unit, often inhabited by one eth-
nic group, making up the country’s federal system. Killils (fre-
quently rendered as Regions or Regional States in official
documents) are large units: the Amhara killil, in which our
main study was undertaken, has a population of 18.6 million.
Zone: Unit within killil equivalent to a province; the woreda where
we conducted our main field work is found in South Wollo
zone which has eighteen woredas, and the zonal and woreda
capital is the town of Dessie.
Woreda: Unit within zone, comparable to a district. The woreda is
governed by an elected Council and manages its own budget
and development programmes. Our research woreda is called
Dessie Zuria which has 31 kebelles within it.
Kebelle: Unit within woreda, comparable to a sub-district. The average
kebelle in our study woreda contains 900 to 1000 households.
The kebelle is governed by an elected Council. (See text for
sub-divisions of the kebelle.) The two kebelles where we
conducted fieldwork are Aba Sokotu (15 km from Dessie) and
Gelsha (30 km from Dessie).
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4 Securing land rights in Ghana
Kojo Sebastian Amanor
Introduction
Land in Ghana has not been nationalised, and the national constitution
recognises the rights of customary authorities in land administration.
Nevertheless, the notion of customary authority has been redefined by
the state in many instances since the colonial period, and what consti-
tutes the customary system and customary chiefs is really a modern ar-
rangement that arises from an alliance between state and ‘traditional
authorities‘, particularly since in some areas chieftaincy was created in
the colonial period.
There are three types of land in Ghana, which are classified as cus-
tomary, state, and vested. Customary land comes under the authority
of paramount chiefs, sub-chiefs, earth priests, and clan or extended fa-
mily heads, depending upon the relative power of these different sec-
tions, their relationship with the state, and the ways in which they have
been historically incorporated into district administration since the co-
lonial period. Customary systems of tenure are often highly contested,
with different authorities claiming to be the original and authentic ‘tra-
ditional authority’. Customary land has also been subject to increasing
interference from government agencies, which have assumed responsi-
bility for the allocation of timber concessions and for the collection of
revenues and rents, such as rents from migrant farmers and timber
revenues. The collected revenues are shared between central govern-
ment agencies, local government, and customary authorities.1 In effect,
customary land becomes subject to revenue-sharing arrangements and
joint management between state and customary authorities. Thus, the
customary system really consists of a hybrid system of accommodation
between customary authorities and state institutions.
State lands consist of lands that have been acquired by the state for
the purposes of national development. This includes land acquired for
public works, national development projects, state economic enter-
prises, and concessions allocated by government to the corporate sec-
tor. The state has acquired land through the creation of a legal frame-
work of eminent domain, which enables the state to acquire land com-
pulsorily for the national interest, which extinguishes the previous
interests in land subject to payment of compensation. Vested lands are
subject to dual ownership in which the land is vested in the president
in trust for the chiefly stools or for the landholding communities in
areas where land does not come under the authority of chiefs. The gov-
ernment neither pays compensation for the land nor expropriates the
land to other parties, but assumes responsibility for its management
and for the collection of revenues. A portion of the collected revenues
is retained by government, and a portion is disbursed to the chiefs or
landowners and local government, according to a revenue-sharing for-
mula.2
There has been considerable abuse of the notion of public or na-
tional interest since the 1960s, with the state using notions of eminent
domain to extract rents for bureaucratic and political elites, and to ex-
propriate land for the wealthy and for allies of the political regime.
Chiefs have also abused the notions of their customary custodianship
on land to promote narrow and selfish interests and accumulate
wealth. They have expropriated existing land users without providing
them with compensation or alternative land. They often engage in mul-
tiple sales of the same land to different parties, and they fail to comply
with contracts to which they originally agreed. They redefine customary
norms to satisfy their whims and self-interest with impunity (Abudulai
2002; Alden Wily 2003; Amanor 1999; Boni 2005; Ubink 2006). This
has resulted in highly inefficient land markets, which lack transpar-
ency and are characterised by many social injustices.
In recent years, there have been major attempts to introduce admin-
istrative land reforms and to promote the regularisation and harmoni-
sation of land management within the state and customary sectors.
The aims of the reforms are to create a more comprehensive land doc-
umentation system which links the formal and customary systems,
and creates a more transparent and efficient system of land administra-
tion. Reform within the land management sector has also been influ-
enced by economic liberalisation, the cutting back of the state, the di-
vestiture of state enterprises, and the promotion of free markets and
private investment. This has resulted in attempts to devolve land ad-
ministration to the customary authorities. However, this strengthening
of the customary occurs in the context of social upheaval and rapidly
changing social and economic relations. It occurs in a period of in-
creasing commoditisation of land and growing demand for land
among corporate sectors and the wealthy. It is associated with the in-
creasing shortage of land and landlessness in rural and peri-urban
areas, increasing migration to urban areas, and a serious problem of
homelessness in urban areas. In attempting to make sense of the chan-
ging framework of land administration, this chapter examines land
tenure policy within a historical context. It locates the changing frame-
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work of land policies and policy instruments within the broader context
of changing paradigms of economic and social development.
In Ghana, three different phases in the land question can be identi-
fied that have occurred since the Gold Coast became incorporated into
the modern world economy as a colony with a modern administrative
framework:
1. The early colonial phase, in which there was minimal state inter-
vention in economic production, from the early twentieth century
to the 1940s. Rural administration was carried out through Indirect
Rule and the establishment of Native Authorities;
2. The late colonial phase and early postcolonial phase, in which the
state intervened in economic activities and development planning
and established state economic enterprises, from the late 1940s to
1983;
3. The neoliberal phase characterised by economic liberalisation and
the rolling back of state interventions in the economy and social
welfare provisioning, which started with the introduction of struc-
tural adjustment in the early 1980s.
This chapter traces the framework of land management as it evolved in
different epochs, contextualising the changing frameworks for land ad-
ministration in the changing paradigms of economic development poli-
cies. It also examines the framework for the management of land and
natural resources within different economic sectors, including agricul-
ture, forestry, mining, and real estate, showing how the changing rela-
tionships between the state, private capital, and international markets
and finance impact on land administration and the concept of land ten-
ure and land reform. After a general introduction to different tenure
and administrative regimes in Ghana, this chapter examines the im-
pact of the colonial administration on land tenure, in the context of in-
direct rule. During the 1940s a major transformation in agricultural
policy occurred in the context of state-led development which had ma-
jor ramifications on land tenure and the role of the state in land man-
agement. The following section traces the relationship between land
policy and agricultural development from the 1940s through the early
independence period, and to the era of structural adjustment and the
introduction of neoliberal policies. This is followed by an analysis of
land relations within the forestry and mining sectors, and within urban
and peri-urban real estate. The changing relationships of various
groups to land are examined in these various sectors, documenting the
impact of policies on land users, land purchasers, developers and inves-
tors, and the control of the state and traditional authorities over the
alienation, appropriation, regulation, and sale of land. The final section
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examines recent land administrative reform initiatives and their impact
on security in the use of land and security in the purchase of land and
creation of land markets.
The regional divide: North and south
Ghana can be divided into two distinct areas: the south and the north.
The south was incorporated into the colonial economy as a primary
commodity-producing area of cocoa, gold and timber, and the north as
a labour reserve for the export economy of the south. In the south, un-
der colonial rule, land ownership was retained by customary chiefs un-
der a system of Indirect Rule. In contrast, in the north, the Lands and
Native Rights (Northern Territories) Ordinance of 1931 placed the man-
agement of land in the post of Governor to administer on behalf of the
people in accordance with their customs. The north was largely inte-
grated into British colonial rule as a labour reserve for the south, chiefs
being appointed firstly to recruit forced labour and then during the
1920s to impose taxes on men, which forced them to migrate to the
south to earn wages to meet tax obligations. Minimal investments were
made in the development of the north, and controls over the emer-
gence of land markets prevented wealthy investors from the south ac-
quiring large tracts of land for agricultural purposes (Benning 1996).
Thus, the development of the north was hindered until after indepen-
dence. It continues to be less developed than the south.
In 1979 the land in northern Ghana was eventually returned to cus-
tomary custodians as a result of a sustained campaign of northern
elites and chiefs, and a unitary land administration system was created
for the whole country. The 1979 Constitution established that land in
Northern Ghana was no longer public land and was to be vested in the
original owners of the land (Danaa 1996). This has not been easy to
implement since notions of customary rights have often been contested
in the north. In many parts of the north, the colonial government cre-
ated and invented chiefs and their administrative boundaries, particu-
larly in those societies that did not have unitary paramount chiefs,
where land originally came under the authority of ritual earth priests.
With the recognition of customary rights of ownership, land in the
north has often been transferred to invented chieftaincies, which never
controlled land before the colonial administration, rather than to earth
priests who maintained ritual control over land. Control over land has
become increasingly contested between chiefs and earth priests, but
also among chiefs at different levels of the (invented) hierarchy (Ben-
ning 1996; Lund 2006).
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Because of the different histories of incorporation of the north and
south into the colonial economy, land in the south is more commodi-
fied. Land has been widely sold in the south since the early nineteenth
century. Land markets have been constrained and restricted in the
north, although there is some evidence that land transactions did occur
before colonial rule was consolidated, particularly during periods of
famine when the poor sold plots for cowries to purchase food (Benning
1996).
By the 1970s, the economy of the north began to be transformed
from a labour reserve to a food production area. Government invested
in large rice and vegetable irrigation projects, and many aspiring com-
mercial farmers from the south invested in developing rice. However,
commercial food crop farming has had mixed success in the north,
and by the early 1980s many of the commercial rice estates collapsed
(Konings 1986). Cocoa continues to be the main crop produced in the
south, although there is increasing diversification into other crops for
urban food markets and export.
Land and colonial rule
Export crop production began in the southeastern Gold Coast in the
early nineteenth century, when the Krobo and Akuapem area began
producing palm oil for exports. The rapid expansion of oil palm cultiva-
tion led to the development of a moving land frontier in which farmers
began purchasing virgin land from neighbouring peoples and chiefs
(Amanor 1994). An institutional framework developed for the sale of
land (Hill 1963). By the late nineteenth century, land sales intensified
as farmers in the southeast replaced oil palm with cocoa and moved
into the moist forests of southern Akyem. The town chiefs in Akyem
alienated considerable areas of land to these migrant farmers, a move-
ment which has been well documented by Polly Hill (1963).
Considerable investment in gold concessions occurred in the gold
boom of the 1870s and 1880s on the Gold Coast (Dumett 1998; Ho-
ward 1978; Kimble 1963). The scramble for gold assumed geopolitical
dimensions. Fear that Asante would sign a treaty with France for the
exploitation of gold led to the British occupation of Kumasi, the capital
of the Ashanti Empire, in 1895, and the annexation of the Gold Coast
as a British colony. One of the early concerns of British colonial rule
was to bring land under the control of the colonial government by vest-
ing all ‘waste land’ or unoccupied land in the Crown. However, control
of land in the south by the colonial state was eventually rejected for a
policy based on Indirect Rule, which vested the allodial title to land in
paramount authorities organised in Native Authorities.3 In this frame-
SECURING LAND RIGHTS IN GHANA 101
work only paramount rulers could transact land with outsiders and for-
eign investors. This effectively constrained the development of free
land markets and speculation in land by preventing land users (the
holders of ‘usufruct‘) and other groups from selling land.
British colonial policy claimed to support the retention of customary
values against the onslaught of modernity. However, the customary va-
lues retained were often inventions of tradition that suited the objec-
tives of colonial rule (Ranger 1993). The history of most African socie-
ties in the nineteenth century was characterised by rapid transforma-
tion, conflicts and social turmoil, rather than the stable traditions
depicted by colonial rule. Chiefs often exploited the constructs of stable
homogeneous traditions and customs to further their own interests
and build their power base. This was often contested under Indirect
Rule, by groups who felt their rights violated by chiefs. Dissension was
expressed in numerous petitions to the colonial authority, demonstra-
tions, violent conflicts, the ‘destoolment‘ (dethronement) of chiefs, and
legal litigation, which were all the hallmark of life under British colo-
nial rule.
The concept of custom was often manipulated by chiefs to further
their own narrow interests (Rathbone 1993, 1996). As long as this
furthered the objectives of colonial rule, this was tolerated by the colo-
nial authority. In many instances, the customary was associated with
privilege for the rural political elite and a corresponding denial of hu-
man rights for the majority of rural people through the imposition of
coercion by the chiefs. Rural dwellers were subject to forced labour for
public works and the extraction of numerous revenues. Chiefs became
responsible for appropriating land for public works, forest reserves,
mining and timber concessions, and allocating land to farmers for ex-
port crop production.
The new economic interests that chiefs acquired in land assured that
there was a conversion of land to new values and land uses. As Field
(1948:7) commented:
The new income from mines and land sales means that the
land, originally valueless to the oman [local state] and quite inde-
pendent of it, has become linked to the oman. The oman does
not control or own it, but has acquired a very acute interest (in
the non legal sense) in it.
While chiefs had powers to sell land and negotiate concessions, they
could only transact land and natural resources with outsiders. Indi-
genes had rights to use land freely in the areas in which they belonged.
Lands that they developed were usually converted into lineage lands
and claimed by their descendants. Farmlands usually came under the
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administration of the extended lineages that had developed the land
rather than under chiefs. Thus, chiefs could only get revenues by trans-
acting land with people from outside the locality and by transacting
lands which were not already occupied by farming people. They could
only gain revenues from land that lay beyond those occupied by rural
communities for residential and farming purposes (Boni 2005). Thus,
the notion arose that lands beyond those used by farming communities
belonged to the stool, which had the right to sell them.
The development of cocoa farming was accompanied by a rapid
scramble for land in which chiefs attempted to sell as much undeve-
loped forestland as possible to migrants before local farmers could con-
vert it into farm. During the 1920s and 1930s, colonial policies of
creating labour reserves in northern Ghana and in the neighbouring
Sahelian countries resulted in a large influx of migrant labour into the
forest. In addition to selling land to migrant farmers, the chiefs could
also allocate land to migrant labourers or sharecroppers, who were re-
sponsible for delivering a portion of the plantations they created or a
portion of the harvest they reaped to the chiefly stool.
Between the 1920s and 1950s most of the land within the high for-
est zone was converted into cocoa plantation, as a process of rapid ac-
cumulation of land assets for cocoa farming took place. Much of this
land was converted into cocoa plantations by migrant capitalist farmers
and migrant labourers (Hill 1956, 1963). By the 1940s, the dominant
population within the rural areas of the forest consisted of migrants.
However, this was not recognised within the framework of Indirect
Rule, which conceived of rural areas as consisting of homogenous
tribes with a common custom and tribunals that tried cases according
to the local tribal customs (Macmillan 1946).
As a larger influx of migrant farmers and labourers entered the co-
coa districts, land became increasingly scarce in relation to labour. The
prices of land and the tenure arrangements were increasingly modified
in favour of the landlords. Boni (2005) shows how the conditions of
land ownership became transformed in the Sefwi Wiawso area of the
Western Region. Originally, before the development of cocoa farming,
land had a low commodity value, and migrants gained land freely. In
the early years of the development of cocoa in the Western Region,
chiefs sought to encourage migrants to develop cocoa and released land
to them on highly favourable terms. As the cocoa industry began to ex-
pand, land was transacted through outright sales, in which migrants
purchased freehold. As land became scarcer, these were replaced by
land leases and sharecropping arrangements in which in addition to
making payments of money to chiefs for land, migrants had to provide
the chiefs with a proportion of the crop or a proportion of the cocoa
plantation they created. The payments, which the farmers originally
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understood they had made for the land, were later reinterpreted by
chiefs as customary prestations to request the granting of land. Boni
(2005) shows how these customary payments changed over time, re-
flecting the growing value of land. Chiefs developed and created new
‘customary’ tenure arrangements, clauses and conditions, and they
were often made to apply retrospectively to all previous agreements.
Migrant farmers increasingly experienced deteriorating conditions and
terms under which they held rights to land. This often led to increas-
ing friction between chiefs and migrants as migrants attempted to re-
sist changes in their contracts.
The alienation of land to migrants also created land shortage for lo-
cal youth, particularly among poorer families, who no longer had the
option to clear unclaimed forestland, since chiefs had alienated all
these lands to migrants. This resulted in increasing frictions between
local youth and the chiefs and between local youth and migrants, since
the youth perceived the migrants as having occupied their land to their
detriment. In some instances, local youth organised against their chiefs
to destool them for abusing their privileges. However, the colonial
authority would often mobilise the police to defend chiefs against
youth who were portrayed as troublemakers (Rathbone 1993). By the
late 1940s and 1950s discontent with the system of Indirect Rule had
spread and became manifest in the riots and lootings of 1948. During
the 1950s, many chiefs were ‘destooled’ by youth and commoners
(Amamoo 1958). A commission of enquiry into the riots of 1948 found
considerable discontent among commoners and ‘young men’ with the
system of Native Authorities and chiefs. The Watson Commission
made recommendations for replacement of the native authority system
by democratically elected local councils. However, the introduction of a
system of elected local government did not completely overhaul the in-
fluences of the chieftaincy institutions, and chiefs were allowed to ap-
point one-third of the members of local councils. Since then, local gov-
ernment in Ghana has been characterised by arrangements in which
one-third of the councillors are appointed by chiefs, central govern-
ment, or an alliance of the two. This is justified in terms of allowing
people with expertise and competence to be appointed to local govern-
ment but has tended to hinder downward accountability and ensures
that political elites and central government dominate local government.
Post-war agricultural restructuring and state-led development
During the 1940s, laissez-faire policies of minimum government inter-
ventions in the economy were replaced by a new framework rooted in
state intervention in the economy to promote development. The state
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began to take an active role in rural development and agricultural de-
velopment. In post-war policy circles, it was argued that trusteeship un-
der Native Administration had failed to produce the impetus for agri-
cultural development (Hailey 1943). Food production had stagnated,
and food imports had increased to meet the needs of the rapidly ex-
panding urban population. Oil palm production was a frequently cited
example of the inadequacies of policy. Oil palm production had origi-
nated in West Africa, which had been the major export palm oil-produ-
cing centre in the nineteenth century. It had been displaced by modern
plantation production in Southeast Asia in the twentieth century, and
now could not even meet domestic oil demands. It was argued that
agricultural development required large investments from the state.
Left to the private sector this investment was unlikely to occur.
During the 1950s, the colonial government began to introduce large-
scale agricultural development schemes. These schemes were based
upon developing modern smallholder agriculture, new infrastructure,
and mechanised agriculture. These new developments were articulated
within a framework of community development, in which the whole
community was mobilised to participate in local development projects
through mass education, the forerunner of community participation.
The early attempts of the colonial government to establish large agri-
cultural development schemes, such as the Gonja Development Pro-
ject, were largely a failure (Konings 1986). Nevertheless, this created
the legacy for agricultural development projects, which was taken for-
ward in the 1960s and 1970s in state irrigation and other schemes.
Three distinct mechanised agricultural sectors were created: state
farms; private estate agriculture provided with loans and subsidised in-
puts by government; and large-scale development and irrigation
schemes, which incorporated small farmers on a contractual basis.
These initiatives were based on promoting large-scale estate agriculture
and required the expropriation of considerable areas of land. To achieve
this, the state needed to transform its relationship with chiefs, as had
been developed under Indirect Rule. It now established an eminent do-
main, through which it controlled the allocation of land to productive
sectors and development projects in accordance with a framework of
national planning. To be able to regulate production on the large-scale
rural development projects of this period, the state needed to own these
schemes, and regulate production and marketing. However, the state
did not nationalise the land and remove it from the administration of
chiefs. It sought the compliance of chiefs in this process of expropria-
tion. It recognised the allodial powers of chiefs and gained their colla-
boration in expropriating land for national development. In return, the
rights of chiefs to a compensation payment for the expropriated land
were recognised. In contrast, farmers were only compensated for the
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crops on the land, unless they had registered title to the land. This ca-
veat enabled expropriation to be carried out without negotiation with
the individual farmers, who were only recognised as owning crops
rather than land. Negotiation for expropriation in the national interest
was carried out between the state and chiefs. The economic benefits
that chiefs could gain from expropriation, in the form of compensation
and concession fees once the land had been transferred to new eco-
nomic enterprises, ensured their support for expropriation. Chiefs
would collaborate with government in finding suitable areas for expro-
priation, particularly since they were unable to gain revenues from lo-
cal communities who held rights to occupy land freely. Thus, expro-
priation of peasant farmers through eminent domain became a device
used by the state in collaboration with the chiefs to further their mu-
tual interests.
This resulted in a new alliance between the state and chiefs, in
which the chiefs facilitated the expropriation of land for development
projects and saw that their ‘subjects’ complied with the directives of
state and parastatal development projects. Konings (1986) documents
many instances of chiefs using coercive powers to ensure the compli-
ance of their subjects in state projects. He claims that the authority of
the chiefs on irrigation projects in northern Ghana in the 1980s had
been so well consolidated by the state that none of their directives
could be challenged by the peasantry. The chiefs had at their command
an array of ‘traditional’ sanctions, which were supported by the state,
and this made it dangerous for farmers to question their authority.
Konings narrates instances of farmers who were evicted from their vil-
lages by the chiefs for daring to question their decisions. Similar devel-
opments occurred in modern oil palm estates that were created in the
1970s. The Ghana Oil Palm Development Project (GOPDC) was cre-
ated on land that was expropriated with the agreement of chiefs: 7,000
families farming on 9,000 hectares of land were expropriated (Amanor
1999; Gyasi 1992).
While some land was often redistributed to farmers on these agricul-
tural projects after the creation of new infrastructures, this redistribu-
tion was often highly skewed, favouring the wealthy, commercial farm-
ers, and men over women. In the Weija Irrigation Project, irrigated
land was redistributed to male household heads, with the assumption
that women would help their husbands in farming (Botchway 1993).
The men were obliged to sell their produce to the project parastatal
marketing company. However, prior to the creation of the irrigation
project, women had farmed independently. They also marketed their
husbands’ crops from which they derived significant incomes. The
creation of the irrigation project deprived them of land and of income,
since the project monopolised the marketing of irrigated crops. Mar-
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ginalised from the project, women refused to work on their husbands’
irrigated plots and focused on farming beyond the perimeter of the irri-
gation project. Konings (1986) describes how irrigation projects in
northern Ghana deprived women of land. Women were deliberately re-
created as cheap farm labour which large-estate rice farmers exploited.
During the 1970s, the state increasingly used the pejorative of emi-
nent domain to expropriate land for commercial farmers and bureau-
crats, often with close links to the political administration. Much of the
land in irrigation projects was allocated to aspiring commercial farmers
with close links to the political administration, including military offi-
cers and bureaucrats, rather than to members of the community. Kon-
ings (1986) also describes how, independently of the state, chiefs
would expropriate local farmers and sell off land to commercial farm-
ers. They often mimicked the rhetoric of the state, claiming to reallo-
cate the land in the ‘national interest’ or the interest of ‘development‘.
Institutional framework for land administration in the
postcolonial period
The new developments in agriculture during the post-war and early in-
dependence period were reflected in institutional and legislative re-
forms. The first significant legislation was the 1952 State Councils Or-
dinance, which regulated the sale of land by chiefs by requiring this to
be conducted with the consent of State Councils. State Councils were
district councils constituted by representation of all the chiefs within
the district, with the Paramount Chief or Head Chief as the President
of the Council. This represented the first stages of reform of the Native
Authority system, which introduced checks on the powers of para-
mount chiefs. Without the consent of the State Council, all transac-
tions in land by chiefs were invalid.
In 1952, elected local government was introduced, and the Municipal
Councils Ordinance was enacted. The management of stool lands was
vested in the local councils who were responsible for collecting the rev-
enues from stool land and depositing them with the Accountant Gener-
al, who divided them between the local council and the stools accord-
ing to a sharing agreement worked out between the stools and the local
council. In the event of failure to agree upon the distribution of reven-
ues, the matter was to be referred to the Minister of Land for resolu-
tion. The Municipal Councils Ordinance did not affect the ownership
of stool land, which remained under the jurisdiction of the chiefs.
However, transfer of stool land to other owners required the approval
of the local councils. Land purchasers needed to approach both the lo-
cal councils and the State Council to get transactions recognised. While
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local councils became responsible for the management of stool lands,
there was no provision made for systematically recording land transac-
tions and registering title at the district level.
Subsequent development of land legislation emerged in the context
of party political conflicts. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) won
the first general election in the newly independent republic of Ghana.
However, several prominent paramount chiefs supported the main op-
position Union Party (UP). This included the Asantehene, Prempeh II,
and the Okyenhene of Akim Abuakwa, Ofori Atta II. The CPP accused
these chiefs of misappropriating stool revenues and using them to
fund the UP party, rather than using them for the benefit of the com-
munities in which their stool lands were vested. In 1958, the Ashanti
Stool Lands Act and the Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act were in-
troduced, which placed the land of these stools in the hands of the Pre-
sident to manage on behalf of the stools and the communities. These
acts effectively established the state as the trustee of the lands of these
two stools, and central government became the administrator of reven-
ues accruing from the stool lands. The acts also established a sharing
arrangement for the revenues from the stools, which were to be dis-
bursed between the central government, the local district authorities,
and the stool. In 1960, the Stool Lands Act extended this arrangement
to all customary stool lands in the country, which vested the adminis-
tration of land in the president as a trustee of the public interest. This
not only curtailed the power of the chiefs over land, but also led to the
replacement of the newly created framework for decentralised land
management within local districts with centralised state administration
of land.
The Administration of Stool Land Act 1962 made the collection of
stool land revenue the responsibility of the state and made the state re-
sponsible for overseeing and regulating transactions in stool land. The
act empowered the state to authorise occupation and use of stool land
for public interest, and to determine the amount of compensation for
land and the value derived from the land by the people.4 The combina-
tion of the Stool Lands Act and the Administration of Stool Lands Act
served to establish an eminent domain for the state. They vested in the
President the right of compulsory acquisition of land in the national
interest. They gave the Office of the President the sole right to deter-
mine the national interest, and to expropriate land for this purpose
(Amankwah 1989).
The reforms to the system of land administration in the 1960s
strengthened state control over land. The establishment of eminent do-
main enabled the state to alienate land whenever it needed to and in
relation to its development objectives. It enabled the state to expropri-
ate land and convert customary land into state land. Beyond this, there
108 KOJO SEBASTIAN AMANOR
was little attempt to interfere within customary relations, to strengthen
the rights of land users, or check the existing abuses by customary
authorities. The only attempt to regulate land relations was the intro-
duction of the 1962 Rent Restrictions Act, which prevented stools from
leasing land to migrants on share arrangements and forced them to
convert share contracts into monetary rents. However, after the violent
overthrow of the CPP government in 1966, the Rent Restriction Act
was repealed and a tribute system reintroduced, in which farmers had
to provide the stools with one-tenth of their crop as rent. This has sub-
sequently been changed, reverting in some areas to a one-third share
of the yield.
While there was little interference with the nature of customary ten-
ure systems, the state was able to insert its land administration institu-
tions directly into the management of customary land. An accommoda-
tion was reached between the state and customary authorities. The
state recognised the rights of chiefs to control land and revenues, and
the chiefs consented to the state gaining a share of these revenues and
actively participating in the management of stool revenues. The chiefs
also complied with facilitating the expropriation of land for the ‘na-
tional interest’ and for commercial sectors and investors supported by
the state. This arrangement has served to undermine the rights in land
of farmers and other land users. The most that land users could gain
was compensation for the crops they had planted on the land. How-
ever, if they had registered the land and gained title deeds, they could
claim compensation for the land as their personal property. Land titling
is largely confined to wealthy commercial farmers and corporate firms,
since it is a complex and expensive process that is beyond the means
of most peasant farmers. This caveat has protected the rights of the
commercial and corporate sector to their investments in land, while al-
lowing small farmers to be expropriated with impunity. It has enabled
an alliance of the state, chiefs, and private sector investors to capture
rents from the expropriation of smallholder farmers. Registration
merely emphasised the favoured status of commercial interests groups,
who were more likely to register land and to protect the interests they
often gained through the expropriation of the less fortunate.
Transformations in peasant agricultural holdings
Although considerable expropriation of land has occurred for the allo-
cation of land to commercial and high-input mechanised agriculture,
this comprises a relatively small sector. The majority of land is under
peasant holdings in both the export agricultural and food-producing
sectors. Within this sector, there is significant social differentiation and
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change in both the productive relations and the nature of holdings.
However, this varies between different areas and regions, and the most
commodified rural areas occur in the forest zone.
The most significant transformations in agriculture arise in the con-
text of the decline of frontier land. In the past, farmers had alternatives
between farming on existing family land and expanding into new, un-
cultivated forest areas. At present, this option has largely disappeared
in the high forest zone, where farmers increasingly depend upon fa-
mily land. Since there is insufficient family land to meet the require-
ments of all members of the lineage, this leads to growing conflicts
over family land.
In the past, when land was plentiful, elders allocated land to their
children and to members of their extended family who had served
them well, to help them develop their farm enterprises. Labour was
highly valued, and land used to attract labour. At present, land has ac-
quired a higher scarcity value than labour, and attempts to allocate land
to junior kin are often disputed by other relatives within the extended
family. Shortage of land also results in a large number of people look-
ing to hire or sharecrop land. Family elders are often interested more
in the potential immediate income that can be generated by the land
rather than in redistributing it to dependent kin. Young family mem-
bers who wish to develop commercial tree crops, such as oil palms or
cocoa, are often frustrated in their attempt to get family land from el-
ders. The elders argue that the farmers are removing land from the fa-
mily for long periods for their own personal benefits. In some in-
stances, family elders have destroyed the plantations of those who have
been given land by their parents, after the death of the one who
granted the land. Youth, children, and wives who have worked on the
farms of an uncle or father find that after his death junior brothers
claim the farms without allocating them a portion in recognition of
their inputs into these farms (Amanor 2001; Okali 1983). As a conse-
quence, many young farmers prefer to farm independently on share-
crop contracts rather than work on family land (Amanor 2001; Gyasi
1994).
In some areas, sharecropping is becoming the dominant mode of
transferring land. In the Kwae area, Amanor and Diderutuah (2001)
found that around 50 per cent of plots were farmed on sharecropping
arrangements, and that land was being given out to close kin on a
sharecrop basis. The rise of sharecropping and other tenancy arrange-
ments as dominant tenure arrangements complicates land ownership.
Security of tenure and security of ownership have become distinct is-
sues, and a strengthening of customary forms of ownership, as defined
by family elders and chiefs, could undermine the remaining rights that
youth and women possess in land.
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Increasingly, farming is an individual activity, in which cultivators
hire land and labour, and landowners contract their land out to share-
croppers. Elders with insufficient capital to hire labour frequently
sharecrop the land. Land is also sharecropped for tree crops such as oil
palm, which incur high costs in purchasing seeds and inputs and hir-
ing labour. The tenants have the responsibility to create the tree planta-
tions using their own capital. The plantations are divided between the
landowner and the tenant when they start bearing. The tenant has
rights to continue managing their share of the plantation until it stops
bearing, which can be 25 years for oil palm and 50 years for citrus.
In some areas the customary payments associated with the allocation
of land to extended family members have been inflated to exclude
poorer family members from gaining family land for planting food
crops. The high costs of the customary payments ensure that they
must invest in high value commercial crops to recoup their expendi-
ture on gaining access to land (Amanor and Diderutuah 2001). In
these areas, agriculture is increasingly commodified, and the process
of commodification has transformed customary land tenure arrange-
ments and social relations within families.
Constraints in state-led agricultural land reform
The post-war system of land administration was established to create
greater accountability in the transaction of land, to hold chiefs accoun-
table and to facilitate the development of agricultural modernisation.
In practice, there has been an accommodation between chiefs and
state, which has led to the expropriation of many small farmers with
derisory compensation payments. While this expropriation is carried
out in the national interest, a significant proportion of expropriated
land has ended up in the private commercial sector. This has resulted
in increasing bureaucratic and chiefly abuse.
Within the customary sector, land transactions continue to lack
transparency and accountability. The high demand for land results in a
growing contestation of customary tenure norms and increasing inse-
curity in rights to use and own land. Chiefs seek to benefit from the
growing demand for land by reinventing customary tenure arrange-
ments to suit their interests. They find ways of increasing exaction on
migrant farmers, and ways of expropriating local farmers without com-
pensation (Boni 2005). In some areas, the growing value of agricultur-
al investment in land is resulting in the breakdown of family inheri-
tance systems, with family elders preferring to accumulate capital by al-
locating land to sharecroppers rather than redistributing it within the
extended family. There is a trend for family land to be allocated to ri-
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cher farmers and to rich tenants with capital to develop the land. The
least powerful members within extended families, including women,
youth, and the poor, frequently suffer the effects of this process of capi-
tal accumulation (Amanor 1999; Amanor and Diderutuah 2001).
These developments result in increasing inequity in rural holdings and
increasing contestation of land ownership and land rights. Customary
relations are frequently being redefined by power.
A fiction is being maintained that customary relations continue to
exist independently of the changing economic, social, and political rela-
tions. This enables the rich and powerful to claim customary privilege
and to use land to further their ambitions. Poorer farmers are losing
land rights and become vulnerable to exploitative relations, which are
justified as the elaboration of customary ‘norms’ and privileges under
modern conditions (Boni 2005; Ubink 2006).
Segments of the corporate and commercial sector have benefited
from the expropriation of land. However, the dominant processes of
compulsory acquisition of land and expropriation of the poor through
the manipulation of concepts of customary privilege do not facilitate
the development of well-functioning land markets. It creates tedious
processes through which access to land is dependent upon political
and bureaucratic interventions. Without these interventions, land trans-
actions become highly risky. The recent expansion of private sector in-
vestment requires the growth of transparent markets and clearly de-
fined concepts of ownership rather than the improvisation of custom-
ary norms and privilege by the powerful in a changing economy. Thus,
the existing land administration system fails to create an adequate and
transparent framework to inspire confidence in land transactions and
to cater for the increasing demand for land. The problems within the
existing framework have also been created by the demands of the cor-
porate sector and international investment for access to land resources.
This becomes apparent when developments in the control of resources
in the forestry and mining sector are examined.
The forestry sector
Many of the developments in land administration in the agriculture
sector are mirrored in the forestry sector. The timber industry in Gha-
na expanded rapidly in the post-war period, when large supplies of ex-
port timber were required for post-war construction in Europe. This re-
sulted in the rapid expansion of expatriate timber companies in Ghana,
in the late 1940s and 1950s, and the rapid growth of timber exports
(Amanor 1999, 2005a). Prior to this, timber had largely been produced
by small-scale pitsaw operators within the cocoa farming belt. These
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pitsawyers purchased timber trees from farmers. The dominant ar-
rangement was for the sawyers to convert trees into beams and allocate
farmers one-third of these or a third of the proceeds. During the early
colonial period, stools did not claim ownership of timber resources on
farms. However, with the expansion of timber concessions in farming
areas, a new legal framework was required, which secured timber re-
sources outside of forest reserves for concessionaires.
The expansion of timber exports coincided with the movement of co-
coa farmers into the new frontier areas in the Western Region. At-
tempts to redefine timber tenure began to emerge in the context of the
opening up of the cocoa frontier by migrant farmers in the Western
Region. New ‘customary arrangements’ were created in which the trees
on the lands into which migrant farmers were moving were recognised
as the property of chiefs (Amanor 2005a). In signing Memorandums
of Agreements for transactions in land with migrant farmers, clauses
were introduced that specified that the timber resources on the farms
belonged to the chiefs. The timbers on these lands were allocated as
concessions, and the chiefs benefited from the timber royalties. The
timber royalties were often worth more than the sale of land to mi-
grants, and chiefs would often sell large areas of land at favourable
prices to ensure they could gain control of the timber resources. The
Protected Timber Lands legislation of the 1950s gave timber companies
rights to fell all exploitable timber trees in their concessions before
farmers were allowed to enter and clear the land (Amanor 2005a).
In this period, a distinct set of practices developed in different parts
of the colony in relation to rights in timber. In the Eastern and Ashanti
regions, timber on existing farms was largely extracted by small-scale
operators who entered into negotiation with farmers for individual
trees. In the frontier areas of the Western Region in which most timber
resources were concentrated, timber trees were recognised as the prop-
erty of chiefs, who had sole rights to transact the timber on farmlands
with concessionaries.
With independence, new legislation was enacted to reflect the chan-
ging status of the former colony, and the changing relationship be-
tween chiefs and state. The Concession Ordinance of 1962 vested all
timber trees within the nation in the President to manage on behalf of
their owners, the chiefs. This legislation extended the new arrange-
ments developed in the Western Region to the whole country, introdu-
cing the fiction that timber trees customarily belonged to chiefs. Since
there was no timber industry in the pre-colonial era, timber tenure is
essentially a modern phenomenon, which is not prescribed by custom-
ary norms.
During the 1960s and 1970s, timber concessionaires continued to
focus on the new frontier areas of the Western Region, which were rich
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in timber species, and to ignore the more patchy timber resources of
the older frontier areas in the Eastern and Western Regions. However,
as these resources began to decline, concessionaires began to focus on
extracting the remaining timber in other farming areas, to which the
Forest Service extended concessions during the late 1980s and 1990s.
Timber concessionaires began to encroach on the timber resources on
farms, creating considerable damage to the farms. This resulted in
growing conflicts between the Forestry Service and concessionaires on
one side, and farmers and chainsaw operators (who had replaced the
pitsawyers) on the other.
New legislation was created in 1994 to facilitate the monopolisation
of farm timber resources for timber companies. The 1994 Forest Policy
removed the management of off-reserve forest resources from district
councils and placed them under the Forestry Service, redefining timber
as a strategic national resource that should not be decentralised. After
gaining control of the off-reserve areas, one of the first legislations in-
troduced by the Forestry Service was to introduce a national ban on the
use of chainsaws in processing timber (Amanor 2005a). Paradoxically,
these changes were introduced within a framework of participatory for-
est management. However, the Forestry Service has largely confined its
consultations to chiefs, whom it recognises to be the legitimate repre-
sentatives of communities. Chiefs have benefited from the new legisla-
tion. They receive part of the royalties from the exploitation of farm
timber, while the farmers who have tended and preserved the trees re-
ceive nothing.5 The empowerment of chiefs in forest policy has re-
sulted in an increasing loss of rights in timber for farmers. With the
expansion of the concession system into farmland, the farming areas
have been rapidly denuded of timber. Current projections estimate the
complete decline of commercially exploitable timber resources in a few
years. Plans for the future of the industry are based on the replacement
of naturally occurring timber by plantation timber. Projects are now
being developed in the transition zone of the forest for the develop-
ment of plantation timber. These may lead to a further erosion of the
resource base of small farmers, as increasingly land is given out by
chiefs for the development of commercial timber plantations at the ex-
pense of small farmers.
The mining sector
Although the colonial state did not directly intervene in the control of
land, it effectively monopolised gold resources for foreign mining com-
panies by banning small-scale gold mining in 1905. With the attain-
ment of independence, the Minerals Act of 1962 was introduced,
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which vested ownership and control of minerals in the President on
behalf of the Republic of Ghana. This empowered the state to grant li-
censes for prospecting and mining and to prescribe the conditions of
exploitation. While the state recognised the interests of the stools in
minerals under their jurisdiction and their rights to royalties and con-
cession rent, it reserved the right to manage minerals and negotiate
concessions with foreign companies to the state. In 1972, the Minerals
Operations (Government Participation) Decree was enacted to enable
the state to gain controlling shares in mining companies. There was
no attempt to readdress the banning of small-scale operators, who con-
tinued to operate illegally.
The rights of small-scale operators were not addressed until the
1980s when a Small-Scale Gold Mining Law was passed under the in-
fluence of economic liberalisation policies. This law made provisions
for the registration of small-scale miners at the district level and the al-
location of licenses for areas of 3-5 hectares for periods of 3-25 years.
However, with the subsequent expansion of corporate mining conces-
sions, local communities and informal sector miners experienced de-
clining access to land. During the 1990s, corporate sector gold mining
rapidly expanded in Ghana to become the most important export-or-
iented economic activity within the country. Gold mining technology
also changed from deep pit mining to more expansive and environ-
mentally destructive opencast cyanide heap-leach mining. In the Wassa
district of the Western Region, 30,000 people were displaced from
their communities to make way for mining operations.6 Many people
have lost access to farmland and suffered contamination of their water
supplies by cyanide and other toxic wastes. This has resulted in a num-
ber of deaths from poisoning.
Expropriation has taken place without the provision of adequate
compensation to the communities. This is justified with recourse to
the familiar argument that the allodial rights belong to the chiefs, who
are the rightful recipients of compensation. Many informal sector gold
miners found their livelihood criminalised as gold-mining concessions
are allocated in areas in which they have been exploiting gold. As se-
curity forces are deployed at the behest of the mining companies to
evict small-scale mining in their concessions, this has resulted in a
number of violent skirmishes and deaths. There has been an escalation
in violence as communities attempt to protect their interests and resist
expropriation. The law courts have also introduced harsh sentences
against members of mining communities who resist expropriation. In
December 2006, five activists of the Wassa Association of Commu-
nities Affected by Mining (WACAM), an organisation that seeks to de-
fend the interests of communities against mining companies, were ar-
rested for meeting with disaffected members of communities in a con-
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cession recently allocated to Newmont in Brong Ahafo. When brought
before the court, the five activists were sentenced to two weeks prison
custody. The judge stated: ‘in recent times, the mining communities
had been disturbing the foreign companies’ and he would use this case
to set an example so that the community people would stop harassing
the mining companies.7 The expansion of investments in mining con-
cessions has resulted in declining access to land, natural resources and
livelihoods for the rural communities in the areas. The rule of law has
served to protect the interests of the powerful and undermine the basic
human rights of the poor.
Real estate: Urban and peri-urban areas
In recent years, land has been rapidly commodified in urban and peri-
urban areas for building property. This is due to the rapid expansion of
the urban population; the growth of a business and middle class with
money to invest; the expansion of corporate investment in Ghana; and
the willingness of private companies to pay high prices for prime prop-
erties in central Accra for business premises and residences for their
cosmopolitan managerial and technocratic employees. A property in
the Osu, Ridge, or Labone areas of Accra can now sell in excess of
USD 500,000.8 Rents for houses in these areas mount up to USD
6,000 per month.
The rapid growth of the urban population in recent years has re-
sulted in overcrowding in the poorer areas of Central Accra. The com-
bination of overcrowded housing and high rents results in many urban
dwellers searching for rental housing and building plots on the out-
skirts of the city and in peri-urban areas. This in turn has resulted in
the rapid conversion of farming land into residential plots. This pro-
cess of expansion of residential areas is poorly regulated, since the in-
stitutional structure for urban land administration has not been devel-
oped to cope with the present scale of transactions. The consequences
are highly insecure land ownership, disputes over land, and poor land
planning procedures. Portions of land are not often allocated for impor-
tant community services, such as schools and recreational facilities,
and areas are not demarcated for future use (Gough and Yankson
2000). The growing urban sprawl contributes to poor infrastructure
development, and houses are frequently located in unsuitable areas.
Within the urban area, land for housing is mainly sold by chiefs or
the central government on land acquired for public purposes. The ac-
quisition of land in urban areas is usually carried out by people who
are not indigenes of the area, since urbanisation results in the develop-
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ment of a heterogeneous population emanating from all regions in the
country.
Indigenes originally had the right to build houses in their settle-
ments and to farm lands over which their extended families claimed
ownership or which lay in uncultivated areas that were not claimed by
anyone. The usual practice for indigenes wanting land for building
purposes was to approach the family head or chiefs and elders with a
request for land. The recipients usually made a presentation of drinks
and sheep before witnesses to the family elders to seal the transaction
after land was allocated to them (Gough and Yankson 2000).
Migrants wanting land for building purposes usually approached the
chief and elders of the community and provided them with drink and
some money. A sum was paid annually to the landowners, who ac-
knowledged the secondary rights of the migrant and the rights of the
chiefs as the original landowners (Gough and Yankson 2000). This
customary framework was retained alongside the drawing up of inden-
tures and site plans by surveyors hired by the customary authorities.
The state defines these transactions as land leases, and the 1992 Con-
stitution prohibits the creation of freehold interests in customary land
and only allows for land leases. However, a normative structure for
leases does not exist in practice (Antwi and Adams 2003), and most
buyers are not clear about what will happen when their leases expire.
Gough and Yankson (2000) found that only 25 per cent of land pur-
chasing households they interviewed had paid ground rent to the mu-
nicipal authority.
Chiefs often use notions of customary rights in land to evade ac-
countability. This often occurs in the context of competition between
the government and chiefs to gain control over land and revenues for
land. Revenues from stool lands are constitutionally subject to a shar-
ing arrangement, in which ten per cent of total revenues are taken by
the state through the Administrator of Stool Lands for administrative
purposes. The remaining 90 per cent are divided between the land-
owning stool (chief), which receives 25 per cent, the paramount stool
(with ultimate political authority over the area), which receives twenty
per cent, and the local council, which receives 45 per cent of revenues.
By presenting land sales as customary ‘drink’ money, the chiefs are
able to evade the declaration of monies they receive from land sales
and evade the collection of revenues by the Administrator of Stool
Lands (Antwi and Adams 2003; Ubink 2008). They are able to use the
money they receive as they please, since it is not documented or sub-
ject to scrutiny.
The lack of transparency in the transaction of land and the ambigu-
ous status of land sales enable chiefs to engage in fraudulent practices.
They frequently sell the same plot of land to different people. Multiple
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sales occur in three contexts. First, they occur because of disputed own-
ership of land or rights to sell lands between rival factions of chiefly
lineages (such as two brothers), who sell the same plots to different
parties. Second, they occur when land purchasers fail to develop their
plots in a timely fashion. As infrastructure within the areas develops
and property values increase, chiefs are tempted to capture the price
differential by reselling undeveloped plots. Third, multiple sales occur
intentionally, by fraudulent chiefs with the sole goal of making more
money. The original purchasers may lose their land altogether and the
payments they made. However, if they persist in gaining redress, they
may be allocated an alternative plot in an undeveloped area. Chiefs are
able to engage in these fraudulent practices with impunity since there
is only a weak legal framework for the redress of multiple land sales,
and since chiefly rule is often highly contested by a number of differ-
ent factions. Real estate developers also engage in corrupt practices.
They buy large areas from chiefs, but then bribe surveyors and bureau-
crats in the land agencies to register much larger areas than they pur-
chased. This often includes areas in which individuals have purchased
plots from the chiefs.
Because of the lack of transparency in land markets, land purchasers
seek to protect their investment by physically occupying the plot. They
often give the plots to tenants to occupy and farm. They erect tempor-
ary dwellings on the land, place sand and blocks on the plot, and begin
building as soon as possible. Physically developing the plot is regarded
as a safer investment in securing the plot than attempting to register
it, particularly since the land may be given out to others before the
cumbersome process of registration is completed. Investment in devel-
oping the land is seen as creating more security than gaining the title
before expending capital on the land.
Insecure land markets result in unregulated and unplanned build-
ings in residential areas and increasing conflicts over land, particularly
as land prices rise. Chiefs have taken to hiring armed land guards to
protect what they consider to be their land, land subject to dispute with
other stools and rival factions of chiefly lineages, and to physically re-
move land developers who have purchased land from rival factions.
Conflicts sometimes result in the loss of life.
The rapid increase in land prices and demand for land has resulted
in an erosion of the rights of indigenes to land as farmland in peri-ur-
ban areas is increasingly transformed into residential estates. Fre-
quently, the expansion of residential areas results in the expropriation
of farmers within the area, as chiefs attempt to capture the new value
in the land. In a study of peri-urban Kumasi, Ubink (2006) found that
chiefs were expropriating farmers of land without compensation,
which they then sold to property developers. The chiefs attempted to
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reinvent customary land to justify expropriation. For instance, at Be-
sease, the chief claimed that the land his subjects (indigenes) were
farming on ‘was only “given out” for farming purposes and that when
the village expands and reaches it, the land falls back into chiefly ad-
ministration, giving chiefs the right to allocate land to outsiders for
more lucrative residential purposes’ (Ubink 2006:4). This claim was
disputed by the inhabitants of the village, who insisted on their rights
to their land. They often attempt to sell their land to outside purcha-
sers before the chief can lay claim to it. However, the chiefs are often
able to expropriate the lands of farmers successfully and sell them to
property developers. The land buyers often belong to more powerful
sections of society than the farmers, and the state is reluctant to inter-
vene in controlling the powers of chiefs over the alienation of land
(Ubink 2008, in press) since this often benefits the state and the na-
tional elite who exercise state power. The chiefs frequently use the
funds they obtain from land sales for their own personal use rather
than for the development of the community. Gough and Yankson
(2000) find similar developments within peri-urban areas of Accra, in
which farmlands are sold by chiefs to purchasers requiring building
plots, and little of this revenue finds its way back into community de-
velopment. Abdullai (2002) reports that during the structural adjust-
ment era, many villagers lost their farmland in Tamale, which was con-
verted by chiefs into building plots. In one village the chief was ac-
cused of ‘selling our children [i.e. their birth right] to buy that car as
well’ (Abdullai 2002:81). With the development of sales of residential
land, the abilities of community members to gain land for property de-
velopment are also curtailed. Community members wanting land to de-
velop housing often have to prove that they have the means to develop
the property before they are allocated land (Gough and Yankson 2000).
The intention is to prevent community members speculating in land,
gaining access to land that they later sell to make a profit. However,
this also serves to limit the access of indigenes to land. Most of the
chiefs in peri-urban areas have failed to reserve lands around the exist-
ing community for its future needs. There are differences in the re-
sponses of chiefs. Both Gough and Yankson (2000) and Ubink (2008)
document instances of more enlightened chiefs who invest in the fu-
ture development of the community or reserve land for the future
needs of the community. However, the few examples of enlightened
chiefs only serve to highlight the lack of accountability of chiefs in gen-
eral, and their ability to use land to serve their immediate selfish
needs. Youth often suffer the most from this allocation of building
plots by chiefs and elders, and often end up without housing or land to
farm. This often leads to growing resentment on the part of the youth,
who feel that their elders have sold out their inheritance (Abudulai
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2002; Gough and Yankson 2000). These grievances are often aggra-
vated by high rates of unemployment among the youth.
Significant areas of urban land have also been acquired by the gov-
ernment in the public interest. Larbi (1996) estimates that thirteen per
cent of Accra land has been acquired by the government. Much of this
land has been used to provide residential properties for the rich rather
than meet the objectives for which it was originally acquired. In Accra,
this includes areas of Ridge, which were acquired for housing govern-
ment administrative staff in the colonial period, and East Legon, which
was acquired for the development of the airport. Lands acquired by
Tema Development Corporation have also been used to develop hous-
ing estates for the wealthy, with houses costing in the region of USD
100,000. In the early independence period, state corporations were cre-
ated to develop housing for workers. They now largely cater to the
needs of the wealthy. State expropriation of land for the creation of
these wealthy estates has been carried out without providing adequate
compensation to the chiefs or the affected communities, particularly in
relation to the extent of the value these lands now command. There is
a large backlog of outstanding compensation claims dating back to the
1970s, which are in excess of the equivalent of USD 110 million. These
claims attract no interest, despite the very high rates of inflation in
Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey 2001). Given the wide disparities between
the luxury of these housing estates and the relative poverty of the pre-
existing communities, this has produced considerable discontentment
within the communities about the expropriation of land. This is often
exploited by chiefs in their bid to gain greater control over land from
the government, although they are often equally as guilty in the misuse
of land.
The expansion of population and growing demand and values for
land has resulted in an urban housing crisis, particularly in Accra. Lit-
tle low-cost housing is being created to cater to the needs of the urban
poor. Many landlords in Accra require advance payments of up to three
years’ rent from tenants, which many people cannot afford. This has
resulted in increasing homelessness. A tour of the streets of Accra by
night reveals many people and families sleeping on the streets, particu-
larly around the markets and in the central commercial districts. The
main markets and lorry parks are often surrounded by densely habited
shacks, stalls and other wooden structures in which many recent mi-
grants to the city dwell. Some of these informal shack settlements have
a population in excess of 30,000, such as in Old Fadama. Apart from
the lack of sanitary facilities, these communities are also highly vulner-
able to outbreaks of fire resulting from the high density of roughly as-
sembled wooden structures. The urban councils frequently attempt to
evict these squatters, who have nowhere to go. However, the extent of
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the squatting problem means that eviction is usually an unsuccessful
strategy. In recent years a number of NGOs have begun working in
these areas, negotiating with the urban councils on behalf of the inha-
bitants, initiating community development, sanitation, slum upgrad-
ing, savings, and low-cost housing initiatives. These include Slum
Dwellers International, People’s Dialogue Ghana, a partner of Home-
less International Ghana, and the Ghana Homeless People’s Federa-
tion.9
The existing policy for land administration in urban areas is charac-
terised by a poor regulatory framework and a lack of transparent and
accountable land markets. Existing land markets fail to meet the needs
of a large part of society for land and housing. The existing framework
enables chiefs to alienate land with impunity, without meeting the pre-
sent and future needs of their communities and without addressing
the livelihood needs of those they expropriate. The land administration
bureaucracy has also been characterised by a lack of accountability and
rent-seeking behaviour. Similarly, the state has abused compulsory ac-
quisition of land to allocate choice urban plots for the development of
wealthy residential areas. Chiefs and bureaucrats frequently collude to
maximise their benefits from the lack of transparency in land markets.
This results in a highly inefficient land administration system in which
few purchasers of land have confidence. Consequently, most members
of urban society attempt to secure land and housing outside the formal
sector and outside the rule of law. This, however, creates glaring pro-
blems for an economy that has become increasingly dependent upon
foreign investment, since foreign investors expect to be able to secure
land through property markets and legally enforced transactions.
Contemporary land reform initiatives in an era of neo-liberalism
The development of new paradigms of development, based on promot-
ing free markets and divestiture of state organisation, has created pres-
sures for reform of the institutional framework of land administration.
However, deregulated markets also create problems and can reinforce
the lack of accountability. The current policy framework for administra-
tive land reform proceeds from the premise that to function efficiently,
land markets require improved information on land holdings and own-
ership, greater transparency and efficiency in land registration and
management, and the ability to enforce contractual agreements
through legal provisions.
The first step taken in reforming the land administration system
was the enactment of the Land Title Registration Act of 1986. While
land registration enactments have existed in Ghana since 1843, they
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have only provided for the voluntary registration of deeds. The purpose
of the Land Title Registration Act was to facilitate the recognition of
transactions in land and the maintenance of comprehensive records of
land transactions by prescribing compulsory registration of title. The
Land Title Registration Act aimed to minimise disputes and regulate
fraud in land transactions. It was argued in policy circles that the devel-
opment of a comprehensive land-titling scheme would create the ne-
cessary information on land holdings to provide for greater transpar-
ency and secure forms of private property ownership that could provide
adequate incentives for investment in land resources. However, land ti-
tle registration has had a limited impact. Registration has only been
implemented in Accra, Tema, and Kumasi. Twenty years after the en-
actment of the Land Title Registration Act, only 111,784 applications
had been received for registration, and only 16,829 title certificates had
been issued (Dowuona-Hammond 2003). Registration has been con-
strained by high transaction costs, large ‘rents’ extracted by the bureau-
cracy, slow processing procedures, poor integration between the differ-
ent land administration agencies, and disputes over land ownership, as
customary authorities and rival factions within chiefly lineages engage
in multiple sales of land. The high costs and frustration result in many
people not registering their land. In a survey conducted in 1995/6 of
233 land-purchasing households within peri-urban Accra, Gough and
Yankson (2000) found that 60 per cent of the sample had not regis-
tered their land because they considered it too difficult or unnecessary.
In a survey conducted in 1999 of 286 land-purchasing households in
Accra, Antwi and Adams (2003) found that nearly 78 per cent of the
sample had not formally registered their land. A considerable propor-
tion of those with registered plots had spent more than five years to
get land titles.
The second strategy to attain administrative land reform revolved
around the creation of a National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands and
Forestry 1999), which defined the main aims and objectives of land ad-
ministration. The National Land Policy attempted to create a frame-
work for the harmonisation of land management between different
government agencies and between government agencies and the cus-
tomary sector. A major objective of the National Land Policy was to pro-
mote greater equity in access to land by strengthening and modernis-
ing customary land tenure. The mechanisms that were identified to
achieve this included:
– collaborating with traditional rulers and other land stakeholders to
review, harmonise, and streamline customary practices;
– facilitating the land administration skills of traditional authorities
and family land owners to create a system of proper record-keeping
and to establish customary land secretariats;
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– developing digital databases within government departments and
agencies involved in land service delivery, and harmonised informa-
tion systems linking national agencies with decentralised customary
secretariats (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999:16).
The National Land Policy sought to promote a system of land tenure
reform by recognising and documenting all the different existing rights
in land. This included allodial title, customary freehold, leasehold, and
secondary rights associated with use and customary tenancy agree-
ments, including sharecropping. However, by recognising all possible
rights within the customary system – and not, for example, deliberat-
ing on the contradictions between user rights and allodial rights, or the
ways in which the claims of chiefs to allodial rights have been used to
expropriate the poor – the Land Policy merely reaffirms the existing
status quo. It reaffirms the unwillingness of the state to intervene in
checking abuses of power. The Land Policy has failed to initiate a
much-needed dialogue in society about democratic land reform and
the role of chiefs in land administration (Alden Wily and Hammond
2001; Ubink 2006).
The recommendations of the National Land Policy are being imple-
mented within the Land Administration Project (LAP) (Ministry of
Lands and Forestry 2003; World Bank 2003b). One of the major com-
ponents of this project is establishing Pilot Customary Land Secretar-
iats (CLS) within all regions of Ghana, with appropriate governance
structures to assure institutionalised community-level participation and
accountability in the use of stool land and the revenue it generates.
However, from the inception of the LAP, it has been the government’s
clear political choice that CLSs should fall under the aegis of traditional
authorities rather than opting for more community-based approaches
to the management of customary land. By placing the customary land
secretariats under the authority of the chiefs, the LAP ignores the fact
that the notions of the ‘customary’ powers and rights of chiefs are
loaded with political inventions and endorses the roles that chiefs were
accorded in land administration in the colonial period, as if there were
a timeless principle of customary tenure.
Ten pilot land secretariats have now been established. Plans exist to
scale this up to 50 CLSs in the next five years. In policy circles, it is en-
visaged that the CLSs will facilitate the development of transparency
and equity, strengthen the accountability of customary authorities in
land management, open up a debate at the local level regarding the
procedures and norms which should guide land administration – in-
cluding clarification of the nature of usufructuary rights and protection
of these rights against the chiefs‘ conversion drive – and, eventually,
provide comprehensive documentation of local land-holdings. However,
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this overlooks the desire of powerful chiefs and rural elites to protect
and enhance their economic interests in land. According to Ubink and
Quan (2008), chiefs are resisting attempts to record their incomes
from land sales, land leases, and tenancy agreements. In addition, they
are trying to use the CLSs to facilitate transactions of agricultural and
residential plots to outsiders, to enlarge their control of land revenues,
and to change long-standing land allocations to strangers. In the imple-
mentation of the LAP, the government has been highly reluctant to in-
terfere with the disposal of land by the chiefs and impose pressure for
greater accountability and equity. This creates the risk that traditional
authorities may use enhanced and equipped CLSs to further their ten-
dencies of dispossessing community members who have obtained land
through informal arrangements without adequate compensation. This
will have the perverse effect of further eroding popular rights in land
while claiming to empower the poor.
The concept of traditional authorities maintaining records and regis-
ters of landholding is not particularly new. Since the 1940s, various
chiefs have attempted to maintain registers of landholdings, particu-
larly of migrant farmers who are subject to various customary pay-
ments for land. This registration of land has been used to transform
the conditions under which migrants hold land, and to facilitate
further extraction of revenues by chiefs, redefinition of contractual rela-
tions, and the appropriation of land. Boni (2005) documents an at-
tempt by the paramount chief of Sefwi to register migrant farmers’
lands land during the 1980s. Surveyors were instructed to map out the
existing portions of migrant cocoa farms and confiscate existing site
plans. This was interpreted by migrant farmers as an attempt to expro-
priate the areas they had not planted under cocoa, and to extort money
from them. The migrants refused to comply, and the paramount chiefs
attempted to mobilise their supporters and local youth to dispossess
the migrants of their land. Government was forced to intervene with
the escalation of violence and a commission of enquiry was set up
which found in favour of the migrants. However, all too frequently, the
government fails to intervene and allows chiefs to appropriate land
(Ubink 2008, in press). As Boni (2005:242) comments:
Local power holders – rather than state bureaucrats – have en-
forced ‘custom’ in villages; the title of the tenant, the taxes to be
paid, the definition of farm boundaries underwent continuous
negotiation that saw in the chiefly establishment and the leaders
both the judge and the interested parties. Those recognised as
the rightful interpreters of ‘tradition’ wittingly capitalised on the
ambiguity and transformability of custom. The government’s ac-
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ceptance of this mode of land tenure administration represented
the – yet unresolved – legalisation of extortion.
Many chiefs have close family ties and affinities with business interests
and are often businesspersons and professionals in their own right (Ar-
hin Birempong 2001). These interests often define the ways in which
they interact with their communities. Thus, the contemporary frame-
work, which presents the sphere of customary relations as undifferen-
tiated and representing subaltern rural interests or civil society inter-
ests in opposition to a corrupt state, is over-simplistic. Chiefs often re-
present distinct elite interests and are often willing to expropriate local
community interests for pecuniary reward. Chiefs have sacrificed the
future interests of their subjects to gain revenues from migrant farm-
ers, property developers, timber concessionaires, and foreign investors.
Both state and customary authorities have colluded in the disposses-
sion of the poor to further the interests of foreign investment in the
agricultural, forestry, and mining sectors. The expansion of the market
has resulted in the displacement of peasant cultivators to make way for
new corporate sectors.
The combination of empowering traditional rulers to administer cus-
tomary land relations and the expansion of land markets results in a
dangerous alliance. This increasingly dispossesses the poor while
claiming to promote ‘efficiency with equity’. The contemporary frame-
work for land reform fails to address the underlying contradictions and
lack of accountability within customary tenure systems, which arises
from the insecurity of ownership for land users deriving from the con-
cept of the allodial rights of chiefs. This empowers chiefs to alienate
land and redefine customary values at the expense of existing custom-
ary (or informal sector) land users, who are not given a voice. However,
this redefinition of the customary is taking place in a period of rapid
social change and increasing commodification of land. The redefinition
of the customary under these circumstances serves to sanction the pri-
vatisation and accumulation of land, the rise of individual sales and ex-
propriation, and the conversion of family lands into market commod-
ities. This is particularly dangerous in the present period when frontier
land has been extinguished, and chiefs have sold all existing lands un-
der their control. The increasing empowerment of chiefs is in danger
of opening up a new phase of land expropriations in which the state,
chiefs, rural elites, and the corporate sector collaborate in redefining
customary land to expropriate land at the expense of the poor and mar-
ginalised. The strengthening of customary land tenure under neo-liber-
al management serves to undermine customary tenure arrangements
and facilitates the transformation of communal and family land re-
sources into private, commercial, and corporate property.
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In 2002 the Foundation for Building the Capital of the Poor (FBCP)
was launched in Accra, an initiative developed by the Ghanaian Minis-
try of Justice with Hernando de Soto‘s Institute for Liberty and Democ-
racy, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). The FBCP was launched in September 2002 at a high profile
event attended by the President of Ghana, J.A. Kufuor, the former US
President, Bill Clinton, and Hernando de Soto. The FBCP aims to es-
tablish a regional training centre in Accra for the benefit of other Afri-
can countries and devise the legal means and reforms to assist in mo-
bilising the assets held by the poor to facilitate their economic develop-
ment. The programme hopes to bring all lands and assets into the
formal economic sector through registration, which should give title-
holders access to credit and collateral. Helping poor people register
their land and property is supposed to facilitate their access to loans
for development of their businesses. However, since its launch in
2002, the FBCP has made little visible progress. The underlying ratio-
nale of the programme is not much different from those that informed
the Land Title Registration Act of 1986. It fails to address the underly-
ing constraints that have prevented people from titling land, and the
constraints on the development of credit markets for the rural poor
(Bruce 1993; Bruce, Migot-Adholla, and Atherton 1994). The frame-
work assumes the existence of a multitude of undifferentiated and as-
piring business people within the informal sector, all with clearly de-
fined property rights within the informal sector, who are frustrated by
legal conventions in registering their land. In reality, land relations are
constrained by multiple claims on land, numerous family members
with competing rights to land, and power relations that enable the pri-
vileged to appropriate and redefine customary or informal land re-
gimes.10 This results in contested rights and ownership of land, and
struggles for the appropriation of land and the defence of livelihoods
and user rights in land. This reality is recognised by the Land Adminis-
tration Project, which attempts to document all the different types of
rights. However, the failing (or disingenuity) of LAP is that it presumes
that a just and equitable solution can be worked out between the var-
ious actors in the different domains with differing access to power. It
accords rights of administration to the most powerful actors within the
process – those who claim customary privileges and the rights to rede-
fine customary relations in their own interest and to extinguish the
rights of others. It confuses rights and privilege and divorces land re-
form from the conditions under which people make their livelihood.
While present land reform programmes claim to promote equity and
efficiency and ‘pro-poor market policies’, they are being implemented
in the context of growing deprivation and impoverishment and lack of
vision of the future security of the poor. A large gap exists between the
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extravagant claims of the development policy to be ‘pro-poor’ and the
conditions under which large sections of the population live. The main
policy concerns are with carrying out reforms that will attract external
investors and promote the accumulation of capital. This chapter has
shown that in the context of increased external investment and expan-
sion of global markets, the land rights of the rural poor have consis-
tently been destabilised.
Conclusion
Within Ghana three distinct phases can be distinguished in land ad-
ministration and its reform. These different phases are closely asso-
ciated with the changing framework of economic and development pol-
icy, and the limitations resulting from previous policy frameworks. In
the first phase of colonial rule up to the 1940s, economic policy was
based on limited government intervention in economic production,
and government controls were largely established over revenue collec-
tion in the import and export trade. The economic base of the colony
was founded on peasant production in agriculture, with expatriate mer-
cantile firms controlling the marketing of produce. Large European
agricultural plantations were not encouraged. The mining sector was
controlled by expatriate mining companies with concessions, and
small-scale mining was banned. Export timber production was limited
in this period and confined to areas near the coast with accessible
transport to the ports. The dominant paradigms for development were
based on limited government interventions in transforming the eco-
nomic basis of the colony and forms of administration based on indir-
ect rule and an alliance with ‘traditional rulers‘ and paramount chiefs
willing to collaborate with the colonial administration. In return for
building the foundations of colonial rural administration, these chiefs
were empowered to control land, which they could sell and extract var-
ious forms of revenues from, and to impose taxation and labour ser-
vices on the population. This enabled a rural administration to be ef-
fected without heavy investment in administration, and the rural popu-
lation to be controlled by the chiefs through customary rights and
privileges. The chiefs had powers to make bylaws, but these were rati-
fied and monitored by the colonial administration. Early attempts to
place land under the colonial authority were abandoned in the light of
popular discontent, and land was placed under the authority of para-
mount chiefs. During the nineteenth century a land market began to
emerge. Colonial administration sought to hinder the development of
land markets by only recognising the ability of chiefs to sell land and
negotiate concessions with expatriate companies and by defining land
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relations in terms of customary codes elaborated by the paramount
authority. This resulted in a definition of customary tenure in which
chiefs owned allodial rights to land, and the peasantry only held user
rights in land. While chiefs had rights to sell land, they could only sell
it to non-locals without user rights. This led to a large influx of mi-
grants into the main cocoa-producing areas. The main developments
in this period were the rapid expansion of export agriculture into new
frontier areas and the conversion of forest into farmland.
By the 1940s this framework was found wanting, and a new develop-
ment framework was created which had important ramifications on
land administration. The system of Native Administration resulted in
growing discontent in the anti-colonial movement against the auto-
cratic rule of chiefs. Reforms were introduced which replaced chiefly
rule with democratically elected district councils. Economic policy was
transformed, and the state began directly investing in economic enter-
prises. Agricultural development policies were initiated which were
based on the promotion of mechanised and high-input agriculture and
irrigation. Since the major paradigms for development in the post-war
period were based on increasing state intervention in the economy and
major state investments in production, this led to the creation of state-
led development projects and state agricultural enterprises. These re-
quired the alienation of considerable land for the state, which necessi-
tated the creation of a framework of eminent domain through which
the state could gain access to land for development projects. An uneasy
alliance was built between the state and the chiefs, in which the chiefs
participated in the alienation of land for national development. In re-
turn, the chiefs continued to be recognised as the owners of the land
with allodial title and gained access to royalties, rents, and concession
fees for land they expropriated. This frequently led to the expropriation
of farmers to make way for large development projects. The state also
engaged in joint enterprises with international capital and promoted
an echelon of large-scale estate farmers, who often formed part of the
state elite. Land was expropriated for these three sectors in the national
interest or in the interest of development. The articulation of a custom-
ary sector based on the allodial rights of the chiefly classes and the user
rights of the peasantry was maintained and formed the basis through
which the state exercised eminent domain and expropriated land with
the chiefs for national development or the development of capitalism.
Land administration became increasingly centralised, and national land
cadastres and land title registers were introduced. These largely catered
for large estate farmers, corporations, and agribusiness.
During the 1980s neo-liberal policies were introduced, which di-
vested state enterprises, decentralised administration, and encouraged
free markets and foreign investment. Economic recovery resulted in
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the rapid expansion of investment in urban real estate and foreign in-
vestment in the mining and agricultural sectors. The framework for
land administration, developed in the early independence period,
proved to be cumbersome, since it was largely adapted to enabling state
expropriation of land rather than multiple market transactions. Thus,
reforms were introduced which attempted to streamline land markets,
make transactions more transparent and efficient, and facilitate land
registration and records management. Attempts are also being initiated
to decentralise land administration, which will enable a more efficient
maintenance of records covering customary claims of ownership. How-
ever, the notions of customary ownership based on chiefly allodial
rights and user rights for their subjects has been maintained. In the
present period there are large pressures on land emanating from an ex-
panding population and increasing demands on lands for livelihoods,
accommodation and accumulation. In contrast to earlier periods, large
areas of frontier lands no longer exist, and urban areas are rapidly ex-
panding into rural areas, creating a peri-urban fringe. These growing
demands for land result in increasing displacement of certain cate-
gories of land users, usually the most disempowered, marginalised and
poor. Expansion of urban areas results in the displacement of small
farmers by wealthier urbanites investing in real estate and the creation
of new commercial agricultural sectors, and agricultural accumulation
results in the displacement of small food crop farmers. The new pres-
sures on land result in rapidly increasing values for land. The demand
for land increasingly results in friction over land within the customary
sector as different groups attempt to capture the new values in land. To
meet the new market demands for land, chiefs frequently attempt to
appropriate the land of users to sell to commercial sectors and real es-
tate developers, and family elders transact the land of their lineages
without providing for the needs of the members of their lineages. This
often leads to the reinvention of custom to justify such appropriations
as within customary norms. The tendencies are reinforced by the state,
which increasingly recognises the rights of chiefs but does little to pro-
tect the rights of land users. It fails to problematise the nature of cus-
tomary tenures, along with the power relations which define it and jus-
tify privilege and injustices, and which do not allow the chiefs to exer-
cise accountability. Thus, chiefs are able to continually reinvent
customary tenure to suit their interests and gain more revenues from
land. This results in a situation in which the customary is increasingly
redefined within parameters concerned with rights to sell and alienate
land as private property. Increasingly within the customary sector, peo-
ple gain access to land through market transactions rather than inheri-
tance. Growing numbers of people experience difficulty in gaining land
for their livelihoods in rural areas and for accommodation in urban
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areas, leading to increasing impoverishment and growing grievances
and conflicts around land. Increasingly, the poor within the informal
sector are being displaced by real estate and new forms of agricultural
property. Thus, contemporary reforms of land tenure and administra-
tion revolve around the interests and demands of markets and inves-
tors in property, and the creation of security and an enabling environ-
ment for these sectors. They are less concerned with creating security
for those who gain access to land based on customary user rights and
informal sectors which do not result in the alienation of land and its
capitalisation. Although there is a focus on regularising customary ar-
rangements, the process of regularisation transforms the nature of cus-
tomary rights and converts them from user rights into private property
leases. It does not strengthen the security of existing land users, but
frequently erodes it by empowering chiefs to control and sell land to
external investors. There is a tendency in contemporary policy frame-
works to associate the customary with the rights and privileges of
chiefs to transact land rather than the user rights of the people. This
leads to a focus on strengthening the customary rights and privileges
of chiefs rather than the user rights of the people. There are dangers
in these developments, since the growing powers of chiefs over land is
not checked by processes to assure accountability, transparency, and
propriety or ethical codes of conduct. In examining security in land, it
is important to differentiate security of user rights from security in
market purchases. In the present period, market-based policies and
processes of accumulation of land and wealth are tending to result in
the sacrifice of user rights to meet demands for the commodification
of land.
Notes
1 According to section 8(1) of the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994
(Act 481) ten per cent of the revenue shall be paid to the Office to cover administra-
tive expenses. The remaining revenue shall be disbursed in the following propor-
tions: 25 per cent to the stool; twenty per cent to the traditional authority; and 55 per
cent to the District Assembly.
2 Ibid.
3 As stated above, a different situation prevailed in the Northern Territories, particu-
larly in those areas lacking an organised system of chieftaincy. Here land was vested
in the colonial state to manage on behalf of the people according to their customary
norms, and the colonial administration attempted to create and build systems of
chieftaincy.
4 This was often estimated at rates well below the actual market value.
5 In off-reserve areas, ten per cent of the royalties are taken by the government for ad-
ministrative charges, and the remainder is divided 25 per cent to the local chief,
twenty per cent to the paramount stool, and 55 per cent to the district council.
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6 Oxfam International ‘WACAM: a powerful voice for mining communities in Ghana’
http://www.oxfam.org/en/programs/development/wafrica/ghana_mining.htm.
7 Mining Violations in Ghana 5th December 2006, http://www.blacklooks.org/2006/
12/mining_violations _ in_ghana.html).
8 ‘House prices in Accra too high’ Business News of Monday, 22 January 2007,
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=117694.
9 See http://www.sdinet.org/reports/rep44.htm for a report on the activities of NGOs
in Ghana working with the homeless and urban squatters.
10 Nyamu-Musembi (2006) addresses some of the shortcoming of de Soto’s theory and
raises some of these issues, particularly in relation to women’s property rights in
Kenya.
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5 Tree plantations, agricultural commodification,
and land tenure security in Ghana
Kojo Sebastian Amanor1
Within contemporary policy circles it is assumed that the registration
of land leads to increasing security and facilitates long-term invest-
ment. Secure rights in land enable land assets to be capitalised through
collateral. However, the major impediment to land registration is as-
sumed to be institutional structures, which result in expensive pro-
cesses of registration. Thus, contemporary land administration reform
seeks to create innovative and decentralised institutional processes that
reduce the cost of registration and enable informal or customary rights
to land to be registered. This chapter argues that the processes of lega-
lising or formalising the land holdings of peasant farmers does not ne-
cessarily lead to increasing security of tenure among the poor, but fre-
quently creates more insecurity. The process of securing rights through
legalisation usually creates new avenues for investment and the accu-
mulation of land and wealth, which frequently undermines the land
rights of the poor.
Legalisation can be carried out by extending formal title to individual
farmers or by creating avenues through which customary relations are
recognised by government agencies and then registered. However, cus-
tomary relations are often contested and subject to power struggles
over the control and definition of land rights. When the contested nat-
ure of customary relations and power relations are not recognised by
the state, attempts to legalise informal arrangements frequently accom-
modate the interests of the rural elite, and in the process the rights of
the poor are eroded. Additionally, the pressures of commodification
within customary systems often result in conflicts between notions of
user rights and fungible assets. Since processes of legalisation are often
concerned with the creation of clearly defined rights in fungible prop-
erty, this often results in the erosion of forms of property based on dy-
namic land use and the strengthening of fungible assets, which trans-
forms the nature of customary property.
This chapter furthermore argues that security in land does not ne-
cessarily translate into collateral, unless particular types of land can be
capitalised and the risk of investment in these sectors is low. When the
assets of farmers are not easily capitalised, the disbursement of loans
may occur through other forms that do not use land as security. Thus,
the constraints on the capitalisation of assets are not only confined to
institutions, but also to the nature of the markets, transaction costs
and market risk.
De Soto (1989) argues that the poor in developing countries have
considerable assets worth trillions of US dollars, which they have devel-
oped through their productive endeavours. However, the legal frame-
work and institutional structures in their respective nations do not en-
able them to capitalise these assets. Large investments are made in
building housing and small businesses without the registration of
property. Focussing on the newly arrived migrant from rural to urban
areas in the informal sector, De Soto argues that the ‘informals’ (as he
categorises them) constitute emerging entrepreneurs who work outside
the legal system. He explores institutional reforms that will enable this
extra-legal sector to be incorporated within economic policies and inte-
grated with the formal sector, in which relevant support can be pro-
vided which will enable ‘informals’ to capitalise their assets and obtain
mortgages, loans and collateral. De Soto argues that the vibrancy of a
nation’s economic system is determined by the ways in which its legal
institutions operate:
The more people are able to participate in the economy and de-
tect opportunities, the greater the potential development. The
great strength of a market economy is that it relies on the peo-
ple’s ingenuity and capacity for work, instead of on the limited
contribution of an arbitrarily chosen elite. What is needed is to
make the transition from a system in which individuals are sub-
ordinated to the aims of the state, to one in which the state is at
the service of individuals and community (De Soto 1989:244).
De Soto largely focusses on the informal housing, trade, and transport
sectors, and shows their considerable contribution to the economy,
bringing together economic approaches developed in studying the in-
formal sector with a new institutional economics framework approach
to property rights. He dismisses notions that poverty in developing
countries arises from cultural dimensions and the lack of individualis-
tic entrepreneurial spirit. However, De Soto tends to over-exaggerate
the entrepreneurial base within the informal sector. While he is right
to point to the considerable value in economic wealth generated in the
informal sector and its contribution to the national economy, he fails
to examine social differentiation within this sector. Not all ‘informals’
own their own houses, run their own businesses, and have their own
transport. Significantly large numbers of ‘informals’ rent premises, use
public transport, and hire out their own labour. Many people within
the informal sector also invest considerable amounts of time and
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money in social redistribution, providing social safety networks for the
diminishing social services provided by the state.
By focussing on recent migrants to urban areas and those with busi-
nesses, De Soto is able to overlook certain problems which relate to the
ways in which land becomes transformed from communal and family
property into individual property and the implications of the commodi-
fication of land for community solidarity (Manji 2006b) and for more
marginalised groups, such as women (Nyamu-Musembi 2006). Simi-
lar issues concerned with finding ways of harmonising the formal sec-
tor with the informal or customary sector have been addressed by a
number of other researchers, working within a framework largely fo-
cussed on agricultural development (Lavigne Delville 2000; Toulmin
and Quan 2000b). This framework questions the value of formal land
titling programmes. Bruce (1993), for instance, examines the relation-
ship between formal titling and collateral. He argues that land titling
programmes that aim to create collateral and the mortgaging of land
will not have positive effects unless other critical institutions exist for
supporting agricultural development. This includes rural land markets,
support services that encourage agricultural innovation, and prices for
agricultural produce that permit the recovery of the costs of invest-
ment. Collateral is only effective in well developed land markets, which
will enable banks to reconvert default loans into capital through sale of
the land held as collateral. In the absence of favourable conditions for
agricultural investment, loans obtained against agricultural land as col-
lateral will tend to be invested in sectors other than agriculture. Secur-
ity of land for credit and tenure security are different entities (id.).
Thus, security of ownership is only one of a number of preconditions
which will enable land to be used as security for loans.
The ability to capitalise land is based upon a number of market fac-
tors and risk factors which go beyond land tenure legalisation and the
rule of law. Within African countries, capital is scarce, and agricultural
investments are highly risky. This results in high rates of interest on
loans, which in Ghana are often between twenty and 30 per cent per
annum in the formal banking sector. Given difficulties in realising
profits, which would enable these interest rates to be met in the agri-
cultural sector, most loans are given to traders or diverted into com-
modity trading, where a much faster turnover can be achieved, not de-
pendent upon the rhythm and vagaries of the seasons.
The creation of an institutional framework for agricultural loans and
collateral does not necessarily enhance the productive abilities of farm-
ers. Loans can often create dependency and result in farmers adopting
technological prescriptions that may not necessarily be in their long-
term interest. Van der Ploeg (1990) distinguishes between two differ-
ent farming strategies or calculi, which he calls the intensive (I-calculi)
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and the extensive (E-calculi) styles. The I-calculi farmer attempts to
gain the highest yield and quality of agriculture by perfecting the craft
of farming. The E-calculi farmer is more concerned with maximising
cost-benefit to achieve the highest returns to investments in labour and
inputs. The I-calculi farmers are concerned with maintaining control
and autonomy over their production and prefer to produce their own
inputs such as fodder and rear their own livestock rather than purchase
livestock and concentrate feed. The E-calculi farmers are more con-
cerned with immediate profit and integration into agricultural markets.
Agricultural services and agribusiness often provide loans which under-
mine the independence of farmers and lock them into commodity
chains and agribusiness prescriptions. Increasingly, the majority of
agricultural value is appropriated by large agribusiness firms who sup-
ply inputs to farmers and purchase crops from farmers for processing.
In modern agribusiness only about ten per cent of agricultural value
accrues to the farmer; the remainder is absorbed by the chains of input
production and food processing (Watts 1994). Increasingly, the large
supermarket chains drive down the profit margins of farmers as they
find new sources of cheap supplies to source (Young 2004). While
modern agriculture is dependent upon loans, this frequently results in
a technological treadmill in which the farmer is increasingly forced to
increase expenditure on inputs to maintain existing levels of produc-
tion. This results in periodic farm crises and the bankruptcy of many
small farmers. Thus, the final outcomes of the capitalisation of agricul-
tural production and assets do not necessarily result in general eco-
nomic security. It frequently leads to increasing economic insecurity
for a large section of the population, ultimately resulting in bankruptcy
and land loss (Amanor 1999).
In examining land reform and the legalisation or formal recognition
of customary tenure, it is important to link land tenure security with
economic systems and economic development. However, we should
not assume, as De Soto tends to, that the accumulation of wealth is
not problematic, or that all actors at the local level possess clear indivi-
dual rights in assets and aspire to be entrepreneurs. The process of
wealth accumulation usually creates social differentiation, resulting in
both increasing wealth in some strata and growing impoverishment
among the poor.
Customary and communal relations should not be idealised and as-
sumed to represent just and egalitarian social values. Social relations
within communities are influenced by social change and by processes
of commodification and capital accumulation. Thus, in an agricultural
setting, we need to focus on the process of agricultural commodifica-
tion and the influences of these processes on social relations, produc-
tion relations, and the land tenure system.
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This chapter focuses on the impact of new wealth created in exotic
fruit trees and timber plantations in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana.
Tree plantation cultivation is being actively encouraged by the Gha-
naian government, which is attempting to provide support services and
loans to plantation farmers. This study examines the impact of planta-
tion development and the accumulation of new wealth on land tenure
systems and conflicts over land. It explores the major constraints on
development programmes that attempt to capitalise farm assets, regis-
ter land and plantations, and provide access to loans for farmers invest-
ing in plantations. It investigates the relationship between registration
and legalisation of customary holdings, the commodification of agricul-
ture, and the security of land tenure.
Site and survey
A study was carried out in four settlements situated in three neigh-
bouring traditional chieftaincies, examining how the recent develop-
ment of tree plantations affected land tenure relations. The settlements
included:
– Banda Ahenkro, the main town in the Banda traditional state, situ-
ated in the newly created Tain district;
– Weila, a town of Banda migrants who settled a long time ago in the
Mo traditional state, in the North Kintampo district;
– Asantekwa, a Mo settlement in the Kintampo North district;
– Nante, a Brong settlement in the Nkoranza traditional state in Kin-
tampo South district.
These settlements are situated in the northern transition zone of Brong
Ahafo, which is characterised by low population densities and readily
available land. Over the last twenty years there has been a large influx
of migrants from northern Ghana into this area, mainly engaged in
food farming. As a result of the availability of land in this area, it is
being promoted by the government for large-scale plantation develop-
ment. This has resulted in an influx of large-scale plantation develo-
pers. Many local farmers are also taking up small plantation develop-
ment. The vegetation consists of guinea savanna woodland, charac-
terised by many small trees and grassland, and transitional
environments consisting of mosaics of high forest and savanna wood-
land vegetation. The Mo and Banda settlements are characterised by sa-
vanna woodland, while that of Nante is transitional.
This study is based on a survey of 181 tree crop farmers in the four
settlements, consisting of 120 men and 61 women. This gender dispar-
ity emerges because tree crop planters are relatively wealthy farmers
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who are predominantly men. Few young farmers and migrants are re-
presented in the survey for the same reasons. However, the gender
constraints vary between different settlements, reflecting pressures on
land and division of labour in farming. It is most pronounced at Asan-
tekwa, where only nine per cent of interviewed planters were women,
while it is much less pronounced in the other settlements. Thus, 50
per cent of the respondents at Weila were women, as were 38 per cent
at Nante and 37 per cent at Banda Ahenkro. To examine the social con-
straints on plantation development, a second survey of 209 farmers
was conducted at Asantekwa, which attempted to discover the distribu-
tion of plantations within the general population and the reasons
which prevented particular categories of farmers from creating planta-
tions.
Agriculture in northern Brong Ahafo
During the colonial period, agricultural policies were largely concerned
with the promotion of cocoa as the major export crop in the forest
zone. The agricultural potential of the Brong Ahafo Region (or north-
Figure 5.1 The Brong Ahafo Transition Zone
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ern Ashanti as it was called in the colonial period) was, by contrast,
hindered by poor infrastructure. It was only in the 1950s that agricul-
tural modernisation began to be promoted in the area. The low popula-
tion density and availability of land attracted large-scale agricultural
projects to the area, which became a major zone of state farms fol-
lowed by modern private estate mechanised agriculture. By the mid-
1970s and early 1980s, subsidised inputs and mechanised land clear-
ing began to be adopted by small farmers in the vicinity of the state
farms and agricultural service centres established by the government
(Amanor and Pabi 2007). The development of a transport network
linking these agricultural centres to the main urban centres facilitated
the expansion of smallholder sector agriculture within the region. By
the 1970s the major wholesale food markets in Ghana emerged in the
Brong Ahafo Region, which became the major food-producing area for
the urban markets (Amanor and Pabi 2007). The main food crops pro-
duced in the northern area of Brong Ahafo are yam and groundnut,
and in the southern, more-forested areas, maize and vegetables.
With the introduction of structural adjustment measures in 1983,
mechanised high input agriculture collapsed as government subsidies
were removed. With the collapse of mechanised agriculture, more com-
mercially oriented farmers moved into tree crop production, which is
seen as a viable commercial sector. Increasingly, tree crops are being
promoted in this zone by government services and a number of NGOS
as part of a programme of export-oriented agriculture initiated under
structural adjustment. These developments have created increasing
pressures on land within the Brong Ahafo Region as commercial farm-
ers seek large plots of land on which to establish plantations.
The main tree crops include cashew, mango and teak. Cashew is the
dominant tree crop, as can be seen in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, which show
the distribution of these tree crops in the various settlements in the
sample. Teak is largely grown as a timber crop, for electricity poles,
and as fuelwood for the curing of tobacco. It has been heavily pro-
moted by the Forestry Service in recent years, as naturally occurring
timber is becoming increasingly scarce, and the timber industry is
looking to a future based on plantation production of timber. It has
also been promoted among the more prosperous smallholder farmers
by NGOs. The northern sections of the Brong Ahafo Region have be-
come a major zone for tree crop production because of the lack of de-
velopment of pre-existing export crops, the comparatively low density
of population, and the availability of land. Tree plantations have ex-
panded in this zone from the 1980s. Cashew was largely disseminated
through farmer networks from the late 1970s in settlements bordering
the Coˆte d’Ivoire, such as at Banda, and has only been taken up in the
last ten years by the agricultural services in Ghana. During the 1980s
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NGOs also played important roles in promoting tree cultivation in
farming communities, particularly the Adventists Development and
Relief Services (ADRA). In recent years there have been a number of
donor-sponsored organisations promoting the development of an infra-
structure for the export promotion of tree crops and enhanced quality
control, including Technoserve and the USAID-sponsored Trade and
Investment Programme Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE).
These developments have resulted in a significant number of com-
mercial farmers seeking large tracts of land on which to develop large
plantations, and a significant number of richer farmers within settle-
ments investing in the development of small tree plantations. Small-
holder farmers take up plantation development for a number of rea-
sons including the following:
– To provide an investment for the future or for their old age, when
they do not have the strength to go clear land and make new farms.
A number of elderly farmers, in their seventies and eighties were
interviewed, whose only source of income came from their cashew
plantations.
– To create an ‘inheritance‘ (agyapadee) from which their children can
benefit in the future.
– To create an investment in a farm which will provide capital from
year to year from the same plot of land; in the case of cashew a var-
iant of this answer is that plantations help to look after the family
and pay for children‘s school fees.
Table 5.1 Mean acreages under tree crop plantations
Plantation crop Banda Weila Asantekwa Nante Total
Cashew 9.5 2.2 2.9 2.8 5.0
Teak 0.1 1.0 4.4 1.8 1.6
Oil palm . . 0.2 0.6 .
Mango . . 0.3 0.2 .
No. of farmers 62 38 41 40 181
Table 5.2 Percentage of farmers cultivating tree crops
Plantation crop Banda
(%)
Weila
(%)
Asantekwa
(%)
Nante
(%)
Total
(%)
Cashew 100 97 90 85 94
Teak 13 20 32 52 28
Oil palm . 3 9 20 9
Mango 2 8 27 12 9
No. of farmers 62 38 41 40 181
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Many tree farmers view the different types of farms as contributing
towards an investment portfolio. Food crops provide the basic food for
feeding the family. Cashew and mango provide a medium-term invest-
ment, providing capital for further farm investment and for meeting
the major family expenditures, such as school fees. Teak provides a
long-term investment, which provides a large lump sum when it is
eventually sold.
While many farmers see plantation crops as providing more profit-
able investments than food crops, food cropping is important in the
area, since it is a major food basket for the urban areas, particularly for
yams, maize and vegetables. Tree crops are usually integrated with food
crop production. Tree seedlings are planted in food plots and food
crops are cultivated among them for up to three or four years, until the
trees begin to establish a canopy. In many instances, farmers plant tree
crops in areas with poor soil fertility, or in old farming areas in which
the fertility of the land has declined through continual cultivation. At
Weila, most women planting cashew used old groundnut farms with
declining fertility. These are usually situated around the perimeters of
the settlement, since these were the first areas to have been cultivated.
Tree plantations, in their early years, require considerable labour in
management. Fire is a big hazard in tree plantations. If they are not
kept free of weeds they are prone to being burnt, and so a fire belt is
cleared around the plantation. Farmers gradually extend their tree plan-
tations, by cultivating adjacent areas from year to year and planting
trees in the old plots. The cost of weeding is the major constraint on
the extent to which they establish their plantation. Farmers who overex-
tend their plantations beyond their capacities and hire labour usually
end up with burnt plantations. In the Nante area, farmers often hire
out their young cashew plantations to migrants to cultivate food crops,
on the condition that they weed around and maintain the young trees
in the plantations. While some farmers hire out land to the migrant
farmers, some give out this land freely (i.e. expect no monetary pay-
ment in addition to labour). Some farmers also give out land to mi-
grant farmers provided they plant trees in the plot. After a three-year
period of cultivation, they release new adjacent land to the migrants to
extend the plantation. This enables them to develop their plantation
while minimising the outlays of hiring labour.
Some farmers also plant their food crops around the plantation to
minimise the incidence of fire. The plantation will be extended into
these areas at a later date, and a new food cropping perimeter will be
created. Since the cultivation of plantations results in the occupation of
land by pure stands of trees (which will remain for many years), this
disrupts fallowing strategies and removes land from recycling between
annual crop cultivation and fallow restoration. Thus, the expansion of
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plantations can result in inadequate land for food cropping within a
system of fallow restoration. To ensure that food cropping is not dis-
rupted by the expansion of plantations, the most fertile land is fre-
quently reserved for yams, which require good soils, and so plantations
are established beyond the main food cropping area or in areas charac-
terised by less fertile soil. Thus, the expansion of tree crops has engen-
dered considerable debate about appropriate and sustainable land man-
agement practices.
Size of tree plantations and social composition of tree farmers
An extensive survey of 209 farmers was conducted at Asantekwa in
early 2008 to investigate the prevalence and size of plantations. The
sample consisted of 112 men and 97 women. Some 63 per cent of men
and 26 per cent of women had tree plantations. Of the total sample 45
per cent had tree plantations. The most common reason given by wo-
men for their lack of tree plantations was lack of land, often because
their husbands had created a tree plantation, and this left insufficient
land for their needs. Married women usually depend on their husband
to provide them with land. Thus, the expansion of male acreages under
plantation at Asantekwa negatively impacts on women’s access to land.
The men interviewed in this survey consisted of 88 locals and 24
migrants. Some 76 per cent of local men created tree plantations as
compared to thirteen per cent of migrants. Migrants do not usually cre-
ate plantations since land is only released to them for food crop cultiva-
tion, unless they apply specifically for land for plantation development
from the chief. Migrants are usually temporary residents, and planta-
tions are a long-term investment, so many migrants are not interested
in obtaining land for plantation development.
Within the four communities of Banda, Weila, Asantekwa, and
Nante, most of the cashew plantations are relatively small. However,
since most plantations are recent – with the exception of those at Ban-
da – they are in a process of expansion, and farmers usually extend the
cultivation of tree crops over their land from year to year. It is difficult
to determine the ultimate extent of these plantations at present. The
survey shows that 75 per cent of cashew plantations were less than five
acres.2 The median size was about three acres. However, Banda planta-
tions tended to be larger than in the other settlements, not surprising
given the longer periods farmers have been involved in cashew cultiva-
tion. Thus, the median size (i.e. half the farmers have plantations un-
der this size) of cashew plantations was six acres at Banda compared
with two acres for the other settlements. The largest plantation at Ban-
da was estimated at 100 acres, compared to thirteen acres at Weila, six-
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teen acres at Asantekwa, and fifteen acres at Nante. Men usually had
significantly larger plantations than women. The average size of planta-
tions owned by males was 6.1 acres, while the average for women was
2.8 acres. The largest woman‘s cashew plantation was twelve acres.
The largest five per cent of male plantations ranged from eighteen to
100 acres, while the largest five per cent of female plantations were be-
tween eight and twelve acres. Some 75 per cent of women’s cashew
plantations were less than three acres compared to six acres for men.
The median size of teak plantations in the survey was three acres.
Some 75 per cent of plantations were under one acre at Banda, under
two acres at Asantekwa, under 2.5 acres at Nante, and under 7.5 acres
at Weila. The largest plantation was estimated to be about 150 acres.
This was cultivated by a caretaker chief for satellite settlements in the
Asantekwa area. He gave out land to migrants to cultivate crops in re-
turn for planting, weeding, and tending his teak plantation. The largest
teak plantation at Banda was only two acres, as compared to fifteen
acres at Weila, and seventeen acres at Nante. Around 50 per cent of
male plantations were two acres or less, while the median for women‘s
plantations was one acre. The largest women’s teak plantation was two
acres. Some ten percent of male teak growers had plantations exceed-
ing ten acres.
Within Brong Ahafo teak and cashew plantations are also created by
large-scale commercial planters who originate from outside the area
and are attracted by the cheap but suitable land. An example of a com-
mercial plantation is Vicdoris Farms, a large cashew plantation situated
in Dawadawa No. 2, north of Kintampo. The owner of Vicdoris Farms
is a wealthy Ashanti pharmaceutical distributor with branches in Accra
and Kumasi and other towns. Vicdoris Farms is more than 1,500 acres,
of which 800 acres has already been developed into cashew plantation.
The land was acquired from the paramount chief and registered as a
lease with the Regional Land Commission.
The development of the smallholder and commercial tree crop sec-
tors creates significant pressures of commodification on land, agricul-
ture, and land-based assets. This results in a number of struggles that
attempt to redefine customary land relations, land management strate-
gies, and investment patterns in agriculture. This further results in the
development of plantation agriculture as a means of securing claims
on land, as well as in a growing interest in various types of land regis-
tration as a means of securing the increasing investment of capital and
labour in land. Such development of agricultural accumulation results
in the redefinition of customary land relations and attempts to seek ex-
ternal legitimation from the state and development agencies of both
contemporary patterns of agricultural accumulation and their asso-
ciated land tenure practices.
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The land tenure system and dynamics of change
Within the transitional zone there are two distinct land tenure systems:
a communal system which is found at Banda Ahenkro, Weila, and
Asantekwa, and a family tenure system, which is found at Nante. Un-
der the communal system, all citizens can farm anywhere on the land
of their settlement, provided no one else is farming it or making
claims to managing the land in a system of rotational bush fallowing.
In the family system, land that has been cleared by members of ex-
tended lineages is claimed by their descendants, and the land comes
under the authority structure within the extended lineage, whether it is
actively farmed or preserved as fallow.
The family land system is characteristic of the high forest zone and
the communal system of the more savanna-like areas in the high forest
zone. The clearance of high forest is a major undertaking involving
considerable labour. Secondary forest is characterised by fast-growing
softwood trees which are often easier to clear and which often create
higher soil fertility than primary forests, which store many of the nutri-
ents in biomass. Farmers in the high forest zone frequently maintain
their lands as secondary forests, returning to farm them before they re-
generate into primary forest. Youth often prefer to work on the land
that their ancestors cleared rather than going out to clear new land,
although ambitious and enterprising farmers will extend their areas of
cultivation by clearing new forest areas. The family rights in land arise
out of claims to being descendants of those who originally cleared the
land.
In contrast, in the savanna woodlands, there is no such clear division
between primary and secondary forest. Savanna woodlands consist of
many small, rapidly regenerating trees and grassland. Fire is endemic
within the woodland savanna and frequently disrupts the regeneration
of fallow vegetation. The population density is also very low. Rather
than managing contingent plots of land within a rotational bush-fal-
lowing system, farmers tend to move around, cultivating suitably re-
generated areas. The majority of the labour is often expended in weed-
ing and tilling the land rather than removing large primary forest trees.
Thus, farmers have less incentive to continue managing areas in which
they have invested less labour in clearing the trees. Farming in the sa-
vanna areas usually consists of a combination of moving forward and
backwards within one area, and locating to new areas when the oppor-
tunities to expand farming become constrained by other people moving
to farm in the area, or by decreasing soil fertility.
In practice, the differences between the family farming system and
the communal system are not so distinct and often blur into each
other, particularly as the systems become increasingly commodified,
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and available land becomes less abundant. Farmers within family lands
often clear new plots within unclaimed forest. Farmers within the com-
munal tenure system often work abreast of their relatives. Thus, chil-
dren often begin farming by helping their parents, who then allocate
them a piece of land to work adjacent to them, and in this way they
can keep a watchful eye on them and offer them farming advice. As
their children grow up, they work alongside each other, offering each
other mutual advice. When the grandparents die, their land is often gi-
ven over to their grandchildren. With increasing population and the in-
flux of migrants, more people within the communal tenure system be-
come dependent upon receiving lands from their parents and grand-
parents, since unclaimed lands by this point lie at a distance from the
settlement. Thus, the communal land system begins to acquire the
characteristics of family land. At Nante, where the family land system
prevails, 83 per cent of the respondents gained land from close rela-
tives, as compared to 52 per cent of those at Banda and Weila, and 28
per cent at Weila.
In both systems women usually get land from their husbands or,
when they are single or divorced, from close male relatives. Some 36
per cent of women at Weila, 27 per cent at Nante, and 26 per cent at
Banda got land from their husbands.3 Also, 27 per cent of Nante wo-
men got land from their fathers, and another 27 per cent from their
mothers. About 38 per cent of Banda women got land from their par-
ents, as compared to 26 per cent of women at Weila.
Within both these systems, land is not allocated as a demarcated
area. Farmers can clear as much land as they are able based on their
strength and ability to hire labour, until they meet other farmers clear-
ing from their farms. To avoid crossing each other’s land and path of
farming, farmers usually work abreast. In the communal system, a
farmer wishing to relocate to a new area will discuss his/her intentions
with neighbouring farmers with the intention of working out a mu-
tually beneficial direction of farming that prevents farmers crossing
each other unnecessarily. Farmers with more capital and labour re-
sources will be able to clear larger tracts of land than those with a les-
ser capacity to mobilise labour.
This arrangement also extends to land that is allocated to migrants
in the communal system. They usually make annual payments for
farming rights to chiefs, rather than payments for specific plots of
land. They are usually shown an area to clear and allowed to extend
their farms on the basis of their own strength, rather than on the basis
of making payments for a particular area of land. In contrast, in the
more heavily populated forest zone, land is usually hired out to mi-
grants for monetary rents or as sharecrop arrangements on demarcated
plots.
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Rights of chiefs and of local farmers
Rights to land are also constructed within a political and administrative
system of control over land, which defines the land relations between
chiefs and their ‘subjects’. The political relations of land originate from
the colonial period of Indirect Rule, when a system of customary land
tenure was articulated by the colonial administration in collaboration
with the chiefs. The state recognises the allodial rights as being vested
in the chief and the user rights in their subjects. This enables citizens
to use land freely for farming purposes but does not allow them to sell
their land, since it is recognised as ultimately belonging to the stool.
Chiefs can transact land and natural resources with migrants, but not
with their subjects who have rights to use the land.
Since chiefs cannot gain revenues from local farmers, they are often
interested in transacting natural resources and land with migrants and
with commercial investors. This frequently leads to conflicts, as locals
try to protect their own use of local resources, and chiefs attempt to
transact land and natural resources and prevent locals extending their
use over them. Three incidents, narrated below, illustrate the conflicts
that arise over the control and commodification of land and agriculture
at Weila, Asantekwa, and Banda.
The chief of Chaara claims ultimate ownership of the land of Weila.
The Weila people originally migrated from Banda and sought permis-
sion to settle on land under Chaara. In 1996 a commercial teak farmer
approached the Chaara chief for land on which to create a large teak
plantation. The Chaara chief decided to allocate land at Weila. He con-
sulted with the Weila chief, but not with the farmers and people of
Weila. The farmers of Weila only became aware of this transaction
when the commercial farmer came with labourers to Weila to begin de-
marcating the land. The youth of Weila were extremely concerned
about this, since a large area on the immediate east of the town had
been allocated to the developer. This was the main area in which they
could find uncultivated land, and the development would create a ser-
ious land shortage for them. They protested against the demarcation of
the land and took the matter up with the paramount chief at New
Longoro. The paramount chief found in their favour and agreed that
the lease of land to the contractor would result in a serious land short-
age for the people of Weila. The contract with the commercial farmer
was annulled. Later, under the influence of Ghana-Canada in Concert,
an NGO promoting tree planting in the Mo area, the leader of the
youth at Weila began to develop his own teak plantations, as did other
youth. The Weila chief began to complain about the inconsistencies of
his actions, alleging that while he had opposed the investor appropriat-
ing land, he was now appropriating land from the community and or-
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dered a halt to his plantation. The youth leader now had to come be-
fore the chiefs and elders to request permission to create the planta-
tions and provide drink, money, and a sheep to propitiate them.
At Asantekwa, the chief and youth have been locked in disputes over
access and control over land and natural resources. Asantekwa is a rela-
tively recent settlement, which has been developed in the last 50-60
years, with its inhabitants coming from the surrounding Mo settle-
ments. The land of Asantekwa comes under the jurisdiction of the
chief of Mansra. During the early 1990s the Mansra chief gained rev-
enue from migrant Sissala charcoal burners. However, the youth of
Asantekwa took up charcoal burning and forced the Sissala to move
elsewhere. This loss of revenue resulted in increasing friction between
the Mansra chief and the youth. When farmers began to move into tree
plantations, the Mansra chief attempted to establish greater control
over land. He argued that the development of plantations on yam farm-
ing land was creating a problem of land shortage for food crops and
that farmers should establish their tree plantations beyond the food-
producing area. He advised cashew and teak farmers to register their
plantations with him. In his bid to extend his control over the land, the
Mansra chief appointed a caretaker chief to look after the land at Asan-
tekwa. This appointment of a chief was a controversial decision, for
there are two sections within Asantekwa who claim to be the original
setters of the land. They originate from the settlements of Banaatwi
and Ahenakrom. The appointed chief came from the Banaatwi section.
The Ahenakrom section (which has stronger credentials in the claim to
being the original settlers and more support among the townspeople)
complained that this was not right, and that the chief should have con-
sulted with the townspeople before appointing a chief. The Mansra
chief responded that the land belonged to him, and he could appoint
anyone he chose as chief. The Ahenakrom section referred the case to
the elders at Mansra, who were divided on the matter but criticised the
chief for his actions. He was considered to have behaved arrogantly. In-
creasingly frustrated, the chief abdicated.
In Banda, there are also conflicting interpretations of the rights of ci-
tizens, chiefs, and migrants to land. The presence of migrants is very
important for tree crop and yam production, since they provide most
of the hired labour. The townspeople attract migrants by providing
them with land for food cultivation. Migrants usually have a landlord
within the town, whom they work for, and who provides them with
land. The migrants are also registered with the chief, who provides
them with a permit to farm in his domain. This permit includes a
photograph of the migrant, defines the economic rights of the migrant,
and records the sums they pay annually for farming rights. In 2007,
the migrants paid ¢200,000 (about USD 22) for an annual farming
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permit. Several of the migrants have been able to establish cashew
plantations after seeing the chief. Some of them confided that the chief
advised them to go into cashew production. In contrast with this, many
of the townspeople claim that by custom migrants do not have the
right to cultivate cashew unless they marry a local woman and have
children with her, who will inherit the plantation.4 These various posi-
tions on migrants emanate out of the different interests in the conflict
over land between chiefs and local citizens. Limiting the access of mi-
grants to land for tree crop production prevents the chief from transact-
ing large areas of land with outsiders and retains a large supply of land
for local farmers. If marriage is the condition for access to a plantation,
then access to plantations is negotiated with families with marriageable
daughters rather than with chiefs. On the other hand, if the chief is
able to release land to migrants for tree crop cultivation by encouraging
migrants to go into cashew production, the chief can create a demand
for land for commercial agriculture from which he can gain large rev-
enues in the future.
The large-scale commercial farmers gain land by approaching chiefs
to lease land. They purchase the land from the chief. However, the
chiefs usually represent this as a customary arrangement to evade con-
trol and interference from state agencies. In contrast to transactions
with migrant peasant farmers, a specific area of demarcated land is
transacted and a site plan drawn up by surveyors. The chiefs sign the
site plan which is then registered with the Regional Land Commission.
While it is difficult to get information on the amounts of money in-
volved in these transactions, one source indicated that around Kintam-
po a commercial mango farmer was recently offered a one square mile
(2.5 km sq) plot by a chief for ¢75 million (about USD 8,000). While
this is a large sum by rural standards, this is relatively cheap for com-
mercial developers given the large extent of the land and the potential
returns from investment in tree crops. Chiefs are often willing to trans-
act large tracts of land with commercial developers since they cannot
gain land revenues from local farmers.
Commodification of agriculture
The development of tree crop plantations disrupts the redistribution of
land through bush fallowing and cultivation. Plantations take land out
of cultivation for many years and give their developers new rights in
land. The land now acquires a value it did not hold previously. Tree
plantations enable investors to store capital in land and to invest in la-
bour to acquire land, although this investment has considerable risk
from the hazards of fire. The overextension of the enterprise beyond
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the ability to intensively manage and weed the plantation often results
in burnt plantations that have to be replanted or abandoned. The
claims on land established by investing in plantations have been se-
cure, since in the customary system of land tenure, the ability to point
to trees that one has planted on fallow land is used as evidence of
rights to the land established through occupation.
However, the new wealth that arises from the creation of plantations
creates new concerns about the long-term security of investments in
land and the risk of this investment for prosperous farmers within the
communities. The ease with which plantation owners can accumulate
land and wealth creates worries among those with the new wealth that
this wealth will lead to future sources of dispute. Thus, bush fires on
plantations become interpreted as the deliberate work of jealous neigh-
bours. Tree planters begin to harbour concerns that their children will
not be able to inherit their wealth since this will be challenged by the
elders, and that the chiefs will introduce new bylaws and establish
claims on their land that will undermine and nullify their investments,
or that the government will introduce new legislation that will under-
mine their rights in the land (see Table 5.3). These fears arise out of a
concern that the world is changing rapidly, that customary relations are
also changing, and the best strategy for the future, for a world we do
not know, is to gain formal recognition of ownership of land through
documents, which the government and legal sector respect. Thus, the
backdrop to the changes brought about by investment in plantations is
not a customary world of stable land, moral, and social values, but a
customary world which is being transformed by economic change, con-
tinually struggling to adapt its frameworks and rules to the processes
of commodification. Processes of social differentiation are beginning to
erode the conventions through which user rights in land are estab-
lished.
In this context, farmers become increasingly interested in securing
the land outside of informal arrangements within the family and cus-
tomary system. Registration of land favours plantation owners. It is not
possible to register land within the customary bush-fallowing system,
since rights are established through clearance and labour rather than
through demarcation of particular areas. However, it is possible to reg-
ister plantations, particularly since farmers usually stop extending
them after a period and concentrate on their management. On average,
90 per cent of the farmers interviewed in the survey expressed an in-
terest in registering their plantations. This ranged from 95 per cent of
respondents at Asantekwa to 85 per cent at Banda. Most farmers were
interested in registering land to make claims on the land rather than
to secure access to loans, collateral, and government services (see Table
5.3). Some farmers at Banda stated that they had several plots of land
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in different places. They had to keep these plots under constant cultiva-
tion to maintain their claims over the land and to prevent other farm-
ers who needed land from encroaching upon these plots. They envi-
saged that a land document expressing their ownership of these plots
would be a viable way of securing the land. Registration of customary
claims on land in this context brings security to those who are over-
stretched in their management of land, rather than to those looking to
extend their existing lands. It breaks down the redistributive features
in the land management system, which arises from allowing people to
make claims on land on the basis of their command over the necessary
labour to maintain management over the land.
A dominant concern underlying much of the thinking of many of
these farmers was that the world is changing, and in the new commo-
dified world documents are important. The Queenmother at Banda
was adamant that registering of land contravened the spirit of custom-
ary land relations, since the land did not belong to the farmer as a pos-
session but could only be used. But then she stated with great authority
and certainty, ‘but things are about to change’. At the time when re-
search was conducted at Banda Ahenkro, a Lands Officer had just been
appointed by the Tain District Assembly to register lands in Banda
Ahenkro. Similarly at Asantekwa, there was an expectation of impeding
change in land tenure matters, with many farmers believing that the
chief had issued a proclamation that farmers should register their plan-
tations. However, as narrated above, the subsequent political disputes
that had arisen around this resulted in the chief ‘abdicating’ his stool.
Many farmers are concerned that they and their children will lose their
claims to land if they do not register their plots and others do, particu-
larly if others make claims to their land in the registration process.
Paradoxically, by claiming that land ownership can be made increas-
ingly more secure, national land policy and registration programmes
introduce an element of insecurity into existing tenure relations. They
make farmers anxious to secure what was already considered secure, in
Table 5.3 Main reasons for wanting to register land
Reason for wanting to register land Frequency Percentage
In case of disputes within the family or with farming
neighbours/chief
82 52
The world is changing, and you cannot be sure what
future disputes will come over land. The safest bet is to
get formal documents
8 6
So that children can inherit it without difficulty 45 29
To be able to get a loan, advice and support from
government agencies
20 13
Total 155 100
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case other people are able to use the new procedures to make claims
on their land.
While the overwhelming majority of farmers expressed interest in re-
gistering their land, very few farmers have been able to register their
land ‘formally’ or ‘informally’ with state agencies. In the survey, only
one farmer had a site plan (the caretaker chief of satellite settlements
around Asantekwa with a 150-acre teak plantation). Another five farm-
ers had registered their teak plantation with the Forestry Service, and
another four were in the process of registering their teak plantation
with the Forestry Service. Some 88 per cent of the respondents did not
know the procedures for registering land or plantations.
In most instances, the cost involved in registering land is the main
constraint. Formal land registration is beyond the means of most farm-
ers. At the Town and Country Planning Office of the Kintampo District
Office, one officer estimated that the cost of providing a registered site
plan for farmers would be ¢2.5 million (about USD 265) for a two-acre
plot, ¢3.5 million (USD 370) for ten acres, and ¢7 million (USD 740)
for a 30-acre plot. The major expenditure involved in this process is
getting a licensed surveyor in Kumasi to sign the site plan. There are
no licensed surveyors in Kintampo. While most farmers were inter-
ested in registering their land, very few were willing to pay amounts
commensurate with the cost of registering land formally (see Table
5.4). Very few farmers were willing to spend more than ¢500,000
(about USD 50) to register their land.
Land registration, regularisation and loans
Formal registration of land leases or plantations in Ghana is beyond
the means of the majority of farmers. It has essentially been developed
to meet the needs of the commercial sector. However, in recent years
Table 5.4 Amount farmers are prepared to pay to register their plantation
Amount willing to pay to register land
(cedis)
Frequency Percentage
cannot pay anything 1 0.8
Up to 20,000 10 7.8
21-50,000 24 18.6
51,000-100,000 20 15.5
101,000-200,000 19 14.7
201,000-500,000 33 25.6
501,000-1 million 8 6.2
Between 1 and 2 million 5 3.9
Over 2 million 9 7.0
Total 129 100.0
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administrative reforms in a number of sectors have attempted to create
new institutional structures to enable the registration of customary
rights in land or the land of small farmers. The Land Administration
Project (LAP) is developing a number of pilot Customary Land Secre-
tariats to document customary land holdings. Within the research area,
there were no operational Customary Land Secretariats, and the LAP
project has had little influence on land tenure issues. However, there
are a number of sector-based initiatives which attempt to create more
accessible processes of land registration or access to loans for planta-
tion owners.
In the forestry sector, with the growing focus on plantation timber,
the Forestry Service has become increasingly concerned with regularis-
ing tenure arrangements and registering owners of timber plantations.
New legislation in the forestry sector seeks to clarify and regularise
ownership and benefit-sharing within forest reserves and in private
plantations. Increasingly, forest reserve land is being allocated to the
commercial sector for development. Arrangements have been worked
out between chiefs, the commercial sector, and the Forestry Service
and translated into benefit-sharing arrangements. The commercial sec-
tor is responsible for developing the plantations. The Forestry Service
is responsible for protecting the reserves, supervising reforestation
plans, and monitoring developments. The chiefs are responsible for
guaranteeing the security of the land on which the project occurs and
ensuring that the community does not encroach on the reserves. The
commercial developers receive 90 per cent of the stumpage value of
the timber. The chiefs receive ‘drink money’ or customary payments
for the land, annual rent payments, and six per cent of the stumpage
value of the timber. The forestry commission receives two per cent of
the stumpage value, and the communities on whose land the forest re-
serve stands receive two per cent for community development projects.
On individually owned private sector plantations, the legal frame-
work for timber rights has clarified that 100 per cent of the value of
the timber belongs to the farmer, subject to the local land tenure ar-
rangements under which the land was negotiated by the planter. This
means that chiefs cannot claim a portion of the planted timber as cus-
todians of the land, unless this constituted a prior agreement under
which the land was released to the farmer. Levies and conveyance fees
on the timber are paid by the purchaser of the timber.
The Forestry Commission5 has declared its intent to register all indi-
vidual timber plantations in Ghana. This intent largely arises from the
need to monitor sources of timber and to control the legality of produc-
tion, since there are concerns about the present proliferation of illegal
logging. Given the extent of timber plantations, which are now being
established within forestry reserves, it is important for the Forestry Ser-
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vice to be able to monitor the sources of timber conveyed along roads
to prevent illegal harvesting of forest reserves and theft from private
plantations. Registration of owners enables the origins of timber to be
checked against conveyance documents. Registration of ownership also
enables the Forestry Service to maintain a record of the volumes of
timber being cultivated and their state of maturity, in order to forecast
trends in timber production. It enables the Forestry Service to identify
potential sources of timber for timber contractors, and to provide man-
agement services, recommendations for plantation developers, and
loans or access loans against plantations.
Two systems of plantation registration have been developed in the
Forestry Sector. The first comprises the formal registration of the plan-
tation as a lease with title deeds and a site plan. The site plan is usually
drawn up by the Town and Country Planning Department of the local
District Assembly, sent to a registered surveyor to sign, and then regis-
tered with the regional branch of the Lands Commission. A copy of the
site plan is registered with the Forestry Service and sent to the Forestry
Commission in Accra. The formal registration of the plantation enables
the owner to apply for loans.
The second process involves the ‘informal’ registration of the planta-
tion with the district Forestry Service Division. This is a ‘free’ service
provided by the Forestry Service. The plantation is not measured, de-
marcated or mapped. However, a forestry officer visits the plantation to
verify its existence, and the owner fills in a form to register it with the
Forestry Service. The form has fields for the family head, village chief
and paramount chief to sign and substantiate that the plantation is the
property of the owner and that his ownership is recognised by the fa-
mily and chief. Clearly, much thought has gone into the preparation of
this document. The objective is to involve all the important stake-
holders in verifying the legitimacy of the property of the plantation
owner, and thus harmonising the institutional structures of the cus-
tomary system with registration by the Forestry Service. However, this
opens avenues for chiefs to begin to demand payments from farmers,
since chiefs do not sign land documents without receiving a payment
and ‘customary drinks’. In many areas, chiefs attempt to extract pay-
ments from local farmers for creating plantations, and farmers are re-
sisting these demands. As discussed above, in Asantekwa, recent politi-
cal conflicts between the Mansra chief and the townspeople arose from
the attempts by the chiefs to regularise the use of land for plantations
and to gain greater control over land. Where these types of disputes oc-
cur, the attempts of the Forestry Service to create a ‘harmonisation’ be-
tween the formal and informal systems may enable chiefs to extract
revenues from plantation farmers and further inflame disputes and in-
crease the insecurities in land holding.
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A second major constraint in the registration of plantations within
the Forestry Service arises out of the lack of logistical support and in-
sufficient staff to implement this programme, a point that the Planta-
tions Officer at Kintampo woefully conceded. In the course of carrying
out interviews at Nante, I informed some teak farmers about the free
registration of land carried out by the District Forestry Service and ad-
vised them to go and register their plantations at Kintampo. The scepti-
cal farmers laughed politely at my suggestion. One of them pointed
out: ‘If we go to Kintampo to register our land the forestry officer will
tell us that they do not have money for transport to come here. So be-
fore they come here we will have to pay for their transport and allow-
ance.’ This was borne out at Banda Ahenkro where we found a teak
farmer with an incomplete form, which a Forestry Officer from the re-
gional capital had sold him for ¢100,000. The Forestry Officer had
convinced him that he was ‘favouring’ him, since the real price of the
form was ¢200,000. However, what was of concern to this teak planter
was that he had been waiting for more than a year for the officer to
come back to help him complete the filling of the form.
Poor logistical support not only prevents programmes from being
implemented, the frustration it brings breeds lack of accountability and
encourages staff to engage in corrupt practices. Thus, the combination
of local political interests in land, poor logistical support within the
Forestry Service, and the farmers’ distrust of forestry officers is likely
to undermine the attempts of the Forestry Service to comprehensively
register the teak plantations of smallholder farmers. However, if plan-
ters absorb the transaction costs in registering their plantation, the For-
estry Service largely gains from its extended ability to monitor timber
without absorbing the costs of the information – particularly since
there is little benefit for planters in registering their plantations.
Within the cashew farming sector no attempts have been made to
register the plantations of farmers, although this capacity exists within
some of the Agricultural Departments, such as the one at Kintampo.
The Trade and Investment Programme for Competitive Export Econo-
my (TIPCEE) is mapping cashew farms, using district extension ser-
vices to carry out the programme with GPS devices. However, as is
common with many national and donor initiatives, the information
being generated is not shared with the district. According to the Direc-
tor of Agriculture, the software for the programme uses a special don-
gle key, which prevents the information being accessed and used by
the Kintampo District Agricultural Department.
While registration of cashew plantations does not have the same
priority as the registration of teak plantations, loans for farmers are
much more prevalent in the cashew sector. Loans to cashew farmers
are given out in the Tain, Kintampo North and Kintampo South dis-
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tricts by the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) in Techiman. The
applications are made through the Agricultural Department. Loans are
not made against collateral of land or plantations. Collateral in this
case is replaced by the solidarity of social groups. Before farmers can
receive a loan, they must join a cashew farmers group, which consists
of between eight to twelve farmers. If any member of a group defaults
on repayment, all other members of the group will be penalised and
excluded from future loans. If a significant number of groups default,
then the settlement will be excluded from receiving loans. The loans
are given to assist farmers in planting food crops in young cashew
plantations and in weeding the plantations to ensure the survival of
the young cashew plants from fire. Before loans are given, the cashew
plantations of the group members are first inspected by an agricultural
officer to certify that they exist and are suitable for granting loans. The
group members then need to open a bank account with ADB, deposit
an initial sum for opening the account, and get their photograph taken
for an identity card. The amount given to all farmers for the loan is ¢
1.5 million (about USD 160). This has to be repaid with twenty per cent
interest within one year. However, the transaction costs that farmers
have to bear on the loan are quite high in relation to the loan, which
include the costs of opening the bank account, transport to Techiman
on a number of occasions, or paying for the transport expenses of re-
presentatives of the group. Many farmers estimated that they spent at
least ¢300,000 on ‘going up and down’ to get the loan, which substan-
tially reduced the amount available for expenditure on their farms (and
increases the interest rate on the actual amount available for farm ex-
penditure to about 50 per cent if they receive 1.2 million after the de-
duction of costs in getting the loan). Not surprisingly, a large number
of farmers fail to repay their loans on time. The amount of the loan
was also considered to be modest in relation to the expense involved in
managing cashew (see Table 5.5). The total amount of the loan enables
a farmer to hire labour to weed three acres of cashew, or more realisti-
cally, if the costs of purchasing seeds for food crop production are ta-
Table 5.5 Cost of hired labour
Labour task Cost (cedis)
Clearing one acre 150,000-200,000
Raising yam mounds 200,000
First weeding 150,000-200,000
Second weeding 150,000-20000
Weeding an existing 1-acre cashew
plantation
400,000
Cultivating 1 acre of yam with cashew
(excluding cost of planting material)
800,000
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ken into consideration, an approximate maximum of two acres. How-
ever, it does not take into consideration the cost of clearing new land if
the farmers wish to expand their acreage, nor of using pesticides on es-
tablished cashew.
In the survey, 32 per cent of cashew farmers received loans. This var-
ied from 63 per cent of the cashew farmers interviewed at Weila to
only eighteen per cent at Banda Ahenkro (see Table 5.6). Fewer loans
are given to farmers in the Tain district than in Kintampo North and
South, ostensibly because of a high failure rate in repayment. In Banda
Ahenkro, only one cashew farmers’ group received loans in 2006, and
one individual in that group has failed to honour his repayment of the
loan in time. At present, no farmers are receiving loans. Most of the
farmers receiving loans are those who plant seeds recommended by
the Agricultural Department. Some 70 per cent of the farmers receiv-
ing loans planted seeds provided by the Agricultural Department. How-
ever, in Banda most cashew plantations have been established with
seeds acquired outside the agricultural extension system. Thus, it is
likely that the Ministry of Agriculture uses the promise of loans to pro-
mote its extension recommendation, only recommending farmers for
loans who plant their seeds and follow their recommendations.
Most of the farmers who have received loans are highly critical of
the loan programme. Some 70 per cent of farmers felt that it was ex-
cessively difficult to get the loan, and that it required an excessive
waste of time and energy on ‘go and come’ (ko ne bra). And 86 per cent
of the cashew farmers felt that they had to spend an excessive amount
of money on the logistics of applying for and following the loan
through. However, 76 per cent of the cashew farmers said they would
still apply for another ADB loan, since there was no viable alternative
source of institutional capital loans. A total of 90 per cent of all loans
to cashew farmers originated from ADB. The remaining farmers ob-
tained loans from cashew-buying companies or credit unions.
Although these loans were easier to get than the ADB loans, they were
for much smaller amounts, often under ¢500,000. Cashew-buying
agents may often use small loans to engage in forward buying to se-
cure future supplies, deducting the loan from the future sale of the
crop.
Table 5.6 Proportion of cashew farmers receiving loans
Banda
(%)
Weila
(%)
Asantekwa
(%)
Nante
(%)
Total
(%)
Percentage of farmers
receiving loan from ADB
18 63 34 20 32
No. of farmers 60 38 41 40 179
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Although the bank could easily use the cashew plantations as collat-
eral against the loan, and take measures to possess the farm until the
loan and interest are paid off, the management costs of this would
most likely be higher than the value of the loan. Thus, the bank prefers
to place the transaction costs on the farmers through the organisation
of farmers’ groups with a collective responsibility towards loan repay-
ment. The relatively low value of the cashew in relation to the high in-
terest rates and the small amounts of capital loaned prevent the cashew
plantations of small farmers being used as collateral by banks. The va-
lue of the plantation can only be capitalised through working it and
harvesting the cashew, since the land has little value beyond the com-
paratively high investments in labour and crop, which can be destroyed
by bush fires when it is relaxed. Thus, by possessing cashew planta-
tions against defaults on loans, the banks assume a high-risk invest-
ment which requires considerable investment in labour to yield divi-
dends. Markets for existing cashew plantations are limited, and thus
default on the loans cannot be immediately capitalised.
Conclusion
Within Brong Ahafo the Forestry Service has developed a programme
of informal mechanisms for registering teak plantations. However, it
has not developed a programme of loans to support the development
of teak plantations to complement the registration of land and enable
farmers to gain land for collateral. Although the plantation registration
programme claims to facilitate the ‘free’ registration of teak plantations
for farmers, the lack of logistical support means that farmers largely
have to absorb the transaction costs of registering their plantations,
which may include payments to forestry officers. Moreover, the bene-
fits of registering are not clear or tangible. The requirements that the
documentation be signed by chiefs and family elders are concerned
with establishing community legitimacy and transparency for land re-
gistration, but they fail to take into account political struggles over the
control of land which often divide the interests of chiefs and commu-
nity elders from cultivators. It opens up potential avenues for money to
be exacted from planters by chiefs for recognition of their land rights
and acquisition of documentation. These requirements create high
transaction costs, which deter most farmers from pursuing land regis-
tration. Thus, informal registration becomes an avenue pursued by
only a few determined teak planters, mainly those who seek an active
client relationship with the Forestry Service.
While the government has attempted to gain support from the pri-
vate sector and foreign investors for financial support to teak planters
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in the form of loans, this has not been successful. The main con-
straints result from the reluctance of the private sector and interna-
tional capital to invest in plantation development, given the high risks.
Nevertheless, the government continues to invest in developing public
sector plantations within the forest reserves and in creating favourable
incentives for private sector investment, hopeful of eventually attracting
foreign investment. The teak plantation registration programme of the
Forestry Service is largely concerned with the gradual building up of
an information system on the location of existing plantations, which
can be used to link buyers and sellers in the present, gradually develop-
ing conditions for when capital investors become more interested in in-
vesting in the future development of teak. The programme is con-
strained by a failure to attract private sector investment in financing
loans for teak farmers commensurate with the value of investment in
teak. It mainly offers farmers who register their plantations state recog-
nition of their ownership of teak, information on potential buyers and
price, and technical advice for teak production. Scarcity of capital for
loans and unwillingness to take long-term risks are important factors
which presently hinder the capitalisation of teak plantations. However,
the registration of teak plantations also has the ulterior objective of
meeting the needs of the Forestry Service to monitor legal timber and
track the origins of felled timber. By actively registering their planta-
tions teak farmers help the Forestry Service to build up low cost infor-
mation. As capital becomes available for teak development, it is likely
that institutional innovations for the recognition of teak plantations
will take place, but alongside political struggles to gain control over
teak and extract revenues from it, which are likely to undermine some
of the interests of the poorest and most marginal sections of society
In contrast with this, within the cashew sector an institutional fra-
mework for the disbursement of loans to small farmers has been devel-
oped by the agricultural services in collaboration with the ADB. How-
ever, this eschews linking land to collateral, since this would result in
high transaction costs resulting from poorly developed land markets
and information systems, which are incommensurate with the size of
the loans and the management costs of capitalising debt through collat-
eral. While the Ministry of Agriculture is involved with TIPCEE in the
mapping and digitising of cashew plantations, the results of this are
not made public within the districts or used in registering farmers’
plantations, nor are they officially used against the provisions of loans
at present. While many cashew farmers have received small loans, the
transaction costs of linking loans to the registration of land are higher
than the value of the loans. Cashew is also a high-risk crop, which is
vulnerable to fire. The ADB loans programme for cashew thus at-
tempts to minimise risk by forcing farmers to bear the transaction
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costs of a tedious programme of farmer group monitoring which trans-
forms them into bank clients with mandatory accounts. This combines
peer group pressure, threats of removal of extension and financial sup-
port with more coercive measures including police action. This does
not translate into the easy capitalisation of assets by independent farm-
ers developing their own investment strategies, but into forms of de-
pendent accumulation in which support to farmers is conditional upon
them following the prescriptions of agricultural banks, agricultural ex-
tension services, and agribusiness. Thus, even in the agricultural sec-
tors with fungible assets and the most secure delineation of property
rights, farmers are not easily able to capitalise their assets, since the ca-
pitalisation of assets is subject to political control and the desire of ca-
pital to reorganise markets in specific directions. It is extremely unli-
kely that smallholder food crop farmers will be able to capitalise their
land through community-based land registration programmes, given
the constraints that this richer echelon of commercially aspiring rural
farmers experience in attempting to capitalise their farm assets.
In the present global policy frameworks for land administration,
much is made of harmonisation between customary and formal sys-
tems. This chapter has shown that in the transitional zone of Ghana,
this concept is highly problematic in the context of agricultural change
occurring within farming systems. The smallholder/peasant farming
sector now contains two different sectors with diametrically different
principles of farm use, although the same farmers use both systems.
The food-producing sector is based on a bush-fallowing system rooted
in perpetual movement over land, as well as the recycling of land.
Farmers use land as they require it but are only allowed to claim rights
in land that they use and manage. If they extend their farms in one di-
rection, and leave land unmanaged in another direction, a new farmer
can legitimately move into that land. There is no attempt to demarcate
the area that a single individual can cultivate or to limit the maximum
area they can cultivate. Everyone cultivates according to his or her
strength. As labour becomes commoditised, strength comes to denote
the ability to hire labour. The system is well adapted to the conditions
of expanding farming frontiers, in which the overriding ideology is one
of encouraging everyone to develop as much land as they can.
With the development of tree plantations, this ideology is transferred
into plantation development, and planters are encouraged to develop as
much land as they can. This ultimately begins to undermine the pre-
existing tenure system. The tree plantations permanently remove land
from the recycling system of bush-fallowing. External investors become
interested in developing large plantations and acquiring land, and land
begins to acquire a commodity value that the chiefs attempt to exploit.
However, attempts by the chiefs to allocate large tracts of land to inves-
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tors is frequently opposed by local people when it threatens their liveli-
hood and land use interests, and disrupts their system of bush-fallow-
ing (as occurred at Weila). Conflicts may develop between neighbours
or within families over the alienation and accumulation of land by tree
planters, which may result in attempts to limit plantations and demar-
cate areas in which plantations cannot be developed by local farmers.
With external investors expressing interest in plantations, chiefs may
attempt to contain the expansion of plantations by locals, to be able to
sell remaining areas of land or attempt to force local plantation develo-
pers to pay revenues for the privilege of creating plantations. Thus,
both internal processes of accumulation and social differentiation and
external investments by commercial planters create pressures that
transform existing land relations.
The land rights of tree planters have been highly secure within the
customary system of land use, since this accords rights to fallow land
based on the evidence of management of the land, including the plant-
ing or tending of trees. However, the new wealth that plantations create
and their potential disruption of bush-fallowing strategies result in con-
flicts. Tree planters develop anxieties over the value of the plantations
they create. They become worried that elders in the family will prevent
their children from inheriting their plantations. These anxieties trans-
late into an interest in titling their plantations to secure their wealth
further. Tree planters tend to be highly amenable to programmes con-
cerned with land titling and extending secure property rights to those
who have acquired their land in the customary sector. Various donor-
supported programmes are assisting new export sector tree crops.
While tree planters usually constitute the richer segments of the popu-
lation with surplus capital to invest in hiring labour, these programmes
are promoted as poverty reduction programmes. They frequently devel-
op components concerned with security of customary land tenure and
securing land rights for the poor. Paradoxically, these tree planters will
constitute a major clientele for these programmes in years to come,
since tree plantations are fungible assets, which are easily mapped and
demarcated, unlike the mobile resource base of bush-fallow cultivators.
This expansion of tree planters with registered holdings will ultimately
serve to undermine and erode the base of the food crop farmers and
their system of land use. In policy circles, this is likely to be promoted
as facilitating community-based land management and harmonisation
of customary and formal systems, without any hint of the complex de-
bates, discourses, and conflicts that occur around these competing land
uses. It may also be presented as the march of progress, as more valu-
able cash crops replace food crops and permanent cultivation bush-fal-
lowing. However, within the system of bush-fallowing without clearly
demarcated land ownership, food farmers have managed to create con-
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siderable value in crops, which rivals the leading export crops, as al-
luded to by the comparison between the value of the contribution of
yam and cocoa to the agricultural economy. This only goes to show that
notions of customary tenure are selectively constructed to mould and
fashion the customary to fit contemporary policy agendas and exclude
elements that are not considered compatible. This process is carried
out through the legalisation, formalisation, and recognition of custom-
ary land tenure.
In reality, a large gulf exists between the dynamic land use systems
based on use rights and recycling of land, and the visions of a custom-
ary system based on clearly defined and fungible property rights. The
transition from the one system to the other is unlikely to occur without
considerable appropriation of land from the poorer sections of farmers.
It is perhaps this appropriation of common property and family user
rights that will redefine land assets and create the basis for individua-
lised land tenure security based on legalisation and the rule of law, so
loved by De Soto and advocates of the new institutional economics.
Notes
1 I particularly wish to thank Patrick Nsiah of Asantekwa who was of great assistance
in helping to carry out fieldwork for this research and contributed to my understand-
ing of the issues in this area. Eric Osei and Kofi Gyampoh also helped in the initial
field research.
2 1 acre is equivalent to 0.4 hectares.
3 Fifty per cent of women at Asantekwa also got land from their husbands, but the
number of women was too small in the sample to be statistically significant.
4 The Banda have a matrilineal inheritance system, so the children of a Banda woman
and a migrant are recognised as Banda.
5 The Forestry Commission is responsible for formulating forestry policy in Ghana,
and the Forestry Service implements these policies.
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6 Legalising customary land tenure in Ghana: The
case of peri-urban Kumasi1
Janine Ubink
Introduction
Ghana has legalised customary tenure indirectly, through constitu-
tional recognition of customary land management and of the position
of chiefs. The 1992 Constitution continues the practice started in the
colonial period to vest all customary lands – which constitute approxi-
mately 80 per cent of the land in Ghana (Alden Wily and Hammond
2001:46-8; Kasanga and Kotey 2001:13; Larbi, Odoi-Yemo, and Darko
1998:1) – in the appropriate stool, skin or land-owning family2 on be-
half of and in trust for their people, and confirms that such lands be
managed according to the fiduciary duty of the traditional authorities
towards their people (articles 267(1) and 36(8)). The Constitution
furthermore guarantees the ‘institution of chieftaincy, together with its
traditional councils as established by customary law and usage’ (art.
270(1)). Article 270(2) stipulates that Parliament cannot interfere in
the recognition process of chiefs. This power lies exclusively with the
Traditional Councils and Houses of Chiefs, with a final appeal to the
Supreme Court (articles 273 and 274, 1992 Constitution and sections
15, 22, 23, Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370)).
The fact that in Ghana customary land is managed by traditional
authorities, does not preclude the fact that the government is to a cer-
tain extent also involved in this realm. Over the years various Land Sec-
tor Agencies have been involved in land use planning, land title regis-
tration, issuance of formally registered leases, stool land revenue collec-
tion, and adjudication of land disputes. In 1999, after decades of
piecemeal legislative and state management measures, the government
of Ghana formulated its first comprehensive National Land Policy in
1999 (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999) and has embarked, with
multi-donor support, upon a Land Administration Project intended to
reform land institutions and develop land policy so as to provide great-
er certainty of land rights for ordinary land users and enable greater ef-
ficiency and fairness in the land market (Ministry of Lands and For-
estry 2003; World Bank 2003b).
This chapter studies customary land management in peri-urban Ku-
masi. Peri-urban areas form tenure hotspots where property relations
are subject to intense contestation and where access to wealth and
authority is undergoing rapid change. Due to the expansion of urban
centres and population growth, peri-urban areas are witnessing a high
demand for residential and sometimes commercial land, which trig-
gers struggles over the rights to convert farmland, now cultivated by
community members, and to sell it for other purposes. Since tradi-
tional authorities have a strong position with regard to land, they play
a prominent role in these conversions. Peri-urban Kumasi, the zone
around the capital of the Ashanti Region, is a case in point. Kumasi is
a bustling city and an important transportation hub and houses the
still vibrant royal court of the Asantehene,3 the powerful king of all
Asante. Its number of inhabitants has grown by 4.2 per cent annually
since 1960, to 1,400,000 at present. This has led to the abovemen-
tioned pressure on land in the peri-urban area. Increasingly, farmland
is being converted to other uses, especially alongside the major roads
to Kumasi, where access to the city is easy and electricity is available.
Many peripheral villages have now become fully encapsulated by Ku-
masi. This chapter is based on fieldwork in nine peri-urban villages, at
a range of ten to 40 kilometres from Kumasi.4
In this chapter we will study the case of ‘tenure hotspot’ peri-urban
Kumasi to provide an insight into an example of long-term, indirect le-
galisation of customary tenure. The following questions will be asked:
(1) How is customary land managed by traditional authorities in peri-
urban Kumasi? (2) To what extent and how is the government involved
in customary land management, both before and after the new Na-
tional Land Policy and its implementing Land Administration Project?
(3) What are the effects of this constellation on the tenure security of
the indigenous5 farmers?
Customary land management by traditional authorities
Chiefs
In the Ashanti Region it is the chiefs who are the caretakers of all cus-
tomary land or stool land. According to representations of customary
law in case law, textbooks and legal discourse, Ashanti convention
holds that the ultimate title, also called the allodial title, of every piece
of land is held in common by the members of a community,6 and the
chief is the custodian of such land. Chiefs are customarily and consti-
tutionally obliged to administer and develop the land in the interests of
the whole community (articles 36(8) and 267(1), 1992 Constitution).
Stool lands, therefore, are communal property. As long as there is va-
cant land, each member of a community has the right to farm and
build on part of it, which gives the member a usufructuary title7, also
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called customary freehold, to the land.8 The usufructuary interest can
be inherited9 and is extinguished only through abandonment, forfei-
ture10 or with the consent and concurrence of the interest holder. The
usufructuary cannot be deprived of any of the rights constituting the
interest, and not even the chief can make an adverse claim (Asante
1969:105-106; Danquah 1928:197-200, 206, 221; Ollennu 1962:29,
55-56; Ollennu 1967:252-255; Pogucki 1962:180; Sarbah 1968:64-67;
Woodman 1996:53, 66, 107).11
These customary rules date from the days when communities were
involved in subsistence farming in land-abundant areas, when not land
but people were of value to the chief and the community. Now that
market production, population growth, and urbanisation have en-
hanced the economic value of land, many chiefs in peri-urban Kumasi
claim that these rules are outdated and need to be adjusted to modern
circumstances. They argue that communal land that can be used in a
more productive way should be brought back under chiefly administra-
tion. Or, as the Beseasehene (the chief of Besease) said: ‘It is a law that
when the town12 is growing and it comes to your farm, you do not have
any land.’13 These claims have seriously weakened the value and secur-
ity of the usufructuary interest: when there is a demand to change the
use of land from agricultural to residential, individual farmers lose the
security of their usufructuary rights, and the chief claims the power to
reallocate these lands.
Some chiefs, however, are taking the argument much further and
are venturing to manipulate and shift the meaning of communal land
ownership.14 They claim that their rights to administer stool land do
not derive from their function as caretakers on behalf of the commu-
nity but instead assert that ‘land belongs to the royal family, since it
was members of the royal family who fought for the land’ and the chief
has administrative powers over the land as the leader of the royal fa-
mily.15 According to these chiefs, the royal family had only given the
land out for farming purposes to temporary caretakers and can reclaim
it when its use is changed without any need for compensation. ‘The
farmer does not lose any land since he did not own any land. The
farmer is only the caretaker for the chief. The land was given to him
free of charge, so how can he claim part of the money when it has
been sold?’16 This narrowing down of the land-owning community
weakens the security of usufructuary rights even more as it degrades
the nature of the customary rights of usufruct. The customary freehold
is transformed into a permissive right of tenant-like character, based
on the leniency of the chief instead of on the communal ownership of
the land. The allodial title proportionally gains in weight and shifts
from the community as a whole to the royal family, on whose behalf
the chief claims outright ownership.
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The argument of the first group of chiefs – that communal land
which can be used in a more productive way should be brought back
into chiefly administration – is only convincing if the proceeds of the
conversion are used for community development such as infrastruc-
ture, education and alternative livelihood projects, which might help in-
habitants of the village to make a living after the loss of their agricul-
tural land. Although all the chiefs interviewed – even the ones who
claim that land ownership lies with the royal family and not with the
whole community – acknowledged that they have at least a moral obli-
gation to use part of stool land revenue to compensate the farmer and/
or for community development, actual practice differs considerably.
The neighbouring villages of Jachie and Tikrom offer two extreme ex-
amples. In Jachie, the chief demarcated a large part of the village farm-
land for residential plots and allowed members of the community to
buy this land at a very low price. The remaining plots were leased to
outsiders for residential purposes. All the revenue generated has been
used for community development. In the four years of his reign, the
Jachiehene has built a library, a school, and a palace, and has allocated
part of his land to a technical school in exchange for scholarships. The
neighbouring Tikromhene provides the opposite example. He has con-
verted and leased most of the farmland in his village without giving
the community members any part of the demarcated land or any finan-
cial compensation. When a member wants a residential plot, he has to
pay the market price. Out of the revenue from stool land leases, almost
nothing has left the chief‘s palace.17 As the above-mentioned examples
of Tikrom and Jachie illustrate, practices regarding the division of land
and revenue differ enormously. On average, however, chiefs receive un-
satisfactory marks from most villagers for their administration of the
land. ‘So much money goes to the chief, and so little to development’18
and ‘Due to the greedy nature of landowners (i.e. chiefs) there is not
much development in this town’19 are utterances heard regularly in the
villages.
The effects of the two kinds of discourses – more productive use or
landownership lies with the royal family – are not that different in
peri-urban Kumasi.20 Chiefs from both groups are rapidly converting
farmland, in which indigenous community members or families have
usufructuary rights, into residential land which they allocate to outsi-
ders through customary leases. This is leading to increasing tenure in-
security among indigenous farmers. As a result of the allocations, poor
and marginalised families frequently lose their agricultural land, their
employment and their income base. Apart from some positive excep-
tions, traditional authorities display little accountability for any money
generated, and most indigenous land users are seeing little or no bene-
fit from the leases. They are only rarely – and then very inadequately –
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compensated for the loss of their farmland, and in most villages only a
meagre part of the money is used for community development.
Although the new lessees are benefiting from the land conversions,
they are also affected by the lack of community improvement, since
the areas they are building their houses in are seldom serviced with
electricity, roads and sewers. Furthermore, the numerous accounts of
multiple sales of the same piece of land to different buyers and of sales
of alleged residential plots on land unsuitable for residential purposes
show the buyer’s vulnerable tenure security. In sum, the practice of
customary land management in peri-urban Ghana differs widely from
the constitutional provision that puts the interest of the community
first (article 36(8), 1992 Constitution).
Local negotiations, struggles and debates
Local land administration practices result from continuing processes of
negotiation and are not only shaped by the ideology, claims, and ac-
tions of the chief but also by the extent to which these are accepted or
contested locally and nationally. The chiefs‘ actions in peri-urban Ku-
masi and their severe effects on the tenure security and livelihoods of
the people are causing a great deal of turmoil among community
members. Individuals, families, and other groups of people are challen-
ging the chiefs’ actions.21 In some villages, people have tried to resist
the reallocation of land by the chief per se, while in other villages the re-
allocation itself was accepted but the way it was done was contested,
especially the division of the financial returns from the reallocation. In
the following examples, both categories of resistance are discussed.
(i) Resistance against the chiefs‘ reallocation of land
Outsiders started to look for residential land in the village of Brofoye-
duru about fifteen years ago. ‘At first it was the chief selling22 these
plots, but the farmer did not get his right percentage’, i.e. the chief
paid no compensation to the farmer.23 After a while, the chief‘s sisters
went to talk to him, and he allowed first one and then all of his sib-
lings to sell their own land. When word got out, other people also
started selling. ‘The chief is letting it go. He signs the papers after the
sale for some money.’24 Although the people in Brofoyeduru success-
fully resisted the actual sale of their land by the chief, they do not in
general deny the chief‘s right to sell. Some villagers explained their be-
haviour as follows: ‘The right thing would be for the chief to sell it. But
if the chief does that, the farmer does not get much money. Since
everyone is poor here, the chief has to allow it.’25
In Besease, unlike in Brofoyeduru, many people deny outright their
chief‘s claim that he can reallocate their land. The majority of the villa-
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gers acknowledged the chief‘s right to be informed about a sale, to sign
the land allocation papers, and to receive a signing fee for this service
– although some said it should be the buyer who takes care of these is-
sues and not the seller – but they claimed the farmers were the only
ones to initiate a sale and to receive the money paid for the land:
‘When the town reaches my land, I can sell it. The abusua panin26 and
the chief have no say in that;’27 ‘If the chief wants a third of the money
when I sell land, I will take the case to court.’28 Land transactions in
Besease thus display ongoing struggles between the four land-owning
chiefs and their people. ‘If you are very persistent, the chief cannot take
your land away,’ a farmer explains. ‘You can sell it and give part (of the
money) to the chief. But if you are unlucky, the chief will take the land,
and if you don’t fight it, you won’t get anything.’29
Struggles over land can sometimes lead to violent incidents between
villagers and the chief. For instance, the Beseasehene sold land that
did not belong to his family. When the buyer started to develop the
land, the family that had the customary freehold in the land stopped
him. After the buyer applied to the chief to recover his losses, the chief
‘went to the land-owing family to plead, but he nearly got beaten up’.30
In some villages there have even been large-scale violent uprisings of
commoners against the chief. For instance in Pekyi No. 2, where the
chief sold a large part of the village land to the Deeper Life Christian
Ministry and then pocketed the money, the commoners chased both
the chief and the church representatives out of the village, killing one
of the latter in the process.
Of the nine villages studied in depth, only in Boankra – where there
has not been a chief for the last fourteen years – did the royal family
seem to acknowledge the families’ rights to initiate the sale of land:
‘When the new chief comes, the clans can still sell their own land, but
with the consent of the chief, who will ‘take something’ for the stool.’31
However, it remains to be seen what position the royal family will take
in land negotiations when a new chief is enstooled.
(ii) Resistance against the way chiefs reallocate land
In a number of the case-study villages, people did generally accept the
fact that chiefs were reallocating community land, but they vehemently
opposed the procedure and the division of revenues. The previously
mentioned village of Tikrom presents a worst-case scenario with regard
to community development. According to a Unit Committee member,
‘the Tikromhene is selling land without consulting anyone, compensat-
ing the farmer, or giving part of the revenue to the town’, and part of
the remaining land has been degraded or even destroyed as a result of
sandmining.32 Furthermore, the chief does not abide by the planning
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scheme and has, for instance, sold land that was reserved for the
school.
A long process of consultation took place between the chief and the
community. At a series of village meetings, the people requested a sub-
stantial percentage of land revenues for community development, but
to no avail. They then tried to involve the chief from their place of ori-
gin, but this chief did not want to come and talk to his ‘son’. As the
Tikromhene comes directly under the Asantehene, the former assem-
blyman33 then wrote a petition to the Asantehene in May 2002. How-
ever, the case has never been called before the Asantehene, and it is as-
sumed by some that the Tikromhene has encouraged the secretary of
the Asantehene to remove the petition from the files. In addition, the
former assemblyman has brought in the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to investigate the chief‘s sandmining close to streams.
The EPA came, looked and reproached the chief, but does not have the
power to prosecute. Such power lies with the District Assembly, but it
is rarely used. A local radio station discussed the sandmining problem
in Tikrom in one of its programmes, in which the assemblyman ap-
pealed to the Asantehene for help, but there has been no response.
As the example of Tikrom shows, local assembly members often play
an important role in challenging misadministration by chiefs. In many
villages, the same role is played by members of the Unit Committee,
the lowest level of local government in Ghana. One of their popular
procedural solutions to the misadministration of stool land is the estab-
lishment of a village committee, usually called a Plot or Land Alloca-
tion Committee, to oversee the proper allocation of village land. Such a
committee usually consists of representatives of the chief and his el-
ders and representatives of the village, often Unit Committee mem-
bers. The Plot Allocation Committee checks that the site plan is in ac-
cordance with the planning scheme, and it has to sign the allocation
papers. The existence of such a committee normally coincides with the
transfer of a fixed portion of the revenue to the community for develop-
ment. Although many chiefs pay lip service to such committees, they
usually work with a committee made up solely of elders and the chief
himself, and popular attempts to set up committees with a broader re-
presentation have often been frustrated by the chiefs.
The kinds of activities undertaken in Tikrom to challenge the chief‘s
style of stool land administration were also found in many other vil-
lages and appear to be a common response to misadministration by
chiefs. Their success is often limited, leaving the people with feelings
of desperation or resignation that they have been left to their own de-
vices. The following statements by two former assemblymen aptly illus-
trate these feelings: ‘In Europe, if a government is criticised three
times, the government goes. But here people come to beat you up in-
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stead’;34 ‘People who lose their land to the chief usually don’t go to a
chief or to court, normally they give up.’35
Because of this lack of success in negotiations with the chief, many
people do not aim their anger and resistance at the chief who is selling
the land but at the buyer. Both my fieldwork and a study of pending
cases at the High Court of Kumasi show that the farmer, who is angry
that his land has been sold by the chief, often tries to restrain the buyer
from going onto the land and building there. For instance in Adadeen-
tem, the former chief sold substantial portions of the community’s
land. This aroused a lot of dissatisfaction amongst the people, but no
concrete actions were taken against the chief. One of the villagers, how-
ever, sued the buyer of a vast tract of land in the High Court of Kuma-
si. Another example of the ‘buyer loses out’ principle is found in Be-
sease, where the Beseasehene sold two plots of land belonging to his
subchief, the Kontihene. On finding out about the sale, the Kontihene
first ‘caused trouble with the Beseasehene’, but ‘we enstooled him, so
(…) we don’t want to quarrel with him. But the buyer can’t come and
work on it. If you come to work you will meet the Konti.’36
Traditional controls on chiefly administration
Chiefs often reject people’s suggestions and claims about adjusting
stool land administration and continue to rule as they always have
done. This poses the question of how is it possible that these chiefs
cannot be steered away from their devastating track? Are there no
checks and balances on their administration? A literature survey of
some of Ghana‘s ‘grand old men’ in the field of customary land tenure
yields the following quotes: ‘(T)he occupant of the stool can only bind
the stool, i.e., the town or community, if he acts with the consent and
concurrence of the whole town or community represented by the sub-
chiefs, and the principal councillors from the various sections’ (Ollen-
nu 1962: 130). ‘Hereditary37 councillors, or elders as they are called in
the lower councils, and chiefs or sub-chiefs in the higher ones, are the
heads of houses, families, or towns who have been elected by members
of a house, family, or town to be their respective head, patriarch, or
chief. (…) They hold their offices in the pleasure not of the Chief or
head Chief, but by the sufferance of the people who have elected them
to the Council. (…) It is of utmost importance, in view of our form of
government, for the Chief, who is always the President of his Council,
to give due weight and make full allowance of the expressed opinion of
these councillors’ (Danquah 1928:57). ‘The chief was bound by his oath
to consult the elders on all matters, and to obey their advice’ (Busia
1951:14). To supplement these authoritative but not too recent writers38
with a contemporary influential voice, I turn to Kasanga who, less spe-
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cifically but equally romantically, states that ‘there are reasonable
checks at the local level on almost everybody’ (Kasanga 2000a:72;
cf. Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 31).
According to these writers, traditional responsibility for village chiefs
thus rests on two pillars. The first pillar is made up of a council of el-
ders, selected by and representing all major factions of the community,
without whose consent the chief cannot make any decisions. The sec-
ond pillar consists of the possibility to destool seriously malfunctioning
chiefs. Leaving aside whether traditional rule was ever so equitable and
well-balanced as these authors claim – which has been convincingly re-
futed in the extensive oeuvre of McCaskie (including McCaskie 1992,
1995, 2000a) – the current performance of chiefs in peri-urban Kuma-
si at least disabuses us of the idea that the two pillars function effec-
tively in present-day village practice.
To begin with, in a number of case-study villages, the council elders
are primarily or even entirely selected from the royal family and not
from the important families in the community, as in Kotwi. The Kotwi
stool was originally carved out of the Asampong stool, and the Kotwi-
hene was like a subchief to the Asamponghene and thus did not have
his own subchiefs. Later, the Kotwihene was upgraded, and he now
swears his oath directly to the Asantehene. Although he could now
have subchiefs, he has not installed any. He has continued to discuss
village affairs with the elders from his family, and when there is a pub-
lic ceremony, the Asamponghene and his subchiefs will join the Kotwi-
hene and his elders. The absence of a council representing the whole
community was encountered in a number of the other case-study vil-
lages as well. Furthermore, the rule that elders hold their offices not in
the pleasure of the chief but to serve the family that has elected them
also seems to be under strain. For instance in Nkoransa, where the se-
cretary of the chief explained that ‘it is not the rule that a certain family
always brings a subchief. It is the chief who picks them. When one
dies, he can choose a new one’.39 This is underpinned by the abun-
dance of conflicts between elders and their own family, who can no
longer dismiss them when unsatisfied.40 Regardless of the composi-
tion of the council, the chief often co-opts his elders by sharing the
benefits from land administration with them, removing their incen-
tives to effectively check the use of power and, if necessary, to stand up
against the chief (cf. Abudulai 2002:83). According to a UC member of
Tikrom, ‘the subchiefs support the chief because they get a share of
the money. If they argue with him, they won’t get anything’.41 Even at
the Asantehene’s Land Secretariat it is acknowledged that ‘in many vil-
lages the elders connive with the chief‘.42 And those elders that are not
co-opted are often simply ignored by the chief, as is aptly illustrated by
the following statement: ‘Beseasehene is a new chief. He doesn’t mind
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the rules,’ says his Kontihene subchief, ‘I tried to talk to him, but he
didn’t take my advice. If I wasn’t educated, he would try to cheat me as
well.’43
When the people of a community want to destool their chief, a case
has to be brought before the Traditional Council, which is made up of
the paramount chief and his subchiefs.44 A first hurdle is that destool-
ment charges cannot be brought by commoners but only by the ‘king-
makers’, i.e. those subchiefs and members of the royal family who can
also make or enstool a chief (Hayford 1970:36). As discussed above,
these subchiefs are often co-opted and are therefore not likely to take
the lead in actions against the chief. And if they do dare to do so, ac-
cording to one of the subchiefs of the Ejisuhene, this is only ‘after
many years of wrongdoing, the chief will first be given the benefit of
the doubt’; to explain why they have waited so long to start a destool-
ment case against the chief, he adds: ‘The kingmakers have deposed
the previous Ejisuhene and installed this one, of whom they had high
expectations. They now lose part of their legitimacy when they want to
destool the one they selected.’45 If those years of waiting are added to
the years the destoolment procedure itself may take, it is obvious that a
chief can easily come to sell a considerable amount of stool land and
spend the proceeds as well. A second obstacle lies in the fact that the
paramount chief, who chairs the Traditional Council, often has a direct
interest in who occupies the village stool, mainly because of his claims
to a share in the villages’ land revenues. The paramount chief of Ejisu,
for instance, favoured those chiefs who sold large amounts of stool
land and shared the proceeds with him. The fact that this did not
usually leave much land or revenue for the community did not seem to
bother him. Furthermore, to mention a third hindrance, the members
of the Traditional Council consist of direct colleagues of the chief-on-
trial. Many of the current destoolment charges are to do with land ad-
ministration in one way or another. And often the charges against the
chief-on-trial, such as selling farmland and not using enough stool
land revenue for community development, are also points of discussion
in the villages of the judging chiefs. Clearly, their personal interests in
such cases may stand in the way of objective and impartial judgment.
The main customary checks and balances on chiefs – ruling in coun-
cil with subchiefs and the possibility of destoolment – are not very ef-
fective therefore. One can add to this the fact that chiefly accountability
is extremely low. Most land administration is concealed due to a lack of
registration. A good chief may account for his administration of his
own accord, but this is an exception rather than the rule. Some elders
and chiefs claim that ‘nobody has the right to ask the chief to ac-
count’,46 and ‘if it goes wrong, there is nothing to do about it’.47 They
explain this by the fact that the chief also has his professional income,
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and it is impossible to know whether he is spending personal or stool
money. Or they say that ‘the chief does not receive any remuneration
but does have job-related expenses, to which the people do not want to
contribute’48 and that the chief continues to have obligations for which
customary provisions have ceased.49 Others claim that to ask a chief to
account for his expenditures is considered a vote of no confidence. ‘If a
chief does his work well, no one will bring him to account.’50 Most
people will not dare to do this unless there are clear indications of ser-
ious misconduct by the chief. And even then, ‘who is to bell the cat?’
The chief is still a powerful figure in most villages, and one is certain
to encounter his wrath by highlighting irregularities in his actions.
Moreover, taking action against a chief violates his traditional sanctity.
Most people would consider it the task of the royal family, and if the
royal family does not enact this task, how can commoners be expected
to take it upon themselves? The only kind of functioning accountability
is what I call ‘end-term accountability’. During destoolment proce-
dures, a chief has to account for all stool revenue, but by then most of
the money has usually been spent and is very hard to recover. Besides,
as noted, starting a destoolment procedure brings its own difficulties.
Colonial distortion of checks, balances and accountability
The current customary system lacks effective checks and balances and
accountability, but this is not surprising when the historical develop-
ment of the position of the chiefs is taken into account. During the co-
lonial period, local checks and balances and accountability structures
were severely distorted when the British government overrode the tra-
ditional rules of investiture and reserved for itself the right to appoint
and dismiss chiefs (Annor 1985:153; Busia 1951:105-6; Toulmin and
Quan 2000a:10; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987:11). With this ‘devo-
lution’, as Von Trotha (1996:81) calls it, the local attachment of the
chief to some extent gave way to his responsibilities and loyalties to-
wards the government. Where commoners tried to reassert local checks
and balances, a chief who was on friendly terms with the British ad-
ministrator was easily able to discredit the commoners by branding
them as malcontents and troublemakers (Kumado 1990-1992:203;
McCaskie 2000b).
The British gave the chiefs strong rights in land by accepting their
claims that according to customary law, all land belonged to a custom-
ary community with the chief as the administrator. However, they did
not give the chiefs free reign in all aspects. They regularly held them
to account, monitored the bylaws they made, and intervened in local
conflicts, thereby to some extent compensating for the lack of local
checks and balances, at least in the field of land administration (Cro0k
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1986:88; Dennis 1957). Post-colonial governments in Ghana have
shown an ambivalent attitude to chieftaincy (Kofi-Sackey 1983; Kuma-
do 1990-1992; Nugent 1994; Ray 1996; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal
1987, 1996), and the pendulum has swung between devolution and
the prohibition of governmental interference. Although under the cur-
rent Constitution the Ghanaian state is not permitted to exercise its so-
vereignty over chiefs regarding their enstoolment and destoolment (ar-
ticle 270(2), 1992 Constitution), the pre-colonial local checks and bal-
ances and accountability structures have not been rebuilt. A crucial
question therefore is whether the current government can also impose
state constraints on the administration of chiefs to compensate for the
lack of local checks and balances.
State involvement
We have seen that the 1992 Constitution vests all customary or stool
lands – which constitute approximately 80 per cent of the land in Gha-
na – in the appropriate stool on behalf of and in trust for their people,
and confirms that such lands must be managed by traditional authori-
ties (articles 267(1) and 36(8), 1992 Constitution). Notwithstanding
these provisions, the state has sought to regulate certain aspects of
stool land management. Over the years various governments have ta-
ken piecemeal measures in the areas of land use planning, land title
registration, issuance of formally registered leases, stool land revenue
collection, and adjudication of land disputes. This section of the chap-
ter will first describe the mandate as well as the actual functioning of
the principal state institutions involved in these fields to show the
checks and balances they are able to place on chiefly administration.
Then it will emphasise some of the political constraints state institu-
tions face by looking at the government’s policy of non-interference
with regard to chieftaincy. Finally, it will discuss current policy efforts
under the National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999)
and the Land Administration Project (Ministry of Lands and Forestry
2003; World Bank 2003b).
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands
The Constitution provides for an Office of the Administrator of Stool
Lands (OASL), which was established by the OASL Act, 1994 (Act
481). This office is responsible for the establishment of a stool land ac-
count and for the collection of all ‘rents, dues, royalties, revenue or
other payments whether in the nature of income or capital from the
stool lands’ to be paid into this stool land account (article 267(2), 1992
174 JANINE UBINK
Constitution and section 2, OASL Act, 1994 (Act 481)). Of the revenue
accruing from stool lands, ten per cent is paid to the OASL to cover ad-
ministrative expenses. The other 90 per cent is to be disbursed in the
following proportions: 25 per cent to the stool for its maintenance;
twenty per cent to the traditional authority; and 55 per cent to the Dis-
trict Assembly (Sections 3 and 8, OASL Act, 1994 (Act 481)). Although
this could curb the appropriation of stool land revenue by chiefs for
their personal use, there is no legal requirement that the 25 per cent of
the revenue received by stools is reinvested in the community. Rather,
the provisions encourage chiefs to retain the revenue ‘for the mainte-
nance of the stool in keeping with its status’. The use of the twenty per
cent share to the Traditional Council is not specified. According to Al-
den Wily and Hammond (2001:118-119), the government in this way
‘endorses the perception of chiefs of themselves that they are the own-
ers, not merely trustees acting on behalf of the real owners, the com-
munity at large’.
This provision has a long history pre-dating the current 1994 Act. It
dates back to the Local Government Ordinance, 1951 (Cap 64), and its
original purpose was to be the first step in depriving the big chiefs of
any role in land management and eventually of ownership and their
claims to have the right to collect land ‘rents’ (Rathbone 2000:30).
Chiefs, therefore, have always resisted handing over ‘their’ income to
the OASL. Since in peri-urban areas the conversion from agricultural
to residential land accounts for most land revenue, chiefs in these
areas centre their resistance on the definition of stool land revenue.
They claim that the money they receive for the allocation of land is not
purchase money but ‘drink money’ or ‘drinks’. They refer to the cus-
tom of bringing some drinks to the chief when acquiring land from
him as an acknowledgement of the ownership of the land, to show alle-
giance towards the chief, and for the customary pouring of libations on
the ground to seek the gods’ blessings for the transaction. Where a bot-
tle of Schnapps was sufficient in times of land abundance, when land
became more valuable a small amount of cash money was added to the
Schnapps. In peri-urban Ghana and other areas where land is highly
valued and demand is increasing, the amount of cash demanded has
gradually risen and now effectively constitutes a market price for the
purchase of land leases (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Edusah and
Simon 2001; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; McCaskie 2000b). The chiefs
continue to call this payment ‘drinks’ and claim that it should therefore
not be regarded as ‘stool land revenue’ in the sense of the OASL Act,
and they resist the disclosure of the sums collected. In peri-urban
areas, the only land revenues that flow to the OASL consist of ground
rents – annual governmental fees payable on land leases – which are
distributed according to the constitutional formula. These rents are
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small compared to the sums of ‘drink money’ collected directly by the
chiefs in selling land leases. The total amount of ground rent on a 99-
year residential lease adds up to about five per cent of the amount of
‘drink money’. Because ‘drink money’ is portrayed by the chiefs as a ri-
tual device rather than the means of exchange in a sales transaction, it
is not collected by the OASL, and so not subject to distribution under
the constitutional formula, and thus becomes, effectively, part of the
chief’s income.
Contrary to Kasanga and Woodman (2004:185), who for unclear rea-
sons claim that ‘it has been accepted by everyone concerned that those
(sums in ‘drinks’) do not amount to revenue from stool lands within
the meaning of the statute law’, most officials interviewed consider that
the law meant to include this ‘drink money’ in the definition of ‘stool
land revenue’.51 This interpretation seems to square with the very broad
definition of stool land revenues provided in the OASL Act, as quoted
above. This issue has, however, never been tested in the courts. In the
highly personalised society of Ghana, if a case were brought to court by
an officer of the OASL, this would not be considered an action on be-
half of the government, of the ruling political party, or even of the
OASL in general, but as a personal action of that particular officer.
Such an action would surely provoke the wrath of all of the chiefs. Ac-
cording to the District Chief Executive of Ejisu-Juaben district, ‘The
one who does it will become an enemy of the chiefs’, and this can pose
serious dangers to the career of the official concerned.52 In a number
of cases officials have been ‘transferred’ after standing up to a powerful
paramount chief or the Asantehene. According to the District Chief Ex-
ecutive of Ejisu-Juaben district, ‘careless statements by land officials
could be dangerous. They may have to pay a price for discourtesy’.53
Furthermore, as the Deputy Regional Lands Officer in Kumasi ex-
plains, every official is also ‘subject of a stool and subordinate to the
chief‘, and such an action would be considered an act of disloyalty to-
wards him.54 The one official we encountered who did want to go to
court over a sum of ‘drink money’ of Cedis 3 billion (at the time of sale
the equivalent of approximately E 300,000) claimed that he was
stopped by ‘the government’, because ‘the President does not want to
pay for such an action’.55
The lack of an effective political mandate for the OASL to exercise
the role intended by the constitution is only part of the story. A lack of
funds, qualified staff, equipment, and vehicles on the one hand, and
mismanagement, corruption, and lack of accountability in the OASL’s
own use of land revenues on the other (Grant 2004:20-21, 40-41; Ka-
sanga and Kotey 2001:iii; Kasanga and Woodman 2004:185) also se-
verely hamper the functioning of the OASL and affect its legitimacy in
the eyes of the people. To date, the revenues collected and distributed
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by the OASL have never been publicly disclosed, and the use of land
revenues received by all parties remains unaccounted for and non-
transparent. Accusations of irregularities in both spheres are rampant.
Lands Commission
The Lands Commission (LC) first came into existence following the
1969 Constitution, under the Lands Commission Act, 1971 (Act 362),
and operates under the Lands Commission Act, 1994 (Act 483), since
the advent of the 1992 Constitution. The LC is responsible for the
management of all public and vested lands,56 is meant to advise and
make recommendations on policies with respect to land use and devel-
opment, and advise on and assist in the execution of the registration of
land titles (section 2, Lands Commission Act, 1994 (Act 483)). With re-
gard to stool land, section 4 of Act 483 states: ‘There shall be no dispo-
sition or development of any stool land by any person unless the Regio-
nal Lands Commission (…) has certified that the disposition or develop-
ment is consistent with the development plan drawn up or approved
by the planning authority’ (cf. art. 267(3) of the 1992 Constitution).
This section continues the practice begun in 1962 by the Administra-
tion of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) to require the consent of the state to
the alienation of stool land (Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 3). Thus, if a
stool wants to dispose of land, it has to ask the LC for its consent and
concurrence. This could enhance the tenure security of the indigenous
farmers. However, in practice, consent before an allocation of stool
land is never sought. Concurrence after the allocation is sometimes
sought, although not by the chief but by lessees who want to formalise
their acquisition, and this is still quite rare. Typically, only the more
educated people or people with connections in the bureaucracy go
through the long,57 cumbersome, and expensive process of formalisa-
tion.58 The provision of consent and concurrence is not enforced by
the LC and therefore does not in practice provide an effective check
upon the administration of lands by chiefs. Like the OASL, the LC is
hampered by a shortage of trained and motivated staff, lack of basic lo-
gistics and support services, poor remuneration and incentive
packages, low morale, and endemic corruption (Report on the Benefi-
ciary Assessment Survey of the Lands Commission – Ghana, 1997,
quoted in Hueber and de Veer 2001:195; Centre for Democracy and
Development 2000:99-105; Grant 2004:21-21, 40-41, 95; Kasanga
2000b:14; Kasanga and Kotey 2001:iii, 8).59
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District Assembly
The Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), designates District Assem-
blies (DA), which have been created since 1986 but only received con-
stitutional backing in 1992, as the main planning authority charged
with the overall development of the district. With regard to land admin-
istration, they have legislative powers to make bylaws with respect to
construction, sanitation, and the environment. The preparation and ap-
proval of planning schemes, the granting of building permits, and the
enforcement of regulations and sanctions for non-compliance all rest
with the DA (Kasanga and Kotey 2001:9). Villages and towns are sup-
posed to draw up a land use planning scheme with the help of the
Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) of the DA. Such a
planning scheme designates the uses of the various areas, and shows
the boundaries of the individual plots. When a prospective developer
applies for a building permit, the TCPD has to check whether the site
plan conforms to the planning scheme, and whether the allocation pa-
per is signed by the local chief.
Ammissah et al. (1990:34, quoted in Hueber and de Veer 2001:19)
argue that ‘Since the main aim of the chiefs is to maximise financial
returns within the shortest possible time, important land uses such as
open spaces, playgrounds, schools, markets, refuse dumps, roads, etc.
are sacrificed, in order to augment the supply of building plots. This is
a major cause of haphazard and unauthorised development in all statu-
tory planning areas’. By means of the land use planning process, the
DA could provide some checks on the land administration by chiefs,
preventing double allocations,60 and reserve land for public purposes
or even for agriculture. Chiefs can prevent the drawing up of a plan-
ning scheme, however, by withholding their cooperation and not pro-
viding any information. ‘If a chief does not cooperate, you cannot make
a planning scheme.’61 According to the TCPD in Ejisu, ‘It is to the ben-
efit of the chief not to have an approved planning scheme. Therefore,
the cooperation of chiefs is not very high. Most have their own unap-
proved planning scheme’.62 Furthermore, although awareness of plan-
ning schemes, and building, permits is increasing, it is still low, and
most people do not comply with the demand for a building permit, or
partly due to the lengthy63 bureaucratic procedures and the costs in-
volved, the building precedes the formal planning process (Edusah and
Simon 2001: section 4.4; Hueber and de Veer 2001:191; Toulmin and
Longbottom 2001:29-30).64 Finally, fieldwork showed that the imple-
mentation of planning regulation is often lacking, due to a lack of per-
sonnel, funds, and logistics (cf. DFID/Toulmin, Brown, and Crook
2004:12; Hueber and de Veer 2001:188-9; Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 9-
10) and mismanagement and corruption (cf. Kasanga 1996:99; Kasan-
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ga and Kotey 2001:iii). And even when violations are found, severe
sanctions, such as demolition of unauthorised structures, are avoided
(cf. Hueber and de Veer 2001:191).
Furthermore, when the DA does not have a financial interest, it tries
not to get involved in ‘local affairs’. For instance, if there is more than
one land-owning chief in a village, the TCPD will accept a signature of
any one of the chiefs as a valid one. And if there is an agreement with-
in a village that a Plot Allocation Committee – a locally initiated com-
mittee consisting of representatives of both the chief and the village
that should sign all allocation notes and secure a percentage of the rev-
enue for community development – should also sign the allocation pa-
pers, this is considered an internal village affair by the TCPD, and they
do not check whether such a signature is found on the allocation paper.
In this way, the locally agreed upon solution to problems of transpar-
ency and distribution of land revenue is not supported by the govern-
ment.
While the land use planning system could in theory provide a check
on chiefly land administration, it also provides chiefs with additional
powers in local struggles over land. The formalisation of the land allo-
cation process by the government, with the signature of the chief as a
key element, gives chiefs an extra-official card to play, especially those
higher up in the hierarchy of traditional authorities. For instance, Abu-
dulai (2002) describes how in Tamale the sub-committee of the LC at-
tributes most of the problems in the field of land administration to the
lack of documentary evidence. It therefore decided that divisional
chiefs must countersign allocation papers to bring some order into the
system. Similar actions were encountered during fieldwork at the DA
in Ejisu – where it was decided that building permits could be given
only when the allocation papers bore the countersignature of the para-
mount chief, so as to prevent future land disputes and litigation, not
least involving the paramount chief himself – and at the LC in Kumasi
– where despite a court ruling that Kaase stool lands did not fall under
the authority of the Asantehene, the LC tried to convince the Kaase-
hene to have all land allocations countersigned by the Asantehene at
the cost of one-third of the purchase price.65 A comparable example is
found in the distribution of OASL revenues, which are usually paid to
the paramount chief, who is supposed to redistribute them in his area
according to the constitutional formula. These actions can be explained
by a combination of ‘administrative efficiency’ – dealing with one big
man instead of a whole group of people – and attempts to satisfy the
person with the greatest troublemaking capacity.
Every electoral area has its own representative at the DA. In many
villages, these local assembly members and the members of the Unit
Committee (UC) – the lowest level of local government – are public fig-
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ures, who are widely known, easily accessible, and often most actively
involved in development of the community. They are aware of the fact
that a lot of money for town development could be generated by stool
land allocations. It is therefore not surprising that where chiefs are un-
willing to distribute land revenues, UC and DA members are often in
direct confrontation with the chief, or lead the public actions against
him. Yet, while the UC and DA members are a local force to be reck-
oned with, they are not often backed by the district authorities. The
District Chief Executive (DCE) of Ejisu, for instance, while acknowled-
ging the negative effects of chiefly land conversions in his district, went
no further than the occasional public statement that chiefs should
spend part of the land revenues on community development. When we
proposed the idea to back up local Plot Allocation Committees (PACs)
by providing building permits only when allocation papers carry the
PAC’s signature, he rejected the proposal because land revenue would
then be spent by the UC and fall outside his own responsibility.66
More generally, during the UC and DA inauguration ceremonies,
members are often instructed to refrain from interfering in chieftaincy
and land matters.67
State courts
As regards the position of state courts in the field of customary land
management, chiefly re-appropriations and conversions of stool lands
in which community members have a usufructuary interest are not
supported by court decisions (Ubink 2002-2004). Although a trend
can be discerned in judicial customary law – rules of customary law as
set out by the courts – towards more power to the chief as administra-
tor to ensure sound town planning and a more equal distribution of
land, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the chief has the power
to deal with land as he wishes, without regard for community interests
or compensation for farmers. Customary law in the Ghanaian courts
rather conveys an image of protection of usufructuary rights against
the chiefs‘ attempts to re-appropriate stool lands for ‘development‘ pur-
poses. First, usufructuary rights are quite secure. Second, the transfer
of the usufructuary title does not need the consent of the allodial title
holder. This seems even to apply when farmland is transferred for
non-farm purposes, such as housing or cemetery plots. And even if a
chiefly grant were needed to change land use from agricultural to resi-
dential, as was stated in one court case,68 it seems that the community
member has a right to receive this grant unless overriding communal
interests prohibit it. Third, chiefs can be held accountable for the way
they use stool land revenues, since there is a ‘statutory imperative that
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moneys from stool land acquisitions should be lodged in a designated
fund’.69
Although state courts protect the interests of indigenous farmers
whose land is being re-appropriated by the chief, the effect of such
court decisions on local land practices and tenure security is limited.
Notwithstanding the large number of land cases in the courts, many
more land conflicts never reach them, either because of the aggrieved
parties’ lack of access or interest, or because the land conflicts are em-
bedded in ‘chieftaincy affairs’ for which state courts have no jurisdic-
tion (section 15(1) Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370)). Moreover, court de-
cisions seem to have little effect on land disputes beyond the specific
cases on which the court decides. This can be explained by a number
of factors: First, people have minimal knowledge of court decisions.
During fieldwork, people hardly referred to case law or legislation, and
when they did they often misunderstood it or invented their own provi-
sions. Second, the existence of an arena for strong local chiefs, hardly
constrained by local checks and balances and – as we will see in the
next section – also barely controlled by the government, which explains
why chiefs do not feel bound to comply with the rules of customary
law as set out by the courts.70
A policy of non-interference
In the sections above a number of examples display a lack of political
willingness to enhance the functioning of Land Sector Agencies (LSAs)
such as the OASL and the LC and strengthen their checks on chiefly
land management: the unwillingness of the political establishment to
bring before the court the question of whether ‘drink money’ is stool
land revenue in the sense of the OASL Act; the instructions to DA and
UC members to abstain from chieftaincy affairs; and the refusal of the
TCPD to check land allocation notes for a signature of the Plot Alloca-
tion Committee, where such committees exist.
This lack of political support – which results in large part from a de-
ference to chiefly authority and power amongst local government offi-
cials – is also mirrored in the policy discourse of the present govern-
ment. In the media, government officials at all levels regularly and ve-
hemently proclaim that they will not ‘meddle in chieftaincy affairs’.71
According to Boafo-Arthur (2003:138), President Kufuor himself ‘has
made it clear that the current ruling party is not interested in meddling
in chieftaincy affairs.’ These ‘non-interference’ statements are some-
times made in reaction to chieftaincy disputes, over which section 15(1)
of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), declares the government has no
jurisdiction, but also to express in more general terms that the govern-
ment will not interfere in chiefly administration such as in the field of
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land management, which is not dictated by any legislative provision
whatsoever. For instance, the former coordinator of the Land Adminis-
tration Project at the Ministry of Lands and Forestry asked in an inter-
view: ‘Is it the business of the government to address the accountability
of chiefs? Within the local system there exists accountability, they can
‘destool‘ a chief, or remove his authority. We do not want to impose ac-
countability on the chiefs, since land is essentially a chief‘s thing.’72
And the former Minister of Lands and Forestry, Professor Kasanga, ar-
gued that ‘The state should not attempt to enforce local checks and bal-
ances. This should be done by the citizens themselves’.73 Obviously,
such state discourse, together with what we refer to as the govern-
ment’s ‘policy of non-interference’, provides chiefs with ample room
for manoeuvre and gives them little reason to fear state intervention in
land matters.
The primary basis for the present government’s policy of non-inter-
ference appears to be a deliberate political alliance with powerful
chiefs, coupled with a recognition of the chiefs’ considerable local poli-
tical power and influence and their roles as the key vote-brokers, espe-
cially in the rural areas. In addition, the current tendency to fill chief-
taincy positions with highly educated professionals blurs the traditional
distinction between the governmental elite and the chiefs, and creates
new alliances between these two groups (Ray 1992).74 The elite of the
party presently in power, the NPP, is especially closely connected to the
chiefs. Not only does it have its stronghold in the Ashanti Region, with
its powerful chiefs, but President Kufuor himself is connected through
marriage to the royal family of the Asantehene. Many members of the
current government, up to high levels, are chiefs or royal family mem-
bers in their hometown. It should also be noted that rampant irregula-
rities and mismanagement by state institutions in procedures of com-
pulsory acquisition of land do not give the state a strong moral position
from which to judge the quality of chiefly land administration (Kotey
1996; Daily Graphic, 22 August 2002, 17). Moreover, when the state
needs to make new land acquisitions itself, a cooperative relationship
with chiefs will be useful.
Chiefs seek to capitalise on the government’s current support for
chieftaincy by rekindling discussions on certain subjects, such as: the
creation of a second chamber of parliament consisting of chiefs; the re-
presentation of chiefs on DAs; the referral of all proposals for legisla-
tion to the National House of Chiefs for comment as an integral part
of the legislative process; the de-vesting and return of former stool
lands vested in the President; and an increase in the percentage of
stool land revenue to be disbursed by the OASL to the chiefs.75 Chiefly
statements and demands on these issues at workshops and policy
meetings generally go unchallenged by government representatives.
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The overall picture of governmental intervention in customary land
throughout most of the post-independence period is one of piecemeal
attempts to control the management of stool lands. We have seen that
the government has constitutionally recognised customary land man-
agement and the position of chiefs. This indirect legalisation was sup-
plemented by state institutions created and mandated to act as a check
on stool land management. These institutions do not, however, in rea-
lity exercise effective control upon the chiefly administration of land
due to a combination of factors: a lack of chiefly cooperation with the
tasks and duties of LSAs; the LSAs’ lack of funds, staff and material
and their problems of mismanagement and corruption; and the diffi-
culties for and unwillingness of officials to challenge chiefly behaviour.
In this context, the lack of political interest by the present administra-
tion to contest the authority of the chiefs by tackling their frequent lack
of co-operation in land matters is so pervasive that we can speak of a
policy of non-interference.
Land Administration Project
Against this background of state institutions and discourse, the govern-
ment of Ghana, after decades of piecemeal legislative and state man-
agement measures, formulated its first comprehensive National Land
Policy in 1999 (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999) and has em-
barked, with multi-donor support, upon a Land Administration Project
(LAP) intended to reform land institutions and develop land policy so
as to provide greater certainty of land rights for ordinary land users
and enable greater efficiency and fairness in the land market (Ministry
of Lands and Forestry 2003; World Bank 2003b). Under the LAP the
medium- to long-term plan is that government should divest itself of
responsibility for the management of stool lands. This should proceed
incrementally, on the basis of the satisfaction of certain criteria, includ-
ing the setting up of Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) with appro-
priate governance structures to assure institutionalised community-le-
vel participation and accountability in the use of stool land and the rev-
enue it generates. CLSs were expected to improve record-keeping and
strengthen the accountability of customary authorities in land manage-
ment, which would in turn ‘bring benefits in terms of: lower costs and
simpler methods for confirming claims to land; easier public access to
information regarding land use and holdings; improved boundary dis-
pute resolution; and opening up of debate at local level regarding the
procedures and norms which should guide land administration‘
(DFID/Toulmin, Brown, and Crook 2004: para 39). The principal bene-
ficiaries were expected to be the majority of people for whom the cur-
rent land administration system is effectively inoperable due to the lack
LEGALISING CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN GHANA 183
of transparency in the land allocation process, uncertain tenure rights,
high costs, and slow and complex bureaucratic procedures (DFID/Toul-
min, Brown, and Crook 2004: para 6).
Guaranteeing tenure security of small land owners in peri-urban
Ghana against powerful chiefs and elders requires a clarification of the
nature of usufructuary rights and a protection of these rights against
the chiefs’ conversion drive (cf. DFID/Toulmin, Brown, and Crook
2004:19; Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003:13; World Bank
2003b:37). Alden Wily and Hammond (2001:28, 54) show, however,
that during the LAP conception and design process there was no wide
and open discussion of the role of chiefs in the administration of stool
land – including the tendency of chiefs to behave like private landlords
– or of the possible checks and balances the state could place on stool
land administration. Furthermore, from the inception of the LAP, it
has been the government’s clear political choice that CLSs should fall
under the aegis of traditional authorities rather than opting for more
community-based approaches to the management of customary land.
By placing the CLSs under the aegis of the chiefs, the LAP ignores the
fact that the notion of the ‘customary’ powers and rights of chiefs is
loaded with political inventions and endorses the roles that chiefs were
accorded in land administration in the colonial period as if this is a
timeless principle of customary tenure (Amanor 2005b:110-1). This ap-
proach, which was not necessarily the donors‘ intention, enhances the
risks of elite capture of increasing land revenues to the detriment of or-
dinary land users.
In the pilot phase of the CLSs, the government has displayed strong
reserve in dealing with chiefly prerogatives and accountabilities (Ubink
and Quan 2008). For example, through the CLS pilot process, LAP
staff have opportunities to introduce Memoranda of Understanding
(MoUs) between the Ministry and the chiefs, setting out the responsi-
bilities on both sides and working towards the establishment of a wider
regulatory framework for CLSs. However, the government has not as
yet made efforts to clarify the nature of usufructuary rights or adapt
model MoUs drafted by the CLS facilitation team and have them
signed as formal agreements between the Ministry and the chiefs to
govern the operations of the pilot CLSs. LAP staff has even advised
against the use, in draft MoUs, of language which might be interpreted
by the chiefs as imposing requirements of accountability, disclosure of
revenues, or significant commitments of stool resources to supporting
CLSs. The government has so far not introduced a clear policy on the
purpose and responsibilities attached to CLSs, and the parameters for
the establishment of each pilot CLS remain somewhat ad hoc. What is
clear is that in order to secure the votes that the chiefs command, the
government in the short to medium term is unlikely to risk antagonis-
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ing the chiefs by requiring public disclosure of land revenues and ac-
countability in their use.
Although the LAP includes provisions for strengthening civil society
participation and advocacy in relation to land management, this has
been slow to develop and remains problematic at the time of writing.
On the one hand, Ghanaian civil society has limited pre-existing capa-
city and virtually none in place for the engagement and advocacy on
land. It is difficult to induce this by external intervention because of
widespread deference to chiefly authority and a history of co-option of
civil society by both chieftaincy and political parties (Amanor 2001:
112-3). On the other hand, the Ministry has been reluctant to give up
control over funds intended to support civil society partners or com-
mission services from them, and there is a lack of alternative mechan-
isms such as independent trusts or programmes capable of managing
funds to meet the donors‘ and government’s requirements.
Conclusion
This chapter has described how the new value of peri-urban land has
triggered a multitude of struggles and negotiations. Although actions,
statements, and beliefs as to what is just vary between villages, fa-
milies, and individuals, one main tug-of-war can be outlined: the strug-
gle between chiefs on the one hand and villagers on the other for the
rights to allocate land and share in the revenue. Despite high local re-
sistance, the chiefs in a number of case-study villages persisted in their
style of land management, which was highly lucrative for them and
sometimes for other selected members of the community – such as el-
ders or royal family members – but extremely detrimental to the liveli-
hoods of the poor majority. Farmers’ tenure security, especially the as-
pect of assurance,76 was severely corroded by the chiefs’ actions.77 Prac-
tices such as multiple sales and allocation of land unsuitable for
residential purposes also threaten the tenure security of the new les-
sees. This poses the question of how chiefs are able to continue acting
contrary to the wishes of the majority of the villagers, both old and
new. I will discuss three determining factors.
A first factor encountered in this chapter is the erosion of customary
checks and balances on chiefly functioning. Customary responsibility
should be guaranteed by the existence of a council of elders, consisting
of representatives of all major sections of the community, whose per-
mission a chief needs for any decision he wants to take. We saw, how-
ever, that in many villages in peri-urban Kumasi, the councillors no
longer represent the major families of the community, are co-opted or
ignored, and that the customary notion of ruling in council has thus
LEGALISING CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN GHANA 185
been severely eroded. The second check on traditional rule, the possibi-
lity to destool a seriously malfunctioning chief, is also prone to difficul-
ties. Charges have to be brought by the kingmakers, not by com-
moners, and will be judged by a council composed of other chiefs.
The second factor is found in the behaviour of government, which
currently provides hardly any checks and balances on local land admin-
istration.78 Their discourse as well as their actions point towards the
existence of an informal ‘policy of non-interference’, inspired by the po-
litical power of the chiefs and the alliance between traditional and state
elites. The fact that the government continually emphasises the sover-
eignty of the chiefs and that land administration rests exclusively in
their hands gives additional legitimacy to the chiefs and provides them
with ample leeway to administer land the way they please. The Na-
tional Land Policy and the Land Administration Program do not seem
to promise any change in this respect in the near future. On the con-
trary, the CLS pilot programme carries a significant risk that CLSs will
strengthen the political and economic weight of the traditional authori-
ties by providing formal recognition of their powers to administer and
allocate land. If the government does not clearly spread the message of
the legitimacy of communal interests in land and the need for account-
ability of the chiefs, then it will de facto allow traditional authorities to
use enhanced and equipped CLSs to further tendencies of disposses-
sing community members of lands (cf. Antwi 2006:5)
The third explanatory factor lies in the fact that stool land manage-
ment is characterised by a leading position for the chiefs and the pro-
minence of customary law. This is the reality in most localities and has
been recognised in the 1992 Constitution. On account of the promi-
nence of customary law in the field of land administration, all actors in
land struggles have to legitimise their actions and claims largely with
appeals to customary law.79 When circumstances change and new op-
portunities arise, they will try to use the unwritten and somewhat ne-
gotiable nature of customary law to construct norms in their own inter-
est. Struggles over land will thus often take the form of interpretative
struggles over meaning in which ‘the power to name’ can be a highly
political issue (Bassett 1993:21; Shipton and Goheen 1992:309-311).
The critical question is, which actor or group of actors has the power
to issue definitions and is able to mobilise support – from community
members, the traditional system, and the state – for its version of cus-
tomary law? Since the chiefs are generally regarded as authorities in
the field of customary law and as guardians of stool land, they are able
to point to ‘custom’ to acquire and legitimate power over land in the lo-
cal arena and to resist interference by the state.
In conclusion, the government of Ghana has indirectly legalised cus-
tomary land tenure and the position of the chiefs as custodians of this
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land. Besides the provision that customary land should be managed on
behalf of and in trust for the people, the government hardly steps into
local land management issues. State institutions established to check
upon chiefly land administration do not in reality exercise effective
control, and the Land Administration Project, despite the formulation
of goals like equity and accountability, has not actually imposed any
such requirements on the chiefs in the implementation process so far.
In combination with the eroded local checks and balances, the chiefs
have a free hand to determine their own position in customary land
management. It seems that this has given the chiefs the power to over-
stretch the somewhat dynamic nature of customary law by manipulat-
ing it to suit their needs and legitimise their claims, resulting in the
described detrimental effects on the tenure security of the people. Any
substantial change in this situation requires two intimately connected
transformations: the organisation and empowerment of local farmers,
and a different attitude of the government towards chiefly rule and cus-
tomary land management.
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7 Land tenure reform and tenure security in
Namibia
Marco Lankhorst1
Introduction
Land tenure in modern-day Namibia is still deeply influenced by its
apartheid history. Under South African rule, the black population faced
restrictions both in terms of the nature of the rights to land that could
be held, and the parts of the country where such rights could be ob-
tained. With some exceptions, they could access land only in the so-
called homelands, where tenure was regulated by customary law. The
white elite, on the other hand, appropriated almost all of the commer-
cially attractive land, forcing many of the original inhabitants to reset-
tle. Although formal restrictions on access have been removed, much
of this pattern remains visible today. A few thousand settlers of Eur-
opean descent have freehold titles to approximately 4,500 farms, whilst
the majority of Namibia’s predominantly rural population continues to
live in the former homelands, where land tenure is administered by
traditional authorities. At the same time, however, the removal of pass-
laws has unleashed hitherto repressed internal migration caused by de-
mographic, economic, and ecological changes. This migration creates
pressures on land in both urban and communal areas.
These circumstances have given rise to a number of land rights is-
sues, which can be divided into two categories for the purpose of analy-
sis (see Table 7.1). The first set of questions involves the distribution of
land tenure rights amongst different groupings in Namibian society.
Most important amongst these is the imbalance in commercial land
holding between settlers of European descent and black Namibians in
general. This is the primary focus of government attention when it
comes to land reform. Ethnically specific historical claims on commer-
cial land by the Herero, and (in more latent form) the San and Nama –
the tribes most affected by the colonial dispossessions and displace-
ments (in this regard, see Harring 2004 and Werner 1993) – can also
be brought under this heading. It must be stressed, however, that such
claims are not acknowledged by the government (Melber 2005:139).
The second set of questions is tenure security related.2 The matter
arguably affecting the largest group of people is that land tenure claims
based on communal law appear to be poorly protected against govern-
ment intervention. Relying on its ultimate ownership of unregistered
land, the state has on a number of occasions attempted to resettle com-
munities with land rights based on communal law, in order to make
room for commercial and other activities. In the urban context, large
numbers of slum dwellers live in comparable uncertainty. They gener-
ally occupy municipal land, and although this situation is condoned
and in most places facilitated, forced resettlements occur with some
regularity. Then there is the plight of many San, and to a lesser extent
also of the Nama and Damara, who live without a lawful claim or effec-
tive legal protection on communal or commercial land owned by
others. And lastly, there is the complex problem of encroachments of
commonage in the communal areas. Particularly since independence,
communal lands have witnessed a process of privatisation through ille-
gal fencing that reduces access to grazing and water for those excluded,
which in turn has led to encroachment on the commonage of neigh-
bouring communities. An overview of these two sets of land rights pro-
blems is provided below, in Table 7.1.
Recent literature evaluating the government’s redistributive policies
shows that, although important as a symbol to redress past wrongs,
these measures improve neither the economic situation of individual
beneficiaries, particularly the poor amongst them, nor that of Nami-
bia‘s agricultural sector as a whole. Two policy instruments exist to ef-
fectuate the redistribution process, the so-called Affirmative Action
Loan Scheme (AALS) and the resettlement programmes. The AALS al-
lows relatively well-off communal farmers – they must be in possession
of a minimum of 150 heads of cattle – to obtain credit at favourable
terms with which to buy commercial farms on the market. In practice,
this requirement, intended to ensure the viability of larger capital-in-
tensive agricultural enterprises, rules out participation by the poor.3
They are targeted instead by the government’s individual and collective
resettlement programmes.
Resettlement programmes involve the purchase by the state of
ranches used for extensive livestock farming, which are then either
sub-divided in a large number of smaller units to be farmed intensively
Table 7.1 Land rights issues in Namibia
1. Redistributive
a. White minority vs. black majority in general
b. Ethnically specific historical claims
2. Tenure security related
a. Communal rights holders vs. the state
b. Informal settlers in urban areas
c. Landless San in rural areas (commercial and communal)
d. Encroachment in communal areas
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or managed collectively. A parallel to this programme exists in the for-
mer homelands, which centres on unused communal land. There are
clear indications that the results achieved in terms of poverty allevia-
tion are unimpressive. To begin with, largely on account of the cost in-
volved in purchasing commercial land, the scale of the programme is
modest. In the first thirteen years of its operation, less than two per
cent of white-held commercial farm land was transferred into the
hands of the black community (Fuller 2006:7).4 By 2001 just over
30,000 beneficiaries had been allocated a plot under these pro-
grammes, of whom more than 23,000 through the communal limb of
the programme (Tapia Garcia 2004; Werner and Vigne 2000:49).5
More importantly, the income that settlers derive from the land tends
to be insufficient for subsistence purposes (Werner and Vigne 2000).
As a general matter, agricultural output tends to be disappointing (Ta-
pia Garcia 2004:50 provides an overview of studies into the function-
ing of these schemes).
Various explanations for this situation have been offered, including a
lack of skills amongst the beneficiaries (Werner and Vigne 2000) and
the climatic unsuitability of most of Namibia‘s agricultural land for
small-scale intensive farming (Werner 2003:4). This combination of-
fers little hope that, without an illusory significant increase in the
amount of resources invested, the resettlement programme can be
modified so as to effectively promote the interests of Namibia’s poor.
Given the obstacles in the way of redistribution, the second set of
land tenure problems, relating to tenure insecurity, emerges as worthy
of more serious attention. The threat of state intervention on commu-
nal land, the uncertainty faced by extra-legal settlers in urban slums,
the dependency of certain traditional communities on others for access
to land, and the inter-related processes of privatisation of the commo-
nage and encroachment of the commonage all adversely affect the live-
lihoods and/or the willingness to invest of some of the most disadvan-
taged segments of Namibian society. Targeting these problems, there-
fore, has the potential to remove significant obstacles to the
development of the individuals and communities involved.
The objective of this contribution is to chart the scope for making
such improvements to tenure security by: (1) systematically discussing
the legal, social, economic, and historical circumstances that give rise
to these problems; (2) critically examining recent legislation that aims
to remedy them, including the Communal Land Reform Act (Act no. 5
of 2002), the Nature Conservation Amendment Act 1996 (Act no. 5 of
1996), and the Flexible Land Tenure Bill; and (3) by advancing more
promising alternatives or complementary strategies. The discussion of
these matters is organised as follows. The first section provides a num-
ber of summary statistics to familiarise the reader with the socio-eco-
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nomic conditions that provide the background to our discussion of
land rights issues. The next section takes a historical perspective to
bring the main features of Namibia‘s land tenure system into focus.
The last section discusses in detail each of the tenure security-related
land rights issues introduced above, as well as the related government
initiatives. A final section concludes.
Some relevant indicators
This section provides a brief introduction to socio-economic conditions
in Namibia, so as to begin to familiarise the reader with the situation
of the various groups affected by the tenure security-related problems
discussed below. As is clear from the discussion in the Introduction,
three of these problems relate to the rural context and one occurs in
the urban context. Therefore, after reviewing some general indicators,
we look at conditions specific to these settings and also make com-
ments on the status of the San and the Nama, which informs the dis-
cussion of their problems with accessing land. We start, however, by
discussing climatic conditions.
To begin with, considering climatic conditions helps to explain why
Namibia, which is 1.5 times as big as France but has fewer than two
million inhabitants and is thus amongst the world’s most sparsely po-
pulated countries, has a land problem at all. The extremely arid climate
renders much of the available land only marginally fertile. In addition,
the agriculturally most attractive terrains are predominantly held by a
select group of white settlers. These matters are, of course, primarily
important in understanding land redistribution policies and their im-
pact. There is also, however, a more subtle implication for the tenure
security-related problems addressed here. To make the exploitation of
marginal lands viable, significant investments will generally be re-
quired. This applies to commercial farming, subsistence farming, and
more traditional forms of land use.6 Tenure security can be expected to
have a major impact on the willingness to invest. Therefore, these cli-
matic conditions, particularly when considered in combination with
the conditions of poverty that are about to be discussed, underscore the
need to address the problems of tenure security with which this contri-
bution is concerned.
Turning to the socio-economic conditions, as well as the issue of pov-
erty, we run into a second paradox. Namibia is a middle income coun-
try with a 2002 per capita income of USD 6,210 at PPP (UNDP
2004b:186), which is relatively high by African standards.7 The distri-
bution of income is highly skewed, however.8 The richest 25 per cent
of the population earns 66 per cent of national income, whereas the
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poorest 25 per cent can dispose of no more than 6.3 per cent (Republic
of Namibia 2006b:38). Some 35 per cent of the population survives on
less than USD1 a day (UN Habitat 2005:15), the World Bank threshold
for extreme poverty. These facts are complemented by high levels of
unemployment, at 31 per cent (Republic of Namibia 2001a), and a ser-
ious HIV/AIDS problem, with a HIV prevalence rate of 19.6 per cent
in the year 2006 (UNAIDS 2006:18).
Poverty, in these and other manifestations, is concentrated in rural
areas and in informal urban settlements. Namibia‘s rural population,
which makes up roughly 65 per cent of the total, accounts for only 37
per cent of national consumption, reflecting much higher urban house-
hold and per capita income levels (Republic of Namibia 2006b). In ad-
dition, it can be gleaned from the Republic of Namibia (2006b) that in
the countryside, where 48 per cent of the households rely on subsis-
tence farming as their primary source of income, households are lar-
ger, literacy rates are lower, and there is less access to durable goods.
By contrast, HIV prevalence in rural areas not close to main roads is
generally considerably lower than in urban areas (Republic of Namibia
2001b).9
That conditions in rural areas are, on the whole, poorer than in the
cities is also confirmed by a process of rapid internal migration from
rural to urban areas.10 In 2001, roughly 33 per cent of the population
lived in urban centres, an increase of five per cent compared with 1991
(Republic of Namibia 2001a). Migration has resulted in an annual po-
pulation growth rate of 3.9 per cent in the capital Windhoek (Gold and
Mitlin 2001:22), for instance. These migrations away from the country-
side appear to be predominantly motivated by a search to improve liv-
ing conditions (Fjeldstad et al. 2005:14) and particularly for employ-
ment (LAC 2005a:10), which is confirmed by the fact that urban cen-
tres have more people in economically active age groups than rural
areas (Republic of Namibia 2001a).
Having little means, many of these internal migrants end up in in-
formal settlements on the fringes of towns. Fjeldstad et al. (2005:1) es-
timate that about 40 per cent of the urban population lives in such
areas, while Christensen (2004:2) puts the number of households for
the whole of Namibia at 100,000. As can be expected, conditions in
these settlements, at least where income levels are concerned, are not
much different from the situation in the countryside. Surveys con-
ducted by Lankhorst and Veldman (this volume), for instance, suggest
that income levels in informal settlements are much closer to the rural
average reported by the Republic of Namibia (2006b:36) than the ur-
ban aggregate. Similarly, where some form of employment provides
the main source of income for almost 77 per cent of the inhabitants of
urban centres (id.:19), Lankhorst and Veldman (this volume) found that
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only 38 per cent of households in informal settlements could rely on
salaries or wages.11
It will be shown below that the problems with tenure security in ru-
ral areas have a particularly strong impact on the San and, to a some-
what lesser extent, the Nama.12 It is useful, therefore, that we very
briefly discuss some aspects of the socio-economic situation of these
groupings. This will provide the necessary background for understand-
ing the specific land rights problems they face. The San,13 who number
around 30,000 and are spread out primarily over the northeast of the
country, are beyond a doubt the most marginalised people of modern-
day Namibia. Their 1998 Human Development Index (HDI, which as-
sesses life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, and income), for in-
stance, was much lower than that of the population as a whole (around
0.30, as opposed to 0.77 – UNDP 1999), and significantly lower than
that of other minorities. As Harring and Odendaal (2006) report, most
San are unemployed. Those that do have jobs are farm labourers, work-
ing on both white- and black-owned farms, mostly under unfavourable
conditions. In addition, the San stand out for their weak representation
in government (Suzman 2002:23). The Nama,14 who number around
60,000 and are concentrated in the southern and western parts of Na-
mibia, fare considerably better in terms of HDI, although they are still
around fifteen percentage points below the national average (UNDP
1999). A considerable number of them, however, live and work on the
farms of others under conditions comparable to those of the San.
A background to land tenure in Namibia
Namibian property law is characterised by a duality inherited from the
colonial period, consisting of a parallel freehold and communal system.
The freehold system, based on a mixture of Roman Dutch law and
English common law, will not be dealt with extensively in this section.
Its Western origins allow for the assumption that its main features, in
terms of individualisation and registration, are sufficiently well known.
In addition, none of the new or recent legislative instruments affecting
tenure security discussed below involve the granting of freehold titles.
The main focus in this section is, therefore, on communal law. To un-
derstand the institutional, substantive, and spatial complexities of mod-
ern communal law, it is essential to place it in its historical context.
European occupation and settlement of South West Africa, as Nami-
bia was known at the time, started relatively late with its annexation by
Germany in 1885. Throughout the period of German occupation, the
reach of the colonial administration never covered the whole of the col-
ony, but remained confined to the central and southern parts of the
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country, known as the ‘police zone’. Progressive settlement combined
with the disruptive effect of a rinderpest epidemic soon brought the
original inhabitants of this zone, the semi-pastoral Herero and the
Nama, into conflict with the Germans. Brutal use of military force by
the Germans led to very large losses of life and massive displacements
for both tribes.
After the First World War, South West Africa became a British pro-
tectorate administered by South Africa. The new colonial government
built upon the structures left by the Germans. It instituted a system of
indirect rule in the outerlying regions, and encouraged white South
Africans to settle in the police zone. While in 1913 the German colony
had counted 1,331 white-owned farms, in 1938 this number had grown
to 3,305 (Suzman 2002:8). Of the original populations most affected by
these settlements, the Herero and Nama were relocated to so-called ‘na-
tive reserves’ outside the police zone, which for the most part consisted
of marginal lands (Suzman 2002:8). The influence of white settlement
on the position of the San peoples, which was considerably different
but not less detrimental, will be discussed below.
Members of all native communities were only permitted to settle in
the reserve allocated to their tribe (homeland).15 Native authorities,
who were appointed by the colonial administration, enjoyed a degree of
autonomy in the administration of the reserves, which included powers
to allocate land to their subjects according to customary laws. The re-
serve system further depended on severe restrictions on the movement
of the native peoples. Travel between these reserves and the police zone
was strictly regulated by the authorities. It is generally recognised that
this constellation of measures was designed, at least in part, to assure
white farms and industries of a large pool of cheap migrant labour (see
e.g. Hendricks 1990 and Suzman 2002).16
Although restrictions on movement and the right to settle in the for-
mer police zone were removed when Namibia gained independence
from South Africa, other important features of the homeland system
have been preserved. As regards land tenure, it should be pointed out,
first, that the country remains divided into a segment where land is
held under freehold title (which accounts for approximately 43 per cent
of its surface area) and the former home lands, now called communal
areas (approximately 42 per cent).17 There, the government has insti-
tuted tenure regulations that continue to give some room to customary
practices. Significantly, also, post-apartheid legislation regulating the
recognition and exercise of traditional authority has kept the ethnically
based territorial divisions within the formal homelands in place (see
Figure 7.1). Most important amongst this legislation are the Traditional
Authorities Act (Act number 25 of 2000) and the previously mentioned
Communal Land Reform Act.
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The Communal Land Reform Act legitimises and circumscribes the
role of traditional authorities in the allocation of land to the members
of their traditional communities. The legitimacy of the exercise of such
powers, according to the Traditional Authorities Act, is subject to recog-
nition of the traditional authority, and effectively of the traditional com-
munity he or she represents, by the central government.
This recognition process involves the identification of the area habi-
tually inhabited by this community, over which the powers of the tradi-
tional authority extend. The nature of customary land rights that tradi-
tional authorities can grant, and the procedures to be followed, are to a
considerable extent regulated by the Communal Land Reform Act. A
primary provision of the act (section 17) determines, in accordance with
the Constitution (see schedule 5), that ultimate ownership of commu-
nal land is vested in the state. Tenure claims in the communal areas
(described in the act as customary land rights and leasehold rights) are
therefore best classified as use rights. The implications thereof are dis-
Figure 7.1 Communal lands in independent Namibia
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cussed below. The act further provides that applications for land to
chiefs or headmen have to be made in writing. The validity of land allo-
cations by traditional authorities is dependent on the approval by the
region’s ‘communal land board’ and must be followed by registration.18
In addition, the act contains rules regarding (1) the types of land use
for which rights may be granted to individual community members,
(2) the duration of customary land tenure rights, (3) the maximum size
of plots, (4) transfer and inheritance, and (5) contains a prohibition on
charging fees for the allocation of land tenure rights. Finally, the act
confirms the powers of traditional authorities to regulate access to
grazing on their community’s commonage.
Tenure security-related land rights issues
Tenure insecurity hinders development.19 It can easily be appreciated
that it may inhibit investments, for example to improve housing in ur-
ban slums or to set up an income-generating tourism venture in com-
munal areas. The consequences can be wider, however, as non-econom-
ic aspects of development may also be affected. Traditional commu-
nities will often feel a strong cultural link with the land they have
historically occupied. A threat to this area may, thus, hinder the capa-
city of communities to negotiate a place in the modern world.20
This section discusses a number of causes of tenure insecurity in
Namibia, and examines and evaluates the legal instruments that may
be used to reduce these uncertainties. It starts by discussing uncer-
tainty raised by incidents where the government, claiming its ultimate
ownership of communal land, required rights holders to resettle in or-
der to allow the land to be used for other purposes. It then moves on
to consider the situation in urban informal settlements, where govern-
ment-imposed relocations are also a frequently recurring problem. The
last two sub-sections focus on insecurity caused not by government in-
tervention but by the actions of other persons or communities.
State interventions in communal areas
On a number of occasions, well covered in the media and the litera-
ture, the post-independence Namibian government has taken or
planned actions which substantially limit the use that certain tradi-
tional communities could make of their lands. In each of the cases that
are about to be discussed, the administration’s objective was to use
these lands for a purpose that was considered to be of over-riding im-
portance. In none of these cases was the community involved given a
direct say in the process leading to the government’s decision affecting
LAND TENURE REFORM AND TENURE SECURITY IN NAMIBIA 201
their land, nor were serious and encompassing negotiations started
after this decision had been made, nor was adequate compensation of-
fered. This sub-section discusses some of the implications of such an
approach.
The best-known of these incidents, due to its coverage in the interna-
tional press, involves the planned construction of a hydropower dam at
the Epupa Falls in the northwestern part of the country (Kaokoland on
Figure 7.1); a project on which the Namibian government cooperates
with Angola. The government sees the realisation of this project as cru-
cial to the development of the region. The dam would provide both
power and employment. At the same time, however, the lake that
would form behind the dam would disrupt the lives of those members
of the Himba people who live near the Kunene River. It is reported that
around 1,000 Himba would be displaced, and as many as 5,000 would
lose access to grounds for grazing, which would increase pressure on
pastures further inland and would increase susceptibility to drought
(Suzman 2002:20). Also, construction of the dam would submerge
160 ancestral graves, which many Himba consider significant, since
burial sites form an anchor point in defining social relations and rela-
tions to the land (id.). Lastly, it has been suggested that the lake would
increase health risks in the region by producing a higher incidence of
insect-carried diseases such as malaria (Corbett 1999). However, the
plans offered those immediately affected very little in terms of compen-
sation. Cost estimates for the project included no provisions for the
purchase of the land involved and noted that resettlement costs would
be low because the Himba are poor and have little personal property
(Harring 2004:75). The official consultation procedure started by the
government in 1991 failed to inform the Himba of the lake formation
until a later stage (in 1997). There appear to be strong indications, also,
that the government obstructed the organisation of the protests that
followed. Meetings have been dispersed (Daniels 2004:54), and mem-
bers of the Owambo tribe, sympathetic to the government, have been
resettled in the area to provide a counter-balance (Harring 2004:75).
Nonetheless, a vocal international campaign was mounted,21 which, to-
gether with complications on the Angolan side, led to the temporary
suspension of the project.
The same reluctance on the side of the Namibian government to in-
form and involve the leadership and members of affected communities
can be seen in other instances where the Namibian government laid
claim to communal lands. These include its attempts to establish a re-
fugee camp on !Kung San traditional land (see Pakleppa 2004) and its
efforts to extend a prison farm into Khwe San territory (see Daniels
2004).22
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The statutory basis for these (planned) interventions is to be found
in the Communal Land Reform Act. This act empowers the president
of the republic to withdraw terrain from communal land in the public
interest on the condition that just compensation is paid. These inci-
dents suggest that where withdrawal of communally held tenure is in-
volved (as opposed to claims held by individuals in the communal
areas), the government intends to offer very little in the way of com-
pensation. In any case, it appears that the state relies on a method for
calculating compensation that, from the perspective of the commu-
nities involved, may understate the value of their land
There are good arguments in favour of taking a more inclusive ap-
proach to compensability, even from the government’s point of view.
To begin with, it is certainly possible that the current restrictive stance
has wider consequences. Creating a reputation for underestimating the
value of communal land can be expected to affect the behaviour of
communal rights holders other than those directly affected. To give an
example, it may negatively influence the decisions of other commu-
nities who, like the Khwe and Himba, seek to expand their income
base by investing in tourism. Second, a decision-making procedure that
involves the affected community at an early stage can be expected more
often to lead to a workable outcome. This is significant given that three
of the four cases referred to above attest to the fact that even relatively
small and, in the cases of the San, politically weak communities can be
effective in blocking the implementation of the government’s plans.
Lastly, such a cooperative approach offers better prospects for minimis-
ing the negative impact of these plans.
Informal settlers in urban areas
Many inhabitants of the homelands who moved to the cities in search
of work when the apartheid era pass laws were abolished ended up in
extra-legal (informal) settlements. These are to be found in and around
most towns, in both the former police zone and the communal areas.
This sub-section briefly discusses instruments that could be used to in-
crease the sense of security of persons occupying a plot in such
areas.23
During apartheid, black people working in police zone towns either
stayed in a sort of hostel, known as single quarters, or in townships
(which were in most cases communal enclaves surrounded by freehold
land). Illegal settlements in and around towns were vigorously com-
bated during most of the apartheid period. Only in the second half of
the 1980s, when some restrictions of the separate development policy
were relaxed to allow freer movement, were modest informal settle-
ments allowed to emerge near urban centres (Fjeldstad et al. 2005:5).
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In the homelands, sizable urban centres emerged only from the 1960s
onwards in response to the administrative and military requirements
of the South African Defence Force. Like in the police zone, these
towns were strictly segregated. There was no homeland equivalent to
the government-planned townships of the police zone, however, so that
all non-white settlement around these towns occurred in an unregu-
lated fashion (id.).
As mentioned, after independence these informal settlements in-
creased in size and number. In 1992, with the passing of the Local
Authorities Act (Act no. 23 of 1992), all unregistered (i.e. non-freehold)
lands falling within municipal boundaries, where the bulk of these in-
formal settlements are to be found, were transferred to the newly estab-
lished local authorities, both in the communal areas and in the former
police zone. This land is meant to be subdivided, serviced, and sold to
the public. In an attempt to regulate the growth of extra-legal settle-
ments, so-called ‘reception areas’ have been designated in many towns.
Newcomers are channelled towards these areas, where they enjoy a de
facto permit to occupy a plot until a permanent solution is found.
The prospect of eventual relocation to a site that can be permanently
settled is a primary reason why the inhabitants of reception areas ex-
perience insecurity. Lankhorst and Veldman (this volume) find that
forced relocations to, within, and between reception areas – i.e. to an-
other non-permanent location – constitute another important and more
immediate reason for uncertainty. Such relocations can be motivated
by reasons to do with public health, safety, or zoning, or by the desire
to make space for other kinds of development. In general, slum dwell-
ers receive no compensation in case of relocation other than help with
the actual moving. To avoid having to do so, local authorities tend to
prohibit the erection of permanent structures in these areas (Fjeldstad
et al. 2005: 16). Lankhorst and Veldman (this volume) show that the
resulting insecurity can be a cause of anxiety amongst a substantial
portion of the inhabitants, and that it can have a tempering effect on
household maintenance and the willingness to make improvements.
The Namibian government appears to be determined to address the
problem of insecurity in urban slums by means of legalisation of ten-
ure. As it has proven impossible to give a meaningful number of infor-
mal settlers access to freehold ownership under existing legislation,24 a
bill has been prepared that introduces new forms of low-cost statutory
tenure. Although much effort was devoted by the drafters of this Flex-
ible Land Tenure Bill to reduce the administrative costs of developing
and registering new land (by creating local registries with simplified
procedures), it remains to be seen whether sufficient resources will be
made available to implement this programme. The long delay in sign-
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ing this bill into law may well be explained by such funding pro-
blems.25
An alternative to improve legalisation, which could be relied on to
improve tenure security in the intermediate period, would be to intro-
duce a clear policy regarding urban relocations, obliging local authori-
ties to pay compensation in conformity with prices formed on the in-
formal market (in cases where no genuine public health or safety con-
cerns are at issue). Such a policy would, of course, impose a cost on
Namibia‘s local authorities and therefore limit their freedom of ac-
tion.26 But most local authorities, however strapped for cash they may
be, have large reserves of land, so the effect need not be too quelling.
As Lankhorst and Veldman (id.) show in more detail, there are two
further arguments for proceeding with caution in addressing the pro-
blems in Namibia‘s urban slums by means of the framework set up in
the Flexible Land Tenure Bill. First, it is questionable whether flexible
titling alone will allow for substantial improvements in tenure security.
This can be explained as follows. To reduce the costs of legalisation for
the settlers, the bill allows large numbers of them to register their land
as a group in the local registry, initially without indicating the internal
sub-divisions. On the administrative side, cost savings are made possi-
ble inter alia because group registration is not affected by the costly
and time-consuming administrative requirements that come with de-
veloping new residential land under freehold tenure, notably those im-
posed by zoning regulations. Given, however, that the bill foresees that
group tenure can, eventually, be individualised and turned into free-
hold tenure, application of these regulations is in reality postponed
rather than circumvented. As a consequence, settlers may be certain of
their ownership of the land they hold as a group, but the shape, dimen-
sions, and even the location of their individual plot within it may later
be changed. For this reason, group title-holders will be advised on their
title certificate that they should not erect permanent structures before
their rights have been upgraded, or a layout for the area has been ap-
proved by the local authority. 27
A second reason to proceed with caution in implementing the Flex-
ible Land Tenure Bill is the following. In addition to improving tenure
security, the bill aims to improve the economic opportunities of Nami-
bia‘s urban poor, notably by allowing them to sell, let, and mortgage
their rights. As a general matter, it is not evident that the tenure forms
introduced by the bill would indeed give settlers more freedom to dis-
pose of their land than they currently enjoy. Lankhorst and Veldman
(id.) show that selling and letting is quite common in the current situa-
tion of extra-legality. And it should be taken into account that the bill
introduces a number of transaction costs for settlers that are absent un-
der extra-legality (such as registration fees). Moreover, given the level
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and irregularity of income in these settlements, and the difficulties in
establishing the limits of individual plots, it is unlikely that banks will
be interested in extending credit to their inhabitants, suggesting that
the ability to use flexible titles as collateral might well be meaningless.
Therefore, application of the bill – once signed into law – is not ad-
visable unless sufficient resources become available to create and staff
registries and to satisfy the necessary administrative requirements. Be-
fore that happens, a clear policy regarding relocations that obliges local
authorities to pay compensation appears to be the best option to im-
prove tenure security in Namibia‘s urban slums.
Landless San and other peoples without access to land in rural areas
The post-independence land tenure system in Namibia does not pro-
vide all formerly disadvantaged ethnicities equal access to land in rural
areas. The San, in particular, remain at a disadvantage. Two factors
have contributed to their situation. First, a substantial portion of San
traditional land falls in the former police zone and is held under free-
hold title, mainly by white commercial farmers. Second, the vast major-
ity of San communities in the communal areas have not seen their
claims to traditional leadership recognised by government. San land
use is therefore often dependent on the interests of commercial farm-
ers or the leaders of other traditional communities. There are clear
signs both in the commercial and the communal context that this hin-
ders their development. The Nama and the linguistically related Da-
mara people face similar problems. Given the importance of ethnicity,
these problems are more political in nature than the other land issues
dealt with in this section, and the discussion here is limited to charting
some of the main features of the debate.
The history of the San over the past centuries is characterised by pro-
gressive marginalisation, brought about by the impact of migration
and colonisation. Originally, the San were spread out thinly over most
of modern-day Namibia, living a highly mobile life of hunting and
gathering. Southward migrations into northern and central Namibia by
the much more numerous and cattle-herding Bantu tribes (mainly Da-
mara, Herero, Owambo, and Kavango) forced the San into retreat. Sub-
sequent displacements of the Herero, Nama, and Damara tribes under
the German colonial administration pushed them back further. During
the South African mandate the San held a unique, but unenviable posi-
tion. They were deemed to be a lesser expression of humanity insuffi-
ciently developed to be granted a reserve. Only at a late stage was Bush-
manland (see Figure 7.1) constituted as the San homeland. It was, how-
ever, never given self-governing status, nor were serious attempts made
to concentrate South West Africa‘s San within this area. The area was
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inhabited only by a few hundred members of two of the seventeen dis-
tinct San groupings present in Namibia (Harring and Odendaal
2006:1). As a result, the vast majority of the San found themselves
either on white-owned commercial farms or, outside the police zone, in
the native reserves of other tribes (id.). The problems in the former po-
lice zone are discussed first.
Many San living on commercial land face problems that in Namibia
are referred to under the heading of the ‘farm workers issue’. Given
the size of commercial farms and the nature of the work, these la-
bourers, who are amongst the worst paid of Namibia’s work force, gen-
erally have no choice but to make their homes on their employer’s es-
tate. They come in two varieties. There are those whose roots lie else-
where, often in communal areas, and then there are so-called
generational workers, whose families have been living on the land for
long periods. As follows from the historical account given above, the
latter group includes many San. A considerable number of Damara, as
well as a number of Nama, both also original inhabitants of the former
police zone, are in the same position. The vulnerability of this group
was highlighted after independence when, in anticipation of the pas-
sing of labour and social security laws, many commercial farmers dis-
missed and expelled a number of their workers (Suzman 2002:23).
This process is still continuing and particularly affects the elderly (Full-
er 2006:10). Changes in farm ownership, including those occasions
when farms come into the hands of black owners by means of the gov-
ernment’s redistributive policies, also frequently result in dismissal
(Fuller 2006:11; Werner 2003:14). Often these landless workers move
to form extra-legal settlements around neighbouring towns (Suzman
2002:23). This problem has increasingly caught the attention of the
government. In 2002 the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement drafted
a policy on farm workers’ rights. The document has not been pub-
lished, however, and to date no effective measures have been taken.
Most San living in the communal areas are also dependent on others
for access to land. In the second half of the 1990s, the leaders of six
San communities applied for recognition under the Traditional Authori-
ties Act. Although at first none of their submissions were approved, the
government finally recognised the leaders of the two San peoples living
in Bushmanland, the !Kung in the West and the Ju|’hoansi in the East
(see Harring 2004:72; Suzman 2002). They are said to constitute only
fifteen per cent of Namibia‘s total San population (Harring and Oden-
daal 2006:2). As suggested, those communities who saw their claims
rejected live under the traditional authority of other tribes, mainly
Owambo and Kavango. The disadvantages of this dependence are illu-
strated by some events in the recent history of the Khwe San people.
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The Khwe live in Namibia‘s Caprivi region. Their claim to traditional
authority is contested by the Mkubushu. When this Bantu tribe entered
the area several hundred years ago from what are now Angola and
Zambia, the San were already there. Although their relation was not
entirely hostile, the Mkubushu, a politically centralised, agricultural,
and thus sedentary people, have dominated the Khwe for much of the
ensuing period. Amongst others, the Khwe were forced to retreat from
the fertile lands near the Okavango River into the dry interior. During
apartheid, whilst the Mkubushu were resettled elsewhere so as to leave
a buffer zone for operations of the South African Defence Force, many
Khwe cooperated with the military and remained in the region. After
independence, despite having what are generally recognised to be
strong credentials (Harring 2004; Harring and Odendaal 2006; Suz-
man 2002), the Khwe leadership’s application for recognition was re-
jected by the government in favour of the Mkubushu’s claim that the
Khwe fall under their chieftainship.
The point here is not to discuss the formal legal merit of the Khwe
claim (in this regard, see, for example, Harring and Odendaal 2006),
but rather to highlight some of the disadvantages of their unrecognised
status. To begin with, the Khwe have been unable to exert influence on
the post-independence resettlement of the Mkubushu in the area, a
process in which their access to land was further reduced (Suzman
2002:24). The Khwe were also not consulted by the government about
the conversion of a large portion of their traditional territory into the
Bwabwata national park. There is opposition to the park because its
regulations complicate food collection, and because it is considered less
likely that the inhabitants will be allowed to share in the revenues gen-
erated, than if the area had been proclaimed a Khwe conservancy (Har-
ring and Odendaal 2006:11).28 Lastly, with the government seeking
and obtaining consent from the Mkubushu chief, the Khwe have been
unable to prevent the transformation of a defunct government farm on
their traditional lands into the Divindu Rehabilitation Project, a prison
farm, which they feared would adversely affect their business at the
nearby n//goavaca tourist campsite. Only by seeking redress at the
High Court in 1997 with the help of the Legal Assistance Centre have
they managed to stall an extension of the prison farm (see Daniels
2004). Clearly, formal recognition would have enhanced the bargain-
ing position of the Khwe’s traditional leaders in each of these situations
and would, therefore, have given the Khwe community more freedom
to shape its future.
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Encroachment on communal lands
Encroachment on communal rangeland has been a pervasive problem
since independence. In many cases the intrusion is directly related to a
process of privatisation of commonage by fencing. The results are re-
duced access to land for grazing, land degradation, and, ultimately,
conflicts over land. This final sub-section traces the origins of these
problems and investigates to what extent the instruments provided by
the Communal Land Reform Act and the Nature Conservation Amend-
ment Act may be relied upon to remedy them.
Encroachment of communal land often takes the form of members
of one traditional community moving their cattle herds into the lands
traditionally occupied by another community. For example, Herero and
Kavango herds appear to be kept in Bushmanland on a permanent ba-
sis (see Harring and Odendaal 2006:25). Similarly, Owambo have
moved into Western districts of the Kavango region (see Cox et al.
1998 and Fuller 2006:11). It may, however, also happen that members
from another community move in to occupy land for permanent settle-
ment, as Owambo from the Ohangwena and Oshikoto regions did in
Ukwangali (Fuller 2006:10), or that members from the same commu-
nity but from a different locality claim access, as happened, for in-
stance, amongst the Herero at Okonyoka in the Aminuis communal
area (Twyman et al. 2001).
Reduced access to land for grazing is what drives these migrations.
Several developments have contributed to this reduction. After inde-
pendence, wealth accumulated by blacks in the urban-based economy
has increasingly been invested in commercial farming on communal
lands. Taking advantage of weak oversight by traditional authorities or
of good connections, many of these commercial farmers have closed
off attractive portions of commonage (often including boreholes) in or-
der to assure themselves of a good return on their investment (Cox et
al. 1998; Verlinden and Kruger 2007). Subtractions from the commo-
nage have also occurred due to population increases in towns and cat-
tle posts. To feed the extra mouths, more fertile pasture in the sur-
roundings is gradually turned into fields for cropping (Verlinden and
Kruger 2007). Both processes have increased the pressure on the re-
maining rangeland, where the bulk of subsistence farmers are left to
herd their livestock, resulting in widespread degradation.
The ensuing migrations in search of better grazing, as well as the
process of illegal fencing, must be seen in light of a reduction in the ef-
fective level of control over access to rangeland after independence.
Several arguments have been presented to explain this reduction. To
begin with, Namibia‘s new constitution overturned two cornerstones of
the homeland policy by giving every citizen the right to reside and set-
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tle in any part of the country (art. 21h). In addition, it vests ownership
of communal lands in the state (schedule 5). In the immediate after-
math of independence, these changes raised uncertainty about the
scope of traditional leaders‘ powers to regulate access to land, particu-
larly as regards the exclusion of members of other communities (Fuller
2006:4; Sullivan 2002:166). At the same time, part of the administra-
tive support for traditional leaders provided by the colonial administra-
tion temporarily fell away (Cox et al. 1998), while as has been sug-
gested (Kakujaha Matundu 2002:10), their sense of responsibility for
rangeland conservation had been eroded under apartheid by concen-
trating management in the hands of white administrators. These fac-
tors, together with the inherent difficulties of monitoring access on
very large, remote, and not easily accessible terrains, and the fact that
government attention has been focused on white ownership in the for-
mer police zone, created an environment on communal rangeland that
is qualified by many as presenting the characteristics of an open access
regime (e.g. Kakujaha Matundu 2002; Verlinden and Kruger 2007:
190).
The Communal Land Reform Act (of 2002), which is the primary le-
gal instrument regulating land use in Namibia‘s communal areas, ad-
dresses the issue of fencing and the problem with enforcing customary
common property principles. It contains a clear prohibition of fencing
on communal land (art. 16) and provides rules by which to judge
whether existing fences can be retained. In this regard article 28(8) re-
quires that an existing fence was erected in accordance with customary
law, and that it will not unreasonably interfere with the use of the com-
monage by other members of the traditional community.29 Article 29
(1) confirms the powers of traditional authorities to regulate and, thus,
limit access to commonage, and article 29(5) makes the erection of
fences, obstruction of access to water, permanent settlement, and culti-
vation on such land punishable as an offence.
It is too early to assess whether these provisions allow for effective
traditional rangeland management systems to be restored or rein-
vented. The case study by Verlinden and Kruger (2007), which is based
on data gathered in 2005, suggests that the tide has not yet turned.
Much depends on how traditional leaders will make use of their discre-
tionary powers, notably to enforce the prohibition on fencing. The risk
remains that they will be co-opted by wealthy and politically well-con-
nected individuals. A possible solution to such problems may lie in the
creative use of conservancies.
A conservancy is a legal entity regulated by the Nature Conservation
Amendment Act of 1996.30 The foremost purpose of this act is to re-
construct a common property regime for wildlife in order to fill a va-
cuum created under apartheid that was closely related to the lack of
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rangeland control discussed earlier. Traditionally, the inhabitants of Na-
mibia‘s communal land have perceived wildlife as threatening. It com-
petes with livestock for grazing and water, may prey on livestock, and
many species routinely damage crops (Weaver and Skyer 2003:7). This
perception was strengthened under apartheid when ownership and
management of wildlife were in the hands of the colonial administra-
tion, undermining a role of the inhabitants of the homelands as custo-
dians of wildlife. The resulting heavy poaching, in combination with
droughts, resulted in critically low wildlife populations (id.:8). The act
partly decentralises wildlife management by giving traditional commu-
nities incentives to become involved. This is done by giving commu-
nities who organise themselves in a conservancy ownership rights to
game, which they can communally exploit by setting up tourism ven-
tures (mainly in the form of safari camps and trophy hunting). These,
in turn, also provide employment. The government closely monitors
wildlife populations in the conservancies, and hunting is subject to a
permit system.
Conservancies have been heralded as a success story of community-
based natural resource management. Studies show recovery of wildlife
populations (e.g. Weaver and Skyer 2003) and revenues (amounting to
USD 1.3 million for all of Namibia in 2003) being used to supplement
conservancy members’ incomes, as well as to invest in education and
healthcare (see Fuller 2006 and Weaver and Skyer 2003). With these
successes the number of applications for the establishment of conser-
vancies has risen sharply. The year 1998 saw the creation of the first
conservancy; in 2003 there were 29 registered conservancies, covering
a quarter of the total communal area landmass, and housing some
150,000 inhabitants. It is clear, however, that the successes are limited
to a number of flagship conservancies, each of them major tourist at-
tractions. The majority do not offer prospects of producing revenues
that would significantly increase incomes (Sullivan 2002:167).
The continued interest in establishing conservancies has been ex-
plained by pointing to the fact that communities, living in the post-in-
dependence context of uncertain customary tenure, primarily concep-
tualise this institution not as a means to manage wildlife, but as a way
to strengthen traditional land claims (id.:165). Given that procedures
for registering a conservancy require that its physical boundaries and
membership be defined, they are understood as a tool to keep outsiders
out. This is so, even though the rights conferred relate to wildlife and
tourism, and therefore do not directly affect the rights of non-commu-
nity members to grazing and water (Fuller 2006:15). As follows from
the discussion in the previous sub-section, these properties of conser-
vancies can be expected to be of additional importance to communities
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whose leaders have not been recognised under the Traditional Authori-
ties Act.
It is submitted that conservancies could play a key role in addressing
the problem of encroachments on communal land. Its primary func-
tion would be in the intra-community context, where it could provide a
basis for the reconstruction of a common property regime that regu-
lates rangeland access (according to Jones and Mosimane (2000:81),
examples already exist). Despite challenges, conservancy committees
have been shown to be reasonably representative of their community.
They include younger people and women, tend to cooperate with, but
remain independent from, local traditional leaders, and are perceived
to distribute revenues fairly (Jones and Mosimane 2000; their compo-
sition and functioning is criticised, however, in Sullivan 2002). Where
oversight by traditional authorities is insufficient, the establishment of
a conservancy could, therefore, provide an inclusive platform to discuss
and coordinate the diverging interests that different members of the
community may have when it comes to rangeland access. Without sug-
gesting that this would lead to ideal outcomes, it can be expected that
the result would be more sustainable than what is achieved in places
where conditions currently border on open access. Combined with the
prohibitions of fencing and unauthorised use contained in the Com-
munal Land Reform Act, better intra-community management could
also work to reduce migrations to the communal land of neighbouring
communities.
Conclusion
This text has shown that there are serious problems with tenure inse-
curity in Namibia that need to be addressed. Insecurity threatens the li-
velihoods and willingness to invest of some of the most disadvantaged
segments of Namibian society.
We have seen that in many instances this insecurity is the result of
the actions of the government itself. This is the case with forced reloca-
tions in communal and urban areas, and where the government spon-
sors the development of infrastructure or other projects without con-
sulting the communities that are directly affected. A clear policy that
sets out the limits to the rights that the state and its organs may exer-
cise as ultimate owner of communal and undivided urban lands would
be a relatively simple and cheap way to attenuate this insecurity. It was
argued that in the urban context, such an approach might be more ef-
fective than the legalisation programme foreseen in the Flexible Land
Tenure Bill. Such a policy should be based on the principles of consul-
tation of those affected and compensation in conformity with market
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prices. And where traditional land is concerned, the state should in-
clude the cultural value of the land in the evaluation of whether indivi-
dual or group rights should succumb to the interests of the general
public. While such a policy would limit the government’s freedom to
steer development, it would increase the capacity of communities and
individual Namibians to improve their situation.
We have seen further that there are problems with access to range
land and illegal fencing in the communal lands. These problems are
caused by a combination of apartheid policies that have undercut tradi-
tional authority powers and increased mobility and investment in com-
munal areas since independence. The framework for managing range-
land access drawn up in the Communal Land Reform Act (of 2002) de-
pends on the attribution of considerable discretionary powers to
traditional authorities. It was suggested that where sufficient checks
and balances on chiefly powers are lacking, the establishment of a con-
servancy, as foreseen in the Nature Conservation Amendment Act (of
1996), would offer a better guarantee of equal and sustainable use of
rangelands, as it could be adapted to form an inclusive platform to dis-
cuss and coordinate the diverging interests that different members of
the community may have when it comes to management of the com-
monage.
Notes
1 PhD student at the Center for Law and Economics, University of Amsterdam. Corre-
spondence at: Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: Lan-
khorst@uva.nl. This research was neither supervised nor sponsored by the ACLE; all
responsibility for views and errors is mine exclusively.
2 Given that these problems are diverse in nature, it is useful to explain how the terms
‘land tenure’ and ‘tenure security’ are used in this text. Land tenure regimes can take
many different forms ranging from individual ownership of a defined portion of land
to systems regulating various forms of overlapping use that different members of a
community may make of jointly owned land. Consequently, insecurity about tenure
may relate to the ability to continue to reside on a plot, but also to the ability of a
community to keep outsiders at bay, or the ability of community members to gain
adequate and equal access to the commonage. We will see that whether tenure is for-
mally recognised by the state or is merely of a factual nature (but with a local claim
to legitimacy) can have an influence on the level of security that is experienced.
3 No good data on the effects of AALS on production or other relevant parameters ex-
ist. Many entertain serious doubts, however, as to the economic effect for the benefi-
ciaries of this scheme. It is indicative, for example, that 37 per cent of AALS farmers
default on their loans, and that in 2005 a temporary moratorium on loans was de-
clared (LAC 2005a:32). In addition, Chiari (Chiari 2004:34) reports that the Agri-
bank, the institution administering the scheme on behalf of the government, consid-
ers only 50 to 60 per cent of the farms that are purchased through AALS as commer-
cially viable. A contributing factor to the condition of the sector as a whole is that, as
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Sherbourne (2004) points out, demand for farms amongst the new elite is driven to
a significant extent by the perceived effect on social status. Profitable exploitation will
often be a secondary concern.
4 To calculate this share, the data provided by Fuller on the amount of land involved in
the purchase of farms were combined with the number of 36,000 hectares of total
commercial farmland (Werner 2003:3).
5 Tapia Garcia’s figures in this regard are based on unpublished information from the
Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rehabilitation.
6 Yields can be increased by investing in fertilisers and irrigation. Alternatively, and
more relevant to a larger portion of Namibia, raising livestock may offer the prospect
of better returns than planting crops. Cattle, however, is more expensive to buy than
seeds. In both cases the construction and maintenance of waterholes and boreholes
will be essential, as is the case for many forms of traditional and subsistence farm-
ing.
7 Cf. the overview in UNDP (UNDP 2004b:186). PPP stands for purchasing power
parity.
8 Namibia has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. Equality in
income distribution is commonly measured by means of the Gini coefficient, which
is a measure of statistical dispersion. A high coefficient indicates a high level of in-
equality. Namibia has the highest Gini coefficient (0.7) in the global overview pre-
sented in UNDP (2004b:190), which reflects 1993 data. Republic of Namibia
(2006b:40) reports a 2003/2004 Gini coefficient of 0.6.
9 This is partly off-set, however, by more limited access to medical services, and ARVs
in particular.
10 Although common in many developing countries, this process of urbanisation has
specific features in Namibia (see Frayne and Pendleton 2002: 2). During the apart-
heid period, much of Namibia’s non-white population was barred from residing per-
manently and owning property in productive centres (mostly towns) and remained
confined to homelands governed by traditional authorities. Following independence
from South Africa in 1990, these restrictions on internal migration were removed.
11 There are, of course, vast differences of approach and definitions between our tenta-
tive survey (of only one informal settlement) and the government’s statistical re-
search. It is submitted, however, that the differences are sufficiently large to assume
that aggregate figures for urban centres hide considerable differences within the ur-
ban context.
12 As will be explained, this is not to say that other ethnic groupings are not affected.
13 It should be pointed out that the San are not a homogenous group. Suzman (2002:
3) identifies seventeen San dialects occurring within five distinct San languages.
14 As is the case with the San, they are not a homogenous group. According to Harring
(2004:63) there are fourteen distinct groups.
15 Homelands were also created for native communities whose traditional territories fell
outside the Police Zone, see Figure 7.1. Members of these communities were there-
fore not resettled on a scale comparable to the relocation of the Herero, Nama, and
Damara.
16 The extensive historiography on migrant labour in Africa generally emphasises its
negative social and economic impact on rural society. Kreike’s (2004) study of the si-
tuation in Owamboland provides an interesting addition to this literature, by showing
how wages were invested in the rural economy.
17 Christensen, Werner, and Højgaard 1999:1. The remainder is state-owned land that
includes national parks and diamond mining areas.
18 The registration of individual forms of customary land rights and the monitoring by
land boards of traditional authorities form an interesting topic for study. Given that
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the Act has been implemented very recently, however, and that registration has
started on only a small scale (see Fuller 2006:15), little can as yet be said about the
merits of this approach in the Namibian context. It is worth pointing out also that,
although it may be assumed to be intended to prevent abuse of powers by traditional
authorities, the precise problem that is addressed with registration is not spelled out
in the literature with anything near the same amount of detail as seen in the discus-
sions regarding encroachment of commonage, San land rights, etc.
19 For a broader discussion on this topic, see e.g. World Bank 2003d.
20 This is illustrated by the discussions below of the situation of the San and of plans to
construct a dam at the Epupa Falls that threaten culturally important sites of the
Himba tribe.
21 This may partly be explained by the fact the Himba form part of the powerful Herero
people.
22 The situation of the Basters of Rehoboth – which lies in the former police zone and
falls under the freehold regime – regarding the resettlement of members of other
tribes, mainly Owambo, on their traditional lands (see Harring 2004 and Suzman
2002) is comparable, also.
23 This is more elaborately discussed in Lankhorst and Veldman, this volume.
24 Lengthy and costly procedures for sub-dividing municipal land and high prices on
the commercial land market are the main reasons that have been advanced to explain
this failure (Christensen, Werner, and Højgaard 1999:9).
25 The bill was originally prepared in 1997 and 1998; a final, fourth, version was issued
in 2004.
26 A higher degree of certainty would be likely to lead to some increase in the plot
prices charged on the informal market. Lankhorst and Veldman (this volume) quote
selling prices established on the current informal market.
27 See Christensen (2004:7). Should they do so anyway, they would not receive compen-
sation if, at a later stage, it turns out they have to move in order to allow for the con-
struction of roads or service provision.
28 See the discussion below for more details on conservancies.
29 It is important to consider what rules of customary law may be invoked. Although
the process escalated after independence, fencing of communal land started decades
earlier under apartheid (Twyman et al. 2001:12). It is not unthinkable, therefore, that
the powerful men who occupy such terrains will be successful in arguing that it is a
sufficiently well established practice to be accepted as part of custom.
30 The history of conservancies in Namibia goes back further than 1996, however. See
Fuller 2006:8).
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8 Regulating or deregulating informal land
tenure? A Namibian case study on the prospects of
improving tenure security under the Flexible Land
Tenure Bill
Marco Lankhorst1 and Murie¨l Veldman2
Introduction
This contribution aims to highlight some elements of the decision-
making process that policy-makers (and their donors) should follow
when deciding, in a given situation, whether to legalise extra-legal ur-
ban land tenure. Our analysis focusses on an innovative form of legali-
sation developed in Namibia, the Flexible Land Tenure Bill, and is in-
formed and illustrated by results of surveys conducted in the Namibian
town of Otjiwarongo. Nonetheless, the implications of the argument
we make reach beyond the Namibian context. The main point we
stress is that it is crucial for policy-makers to consider the benefits that
extra-legal tenure systems may offer, as extra-legal settlers may effec-
tively defeat law reform if their interests are compromised.
The literature on land tenure legalisation in general, as well as the
case studies on rural settings contained in this volume, suggest that
the stronger the difference between the concepts of tenure underlying
customary law and the formal (i.e. statal) law that supersedes it, the
more problematic the results of legalisation will be. Such disparity
may, for example, lead to a distribution of rights under the formal sys-
tem that is considered inequitable by at least a portion of those af-
fected. As a consequence of such problems related to legitimacy, possi-
ble benefits of legalisation – in terms of increased security, access to
credit, and more efficient production – may fail to materialise or be
cancelled out. In addition, it has been pointed out that the executive
branch in most developing countries cannot manage the complex pro-
cess of legalisation or ensure subsequent upkeep of the land tenure
system, because of the capacity and resources required. These are the
primary considerations that have compelled Platteau (1996) and others
to argue that, at least in the rural African context, legalisation by
means of titling is not an efficient policy.
In the urban setting, however, the prospects for land tenure legalisa-
tion would seem to be better. In these often young and fast-growing
settlements, where people come to search for work and opportunities,
influences of traditional customary law can be expected to be less pro-
nounced. And indeed some empirical studies point to positive results
of legalisation, in terms of improved security, increased investments,
and other factors (for example Field 2006 and Galiani and Schargrods-
ky 2004).
These prospects are further improved by the work of scholars and
policy-makers who seek to design systems of legalisation that reduce
the complexity and costs of registration procedures. Namibia‘s Flexible
Land Tenure Bill, which for some years now has been waiting to be
passed into law, is a primary example of such efforts. As can be learned
from Christensen, Werner and Højgaard (1999) and LAC (2005b), the
bill aims to make legal tenure3 accessible to the poor. For this purpose
it introduces two new types of tenure titles. Registration of these titles
is decentralised, and the procedures are considerably simplified as
compared with the registration of freehold titles. A second major char-
acteristic of the bill, which also works to lower costs, is that it allows
those who seek to acquire title to share the costs thereof amongst each
other, as members of a group. Botswana, with its Certificates of Rights
(see e.g. Kalabamu 2000), and Tanzania, where a system has been cre-
ated based on what is known as the Comprehensive Land Property
Register (see e.g. Wanjohi 2007), provide other examples of simplified,
low-cost titling systems.
Namibian urban centres are particularly suited, therefore, to study
an issue that has only recently come into focus in the literature. The
fact that customary influences can be expected to be less pronounced
does not mean that slum dwellers live in a legal vacuum. Their tenure
relations will generally be regulated by extra-legal practices of a local
nature. A number of authors, including Durrand-Lasserve (2006) and
Rakodi and Leduka (2005), doubtful of the benefits of large-scale legali-
sation, suggest that better results can be obtained by strengthening
these practices.
The objective of this contribution is to expose these lines of thought
to each other. It seeks to answer the question of whether a reduction of
the monetary costs of legalisation as foreseen in the Flexible Land Ten-
ure Bill has the potential to annul the validity of the claim that the best
policy for urban areas is to bolster existing extra-legal practices. It is ar-
gued that it is insufficient to focus on the cost side of the equation.
The benefits that extra-legality may offer to settlers should also be ta-
ken into consideration. In addition, we stress the need to examine the
precise nature of the tenure insecurity that settlers experience in a gi-
ven situation, so as to be able to assess the capacity of legalisation to
provide an effective remedy. It is crucial to adopt the perspective of the
settlers in this way, as we show that they may effectively defeat tenure
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reform if their interests are compromised. The implication for policy-
makers is that the choice between low-cost legalisation and extra-legal-
ity has to be made on a case-by-case basis. Application of this frame-
work to the situation we found in Otjiwarongo suggests that, under
current conditions, the start of a flexible titling scheme is unlikely to
produce satisfying results.
The rest of this work proceeds as follows. We first present the con-
ceptual framework that underpins our approach. Then we report on re-
levant socio-economic indicators for Namibia, and Otjiwarongo in par-
ticular. This is a first step in charting the preferences of the extra-legal
settlers as to the prospects of tenure reform. In the following section
we bring the problem of tenure security into focus by presenting the
results of a series of interviews with residents and local authority offi-
cials. Then we discuss the features of the Namibian Flexible Land Ten-
ure Bill. We combine all this information by comparing the costs and
benefits that existing and legalised tenure arrangements would offer re-
sidents, in order to determine the effect on their incentives. A final sec-
tion concludes, and an appendix provides insight into the method of
our case study.
Conceptual framework
The debate on tenure security draws contributions from economics, so-
ciology, anthropology, and law. This section provides a detailed discus-
sion of various concepts that are relevant to the debate on tenure secur-
ity, in order to provide a background against which the analysis in the
following sections should be appreciated. Notably, it tells us that the
potential of the existing situation in extra-legal settlements should not
be under-estimated.
Our research, essentially, deals with situations of factual legal plural-
ism, whereas legal practitioners commonly work with a normative con-
cept of the law that designates the state as the ultimate source of the
law.4 Such a view holds that custom, which originates elsewhere, may
also regulate behaviour, but only in as much as it is sanctioned by for-
mal state law (formal pluralism of laws). The situation in Otjiwarongo,
which guides our analysis, compels us to choose a different framework
for analysis that looks at law as a social phenomenon. Whereas formal
Namibian law certainly pretends to regulate behaviour in the extra-legal
settlements of this town, in practice, as we will see, it has a limited im-
pact on the lives of the residents. This does not mean that, from a fac-
tual point of view, they live in a legal vacuum. Residents tend to adhere
to a set of local practices that is not sanctioned by formal law, but may
indirectly be influenced by it.
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This relative independence of local arrangements has important im-
plications that are sometimes ignored. As Rakodi and Leduka (2005:8)
note, much research on urban tenure in Africa concentrates on the fail-
ure to extend the scope of formal laws and regulation to the dealings
of the poorest in society. Such an approach tends to foster a view of ex-
tra-legal settlers as playing a passive role and highlights the benefits
that their ‘legal exclusion’ forces them to forego. Thinking in terms of
the semi-independence of the rules that govern behaviour in these set-
tlements, however, instructs us to recognise the agency of the residents
themselves. Rather than a detrimental effect, legal exclusion may be
thought of as a rational choice by the members of disadvantaged com-
munities. This agency is crucial in any process that aims to improve
tenure security. It manifests itself in two ways. In the first place, these
communities are capable of producing law, that is, they generate rules
that guide behaviour within the settlements, and that present an alter-
native to formal law. Second, although disadvantaged in many ways,
the members of these communities have the means to oppose the force
of formal law. We first consider the nature of the law generated in ur-
ban extra-legal settlements, and then move on to discuss the means
and motives of their residents to resist being brought under the pur-
view of formal law. This opens up important insights into the possible
effects of (flexible) titling.
Durand-Lasserve (2006) uses the term ‘neo-customary practices’ to
describe the extra-legal arrangements that are generated by commu-
nities in slum settlements. This term reveals important characteristics
of the phenomenon that we study. On the one hand, it acknowledges
that extra-legal settlers may model their behaviour according to the cus-
tomary rules that governed their dealings in their place of origin. This
is highly relevant in the context of rapid urbanisation in Africa,
although, as we will see, our research produced insufficient evidence to
support such a thesis. On the other hand, the term clearly expresses
that there may be other influences on these practices. These can take
the form of spontaneously emerging arrangements or emulations of
parts of formal law that are advantageous to extra-legal settlers, a pro-
cess that has been dubbed ‘inter-legality’ by Hoekema (2003).
Before we address the crucial issue of the motives that extra-legal set-
tlers might have to resist legal reform, it is appropriate to discuss the
means they can rely on to do so, as this shows their cooperation to be
indispensable to the success of legalisation. Leduka (2000) and Rakodi
and Leduka (2005) group the means of resistance under the heading
of ‘societal non-compliance’. In a formal regulatory environment where
resources and capacity are scarce (think of under-staffed registries),
large-scale, unorganised non-compliance can offer relatively powerless
communities a strong tool to oppose unfavourable legal reforms. Lega-
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lisation of tenure provides ample scope for such behaviour, as it criti-
cally depends on the internalisation of the new rules by the population.
With other types of legal reforms, sanctions such as fines or imprison-
ment and public enforcement may deter non-compliance. These instru-
ments tend to be absent in the field of property law. Compliance, then,
is largely dependent on processes that are internal to the local popula-
tion. The threat of nullity of the extra-legal transaction can be expected
to have only a marginal effect, as it depends on private enforcement in
an environment where there are generally high barriers to court.
Compliance with formal or informal (that is, customary or neo-cus-
tomary) law can be said to be motivated by one of two factors. Either
the persons involved in a transaction may feel that they ought to act ac-
cording to one of these systems, or, if this influence is not so strong,
they may choose the option that serves their interests best. A lack of le-
gitimacy – that is, a poor fit with local traditions and senses of fairness
– has been advanced to explain the failure of formal property laws and
registries to take hold in rural areas (see e.g. Platteau 1996:55). In the
younger urban settlements, where people tend to flock in search of a
better life, the second explanation may be at least as powerful. This
would seem to be the case particularly in Otjiwarongo, where we found
little indication of strong influences of rural origin on tenure arrange-
ments.
The implication is that the success of instituting a formal property
regime (that is not publicly enforced) depends on how well it serves
the interests of the tenure holders involved. They may choose extra-leg-
ality over the rules and procedures of formal law if this better accom-
modates their economic and other objectives. When evaluating the de-
sirability of legalisation in certain circumstances, it is therefore crucial
that the associated costs and benefits be brought into focus. A review
of the literature on legalisation of land tenure will tell us which types
of costs and benefits should be included in this process of evaluation.
Early contributions by members of the Property Rights School
stressed the costs of extra-legality and the benefits of formality.5 In this
view, (neo-)customary regimes offer landholders a lower level of tenure
security than legalised property systems. This is argued to lead to less
investment in the land, to limit access to credit, and to lower the value
of transactions. Much later work (see Platteau 1996) points to the costs
of legalisation. There is a serious risk that differences in the concepts
of property that underlie customary and formal law will lead to a distri-
bution of rights that is considered inequitable, at least by a portion of
those affected. The resulting problems of legitimacy will weigh down
the benefits of legalisation. In addition, registering land is a very ex-
pensive process, and the subsequent proper functioning of the system
is dependent on considerable administrative capacity and resources.
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Namibia‘s Flexible Land Tenure Bill aims to change the balance of
these costs and benefits by lowering the costs of the legalisation pro-
cess, as well as its maintenance.
As is illustrated by the schematic overview below, if we want to know
whether titling offers the prospect of improving conditions for extra-le-
gal settlers, it is insufficient to look at the costs of extra-legality and the
costs and benefits of formality. The benefits of the pre-existing situa-
tion must also be taken into account. Neo-customary practices evolve
spontaneously or by borrowing from formal or customary law. We
should not close our eyes, therefore, to the possibility that custom in
these settlements may already offer some of the benefits that are
sought by means of titling. If indeed they do, this reduces the likeli-
hood that residents will choose to participate in such a scheme and
urges us to consider whether bolstering these practices is not a better
way to improve tenure conditions in these settlements.
Socio-economic indicators
This conceptual framework suggests that the outcome of the trade-off
between flexible titling and the accommodation of extra-legal practices
is determined by the cost implications of either alternative, the eco-
nomic opportunities that they offer the settlers, and desirable or unde-
sirable social consequences. The full trade-off itself, as it applies to Ot-
jiwarongo, is made below. The present section complements the survey
of socio-economic indicators at the national level presented in Lank-
Table 8.1 Costs and benefits of legalisation vs. extra-legality
Legalisation Extra-legality
B
en
ef
its
Old property rights advocates and De
Soto c.s.:
a) Enhances tenure security
b)Provides access to credit
c)Spurs the development of an
efficient land market
Literature on the potential of (neo-)
customary practices:
a) Flexibility / adaptability
b) Legitimacy
c) Lower transaction costs?
C
os
ts
Literature reviewed in Platteau (1996):
a) Expensive administrative process
b) Expensive up-keep of the system
c) Introduction of new transaction
costs for settlers (fees)
d) Potentially large social costs
(exclusion / unfair distribution)
Mirror image of the benefits of
legalisation:
a) Low level of tenure security
b) No possibility to pledge the
property
c) High transaction costs?
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horst (this volume) by looking at local conditions. This is an important
first step in charting the likely preferences of Otjiwarongo’s extra-legal
settlers as regards tenure regimes.6 This type of data allows us to start
developing our thoughts about how they might value the opportunities
offered by either regime (formal or informal), and it helps to gauge
how the settlers might balance these against possible costs, such as the
threat of relocation as well as surveying and registration costs.
The town of Otjiwarongo is situated in the northern half of the coun-
try, along the Trans-Caprivi highway, which constitutes an important
artery for the transport of goods between Angola and other countries to
the north and east on the one hand and Namibia‘s port in Walvis Bay
and South Africa on the other. Much of the local economy depends on
this traffic, as is evidenced by a surprising number of petrol stations.
The town also serves as a focal point for the commercial farms of the
region. As the administrative capital of the surrounding Otjozondjupa
region, Otjiwarongo houses a considerable number of state, regional,
and local government offices.
The 2001 national census counted a total of 22,614 inhabitants for
the town of Otjiwarongo (Republic of Namibia 2001a). Local officials
and NGOs, however, currently work with an estimation of 28,000.7 In
light of our findings as to the size of the extra-legal settlements re-
ported below, we hold this to be a more realistic figure. This makes it a
medium-sized town in the Namibian context (compare Fjeldstad et al.
2005:8). In addition, the Otjozondjupa region reflects many of the pat-
terns witnessed at the national level. Per capita income (compare Re-
public of Namibia 2006b:36), the level of unemployment (compare Re-
public of Namibia 2001a), and household size (compare Republic of
Namibia 2006b:9) are relatively close to national averages. Although
no detailed recent data are available, it can be deduced from Republic
of Namibia (2006a:4) and UNAIDS (2006:18) that Otjozondjupa has
neither a very high nor a very low HIV prevalence rate, compared with
other regions.
According to local accounts, Otjiwarongo’s oldest extra-legal settle-
ment emerged during the apartheid area, possibly during the 1970s or
early 1980s.8 Its name, Tsaraxa Aibes (we ended up not being laughed
at so much anymore by pronouncing it as TsaraGAIbes) appropriately
means ‘dusty place’ in the local Damara language. The members of
that tribe were the first to settle here. Although there are no records of
the size of the settlement during the apartheid period, the removal of
the pass laws following independence from South Africa in 1990 is
said to have spurred considerable growth of this and other new, extra-
legal settlements around Otjiwarongo. A 1993 municipal census
counted some 5,400 squatters. A municipal survey conducted in 1998
resulted in an estimated population of 10,500. The rough estimate that
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follows from our own research results in a 2006 population of about
15,000. This number includes the inhabitants of a second, neighbour-
ing settlement called DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), on account
of it being even further away from the town centre than Tsaraxa Aibes
(approximately seven km). Apart from Damaras, who are concentrated
in the older parts of Tsaraxa Aibes, the settlements nowadays host sub-
stantial numbers of migrants from the north, including Owambos, Ka-
vangos, and Caprivians. Our summary investigations of this matter
suggest that the settlements are growing at a fast pace, on the order of
five per cent per year, and that migration accounts for the larger part of
the increases.
As can be expected, the socio-economic indicators for Tsaraxa Aibes
and DRC compare unfavourably with those for the Otjozondjupa re-
gion and Namibia. It should be stated at the outset, however, that a
high degree of accuracy should not be attached to any of the data we
present, including our own.9 A 1997 survey commissioned by the mu-
nicipality showed that approximately 27 per cent of the households had
at least one permanently employed member, while approximately 69
per cent of the households earned less than N$ 200 (roughly USD
40), and 97 per cent earned less than N$ 1,000 (roughly USD 250) a
month. Another study commissioned in 2004 found a median house-
hold income of N$ 424, but it appears that the sample that was used
to compute this number was rather small (40 interviews). Our own
data, drawn from interviews with members of 105 households, sug-
gests a 2006 median household income of N$ 606 (average N$ 777),
and median household size of 5.7 (average 5.6). We found that 38 per
cent of households had at least one permanently employed member,
and a further nineteen per cent could rely on a pension or disability
grant as a stable (but, at N$ 300/370, often insufficient) source of in-
come. In almost all other households there was at least one self-em-
ployed member, i.e. someone with a regularly practised, income-gener-
ating occupation.10 The employment rate among residents between six-
teen and 59 years of age totals thirteen per cent, whereas a further
twenty per cent are self-employed.
Not surprisingly, then, housing conditions are rather poor in Tsaraxa
Aibes and DRC, despite continuing efforts by the municipality. Hous-
ing consists mainly of self-constructed shacks (primarily using corru-
gated iron, wood, and clay bricks). All dwellings lack drinking water
connections, water being provided through municipal pumps that work
on the basis of a pre-paid card system. Electricity is provided in some
areas closer to town, but household coverage is far from complete, be-
cause of a sizable instalment fee. A sewerage system is absent, and
most households rely on self-made latrines or the bush. A number of
high masts provide street lighting. The municipality collects refuse at
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designated points. Schools and clinics, along with other public services,
are absent. There are some shops, most of which sell only beer and
soft drinks. It is against this background that the analysis in the follow-
ing sections should be seen. We first focus on tenure security.
Tenure security
In this section we look at tenure conditions as currently encountered
in Otjiwarongo’s extra-legal settlements. This is important as it brings
the problem to be solved by means of legalisation (flexible titling) into
focus. Broadly defined, tenure security refers to the extent to which the
holder of a parcel of land feels assured (both in the short and longer
term) of his ability to access his land, to manage and use it, and to ef-
fectively exclude others. Otjiwarongo’s extra-legal settlers do not en-
counter problems falling under all these aspects of tenure security. We
focus on the ability to exclude others from accessing one’s property.11
Tenure security must be distinguished from its effects. If an insuffi-
cient level of security is experienced, this will affect the holder’s incen-
tives to make investments. This can be very consequential, for instance
if it keeps settlers from improving unhygienic conditions. In addition,
uncertainty may have a bearing on the holder’s dealings with third par-
ties. It may weigh down the price that potential buyers would be will-
ing to pay for the possession, and – supposing that the necessary legal
machinery is in place – it can make banks reluctant to accept the prop-
erty as collateral to a loan. This, in turn, may affect investments in
other goods, such as a business or education (this is, essentially, De So-
to‘s (2000) argument).
The existence of tenure insecurity and the question of its effects are,
of course, factual issues that cannot be gleaned from law books. In this
section we present the results of a series of interviews held in Tsaraxa
Aibes and DRC that focussed on indicators for insecurity and the will-
ingness to make investments. These show that actions by the local
authority, specifically large-scale relocations of extra-legal settlers in the
past, are the main cause for uncertainty experienced by Otjiwarongo’s
extra-legal settlers. To interpret these actions by the municipality, it is
useful to begin describing the formal legal situation in these settle-
ments.12 After that, the issue of relocations as a source of tenure inse-
curity is discussed in detail.
The regulation of land tenure around Namibia‘s urban centres has
undergone considerable change since independence. The land on
which Tsaraxa Aibes originally emerged, like all unregistered terrains
around urban centres, resorted to homeland authorities and was gov-
erned by communal law. In 1992, with the passing of the Local Autho-
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rities Act, all unregistered lands falling within municipal boundaries
were transferred from the traditional authorities to the newly estab-
lished local authorities. In the process the status of these terrains chan-
ged. Henceforth, it was intended that they would be subdivided, ser-
viced, and sold to the public with freehold title (see Juma and Christen-
sen 2001; LAC 2005b:34). In formal terms, under this new regime the
traditional occupiers of such terrains, including the settlers in Tsaraxa
Aibes, saw their customary claims converted into tenancy (see Fjeldstad
et al. 2005:16).
The second major change was the designation of Tsaraxa Aibes, and
later DRC, as ‘reception areas’. The large stream of internal migrants
referred to above is channelled to these areas, where the newly arrived
enjoy a de facto permit to occupy a plot (see LAC 2005b:22). Over the
years the municipality has taken both a proactive and a reactive stance
with respect to occupation. A number of times a street layout was
made in advance, and plots were measured and pegged. On other occa-
sions, however, parts of the settlement had to be ‘regularised’ ex post.
Such settlers coming from the countryside are also considered to be
tenants of the municipality. Again, however, tenancy is an intermediate
state, as settlement in such areas is considered to be of a temporary
nature. The objective is to resettle the inhabitants in permanent hous-
ing elsewhere, ideally with a freehold title.13
There are several reasons why the emphasis has generally been on
future resettlement rather than on legalisation of the existing area.
One is a provision in the National Housing Development Act prescrib-
ing that newly developed plots have a minimum size of 300 square
metres, whilst the majority of the plots in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC are
smaller than that. Another is that in the current layout of the settle-
ment, there is no room for public services to be provided (schools,
clinics, police station, etc.) or for open spaces. Other more practical
concerns include the fact that installing drinking water and sewerage
grids is considerably more expensive in an inhabited settlement.
In terms of the settlers’ rights and obligations, from a formal per-
spective, the following can be said. The inhabitants of Tsaraxa Aibes
and DRC are required to register with the municipality and pay rent
for the use of a plot. Currently, the amount to be paid stands at N$ 42
per plot. The tenants are not entitled to transfer their rights to family
members or others without prior permission of the town council. They
can be evicted if the council decides to use the land for other purposes.
In such an event, only the residents owning permanent structures or
traditional homesteads (including houses built with sun-dried mud-
brick) are entitled to compensation. Those who live in iron shacks are
not eligible for compensation.14 It should be noted, however, that Otji-
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warongo’s municipal regulations prohibit the erection of permanent
structures in the area.
This discussion of the formal legal situation forms the background
of our investigation of the tenure insecurity experienced by the inhabi-
tants of Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC. We focus, first, on insecurity in the re-
lation between plot holders and the municipality, caused by the threat
of future relocation without compensation. At the end of this section,
there is a brief discussion also of indicators of insecurity caused by
third-party encroachment.
Relocations of extra-legal settlers have occurred with some frequency.
In most cases, according to municipal officials and documents, this in-
volved relocations from unrecognised settlements (i.e. outside the offi-
cial reception areas, Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC) or from dangerous areas.
At the turn of the century, for instance, several hundred families were
moved out of the Single Quarters. This is the name used to refer to the
hostel where during apartheid male black labourers, brought in from
the homelands, would stay. After independence many of them sent for
their families, and in a few years the place grew to be extremely
crowded, and hygienic conditions were eventually considered unten-
able. The years 2004 and 2005 saw the resettlement of a further 250
families from an unrecognised extra-legal settlement known as Oka-
muti. In addition, over the past ten years the municipality has rather
constantly moved settlers out of flooding areas, as well as other areas
closer to town than Tsaraxa Aibes. At the end of 2006, there were an
estimated 500 to 600 of such ‘illegal settlers’ (approximately 100
households) who were gradually being relocated. As far as we were able
to witness, settlers tended to acquiesce, albeit unhappily, and there was
no use of force or police assistance. To test whether these resettlements
have an effect on tenure security in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC, we con-
ducted 36 in-depth interviews. Details about the method employed are
given below, in the appendix.
In terms of uncertainty, we found the following. When asked about
their personal history and the places where they had lived, seven re-
spondents indicated having been asked to relocate by the municipality.
All households but one were aware of relocations having occurred. Ex-
cept for households who were themselves moved out of flood zones
(two in number), people had little more than a vague notion, if any, of
the reasons for relocations. Some speculated that the lands may have
had to be freed up to make room for industry, whilst others suggested
that extra-legal settlements were not wanted in areas close to wealthier
residential districts. The members of thirteen households stated that
they thought it possible that they might themselves have to relocate at
some point in the future, and a further five indicated that they ser-
iously considered this possibility. Only one of these five households
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had been relocated before. The members of the other six households
that had already been relocated did not consider it possible that they
would be relocated again, pointing either to (1) promises by the muni-
cipality or the central government that on account of having been relo-
cated, or of being old, they had permission to stay on their plot perma-
nently, or (2) the installation of an electricity network which constituted
too large an investment by the municipality to abandon.
To see whether these experiences may also inhibit investments, we
examined the effect on the willingness to make improvements to hous-
ing. The image that came out of our investigation was mixed. We fol-
lowed a two-pronged approach by focussing on the desire and capacity
to make improvements. Regarding the former, we asked respondents
to rank their preferences as to the possible uses for their savings.15 A
sizable minority did not include improvements to their dwelling in
their list of preferences. Asked for their reasons, some settlers told us
that they did not intend to stay in Otjiwarongo for long enough and
were planning either to move back to the countryside or to one of the
larger cities in the south. This would appear to correspond to the find-
ings of Tvedten and Pomuti (1995:14). The threat of relocation there-
fore cannot be said to directly affect the investments in housing of this
group. It could be that uncertainty plays a role in their reasons for
planning to move away, but we did not examine this question.
A lack of funds constitutes a major constraint on making improve-
ments. About 68 per cent of the 105 households that were interviewed
regarding their financial situation were unable to generate savings.
The remainder is made up mostly of households with a stable source
of income exceeding N$ 899 per month and households that depend
on a relatively high, variable income (e.g. contractors and taxi drivers).
At least part of the savings of the latter group, however, are intended to
cushion low-income periods. Nonetheless, the lack of savings is not an
insurmountable obstacle in terms of making improvements, as mud
and clay bricks, for example, are generally self-made and require no fi-
nancial investment. Knowledge of how to make them appears to be
fairly widespread. Of those households that indicated being able to
make improvements and interested in improving their dwelling, two
identified the threat of relocation as the main reason not to do so, and
a further three mentioned it as one of the reasons for not upgrading. A
much larger group of eleven respondents, however, already lived in a
brick house, had recently made improvements, or had started to collect
the necessary materials to do so. Four of them indicated that there was
a risk involved in doing so.
To summarise, our interviews provide reasons to believe that, at least
for a considerable portion of the residents of Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC,
the possibility that future relocations might affect them constitutes a
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source of uncertainty about the continuation of their tenure. There ap-
pear to be gradations in the levels of uncertainty experienced, however,
and as a consequence the effects on the behaviour of the settlers are
not uniform. To bring this matter into focus, we identified those
among our group of respondents who were both interested in and able
to make improvements. Some experienced levels of uncertainty pre-
venting them from making improvements to their dwelling. Others –
who form a majority together with those who entertained no fears of
being ousted from their plot – were willing to take a calculated risk.
To complete our analysis, we also looked for signs of uncertainty
caused by factors other than the actions of the municipality. This pro-
duced no results. Given that almost all of the plots in Tsaraxa Aibes
and DRC are pegged by the municipality and are fenced accordingly by
the settlers, there are generally no disputes over borders. The only evi-
dence we found of such disputes was in a case where heirs had subdi-
vided a plot along contended lines. We also asked settlers what would
happen if they were to leave their property unguarded for a period of a
month, for example to visit family or work on a farm. All indicated that
they would never do so and would ask a family member to watch over
their house. Asked what would happen if they would leave it un-
guarded instead, the risk of theft was generally pointed out. None of
our 36 respondents suggested that the house might then be occupied
by others. Our data cannot be relied upon to confirm this, but quite
probably this is explained by the fact that the settlers generally register
with the municipality as tenants. This issue is discussed in more detail
below. First, we turn to examine flexible tenure.
Flexible tenure
The Flexible Land Tenure Bill drafted by the Ministry of Lands and Re-
settlement and Rehabilitation is aimed at providing Namibia‘s urban
poor access to secure forms of tenure that will enhance their economic
opportunities (see section 2 of the 4th draft of the bill). The primary
aim of the bill, therefore, is to improve the situation in which extra-le-
gal settlers currently live. The innovation that is presented by the bill,
as compared to earlier attempts at legalisation made all over the devel-
oping world, is that it addresses two problems related to legalisation it-
self (i.e. two problems falling in the ‘costs of legalisation‘ box, at the
bottom left, in ).
The first of these problems involves constraints faced by the authori-
ties charged with tenure regulation. Procedures for the development of
new land under freehold title are very complicated in Namibia (Chris-
tensen, Werner, and Højgaard 1999:9). Limited capacity and resources
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in the executive branch, therefore, constitute a serious obstacle to lega-
lisation (compare with the problems discussed by Platteau 1996:47).
Second, the bill acknowledges that large parts of the population face
serious financial constraints. The costs of the formal procedures in-
volved in the subdivision and registration of town lands under freehold
title, as they are paid by the acquirers, can therefore be expected to
further restrict the output of this channel of land delivery.
The bill seeks to provide a solution to these problems by (1) simplify-
ing and thus reducing the costs of the registration procedure, and (2)
allowing those who seek to acquire title to share the costs thereof
amongst each other, as members of a group. These simplifications de-
pend, respectively, on the creation of local registries, complementary to
the deeds office in Windhoek, and on the institution of two new forms
of statutory tenure, parallel to the freehold system. The system intro-
duced by the bill is designed as follows. Groups of settlers may acquire
a large tract of land under freehold title, as co-owners, following nor-
mal procedures. Local registries will issue certificates to individual
members of the group, attesting to their right to a defined (landhold ti-
tle) or undefined (starter title) portion of this land. These forms of ten-
ure can be upgraded according to the needs and financial capabilities
of the holders.
The ‘starter title’ (section 2) is the simplest of the two forms of ten-
ure. It allows for perpetual occupation of a plot as part of a group-man-
aged block. To prevent speculation, the bill determines that no person
can hold more than one starter title. Transfer (both to heirs and third
parties) of a starter title is possible, and though it is required, the valid-
ity of a transaction is not undermined by the failure to register it.
When registering mutations, a fee is incurred. Plots held with a starter
title can also be leased out. Both the ability to transfer starter titles and
to enter into lease contracts can be made subject to consent, a right of
first refusal, or other conditions provided for in the group constitution
that regulates the interactions between the co-owners. In this regard
the bill indicates that the Minister will issue a model constitution for
starter title associations, which may contain compulsory provisions
(section 16(1)g).
A starter title can be upgraded and turned into a landhold title (sec-
tion 9), which confers a tenure right that approaches freehold owner-
ship more closely. It includes the right to transfer, mortgage, and lease
the plot, with the validity of the former two transactions being subject
to a registration requirement. The relevant authority is given broad
powers to impose conditions on plots forming part of landhold
schemes (section 12(6)), which includes the prohibition of transfer of
plots without its permission or within a specified period of time. A
land hold title can in turn be transformed into a freehold title.
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As suggested, in both cases the block is registered as a single entity
in freehold ownership at the Deeds Office in Windhoek. There the
names of the owners gathered in the group are listed, but the bound-
aries separating individual plots within the block are not indicated.
They are recorded in purposefully created and locally administered
Land Rights Offices (section 4). Starter and land hold titles differ in
that only in the latter case are individual household sites defined and
indicated on a cadastral map (section 6), which is kept in this office.
This system allows individual households to make considerable savings
on the costs of acquiring a title. The pilot projects that were started
during the preparation phase of the bill, for instance, allowed these
costs to be shouldered jointly by 110 (Oshakati), 127 (Oshakati), and
207 (Rundu) households. Additional cost savings are made possible by
lowering the professional requirements of the officials involved in re-
gistration. The Land Rights Offices are to be staffed mainly by para-
professionals. Neither a conveyancer nor a legal practitioner is required
to prepare starter or land hold title documents.
Two further features of the bill are of relevance to the analysis of the
prospects of flexible titling in Otjiwarongo’s settlements. First, the pro-
cedure for initiating a starter or land hold title scheme (sections 11-13)
leaves the regional or local authority a considerable margin of discre-
tion in deciding whether such a scheme should be engaged in, and
whether and in what form to impose conditions on it. Second, the bill
is somewhat vague as to the charges that local authorities may impose
on settlers. It states that the relevant authority may require those in-
volved to pay an amount which must be used for the purpose of cover-
ing the whole or part of the costs that will be incurred in the establish-
ment of the scheme (section 11(3)). It is unclear whether the combina-
tion of these provisions may mean that participants in flexible titling
schemes will be charged for the value of the land that is transferred, in
addition to what is needed to compensate local authorities for survey-
ing and registration costs.16 For the purpose of the analysis of the in-
centives that flexible titling produces for extra-legal settlers, we will
work under the assumption that is more true to the spirit of the bill,
which is that the last of these provisions prohibits charging partici-
pants for anything more than these fees.
The prospects for flexible titling in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC
The conceptual framework for our analysis that was drawn up above
suggests that the success of legalisation critically depends on the coop-
eration of the extra-legal settlers, and therefore leads us to focus on the
decision-making process that they may follow to choose between com-
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pliance and extra-legality. We saw that in doing so, it is essential to con-
sider the costs and benefits of both flexible titling and extra-legality, in-
stead of concentrating on the benefits of titling and the drawbacks of
extra-legality. In subsequent sections we set out to fill in some of the
blanks on our outline of this decision-making process. We charted the
socio-economic conditions in the extra-legal settlements to produce a
first indication of their inhabitants’ preferences and priorities; the
drawbacks of extra-legality were highlighted by showing that there are
signs of tenure insecurity in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC; and we examined
the Flexible Land Tenure Bill, which aims to improve security and in-
crease economic opportunities, while circumventing a number of pro-
blems traditionally associated with legalisation. In this section we be-
gin by focussing on the part of the puzzle that is still missing: the ad-
vantages of extra-legality. We then return to the Flexible Land Tenure
Bill, to examine whether the advantages it aspires to offer can be ex-
pected to materialise. This makes it possible to draw all the threads to-
gether and weigh the costs and benefits of flexible titling from the per-
spective of the extra-legal settlers.
An analysis of the currently available opportunities for the inhabi-
tants of Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC must start from the premise that their
formal position as tenants need not fully correspond to the factual state
of affairs. From a formal legal perspective, a right of tenancy involves
certain constraints. It offers less freedom, for instance, to dispose of
the good than does ownership (however it may be conceptualised). If
the municipality, as the owner, does not actively impose the constraints
of tenancy on the settlers, then they may behave according to other pat-
terns. As was suggested when discussing the concept of neo-customary
practices, in doing so they may follow customary traditions, emulate as-
pects of formal law on tenure, or engage in spontaneously emerging
practices. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the settlers effectively enjoy
freedoms that under formal law would be associated with freehold
ownership rather than tenancy.
We used the 36 in-depth interviews to gain a rough idea of these
matters. It is important to emphasise that the questions we asked had
a limited scope. Our investigations on this matter were geared towards
charting the economic opportunities and constraints present in the cur-
rent situation, so that they could be compared to the prospects offered
by legal reform. Although it would certainly have considerably enriched
our analysis, we did not thoroughly examine the nature (conventions
or merely convenient modes of conduct) or the origins (customary or
other) of the extra-legal practices we encountered, nor did we place
these in a broader context of social inter-action. We conducted a limited
and more abstract inquiry focussed on the ability to transact, and on in-
dications of transaction costs. More specifically, in designing our sur-
232 MARCO LANKHORS AND MURIËL VELDMAN
vey we looked at the elements that distinguish tenancy and the various
forms of tenure, including those introduced by the Flexible Land Ten-
ure Bill. This led us to ask respondents primarily about their ability to
transfer their land, to give it in use, and to use it as collateral. In addi-
tion, we looked for indications of customary influences on tenure ar-
rangements that might require us to reconfigure our initial findings.
Further details about our approach are given in the appendix.
To report our findings on existing arrangements in Tsaraxa Aibes
and DRC, it is useful to distinguish the relation between plot holders
and the municipality from the dealings of plot holders with others.
The first of these, the relation to the municipality as perceived by the
extra-legal settlers, is not easily characterised. The wording that respon-
dents used to describe this relation is of considerable importance here.
They generally chose the English word ‘owner’ or its Afrikaans equiva-
lent ‘eigenaar’ over ‘rent’ or ‘huur’.17 Remarkably, this was different in
some cases with plot holders who had been relocated. Moreover, there
were indications that the settlers were at least to some extent familiar
with the concept of rent. The use of a whole or part of a plot in return
for monthly or weekly payment was found to be quite common in cer-
tain areas of Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC, and the words ‘rent’ or ‘huur’ ap-
peared to be used in this regard. The fact that plot holders register with
the municipality appeared to us to contribute substantially to the differ-
ence settlers perceive between (1) the plot holder’s relation with the
municipality and (2) an ordinary tenant’s relation with the plot holder.
Given, however, that the precise connotations that our respondents had
in choosing this wording were not examined, not too much value
should be attached to these findings. All respondents, including those
who had referred to themselves as owners, recognised that the munici-
pality could charge them for their use of the plot, for which the term
‘rent’ or ‘huur’ was generally used. And except for a small number that
claimed to have somehow been given explicit guarantees (which in-
cludes six of the seven households in our sample that were relocated
once), respondents also indicated that the municipality was in a posi-
tion to ask them to relocate, if necessary, whereas such relocations
were generally acknowledged to be unthinkable in the centre of town.
What we learned about rent payment further indicates that the rela-
tion to the municipality as construed by the settlers is best charac-
terised as sui generis, or hybrid, rather than falling into one of the de-
fined categories of formal law. The municipality takes a decidedly pas-
sive role when it comes to enforcing the debt. It fully depends on the
inhabitants coming to the municipality offices (in the township of Or-
wetoweni, not in the extra-legal settlements) to recharge their water
credits. A mail delivery system being absent, no bills or warnings are
sent, and no house calls are made. Although a serious backlog in rent
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payments may cause municipality officials to issue warnings, the up-
grading of water credits is generally not refused because a basic need
is concerned. A strategy that we were told of more than once involved
combining the purchase of water credit with a relatively small payment
of rent. In addition, a refusal to upgrade water credits can, in practice,
be circumvented by the settlers, with the help of neighbours. Tellingly
also, evictions never occur because of non-payment. The municipality’s
accounts bear out these facts, with payment rates being below 25 per
cent. This is in fact part of a broader phenomenon, prevalent also in
South Africa, that has endured since apartheid, when collective non-
payment of rents and service charges was used as a form of resistance
(see Louw 2003).
When looking at the relation between plot holders and other extra-le-
gal settlers, widespread deviations from the ordinary position of a te-
nant were found that are more easily characterised. Although the mu-
nicipality technically forbids the ‘selling’ of plots by residents, such
transfers in return for payment appear to occur with some frequency.
A total of thirteen respondents indicated that they had been party to or
were aware of such a transaction, five of whom indicated that these
transfers occurred often. Average selling prices could be quoted by ten
respondents, which ranged between N$ 150 and N$ 500 for an empty
plot (depending inter alia on the location), and N$ 700 to N$ 2000 for
a plot with dwelling (in which regard building materials and the avail-
ability of electricity in the area were reported to be important). The mu-
nicipality’s registry plays an important part in these transfers, as it was
generally recognised to be in the interest of the buyer to change the
name in the municipality’s books. Despite its prohibition of sales, the
municipality tends to cooperate with such requests, made jointly by the
old and new occupant. According to local officials, who are well aware
of the situation, this is because the municipality does not oppose the
consensual substitution of one tenant for another, when no payments
are involved, and the distinction, for them, is hard to make. For the
same reason, the municipality does not place obstacles in the way of
children assuming the rights of their parents to a plot, when they have
passed away.18
The municipality does not have a policy on sub-renting by plot
holders. It happens very frequently that a registered plot holder allows
others – adult children, family, or friends – to use his plot, in which
case the user is generally seen as being responsible for paying the rent
to the municipality. Many plot holders also accommodate a second
household on their land, with which they share the responsibility for
the rent to be paid to the municipality. Yet another arrangement that is
not uncommon is that a family member or friend lives in and adminis-
ters the plot holder’s shop (a ‘cuka’ stall or shabeen; the plot holder re-
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siding elsewhere). The majority of these arrangements are better classi-
fied as use rights rather than as renting. More closely approaching this
category is the situation we twice encountered in which the head of a
second household is asked to pay for the food of school-going children
of absent plot holder/parents. In some instances, however, more typical
features of sub-letting are clearly present. A total of six respondents re-
ported being aware of prices charged for the use of a whole or part of a
plot, which were in the range of N$ 50 to N$ 100 per month.19 This
suggests that the land is used to generate some income, rather than to
merely share costs. The accounts we heard suggest that migrants from
Angola and Zimbabwe who face difficulties in registering a plot in
their name constitute a considerable part of the group that rents/sub-
rents from plot holders.
Tenure arrangements being at least partially independent of formal
law, it is possible that customary laws exert some influence in Tsaraxa
Aibes and DRC, particularly since our investigations show that there is
considerable in-migration from rural areas (see above). No in-depth
studies of traditional tenure in Namibia and its development in the
post-apartheid period appear to exist.20 It can be gleaned from reports
such as LAC (2005b:28) and UN Habitat (2005:65), however, that the
various systems of custom in Namibia regulate tenure in a way that
shares certain basic characteristics with customary arrangements en-
countered throughout southern Africa. Traditional leaders exercise con-
trol rights to land. They tend to grant access to land to individual men
or male members of a family. Women, therefore, do not generally ac-
quire use rights. In rural areas they will nonetheless often be the prin-
ciple users of the land. This led us to focus on two points in examining
whether customary law has influenced tenure arrangements in Tsaraxa
Aibes and DRC in a way that could affect our analysis. We studied the
role of traditional leaders, and we looked at the rate of female plot hol-
dership.
These investigations did not lead to the conclusion that traditional
customs had a significant impact on the tenure arrangements de-
scribed above. Both municipality officials and residents confirmed that
a number of chiefs live in the extra-legal settlements. These traditional
leaders are not without status. They were reportedly consulted for ad-
vice, they are generally members of representative ward committees
which aim to communicate the needs of the inhabitants to the munici-
pality, and they are sometimes asked by the latter to inform those who
have settled in so-called ‘illegal areas’ that they have to relocate. Tradi-
tional leaders have no direct role in controlling access to land, however.
Our respondents indicated that they are not involved in sales, renting,
or use agreements, nor do they have a say in allotting new or empty
plots. A number of our respondents suggested that the role of tradi-
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tional leaders and the method of distributing land would be different
in their rural place of origin. Our study of the rate of female plot hol-
dership pointed in the same direction. A municipal report on Tsaraxa
Aibes, DRC, and Okamuti (from where settlers were later transferred
to DRC) showed that slightly more than half (52 per cent) of the regis-
tered plot holders were women, which is confirmed by our own investi-
gations. In 57 of the 105 interviews we conducted regarding socio-eco-
nomic conditions, the person registered with the municipality was re-
ported to be a woman.
At this point we are able to draw some interim conclusions. We saw
that the tenure arrangements that prevail in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC do
not correspond to the formal legal framework. In the first place, this
underscores the need identified above to see whether flexible titling
provides settlers with incentives to join in a scheme and to continue to
respect its regulations. Without such incentives, it can reasonably be
expected that a starter or landhold title will be as meaningful to them
as their current position of tenant. Our investigation also points out
that plots are sold and sub-rented with some frequency. The absence of
third-party-encroachment problems, which is related to the existence of
a registry and the fact that plots are pegged and fenced, suggests that
current arrangements enable such transactions in a way that would ap-
pear to fairly effectively shield buyers from competing claims. There-
fore, the provisions in the Flexible Land Tenure Bill that enable holders
of a starter or landhold title to engage in these transactions constitute
neither an advantage nor a drawback. In fact, if we include in the ana-
lysis (1) the fees incurred in registering transactions involving starter
or landhold titles (section 16(1)a) and (2) the various limitations on the
freedom to engage in such transactions that the bill makes possible
(section 6(4)c jo. 16(1)g, and 12(6)c), then we see that extra-legality
may even constitute the more attractive alternative.
The ability to sell a plot, or to rent it out, is not the only potential ad-
vantage that the Flexible Land Tenure Bill is intended to offer to title-
holders. The central objectives of the bill are to provide secure forms of
tenure and to facilitate access to credit by allowing the owners of a
landhold title to use their property as collateral. These opportunities
may tilt the balance in favour of law reform. Because tenure security
has strong implications for access to credit, we first address this issue.
We saw that the level of tenure security is determined by the ability
to exclude others from accessing one’s property. In principle, threats to
the interests of the extra-legal settlers may come from all sides, but the
results of our investigations reported above indicate that in Tsaraxa
Aibes and DRC evictions by the municipality are the main cause for
concern. In the past the municipality has moved large numbers of peo-
ple out of over-crowded areas, and it continues to relocate persons who
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settle outside the designated reception areas. Future relocations appear
to be made necessary by laws and regulations that prescribe minimum
standards for newly proclaimed plots in terms of size and service provi-
sion. Given that the majority of plots in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC are re-
ported to be smaller than 300 square metres and that it is considerably
cheaper to install services in uninhabited areas, eventual legalisation
will likely take place in another location. The municipality’s conse-
quent refusal to signal to settlers that they may occupy their plot per-
manently appears to keep the fears aroused by the earlier relocations
alive.
Starting a flexible titling scheme is not the solution to these pro-
blems of uncertainty, however. To begin with, individual settlers will
continue to face these problems once they become starter title holders
(Christensen 2004:7). They will be advised on the starter title certifi-
cate that they should not erect permanent structures before their rights
have been upgraded, or before a layout for the area has been approved
by the local authority. Should they do so anyway, they would not receive
compensation if, at a later stage, it turns out they have to move in or-
der to allow for the construction of roads or service provision. And,
although this matter is still unsettled, it is to be expected that, for this
very reason, no landhold titles will be issued in the absence of an ap-
proved layout. Titling would have to be combined with the design of a
layout for the area, therefore, to remove the need for further relocations
and reduce uncertainty. But the same result could be achieved by (1)
designing a layout, or requesting the central government for dispensa-
tion from the problematic layout requirements, while postponing ti-
tling, or (2) by dropping the prospect of titling altogether. Put differ-
ently, the same results can be achieved under extra-legality.
Nor, it would seem, does flexible titling offer material benefits over
extra-legality when it comes to opening access to credit. Extra-legality
does not accommodate property-reinforced loans. But it is unlikely that
landhold titles will, in practice, be used as collateral. In the first place,
it is unclear whether such a title provides banks with sufficient security
to extend a loan, as Christensen et al.’s account confirms (Christensen,
Werner, and Højgaard 1999:66). One can easily imagine that restric-
tive conditions imposed by the municipality on the ability to transfer
the property would make lenders reluctant. Foreclosure has proven to
be very difficult to effectuate in other sub-Saharan countries (Platteau
1996:60). In addition, the history of circumnavigating the require-
ments of formal law in these areas may make them distrustful of the
information contained in registries (see again Platteau 1996:60, for an
overview of work showing similar results). Perhaps more importantly,
with low levels of income and low values for the properties pledged,
even if security issues do not arise, the loans that could be extended
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are likely to remain small. This is not to say that they might not be va-
lued by the debtor. It raises the possibility, discussed by Platteau
(1996:62), that they are considered commercially unattractive by
banks. In any case, it is unlikely that the majority of the population (73
per cent) that cannot rely on a stable source of income will be consid-
ered credit-worthy. Micro-financing programmes and saving groups, of
which there are quite a few active in Namibia (see e.g. LAC 2005b:13),
may offer settlers better prospects. In this regard it is worth emphasis-
ing also, in terms of the demand for credit, that residents themselves
may be unwilling to incur land-secured debts if they perceive the risk
of losing their property to be high (Platteau 1996:62).
In summary, it can be said that it is doubtful whether the Flexible
Land Tenure Bill could achieve its objectives in Otjiwarongo’s extra-le-
gal settlements. Low-cost titling would not, in itself, reduce existing
tenure insecurity. Neither does it offer material benefits in terms of
opening up access to credit to significant portions of the population.
And lastly, extra-legality appears to give the settlers more economic
freedom than the legal regime introduced by the bill.
Conclusions and policy implications
This contribution has sought to evaluate the prospects of the Flexible
Land Tenure Bill in the Namibian context, and, on a more general le-
vel, to tie together two strands of the literature on tenure security.
Our findings made in Otjiwarongo suggest that the eventual passing
of the bill should not be followed by a centralised and nationwide im-
plementation policy that calls for the setting up of flexible titling
schemes regardless of local circumstances. Rather, a careful selection
of zones should be made where conditions for implementation are
more favourable than in Otjiwarongo. Our work suggests that in other
circumstances better results can be achieved – both in the short and
the intermediate term – by bolstering existing extra-legal practices (for
example by (1) requesting the central government for an exemption
from the 300 square metres rule and allowing permanent structures,
and (2) micro-managing the remaining layout problems by making use
of empty plots and, where needed, offering compensation).
The second objective of our work has been to tie together two
strands of the literature on tenure security. The history of debate on
this matter shows a continued widening of the scholarly perspective.
Early thought focussed on the perceived inefficiencies of communal
land tenure and on the superior protection offered by Western-style
property law. Later contributions, in reaction to failed titling projects,
expanded the analysis to include the social and financial costs of titling,
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while some pointed also to the benefits offered by indigenous systems.
This has led a number of authors to argue that legalisation is, on bal-
ance and in the current African context, not likely to be an efficient
policy. These scholars suggest that bolstering existing (neo-)customary
arrangements is a more promising way of improving tenure security.
Others have worked to design a system of formal property rights that
has the potential to significantly reduce the costs of titling in monetary
terms. Such an instrument may therefore alter the balance in a way
that makes legalisation feasible.
We have tried to address the question of how to decide between low-
cost titling and strengthening neo-customary practices. We have argued
that in determining whether to legalise tenure, it is not enough to take
only the drawbacks of extra-legality and the costs and benefits of titling
into account. We have underscored the need to include a fourth ele-
ment in the analysis: the possibility that living in extra-legality offers
advantages. Apart from obvious restrictions, extra-legality may offer set-
tlers freedoms that are unattainable under formal tenure laws. It is cru-
cial that policymakers analyse the perspective of the settlers in this way
because their co-operation is indispensable to the success of legalisa-
tion. If there is limited capacity in the legal and regulatory system, set-
tlers may correct perceived imbalances in their new legal status by
non-compliance and continued extra-legality.
Appendix
This appendix sets out the research method that was followed in con-
ducting the case study of the tenure situation in Otjiwarongo’s extra-le-
gal settlements. Before discussing the details of our approach, however,
it is useful to point out that our data were gathered against the back-
ground of a request by the local authority to examine the prospects of
titling in the extra-legal settlements. The Flexible Land Tenure Bill not
having been passed into law yet, the request was to study the feasibility
legalisation by issuing freehold titles. Specifically, we were asked to
chart the residents’ ability to pay for legalisation at the specified
monthly amounts that related to different levels of services to be pro-
vided. The request had come to us via the intermediary of a local
authority in the Netherlands that has a twinning relationship with the
municipality of Otjiwarongo. The query presented in the present article
was not, as such, commissioned by the municipality.
The research we conducted in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC consisted of
two components. We examined (1) the relevant socio-economic indica-
tors (results were used to draft a report for the municipality), and we
made (2) a study of the tenure situation. The latter study primarily con-
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sisted of 36 in-depth interviews with residents. All 36 households inter-
viewed regarding issues of tenure were also asked about their socio-
economic situation. After completing these 36 interviews, a further 69
households were selected and interviewed regarding only socio-eco-
nomic indicators, bringing the total number of respondents on these
matters to 105. The majority of these additional interviews (60) was
conducted by local authority officials, who had previously been involved
in designing and improving this part of the research, but had not taken
part in the initial 36 interviews.
Before starting the first round of interviews, a total of 45 plots to be
visited was selected by means of a map of Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC, to
ensure that data would be retrieved at evenly distributed points. In
cases where there was nobody present at the selected plot or the resi-
dents were unable or unwilling to co-operate, an adjacent plot was
tried. Thirty-six of these interviews produced useful results. We were
assisted by two local interpreters, one who could translate into Damara
and Afrikaans, and another speaking Oshiwambo and Oshiherero. At
the suggestion of our interpreters and local officials, most interviews
were held in the late afternoon and early evening, when many of the
residents who worked would have returned home.
The interviews that we ourselves conducted were introduced by ex-
plaining our relationship to the municipality, as researchers from the
Netherlands, frequently by means of a drawing in the sand. It was ex-
plained that the first part of the interview (on socio-economic indica-
tors) would be used to advise the municipality, whereas the second part
was for our own interest. In view of the delicacy of the issues involved
with tenure security, it was emphasised that neither their name nor
their plot number would be communicated to the municipality and
that none of our work would result in anything that could be traced
back to an individual or a plot. The first part of the interview was con-
ducted using a purposefully created form, filled in by the passive inter-
viewer. The second part was open-structured, allowing respondents to
steer the conversation. Our input in these interviews had originally
been prepared by means of discussions with a number of key infor-
mants, both local authority officials and well-informed members of the
community. These interviews are not counted as part of the 36. In the
phase when the actual interviews were conducted, particularly in the
beginning, it frequently happened that later interviews produced new
insights. A number of earlier respondents were therefore revisited to
ensure that the results would remain comparable. After completion of
the interviews, forms were used to facilitate comparison and aggrega-
tion. Where feasible we sought to confirm our results by interviewing
local authority officials on the same matters, particularly those in fre-
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quent contact with the population. It was, sadly, impossible to feed the
results of our work in general back into the community.
Notes
1 PhD student at the Center for Law and Economics, University of Amsterdam. Please
address correspondence to marcolankhorst@gmail.com. This research was neither
supervised nor sponsored by the ACLE; all responsibility for views and errors is ours
exclusively.
2 Ministry of Housing and Environmental Affairs, The Hague. This research was not
sponsored by the Ministry. All responsibility for views and errors is ours exclusively.
3 In the sense of rights to land recognised, defined, and protected by the state.
4 See Merry 1988 on the distinction between factual and formal legal pluralism.
5 See Platteau 1996 for references. He groups these contributions under the heading
of the ‘Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights’.
6 Not incidentally, the factors that will be looked at are important elements in the UN-
DP’s Human Development Index.
7 See e.g. www.amicaall.org/publications/action/actionotji.pdf.
8 Possibly the settlement is of later date, as Fjeldstad et al. (2005:5) suggest that south
of the Red Cordon Fence, where Otjiwarongo lies, extra-legal settlements emerged
from 1988 onwards.
9 We gathered information regarding 588 persons, belonging to a total of 105 house-
holds (mostly by interviewing one, two, or three household members). This implies
that, at a 95 per cent confidence level, our statements regarding socio-economic con-
ditions at the household level come with a close to ten per cent error margin. There-
fore, the results we report should be taken to be indicative only. For further details
on the surveys we conducted, see the appendix.
10 A wide range of possible occupations can be thought of here, such as collecting and
selling firewood, selling kapanna or vetkoekies, exploiting a shabeen or cuka stall,
gardening, and driving a taxi.
11 Note that the term ‘property’ is used here in a broad sense to include land holding
that might legally be qualified differently than full ownership, such as for example a
lease.
12 This risks creating some confusion, however. The discussion in this section shows
that there is a specific legal regime that governs the situation in these settlements
(by way of their designation as so-called Reception Areas) and that the municipality
has broad powers to request settlers to move. This may raise the question of why we
refer to Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC as ‘extra-legal’ settlements. Our reasons for doing so
are explained in detail below.
13 Thus far, however, no resettlement in this sense appears to have taken place in Otji-
warongo. In the past decade and a half, the municipality has made a considerable
number of plots available in the area between the former township of Orwetoweni
and the extra-legal settlements (probably between 200 and 300). Our survey of this
area, in which 25 households were asked whether they themselves, or any of their
neighbours that they knew of, had lived in Tsaraxa Aibes or DRC before moving
there, suggested that the majority of residents either came from the former township
or from outside of Otjiwarongo. In all likelihood, this is explained by the fact that
most of the government and private programmes that provide loans with which the
land can be purchased and a house can be constructed require evidence of a reliable
source of income. Christensen et al. (1999:9) suggests that low-income groups
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throughout Namibia have not been able to secure a title to developed land. They
point to prices on the commercial land market (of the order of USD 12 per square
metre), which are far out of reach for the large majority of inhabitants of extra-legal
settlements. All of this underscores the importance of focusing on the cost side of le-
galisation, as the Flexible Land Tenure Bill discussed below does, if the residents of
extra-legal settlements are to benefit. In this regard, see also the text accompanying
footnote 175.
14 See Fjeldstad et al. (2005:16).
15 Both those who had previously indicated being able to make savings at least every
now and then and those who were unable to do so were asked this question, the lat-
ter under the fiction that they would have a modest amount of savings to dispose of.
16 It should be taken into consideration that the Namibian system for financing local
government provides municipalities with very few sources of income, and most face
severe problems in balancing their budget. Except for Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and
Swakopmund, a surcharge on the water distributed amongst their citizens constitutes
the primary source of potential income for municipalities. (Until recently, electricity
distribution to end users afforded municipalities another very important source of in-
come. Changes in the system have left them without a direct say in that matter, how-
ever.) It is well known, however, that mainly for political reasons, water is in many
cases distributed below cost (Fjeldstad et al. 2005:12). Not surprisingly, then, munici-
palities look at the town lands in their possession as an alternative source of potential
income.
17 Our interpreters generally employed Afrikaans terminology also when speaking one
of the native languages.
18 This too sets tenure relations in Tsaraxa Aibes and DRC apart from general concep-
tions of tenancy, as the latter arrangement normally ends when the tenant passes
away.
19 We were able to follow up on four of these accounts.
20 Considerable work exists on the regulation of customary law by statute. In this re-
gard, see e.g. LAC 2003 and LAC 1999. No detailed studies of individual customary
regimes could be found, however.
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9 Land reform in Senegal: l’Histoire se re´pe`te?1
Gerti Hesseling
Introduction
As a former French colony, Senegal inherited a French legal culture
which differs from other postcolonial legal systems in Africa, such as
those deriving from British legal culture. One of the major characteris-
tics of the Senegalese legal system is a policy of legal codes, in which
Senegal was a champion among the new African states (Le Roy
1985:254). It was the first former French colony to reform the colonial
land legislation, and in 1964 the Law on the National Domain was
adopted and was considered innovative, since it aimed at harmonising
formal law and customary land rights (Lavigne Delville 1999:8):
While retaining the principle of national property owned by the
state (all non-registered land), in rural areas, the law distin-
guishes between ‘pioneer areas’ which remain under state con-
trol and terroir areas where land management is the responsibil-
ity of the rural municipalities (decentralised administrative
bodies set up in 1972). The existence of local usage rights is re-
cognised in the latter areas, but the land may be taken over by
the state for development projects or allocated by the rural coun-
cils to whoever can ‘develop/use its productivity’. In a way, such
allocation mirrors – on a local scale and with fewer legal guaran-
tees – the registration procedure, by which land may be allocated
to individuals without taking existing rights into account
(although, in practice, the rural councils rarely make allocations
without the agreement of customary holders).
According to Toure´ and Seck (2005:12): ‘This legislation removed the
customary land rights of lineage groups and families in rural areas, sti-
pulating that “all lands not classified as public property, which are not
registered and whose ownership has not been recorded in the Mort-
gage Registry, are by right national lands.” However, occupants of pub-
lic lands who had “made continuous productive use” of the land at the
time that the law came into force, were allowed to apply for it to be re-
gistered. This productive use had to be certified by an administrative
decision, which the interested party had to apply for within six months
of the publication of the enforcement order for the law.’
With regard to the organisational set-up of the land law, there has
been a considerable delay. The rural councils were mentioned in the
1964 law but were only created from 1972 onwards with the adoption
of the Loi relative aux Communaute´s rurales. The 1964 and 1972 laws
are the twin pillars of national land law in Senegal. For a long time
they were considered highly innovative and flexible compilations of
laws and implementing decrees that provided for a legal framework for
local communities to plan and implement community-based natural
resource management activities including land management. As
Schoonmaker Freudenberger (1992:2) states: ‘The legislation is unique
in West Africa for it sets in place “co-management” arrangements that
are now so prevalent in current programs found across the Sahel.’
Hence, the Senegalese land tenure system introduced in 1964 was
highly praised for its innovative character. An important question is
how this land law regime, in place for more than four decades, worked
in practice locally. To what extent did the members of the rural coun-
cils incorporate – explicitly or implicitly – local rules and local customs
and institutions when they used their power to implement the official
regulations with regard to land administration and conflict resolution?
In the end, the question is of the extent to which the interaction be-
tween the state law and the local tenure institutions and norms has
been able to provide secure land rights for smallholders and the poor,
given the rapid developments in Senegalese society.
In this study we shall first briefly sketch the evolution of the Senega-
lese land tenure system before the reform in 1964. In the second part
we will analyse the land reform of 1964, including the institutional set-
up and its adaptations over the years. We will then look at some struc-
tural impediments of the land legislation and what these have meant
for the Senegalese family farmers. The fourth part will be devoted to
recent attempts to modernise the land law system in Senegal, and in
the conclusion we will try to evaluate the positive and negative aspects
of the current system and point out why – despite its innovative charac-
ter – it still fails to provide secure rights to land for smallholders and
the poor. The liberal regime, put in place since the election of Presi-
dent Abdoulaye Wade in 2000, seems to prioritise commercial farming
and agro-business, and consequently to focus more on property rights
at the expense of family farming. L’histoire se re´pe`te?
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The evolution of the Senegalese land tenure system up to 19642
The evolution of the Senegalese land tenure system, as nearly every-
where else in Africa, can be divided into three phases: pre-colonial
times, colonial rule, and post-independence times. Knowledge about
the first phase of pre-colonial times is largely based on oral history, and
one has to make do with research findings that are inferred from the
nature of the pre-colonial social organisation. Senegal was a plural so-
ciety divided into various fiefs that basically corresponded to the main
ethnic groups. The major attributes of property rights – absolute dispo-
sition, exclusivity, and perpetuity – were vested in the person of the
king. The African conception of land prevailed. This means that the
land had been given to mankind by the gods in order to assure the sur-
vival of the species, and served therefore as a sacred space. Over this
land, which should be preserved in its integrity and should be dedi-
cated to its use by the group, individuals held no absolute rights. The
kings generally were the sole ‘owners’ of the land, and their subjects
were no more than precarious possessors.3
During the second phase – colonial times – the French lawmaker
sought to establish a land law regime according to their conceptions.
For the French and the assimilated natives, the new regime sought to
introduce a type of tenure security comparable to that of, and deriving
from, France. The tenure policy of the colonial authorities swayed be-
tween two tendencies: ‘On the one hand it proposed to preserve the tra-
ditional system and to uphold customary rights but on the other hand
it sought to transform them according to western conceptions of prop-
erty, which would encourage investors‘ (Verdier 1971:78). The Civil
Code that was introduced by decree in French-speaking West Africa on
5 November 1830 was declared to apply to all cases that involved a
Frenchman or an assimilated native, and this naturally implied that
the colonial lawmaker decided that the French property regime would
apply to all legal and economic transactions of immovable goods if a
Frenchman or an assimilated native was involved. The system of ‘regis-
tration‘ according to the Civil Code would be applied. The outcome
was the creation of the first Senegalese land law regime, known as the
Civil Code regime. This regime, also known as the mortgage regime,
was aligned to the dispositions of the French legislation of 23 March
1855,4 which enumerated the legal acts that had to be drawn up and de-
termined the rights that could be derived from them. Because of its
complex nature, but above all because it was not adapted to the local si-
tuation, this legal regime failed. It was complex because it related the
identification of rights to the holder of the title and not to the land as
such. And it was not adapted because it totally ignored customary ten-
ure and customary land rights.
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In the face of this failure, between 1900 and 1906 the colonial law-
maker introduced a regime of registration in the Livre Foncier in a gen-
eral way, which applied to all lands. This regime established irrevocable
and incontestable property rights. In the particular case of Senegal, this
registration regime was introduced by the Decree of 20 July 1900,5 but
its dispositions were never really applied, mainly because registration
remained voluntary,6 a situation that lasted until 1906. The effective
introduction of registration in French-speaking West Africa started with
the issuing of the Decree of 24 July 1906,7 subsequently modified by
the Decree of 26 July 1932, concerning the reorganisation of the landed
property regime in French-speaking West Africa.8 Generally speaking,
the registration regime was wholly unsuccessful where customary
lands and rights were concerned, as they remained outside the newly
established regime. Verdier (1971:78) argues that the holders of cus-
tomary lands did not see the advantages of recurring to the lengthy
and costly registration procedure.
The lawmaker then developed another approach which aimed for
the consolidation of customary rights by introducing the possibility
that customary right holders could have their rights confirmed. This
was the objective of the Decree of 8 October 1925,9 which sought to
raise awareness among the African population regarding the patrimo-
nial value of their lands and thus to ease the transition to a Civil Code
property regime. This decree was as unsuccessful as its predecessors.
The main reason was that it regulated the public confirmation of hold-
ings only in function of personal rights and completely disregarded col-
lective customary rights, although such collective rights were by far the
most important rights in African social organisation. That is why, with-
out abandoning the institution of the land book, the lawmaker inter-
vened once again in 1955 and reformed the regime by making it apply
to all forms of tenure, whether individual or collective. This was regu-
lated by decrees issued on 20 May 1955 and on 10 July 1956.10 These
texts once again sought to clarify the customary land tenure regime
and to promote the transformation of traditional rights into full prop-
erty rights. The innovation was that now a distinction was made be-
tween individual customary rights that ‘involve the right of disposition
and evident and permanent possession of the land’ and other custom-
ary rights that did not involve such definitive possession. This last ef-
fort also ended in failure. However, the laws of 1906, 1955, and in par-
ticular the law of 1932 still define the legal structure of registered land-
ownership in Senegal (Golan 1990:10).
The principal reason for these failures of the colonial administration
is that they collided with the natives’ conceptions of land rights. As
they had possessed their land in an uncontested way since time imme-
morial, they could only perceive the efforts of the colonial administra-
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tion to ‘consolidate’ their rights as useless and dangerous – useless be-
cause their rights were uncontested and recognised by the customary
authorities, and dangerous because complying with the requirements
of colonial law implied an implicit recognition of the ‘colonial fact’.11
Thus, when independence came, the new states of French Equatorial
and West Africa inherited an extremely confused situation where land
rights were concerned. The newly independent states, which sought to
promote their countries’ agrarian and more general economic develop-
ment, therefore had to undertake reforms in order to achieve a more
or less uniform system of land rights. And they all tried to.
Actually, it was well before independence that the reform process in
Senegal got under way. A Committee for Economic Studies had been
formed in 195812 and was mandated to undertake ‘the daunting and
difficult task to study the problems posed by the development of the
Senegalese economy.’13 The Committee presented its report on 29 Feb-
ruary 1959. In the second volume, dedicated to the rural world, the
Committee insisted on the need to ‘re-found the land tenure regime’.14
An inter-ministerial study group for reform of the land tenure system
was created in August 1959. Its first task was to present an overview of
the state of the tenure regimes inherited from pre-colonial and colonial
times, and its second task was to advise on guidelines for a new policy.
The study group proceeded to evaluate the land titles that had been re-
gistered following the procedures laid down in the 1932 Decree, the
rights that had been confirmed and inscribed in the Land Books ac-
cording the 1955 Decree, as well as those issued according to the Civil
Code regime by the self-governing ‘four communes’.15 The conclusions
of the study group pointed to the difficulties arising from the coexis-
tence of different property regimes, caused in particular by the absence
of registered titles for so-called ‘civil code’ properties.16 It also noted
the frequency with which registered terrains were not put to productive
use (mise en valeur), in contravention of the 1932 Decree, and finally it
affirmed that a constitutional guarantee of acquired rights was needed.
A first draft of the land reform was rejected by the constitutional court
for being contrary to the constitution (it did not recognise common
property guaranteed by article 12 of the constitution). But in 1963 the
constitution was revised, and the stipulation ‘individual and common
property is guaranteed by constitution’ was replaced by ‘property rights
are guaranteed’. On 17 June 1964, the president of the republic pro-
claimed the new law, and on 11 July 1964, it was published in the Jour-
nal Officiel, known as Loi no. 64-46 relative au Domaine National.
The 1964 Land Law has to be placed in the ideological context of the
Senegalese authorities at that time, which they called Senegalese social-
ism, to be distinguished from scientific socialism, and which was
based on ‘negro-African’ values. This kind of socialism sought to es-
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cape from the political and ideological struggles between the two super-
powers by developing a political perspective through a synthesis be-
tween the positive elements of European socialism and African values.
Senegalese socialism was, above all, to be communitarian. In the words
of the then president, Le´opold Se´dar Senghor (1960:24): ‘African so-
ciety privileges the group over the individual and the community of
persons over their autonomy. It is a communitarian society’. And he
concluded that a ‘realistic African socialism must be communitarian,
not only by erecting itself upon national structures but inasmuch by
stimulating intermediary groups and bodies to adopt a spirit of full par-
ticipation in socialist society’.17
Without doubt, this wish to introduce communitarian values into de-
velopment was at the root of the organisation of the rural world into
rural communities that were to support endogenous development. This
strongly influenced the general rules regarding the distribution and ad-
ministration of lands as laid down in the 1964 Land Law. The issuing
of this law raised great expectations of development and progress. But
did this law and the related institutional changes also result in more
tenure security for the average Senegalese farmer?
The legal framework of the Senegalese land tenure regime
An overview of the land tenure regime in Senegal shows that there are
three broad categories. The first category is the state domain, which is
subdivided into a private and a public domain and regulated by Law
76-66 of 2 July 1976.18 The public and private state domains are con-
stituted by all the rights to movable and immovable goods that belong
to the state. This concerns only a relatively small part of the national
territory. The second category is the private domain, which is regulated
by the Decree of 26 July 1932 concerning the reorganisation of the
landed property regime in French West Africa.19 Landed property is
guaranteed through the registration and publication of all real rights to
a tract of land in the Livre Foncier (Land Book). In practice, only a small
percentage of land (about two per cent) was officially registered, and re-
gistration mainly occurred in the urban centres, and even there only in
a partial way. The third category is the national domain, which is regu-
lated by the National Domain Law of 1964, which is, in fact, a very
short document containing only seventeen articles. The last article
states that the conditions of implementation have to be drawn up in se-
parate decrees.20 According to article 1 of this law, the national domain
consists of ‘all the lands that do not pertain to the public domain, lands
that are not registered or of which the property has not been inscribed
in the register of mortgages at the date at which the present law takes
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effect. The national domain thus contains all non-registered lands. Also
are excluded all the lands that, at this date, are in the process of being
registered in the name of a person other than the state’.
At the time the law was adopted, three per cent of the territory was
controlled exclusively by the state (state domain), a negligible but very
important area as it borders commercially coveted lands along the sea
fronts, rivers and lakes (Schoonmaker Freudenberger 1992:4). About
two per cent consisted of private land owned by individuals (titles regis-
tered prior to 1964 or in the delay granted by the law). Consequently,
the national domain covered over 95 per cent of the national territory.
The majority of the farmers derived their land rights from the national
domain regime. For that reason we will mainly focus on the national
domain regime.
The national domain lands do not constitute a homogeneous whole
because article 4 of National Domain Law divides them into four cate-
gories according to their vocation: urban zones, classified zones, zones
de terroirs and pioneer zones. Classified zones are forest areas and pro-
tected areas such as national parks. The pioneer zones actually were
not clearly identified and constitute a rather negatively defined residual
category comprising the lands that do not fall into the other categories.
This was done intentionally. The underlying idea was to create tempor-
ary land reserves that then could be re-classified and included into the
categories of village lands or urban zones. This zoning exercise re-
flected a preoccupation with the rationalisation and orderly exploitation
of the national space. The reform mainly organised the zones de terroirs
or rural zones, the most important area spatially and economically (in-
cluding at that time 58 per cent of the national territory). It concerns
lands which are regularly used for family farming, pastoral activities or
rural housing.
The legal framework with regard to the national domain is guided
by the following principles:
– farmers have free access to the land21
– they have no private ownership, only non-transferable use rights
– the management of the land is in the hands of elected local coun-
cils under the tutorship of the administration (the pre´fet or the sous-
pre´fet)
– the conditions for allocation or withdrawal of land by the councils
are (1) the productive use of the land, and (2) beneficiaries have to
be resident in the rural community22
– rural councils have the right to settle land conflicts, but if they fail
to resolve the conflict, it goes to the formal court system.
These principles will be elaborated below. The national domain is an
original legal construct intended to displace the problem of landowner-
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ship toward one of simple possession. National domain lands are not
the object of individual property but only of use rights. Indeed, the
user of the land, even though unable to claim exclusive rights to the
land, and even if his situation is defined by law or results from an ad-
ministrative decision, can be assured of a certain stability on the condi-
tion that he puts the parcel he is assigned to into productive use (mise
en valeur). Apart from the case of public utility, the land cannot be re-al-
located unless the absence of productive use can be established. The le-
gal regime of the national domain thus features the inalienability and
non-transmissibility of the lands it comprises, among other characteris-
tics, as well as their use free of charge. According to judicial decisions,
the death of the person who was allocated the land entails the rightful
extinction of his use rights.23 The fact that these lands are allocated
free of charge means that conditions of access gain relative importance.
In practice, this rule of non-transmission is often breached. In case of
death, the Rural Council rarely meets to re-allocate the land consider-
ing the capacity of the inheritors to exploit it. If it intervenes, it is sim-
ply to regularise the procedure. That further reinforces the feelings of
ownership. But the practices of inheritance also demonstrate the resili-
ence of local customs. Rural councils sometimes continue to build on
customary practices and feel legitimised in doing so by the law.
The rules for allocation and re-allocation of national domain land
have always been subject to two general principles. In the first place,
the idea that underlies legislation regarding the national domain is that
land should be made available to the members of the rural commu-
nities. According to article 8 of the National Domain Law, ‘lands in the
village land zone will be allocated to those members of the rural com-
munities who can assure their productive use and will exploit them un-
der supervision of the state and according to the law and regulations….’
There was no intention to dispossess effective occupants and users to
the benefit of the state but rather to deny any rights to those who do
not personally till the land and to abolish the payment of land rent. By
turning residence in the village into the criterion for land allocation,
the authorities did not seek simply to ensure that farmers with land
rights belong to a community but rather to maintain the peasant popu-
lation in the countryside. The second principle has to do with the de-
velopment objectives pursued by the law. In Senegal land has a funda-
mental economic value, and in order to achieve optimal productivity
and profitability, land is only allocated to an individual on the condition
of productive use (mise en valeur). Productive use is the key condition
for access to land and for continued occupation.
According to the 1964 law the rural zones should be administered
under the authority of the state by new councils, named conseils ruraux.
The creation of these councils suffered quite some delay. They were
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only created from 1972 onwards with the adoption of the Loi relative
aux communaute´s rurales.24 This law sets up the institutional structure
of the rural communities and defines the attributes of the members of
the rural councils. A rural community consists of a certain number of
villages with common interests and is capable of finding resources ne-
cessary for their development. The number of villages may vary from
eight to more than 50, and the survey area also varies from about 50 to
more than 300 km. Rural councils are structures democratically elected
to five-year terms. Depending on the population, a council has from
eighteen to 32 members. The members of the council elect one mem-
ber as their president. From 1972 onwards, there was a phased intro-
duction of the rural councils in the different regions (the last ‘first’
elections of rural councils were held only in 1985). At present, Senegal
has 530 rural communities.25
The rural councils have sizable powers with regard to land tenure
within their community. It is the council that allocates use rights to a
farmer on the condition that the plot is exploited by himself with the
help of his family in an economically productive fashion (mise en va-
leur). But the council also has the power to withdraw land: if the farm-
er ceases to use the plot himself, if the productive use of the plot is
considered insufficient, or for reasons of general interest. It is the
council which determines what is meant by ‘productive use’, since no-
where in the law is the concept of mise en valeur defined explicitly. Fi-
nally, the rural council has the right to resolve land disputes. The exer-
cise of all these powers is subject to the authorisation of administrative
authorities. This is called the system of tutelle (administrative over-
sight), inherited from the French. This means that the sous-pre´fet or pre´-
fet may in fact veto any of the council’s decisions. In practice, however,
sous-pre´fets and pre´fets rarely use these powers, so in the majority of
cases the rural councils are left free to make decisions and have no fear
of correction by higher officials.26
In 1996 a new administrative reform was adopted, which has to be
seen in the context of the general trend in Africa towards decentralisa-
tion. The Code des Collectivite´s Locales modified the election and the
powers of the rural councils.27 According to the 1972 law one-third of
the councillors was appointed, but since 1996 all members of the rural
councils have been elected. At the same time one of the most impor-
tant powers of the rural councils, the management of village land, was
considerably reduced. Indeed, if land that previously belonged to the
pioneer zone is reverted to the village land zone (zone de terroir), the
state will continue to manage those areas that have been the object of
special interventions. Thus, certain areas in the village land zone will
be directly managed by the state. The reform also allows the state to
hand over land that municipalities need to expand, and then proceed
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directly with developments destined for urban housing (Faye 2008:9).
On the other hand, the communaute´s rurales have been officially recog-
nised by the constitution, which specifies in article 90 the three levels
of local government in the republic: the region, the commune, and the
rural community.
The legal framework of land reform (1964) and administrative re-
forms (1972 and 1996) could be considered the twin pillars of the land
reform initiated in 1964. To some extent they introduced a new design
for tenure security. Instead of a gerontocratic structure, the legislation
introduced a democratic structure with elected councils. These councils
have the power to apply the principles of the National Domain to a cer-
tain degree, while taking into account local conditions and local prac-
tices. In theory, the members of the council may be sanctioned in case
of mismanagement, in the sense that voters have the possibility to not
re-elect them at the end of their five-year mandate. Although farmers
have no property rights, they have free use rights, and they are allowed
to continue the cultivation of their plots as long as they cultivate them
themselves or with the help of their family, and fulfil the condition of
mise en valeur. Their use rights are limited, however, by the fact that
they are neither transferable nor automatically transferred to their
heirs. Indeed, rights are allocated on a strictly personal basis. In case
of the death of a farmer, his heirs have to expressly request that the
use rights of the deceased be transferred to them.
In the following section we will confront the official rules pertaining
to the national domain as laid down in the land and administrative re-
forms with the reality on the ground: to what extent did the rural coun-
cils succeed in developing a new design for tenure security? How did
they use their legal power to develop tailored local rules in order to find
a balance between local, traditional, community-based tenure regimes
into the modern statutory land law? Or did councillors, as well politi-
cians and bureaucrats, abuse the room for manoeuvring for their own
benefit and ultimately diminish the security of land rights for small-
holders and the poor?
Structural weaknesses in the law
Although there have been numerous changes in the administrative
sphere, the legal tenure system introduced in 1964 has remained lar-
gely unchanged. More than 40 years later, we have to conclude that the
rural councils are still struggling with the implementation of the Na-
tional Domain Law and that the interpretation of the law by the rural
councils shows notable variations depending on the local circum-
stances. Particular regional and local differences have to be taken into
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account when assessing the implementation of the tenure legislation.
The tenure situation along the Senegalese river valley is for instance
quite different from that of the peanut production region or the Casa-
mance. In addition, over the years, the political, economic, and social
contexts in Senegal have been subjected to considerable changes. Con-
sequently, within this multitude of practices, we make no claim to be
exhaustive.
Nevertheless, and in spite of all the words of praise with regard to
the innovative character of land reform, the literature on the land ten-
ure situation in Senegal notes serious shortcomings. The most serious
flaw in the legal framework is the failure to clarify exactly what was
meant by productive use as well as by public utility and general inter-
est. In addition, the rural councils were from the beginning ill-
equipped to execute their duties properly. Finally, the composition of
the rural councils has amply served to handicap an unbiased imple-
mentation of the law, including in the case of conflict resolution. We
will illustrate these problems with some examples.
Right from the beginning, criticism was directed at the absence of a
clear definition of what exactly constitutes productive use (mise en va-
leur), one of the central notions in the national domain law. The con-
cept is fluid. Despite the importance of the notion of productive use,
the law only enunciates this principle without specifying its content in
legal terms. Article 10 of Decree no. 72-1288 empowers the prefect to
fix the minimal conditions for productive use as well as the surface of
parcels considered to be profitable. Such conditions have never been
specified. Consequently, local communities developed a large variety of
local rules with regard to what should be considered productive use of
the land. This makes it understandable that the few interventions of
the judiciary are mostly related to the question of productive use. In its
verdict on the case El Hadji Massamba Sall, the Supreme Court argued
that in the absence of a statutory definition, a rural council cannot mo-
tivate its decision of re-allocation with a simple reference to insufficient
use ‘without specifying in what way this reproach applies to the pre-
sent user’ (Supreme Court of Senegal, 25 March 1981. RIPAS
1982:424 ff). In theory, the absence of a definition may be deliberate,
since the national domain law was conceived to be a general tenure
system, leaving it to the rural councils to work out the practical details
at the local level. But research shows that in general rural councils do
little to verify the ability of applicants to make productive use of their
land (Toure´ and Seck 2005). The criterion has hardly been useful in
developing land tenure rules rooted in local customs and traditions
and has often resulted in ad hoc and unpredictable decisions.
Up till now, in villages without pressure on cultivable land, village el-
ders maintain that they have no knowledge of the land reform and the
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conditions for allocation or withdrawal of land. In 2008 in the rural
community of Sadio – where as a consequence of the exode rural much
land remains uncultivated – a village chief said to our researcher Fati-
mata Diallo: ‘Mon pe`re a cre´e´ ce village. Il y a construit le puit, les au-
tres nous ont rejoint, donc les terres nous ont toujours appartenu et
nous appartiennent encore. Nous ce´dons les terres a` qui veut s’instal-
ler’ (Diallo 2008). For the last six years no case of withdrawal of land
for unproductive use has been noted in the rural community of Sadio.
For most farmers in this community, the condition of productive use is
not yet considered as an immediate threat, and they still feel their land
rights protected.
In other cases the failure to define the concept of mise en valeur re-
sulted in an abuse of the intent of the law. As Schoonmaker Freuden-
berger (1990:9-10) noted in a report for the World Bank:
Powerful Mouride brotherhood has considered mise en valeur the
act of clearing vast acreages and putting the land into peanut
production. This has created serious conflicts between Mouride
farmers and pastoralists. The history of disputes between pastor-
alists and Wolof cultivators is one dominated by the expansion
of peanut cultivation into the territory long used by Fulbe pastor-
alists. Peanut cultivation has been viewed by the state as a more
profitable form of land use than that of pastoralism and forest
protection. (…) This position holds sway due to the considerable
power of the Mouride sect.
Indeed, pastoralism is not considered ‘making good use of land’, and
the power of marabouts to control large tracts of land in undeniable
(Golan 1990:16). A striking and disingenuous example of the power of
Islamic leaders, going back to 1991, is the destruction of 45,000 hec-
tare of gazetted forest of Mbegue´ and the allocation of this area to the
khalif of the Mouride brotherhood for the cultivation of peanuts. As a
consequence, 6,000 herdsmen and 100,000 animals lost the pasture-
land and watering places they had used for centuries.28 More recently,
in 2007, 9,000 hectares belonging to the gazetted forests of Pout and
Thie`s have been allocated to marabouts from the Mouride and Tidjani
sects by the national government without consulting the rural councils
concerned.29
Another example of problems arising from the absence of a clear de-
finition of productive use comes from the Senegal River Valley, a zone
of high economic potential. Up to the early 1970s, state-financed irriga-
tion of the Senegal River Valley was concentrated almost exclusively in
the Delta area and on large-scale schemes for the cultivation of export
crops, especially sugar cane and rice. With the introduction of the land
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reform, a large part of the valley was considered a zone pionnier mana-
ged by the parastatal SAED (Socie´te´ d’Ame´nagement et Exploitation des
Terres du Delta). The large-scale schemes were a complete failure. After
the severe droughts in the 1970s, the SAED set up village-level irriga-
tion perimeters (Pe´rime`tres irrigue´s villageois, PIVs). The drought also
prompted the construction of two dams: the antisaline intrusion Diama
dam near the mouth of the Senegal River (completed in 1985) and the
Manantali dam in the southwestern region of Mali (completed in
1988). One of the objectives of the dams was to enable irrigation year-
round (double cropping) of rice fields on both sides of the river. In
1986 reforms in agriculture policy resulted in the disengagement of
the SAED from land allocation and the transfer of control over large
amounts of land to the rural communities. A decree converted substan-
tial parts of the zone pionnier in the region to zone de terroir and hence
under the control of the rural councils.30 In the course of the 1980s,
the farmers on the village irrigation perimeters (PIVs) organised them-
selves in Groupements d’Inte´reˆt Economiques (economic interest groups),
which had access to credit for investments in the schemes. Those
groups collectively received land allocated by the rural councils. This
means that individual farmers only have rights derived from a GIE. In
the event of a poor harvest and inability to re-pay debts, their use rights
may be suspended by the GEI and given to someone else. The tenure
status of plot holders within an irrigation scheme is thus ambiguous
from a legal point of view. They have to maintain good relations within
the group and especially with the GIE leaders. Farmers with a high so-
cial status are sometimes able to keep their plots for years, while others
have to change plots frequently (Cotula and Toulmin 2004:50; Lavigne
Delville et al. 2002:38, 79). Obviously, the criterion of productive use is
no longer applied by the rural councils but interpreted by the GIEs as
the ability to re-pay debts. The rural councils sometimes played a du-
bious role, as is shown by the following quotation (Be´lie`res et al.
2002:12):
From 1988 onwards, ‘big farmers’ and people of importance in
the rural world wanting to increase their land holdings, together
with newcomers and city-based investors seeking to engage in
what was thought to be a ‘profitable’ activity of rice-growing,
took part in a major land grab. Rural councils (conseils ruraux)
did nothing to prevent this phenomenon and granted large areas
of land to the applicants, in some cases over and above what
was really available.
The insecurity resulting from the ambiguous concept of productive use
drove possessors of land in the rural areas (traditional landholders, bor-
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rowers of land, beneficiaries of re-allocation, as well as illegal buyers)
to demonstrate that their plots are fully exploited, even though some of
the techniques used were ecological harmful.
A second problem is the definitional ambiguity of the notions of
‘public utility’ and ‘general interest’. In the case of public utility, the
state can take land for projects defined as such, and in the case of gen-
eral interest, the rural council has the competence to re-allocate plots if
required by the general interest of the community. According to the
law allocated lands that are part of the national domain but that are re-
quired for operations declared for public utility will be registered in the
name of the state.31 About this notion all we find is an enumeration of
cases in which public utility may be evoked, such as public health, in-
terior security, zoning plans and urbanisation projects, and the develop-
ment of management schemes.32 This absence of definition and clear
framing of the notion of public utility may be problematic, because we
have to do with an instrument allowing for rapid and low-cost state in-
tervention, and the state may be tempted to broaden its interpretation
of the notion. It thus introduces an element of insecurity into local
communities. Rural populations are rightly fearful that the state will
expropriate traditionally held lands for the public interest. An early and
striking example occurring in 1976 is the case of the villagers of Thia-
go contesting in vain the confiscation of their plots in the national do-
main by the local powerful sugar refinery with the approval of the state
authorities (Niang 2004:22). Villagers can appeal the taking of land for
projets d’inte´reˆt general. However, the transaction costs are very high.
First, the plaintiff must contest the decision by appealing to the various
administrative authorities ranging from the sous-pre´fet to the governor.
Failing these appeals, the case must be taken by the plaintiff directly to
the Supreme Court. The transaction costs for the individual citizen ap-
pealing the taking of lands is naturally very high (see also Schoon-
maker Freudenberger 1990:10).
Re-allocation by the rural council in the name of general interest is
foreseen in the national domain law and was later specified in a de-
cree.33 Article 11 of this decree states that general interest means that
‘the land is dedicated to a different use, particularly the passage of cat-
tle or hydraulic works’. Those affected by re-allocation of their lands
will receive an equivalent plot of land in compensation, but the law is
silent about any compensation for improvements on the land, though
that might be an indication of productive use. An aggrieved farmer has
to appeal to the governor and in the second instance to the constitu-
tional court (art. 15 Law 64-46 and art. 18 Decree 573; see also Niang
2004:14). For poor illiterate farmers without a profound knowledge of
the law, this constitutes a quite impassable obstacle.
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A recent example of expropriation by the state is the decision to lib-
erate eleven plots in the rural community of Ye`ne with the purpose of
building a technical development centre, popularly called le stade de
FIFA, since it concerns a project in collaboration with the Senegalese
federation of football. The area of nearly nine hectares has been demar-
cated without previously consulting the rural council. It was only after
the demarcation of the area that the president of the rural council was
involved. Subsequently, the president organised a meeting with the vil-
lagers concerned and transmitted the council’s agreement in principle
to execute the project. The president of the rural council insisted that
the question of compensation for the villagers concerned had to be
settled before the start of execution. This happened in 2005 and 2006.
However, interviews in the summer of 2008 with the villagers con-
cerned revealed that although they never agreed to the withdrawal of
their plots, the construction of the centre was finished, but they had
not yet received any compensation, despite firm promises from the
state. The compensation was estimated at fourteen million FCFA (Dia-
llo 2008). According to Faye (2008:9) this action by the state seems to
be in line with the 1996 administrative reform, which states that
powers of national lands can be transferred to the state when it insti-
gates a project on national land. The state can do so after simply con-
sulting the regional council and the rural community or communities
concerned and after informing them of the decision.
A third flaw in the legal framework is the absence of any form of re-
gistration or rural cadastre. According to the 1972 law, land allocations,
transfers of land from one farmer to another, and the dispossession of
land must be approved by a quorum of the rural council. These sur-
veyed and demarcated transfers are to be written down in a land regis-
ter, a livret foncier. These provisions were never implemented. The allo-
cation of land and other decisions in the field of land tenure arrange-
ments adopted by rural councils are in general only mentioned in the
minutes of the rural councils. Although rural councillors sometimes
mention such a public register, concrete examples of accessible, local
livrets fonciers are not known. It would therefore not be surprising if
they actually don’t exist. Blundo (1996) argues with good reason that
this seems quite consistent with the clientelist, factionalist way land is
managed by elected members of the rural councils.34 However, rural
councils occasionally do deliver certificates of land allocation, especially
in areas where land has monetary value, as is the case in the river val-
ley. The importance of such a certificate is illustrated by Cotula and
Toulmin (2004:49) describing the following land dispute in the village
of Moude´ry: ‘A piece of land had been lent out by the head of the Sylla
family to the Sow family for ten years. In 2003 the Sylla family re-
claimed its land. The Sow family refused to surrender the land and
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brought the matter to court, arguing that the land belonged to the do-
maine national and that therefore the rights of users (mise en valeur)
should be protected. The court, however, ordered that the land be sur-
rendered to the Sylla family, as they could produce a certificate of land
allocation by the rural council, while the Sow family did not possess
any documentation.’ Over time, the writing down of land transactions
has become an expanding practice in rural areas. But the fact that ten-
ure decisions taken by the rural councils are not systematically docu-
mented in a livret foncier as required by law has seriously hampered the
development of new local tenure rules adapted to local customs and in
line with the national land regime, which was the main objective of the
National Domain Law in 1964.
Apart from these legal and conceptual problems, the rural councils
are also confronted with other obstacles to implementing the land law
legislation properly. When the rural councils were progressively intro-
duced in the different regions of Senegal, the newly elected councillors
– who were mostly illiterate – only received cursory training in the in-
tricacies of the legislative corpus, the procedures to be followed, and
their competences. And although this has improved slightly over the
course of time, the level of educational qualifications and skill of the
councillors is still quite low. In some cases nowadays, more and more
educated people are elected to rural councils. The rural councils of Sa-
dio and Ye`ne, for example, have a former secondary school teacher (Sa-
dio) and a geographer working at the University of Dakar (Ye`ne) as pre-
sident.
Another impediment to proper functioning is financial in nature. In
theory, as a decentralised organism, rural councils enjoy budgetary
autonomy, but the required resources have not been transferred by the
state. The financial resources at the disposition of the rural councils are
generally very small. They have no capacity to create, eliminate, or mod-
ify local taxes. Anyway, in areas where a land market is absent, it is dif-
ficult to asses the value of land and, hence, the level at which land-
based taxes might be imposed. But as Toulmin & Quan (2000b:239)
rightly state: local councillors are also ‘caught in a bind, being reluctant
to press their electors for tax payments, while equally wanting resources
to build social infrastructures and carry out development projects’. This
budgetary anaemia has impeded the implementation of the law with
the direct consequence that the procedures foreseen are widely disre-
garded.
Probably the most serious problem is the highly politicised character
of the rural councils. From the start, the composition of the councils
reflected the national political situation. Councillors were predomi-
nantly members of the party in power under the presidents Senghor
and Diouf, the Parti Socialiste. Consequently, members of the opposi-
258 GERTI HESSELING
tion parties run the risk of unfair treatment when applying for land al-
location or when land disputes are brought to the council. From 2000
onwards, when Abdoulaye Diouf from the major opposition party, the
Parti De´mocratique Se´ne´galais (PDS), was elected president, the situa-
tion has been just the opposite: most councillors are now supporters of
the PDS. The political and social constellation in rural communities
has resulted in frequent practices of political patronage. Control over
land and its allocation empowers and legitimates local authorities by
providing them with control over a very important asset for allocation.
The temptation of using land allocation as a means of rewarding
friends and allies is therefore real (Blundo 1996; Toulmin and Quan
2000b:104, 240). Although the National Domain Law was meant to
mark an important step forward in promoting democracy in the rural
areas, and rural councils are indeed elected according to modern demo-
cratic standards, they do not always function democratically in everyday
practice. Rural populations often have a reason to show mistrust in
state institutions, including rural councils.
Although democratically elected, the composition of the rural coun-
cils is not a sample selection of the population. This is particularly true
with regard to the representation of women: at present only 10.9 per
cent of the councillors are women. In 2007, hundreds of women from
all political parties and civil society took the initiative to encourage an
equal number of men and women on the electoral rolls by proposing
the gender equality law. The proposition was denounced by the power-
ful Islamic leaders, who claimed that ‘gender parity is not yet possible
in Senegal‘. The gender equality law was ultimately annulled by the
constitutional council. The ongoing under-representation of women in
the rural councils is one of the reasons why the tenure security of wo-
men improves only very slowly. And yet, the law on the national do-
main was based on equal participation by all members of society in de-
velopment programmes and an equitable distribution of generated
income. This objective was repeated in 1972, when the rural commu-
nities that were to implement these reforms were established. How-
ever, the objectives of equality and equity are not specified with regard
to women’s land rights, and this neutrality does not mainstream gen-
der, which is demonstrated by many empirical studies (Muthoni Wa-
nyeki 2003). As is the case in most African countries, women’s access
to land has traditionally depended on their husband’s family. Very of-
ten local traditions continue to apply, thereby preventing women from
inheriting or owning land. Religion and ethnicity strongly influence
women’s land rights. For instance, under Serer and Diola customary
law, women do own land, whereas in Wolof tradition a woman,
whether married, divorced or widowed, cannot own land. According to
Islam, women have the right to inherit land but always on the princi-
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ple of fewer shares for women than for men. There is, however, a wide-
spread belief that women cannot inherit land under Islamic law.35 In
practice, individual applications for land by women have little chance
of being satisfied by rural councils. Rural councils continue to apply
the unequal and inequitable principles of local customs and (perceived)
Islamic law, a missed opportunity to create new and more modern lo-
cal land rules embedded in statutory law. The way out for women is to
create a women’s association or a GIE and to apply for collective use
rights. Such attempts have been increasingly successful (Hesseling and
Ba 1994; Monimart 1993; Schoonmaker Freudenberger 1992:60; Von
Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997).
Finally, the rural councils have been granted the power to resolve
land conflicts. A wide variety of land-related conflicts have always ex-
isted in rural Senegal. Disputes occur between ‘primary’ and ‘second-
ary’ right holders (such as borrowers or sharecroppers), between her-
ders and farmers, between residents and non-residents, inter-genera-
tional conflicts, about the boundaries between villages, and so on.
Since the adoption of the Loi relative aux communaute´s rurales in 1972,
the rural council is officially the most important local institution to set-
tle land disputes. According to the law, the council-at-large may handle
a conflict, but the president of the council may also delegate a commis-
sion of council members.
Especially in the beginning, councillors were ill-equipped for and
knew very little about conflict management. The largely illiterate coun-
cil members lacked the knowledge and ability to properly apply the
subtleties of the land and administrative reforms. Consequently, villa-
gers continue to bring their disputes before local, traditional authori-
ties, such as the village chiefs, councils of elders and imams, but they
also turn to the administration (sous-pre´fets and pre´fets). Due to lengthy
and costly procedures, dispute resolution by the formal court system
remains the exception. What emerges from the plurality of authorities
involved in conflict resolution is an amalgamation of local and legal
land norms, administrative pragmatism, and often illegal or extra-legal
practices (Schoonmaker Freudenberger 1992:57-58). For poor illiterate
farmers it is not always easy to find their way in all these competing
and sometimes overlapping institutions. In general, and especially in
areas without land scarcity, tenure conflicts have been more or less suc-
cessfully settled, though mainly by village chiefs, councils of elders, im-
ams and the like. Apparently, this works out quite well in small com-
munities where everybody knows each other. At the same time, local
social inequalities will persist. The way the administration (sous-pre´fet,
pre´fets, and gendarmerie) resolves rural disputes is to our knowledge not
documented, but farmers try to avoid bringing their conflicts to these
officials. Rural councils certainly also play their role in local conflict re-
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solution practices, although not as the most important institution for
farmers. They have been able to resolve disputes and arrive at some
type of negotiated arrangements without too much bureaucracy, as
long as local tensions about land do not lead to violent confrontations.
As said before, the absence of recorded decisions is a serious impedi-
ment to evaluating the extent to which they have been able to create
new sets of local rules regarding access to and re-distribution of land.
Under the current situation with increasing land pressure and a chan-
ging composition of the rural councils (more politicised and more edu-
cated members having better relationships with the rich and powerful),
their role becomes more contested.
In sum, the weaknesses in the land reform enhanced the inability
and sometimes unwillingness of the rural councils to develop tailored
and transparent local rules. Their policy is indeed often unpredictable
and subject to (political) machinations. In these cases, the fact that the
possibilities for the rural councils to execute their duties properly are
not optimal is pleaded as a poor excuse by the councillors for their fail-
ure to find a balance between local, traditional-based tenure regimes
and the legal tenure system.
Evolving land tenure arrangements
In areas where rural land does not yet have great market value and
where unexploited land is still available, the great majority of farmers
inherited their plots, and ‘traditional’ tenure systems continue to func-
tion largely as in the past. Indeed, although according to the land re-
form heirs have to address an application to the rural council for the
transfer of the deceased’s use rights, this rarely happens. In general,
they take over these rights with the silent consent of the rural council.
But as population pressure on land increases, technologies change,
and agriculture becomes more commercialised, local land arrange-
ments are evolving elsewhere at high speed. This is particularly the
case with land sales and loans and pawns of land.
Throughout most of rural Senegal, but particularly among the Serer
and the Diola, the tradition of loans of land is still alive, and these
loans are frequently contracted for an indeterminate period of time ex-
tending beyond several generations. Since the National Domain Law
only contains very broad principles and does not specify a legal term
after which a plot cultivated by the same user can be claimed by that
farmer, this term has been generally interpreted as farming for at least
two consecutive years, which actually bans such long-term loans. And
indeed, in practice loans became a ‘two-year usufruct‘ right (Galvan
2004:134 and note 10 on page 255). Lavigne Delville et al. (2002:51) re-
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fer to short-term loans in the important groundnut production region
of Senegal among the Serer:
(L)and is managed by farm households, lineage chiefs retaining
the power to reallocate plots in the event of demographic imbal-
ance, for instance when a migrant returns. The effect of land
loans is to reduce disparities at farm level between available land
and the farm labour force, but the extent of these loans varies
from village to village and year to year. All categories of farmers,
including compound heads, resort to borrowing. There is no
rental or payment of other than symbolic fees whereas, in other
Sereer areas such as Mbayar, rentals emerged in the 1930s. The
duration of the loan, formerly two to three years (corresponding
to a crop cycle), is now almost always one year, in order to pre-
vent the beneficiary of the loan from using modern legislation
as a pretext to refuse to return the plot. Ties between lenders
and borrowers vary (kinship, arrangements between neighbours,
friendship, belonging to the same religious brotherhood, etc.)
(See also Guigou, Pontie´, and Lericollais 1998).
Galvan (2004) investigated in depth the practice of land pawning
among the Serer before and after the introduction of the land reform.
He gives an example of a long-term oral pawn contract. On the day of
the funeral of his grandfather, Djignah Diouf paid the pawn amount to
the grandson of the tiller of the field, Niokhor Se`ne, and claimed back
his field. Diouf and his family approached the ‘customary authorities‘
who agreed that the family had the right to take back the field since he
had paid back the pawn amount. Se`ne went to the rural council, ‘which
ruled without much hesitation in his favour’. Ultimately, however, Se`ne
voluntarily renounced the rural council’s decision and gave back the
field to Diouf arguing that he did not want to disrupt the relationship
between the two families (Galvan 2004:164-165).36
In the southern region Casamance, among the Diola, borrowing and
pawning land has always been a frequent system to level out inequality
in land ownership. In the 1970s, in some villages about a quarter of
the rice fields were borrowed land (Sypkens Smit 1976). This system
has sometimes resulted in violent conflicts, but in general, thanks to
its flexibility, Diola families always disposed of enough land to make a
living. The flexibility of the system was greatly reduced after the adop-
tion of the land reform and the introduction of rural councils in the
Casamance (Hesseling 1983; Van der Klei 1979, 1989:130-131). The per-
ceived invasion of ‘Northerners’ – as the Diola of the Casamance call
the inhabitants living north of the river Gambia – is considered one of
the main reasons for the outbreak of a separation war, which started in
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the 1980s and ended officially in 2004. After the severe droughts in
the 1970s and 1980s in the northern part of the country, many Wolof
and Toucouleur migrated to the Casamance and obtained large tracts
of land for agriculture and horticulture. For example, in less than two
years, 1980 and 1981, about 2,000 parcels of land in the neighbour-
hood of Ziguinchor were re-allocated exclusively to ‘foreigners’. The ru-
ral councils, which were elected in the Casamance for the first time in
1979, were accused of arriving at their decisions based on party politics
so that claims that had appeared justified in the eyes of the local popu-
lation were not honoured (De Jong 2005).
Where loans of land were once common, they are now becoming in-
creasingly rare or are limited to one or two years. In the latter case, the
once oral contracts are often replaced by written contracts. Anyway,
people only lend land to someone they trust, such as friends and rela-
tives (Cotula and Toulmin 2004; Crousse, Mathieu, and Seck 1991;
Schoonmaker Freudenberger 1992; Toure´ and Seck 2005). In the case
of conflicts occurring over loans of land, the rural council generally
grants the borrowed plot, if cultivated for more than two years, to the
borrower. If the land owner appeals to ‘traditional’ authorities, their de-
cision is quite often overruled. If the rural council accepts this, which
happens for all kinds of social-cultural and political reasons, it is know-
ingly acting in contravention of the spirit of the National Domain Law.
Although the law expressly forbids the selling of land in the national
domain, an active land market occurs in areas where new dynamics of
land tenure are triggered by the process of urbanisation.37 This is for
instance the case in the Niayes region. The coastal Niayes is a unique
ecological zone stretching from Dakar to Saint-Louis with rich soils
particularly favourable for horticulture. The area is characterised by
high population density as the result of natural growth and increased
migration flows. Especially near Dakar, purchasing land has long been
a common phenomenon. Buyers purchase land directly from village
chiefs and the traditional ‘owners’ of the land. Many of them are so-
called ‘Sunday farmers‘: civil servants and merchants living in the capi-
tal and producing mangos and citrus fruit as a supplementary income.
Since such transactions are illegal, it is hard to evaluate the actual
number of sales. In areas such as the Niayes, numerous conflicts have
arisen as local people oppose the intrusion of ‘outsiders’.
The rural community of Ye`ne provides another example of selling
land to outsiders. Ye`ne is a gathering of nine villages located on the
Atlantic Ocean coast at a distance of about 50 kilometres from the capi-
tal Dakar. Part of the rural community belongs to the national domain
and another part to public domain (domaine public maritime). Because
of the proximity of Dakar and its location by the sea, Ye`ne is becoming
very touristy as well as becoming a residential zone. Village heads, local
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notables, and also councillors are selling plots to rich town-dwellers for
high prices.38 Knowing that sales are illegal, they insist that they are
just selling the expenses made by them on the plot. The beneficiary re-
ceives a acte de cession often signed by the president of the rural council
(who declared by the way that he feels obliged to do so since the own-
ers are influential local notables and the buyers are often important po-
liticians or famous people, but above all very rich). This document is
said to provide a droit d’occupation. In an interview with the son of one
of the village chiefs who sold all the family plots, he said:
Partout ici il y a des proble`mes avec le domaine national, mais
l’Etat n’intervient pas. Les habitants sont prote´ge´s des ventes
sauf si un ministre ou un commerc¸ant veut ton terrain et que tu
es pauvre. En ce cas tu veux bien vendre ton terrain. C’est ce
que notre pe`re a fait. Tous ses fils se sont alors re´unis parce
qu’ils conside`rent que ces terrains font partie de la proprie´te´ de
la famille. Mais tant que le vieux est la`, nous ne pouvons rien
faire. Donc il vend tout ce qu’il peut vendre. Nous ne savons
meˆme pas ce qu’il a fait avec tout cet argent. Mais apre`s sa mort
on va protester.39
Ye`ne is one of the numerous areas in modern Senegal where the value
of land is increasing rapidly, giving rise to illegal land transactions with
the silent or open complicity of rural councillors. Sellers and buyers
both have to face insecurity. However, it sometimes happens that rural
councils and farmer organisations try to get involved in land use nego-
tiations when urban expansion on farmland occurs. A telling experi-
ence in the 1990s took place in the rural community of Fande`ne on
the outskirts of Thie`s, a rapidly growing town only 70 km from Da-
kar.40 Together with the rural council and organisations in which rural
and urban representatives were represented, and with the legal support
from an NGO, a number of strategies have been designed to achieve
greater security of land tenure for the inhabitants of the rural commu-
nity. First of all, general data were collected about the history of land
use development in the community as well as the land tenure status of
the inhabitants. Subsequently, it was recommended that farmers may
apply to the municipal authorities of Thie`s to parcel out rural plots on
the outskirts of the town, either as a collective or as an individual and
to enter into a process of registration. A second option was to negotiate
cultivation contracts within the gazetted forest with the Water and For-
estry Service. This interesting experience was made possible by the in-
filtration of the rural council by leaders of popular organisations to pre-
vent it being taken over by politicians. Unfortunately, the process has
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been hampered by bureaucratisation and obstructed by government re-
presentatives and politicians despite the initial good intentions.41
Towards a new land reform
The general discontent with the land and administrative reforms re-
sulted in an animated debate on the future developments of the Sene-
galese land tenure regime. When in 2000 Abdou Diouf, the successor
of Le´opold Se´dar Senghor – the initiator of the 64 land reform – was
defeated in the presidential election, Senegalese socialism was no long-
er the ideology of the regime. The Parti socialiste, in power since inde-
pendence, was forced to go into opposition and is no longer repre-
sented in the National Assembly since the elections in 2007. The new
president Abdoulaye Wade and his party, the Parti De´mocratique Se´ne´ga-
laise (PDS), take a clearly neo-liberal stance. With regard to the rural
sector, the new authorities are convinced that smallholder farmers use
archaic and unproductive farming methods. Abdoulaye Wade decided
to modernise agriculture and developed the OMEGA plan. This plan
sees family farming as starved of capital, deprived of access to techno-
logical innovation, and trapped in a spiral of low productivity and fall-
ing incomes (Tan and Gue`ye 2005:46). The process of formulating a
new agrarian policy resulted in 2004 in a draft framework agricultural
law (Loi d’orientation agricole), including a reform of the legislation on
land tenure. For the first time ever, the government decided to discuss
its proposals with stakeholder representatives organised in the national
co-ordinating committee for farmers (Comite´ National de Coordination
et de Concertation des Ruraux, CNRS). The CNRS set up decentralised
discussions and a national workshop, resulting in a long list of amend-
ments, and succeeded in resisting some elements of the draft (Faye
2008). Ultimately, a new framework law on agro-sylvo-pastoral develop-
ment (Loi d’orientation agro-sylvo-pastoral) was adopted in May 2004,
taking into account most of the concerns of the CNRS (Niang and
Dieng 2004:6; Tan and Gue`ye 2005:3; Toure´ and Seck 2005:43). Never-
theless, the new law was criticised by Sylla (2004):
The law juxtaposes two visions of agriculture: family-run farms
on the one hand, and industrial and commercial farming on the
other. (…) Reading between the lines and judging by the pream-
ble to the bill, it seems that family-run farming is seen as obso-
lete and agri-business is to be prioritised. (…) The framework
law does have the merit of recognising pastoral activity as a valid
mode of productive land use – filling the gap in the legislation.
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(…) The most sensitive issue in this law, land reform, has been
postponed until some future date.
If we look at the framework law itself, the following dispositions are re-
levant. In article 22, paragraph 1, the new law stipulates that ‘the defi-
nition of a land tenure policy and a reform of the law on the national
domain will be indispensable for the agrarian, forestry and pastoral de-
velopment and for the modernisation of the agrarian sector’. The same
article specifies in paragraph 2 that ‘Land tenure policy will be oriented
by the following guidelines: the protection of the exploitation rights of
rural actors and the tenure rights of rural communities, a limited alien-
ability of land in order to permit the mobility that favours the creation
of more viable farm units, the transmissibility of land to successors in
order to encourage durable investment in family farms, and the use of
land as collateral for obtaining credit’. Paragraph 3 further spells out
that ‘land tenure reform aims at tenure security for agrarian endea-
vours for persons and rural communities, the promotion of private in-
vestment in agriculture, the provision of sufficient financial resources
as well as competent personnel to the state and to local collectivities for
efficacious, equitable and sustainable management of natural resources
and the lifting of land tenure constraints on agrarian, rural, urban and
industrial development’. These proposals perfectly fit the analysis we
have developed in the foregoing, but they only boil down to wishful
thinking. The land tenure reform that was to be carried through in
2006 according to article 23 has as yet not seen the light and will not
see the light within the two years after its promulgation, as foreseen by
law. Indeed, the national commission to reform the land law was only
established by the Presidency in 2006, and farmer organisations form
a small minority in this commission. Faye (2008:10) is probably right
when he argues that ‘there is no doubt that those in favour of privatis-
ing land at rural people’s expense will return to the attack’.
The debate must go on!42
To some extent, Senegal was far ahead of other former French colonies
in Africa in 1964, when it adopted the National Domain Law and
thereafter progressively introduced administrative reforms for its im-
plementation. At first glance, it could be argued that Senegal’s road to
a new tenure regime constituted an interesting ‘third way’, harmonis-
ing formal law and customary land rights, which according to current
thinking on tenure security should be the appropriate solution for rural
Africa (Lavigne Delville 2000:97). And indeed, the national domain
system has its virtues without doubt.
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In the first place, the land and administrative reforms mark an im-
portant step forward in promoting democracy in the rural areas. Rural
land is administrated by the rural communities through a deliberative
organ, the rural council and its president, both elected by universal
vote. Those rural councils have the power to implement the land re-
form in a flexible way, taking into account local circumstances and be-
liefs. Second, with this law the peasantry was freed from the payment
of fees and, at the same time, submitted to an objective situation which
conferred rights and guarantees as a counterpart to obligations, essen-
tially consisting in making productive use of the land. The rights and
guarantees vary from one zone to another. Third, the decision taken in
1964 to keep the peasants who effectively exploit the land in place al-
ready reveals the desire to assure their stability following the principle
that this stability of users of the national domain depends on their own
effort. As long as productive use is made of the land, the allocation is
for an undetermined period of time. Accordingly, in 1964 the idea of
individual and collective security of tenure, following the reasoning
about productive use was retained. Stability was to be assured as long
as individuals and groups complied with the criteria of productive use.
The national domain regime submits the ancient customary lands to a
uniform, modern, and secular law. The 1964 lawmaker gave the state,
the master of agrarian as well as of general economic development, the
means of action to achieve its goals. The objective of the lawmaker was
to restore the African dimension of tenure. There was no intention to
de-possess effective occupiers to the benefit of the state, but to deny
any rights to those who do not personally till the land and to abolish
land rents. The inhabitants of village lands, the members of the collec-
tivity present on the land, were to be given priority in its use. Land, as
an object of labour, was to be put at the disposition of those who effec-
tively till it. The peasantry was to be attached to the village land in or-
der to encourage endogenous development. At the same time, lands in
the national domain are considered a collective asset that has to be pre-
served for the common good. The repartition of the national domain
into several zones, as well as the possibilities to withdraw parts from
village land for the cause of public or general interest, is meant to serve
sustainable development. On paper, as long as the pressure on land is
not too high, the land and administrative reforms seem to provide a re-
lative stability for smallholder farmers. They have use rights as long as
they continue to exploit their plots, and those rights may be transferred
through inheritance under the condition that the rural council receives
an official request from the inheritors of the deceased and are con-
vinced that they will continue to cultivate the plot. This stability should
also be assured by the formal interdiction to sell lands of the national
domain.
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However, as has been shown above, there is a gap between this ideal
picture and reality, and the very least we may conclude is that the Sene-
galese tenure reform has had mixed effects on security of tenure for
smallholder farmers. In the more remote areas they continue to apply
their local (customary but continuously evolving) land rules, even when
inconsistent with the legislation. In areas where land is increasingly
gaining monetary value, the official law is violated more and more, in
particular with regard to the prohibition of land sales, and land-grab-
bing by elites has become a general phenomenon.
The land and administrative reforms introduced from 1964 onwards
were in our opinion rightly praised for their originality and flexibility,
and their attempts towards an approach which is democratic and con-
sistent with local socio-cultural values. But quite shortly after the intro-
duction of the land reform, and especially after the election of the first
rural councils, a flow of studies were published to highlight the many
malfunctions and unintended effects of the reform. As has been shown
before, we also noticed that the land tenure system provides evidence
of many institutional flaws creating confusion and fostering tenure in-
security. Over time, political and religious leaders obtained a strong
hold over the decisions by the rural councils. Although councils some-
times arrived at occasional compromises trying to incorporate local ten-
ure rules and customs into statutory law, they failed for a variety of rea-
sons to create a transparent and predictable set of new land tenure
rules. But it seems too easy to blame only the rural councillors. As Cer-
nea (1994:189) rightly states: ‘The local level derives strength not just
from its “localness” and self containment, but from the extent to which
the supralocal levels stand behind it.’ Ultimately, we have to conclude
that the reforms seem to be unsatisfactorily suited to address the gal-
loping urbanisation of Senegal and to face the requirements of a mod-
ern agricultural development, both in terms of family farming and
agri-business.
The debate on the future of Senegal‘s land tenure system is still in-
complete, especially since the land reform announced in 2004, in the
law on agro-sylvo-pastoral development, has been postponed. Unlike
the situation in the years after independence, the farmers are now bet-
ter organised, and their views are sometimes taken into account by the
national authorities. They will try to strongly defend their rights
against the tendency of the neo-liberal government to prioritise com-
mercial farming and agri-business at the expense of their own tenure
security. The future will tell us whether Senegal is again ahead of other
African countries by being capable of facing the challenges and dilem-
mas involved in land policy and law-making. Will Senegal find a new
‘third way’ in land tenure and be able to combine the requirements of
modern agricultural development with a human-centred approach to
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land rights? Or will Senegal just follow the tendency to privatise land
laws in accordance with the call by Hernando de Soto?
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10 Tenure security in the periphery of Ziguinchor:
The impact of politics and social relations
Gerti Hesseling and John Eichelsheim
Introduction
Until 1964, land use in Senegal was dealt with by the different ethnic
groups and their respective land tenure systems. In 1964, Senegal in-
troduced a new land law, the National Domain Law or Loi relative au
Domaine National. Senegal was the first former French colony in Africa
to adopt a land reform. Although this law aimed mainly at rural devel-
opment, it also contained regulations regarding urban land tenure. In-
deed, the 1964 law divides the national domain in four categories, one
of them being the urban zones. The law was considered innovative
since it did not try to unify the various colonial and customary land
tenure systems in Senegal but recognised the existence of local use
rights and left it to local institutions to work out the practical details at
the local level (Golan 1990:20-21). To stimulate more private invest-
ment in cities, the government enlarged the possibilities for a citizen
to acquire land as private property. Until now, this option has scarcely
been used in cities with enough space to expand and to absorb, vir-
tually without effort, the great rush of new urbanites. Rather, urbanites
and urban migrants looking for a plot or a house followed unwritten
rules and customs as they knew them from their village, and accom-
modated these rules, when necessary, to the urban context.
For years, the national and local governments paid little attention to
the legal and policy aspects of urban land tenure and housing, and ci-
ties developed without any significant intervention on the part of the
government. However, from the 1970s onwards the government has
promulgated specific legislation on urban land and has started urban
development plans including allotment (lotissement) and re-allocation
programmes. This also happened in Ziguinchor, the capital of the
southern region of Senegal, the Casamance. This is the most fertile re-
gion of Senegal, but as a result of one of the strangest legacies of the
colonial era – the creation of the tiny country of Gambia situated like
an enclave within Senegal – the Casamance is practically cut off from
the rest of Senegal. In the 1980s a rebellious movement, the Mouve-
ment des Forces De´mocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), demanded se-
paration from Senegal, and the conflict quickly degenerated into a full-
blown civil war with many casualties on both sides. In spite of many
attempts to arrive at a peace pact (the last pact reached was in Decem-
ber 2004), fighting continues to flare up. Although this drawn-out con-
flict has a complicated background, it is now generally accepted that
one of the origins of the conflict lies in land disputes, which began to
arise during the implementation of a re-allocation programme in Zi-
guinchor.1
In this chapter we analyse the effects of the re-allocation programme
on the life of the inhabitants of Ziguinchor. In the first part, we will
give some details about the law relating to urban land, and we will in-
troduce Ziguinchor and the re-allocation programme undertaken in
this city. The next part is dedicated to the organisation of the Diola so-
ciety – the dominant ethnic group in the Casamance – and the transi-
tion of the tutorial adjiati system from rural to urban settings. We will
describe how both the urban environment and the re-allocation pro-
gramme transform and politicise the position of the adjiati and the re-
lationship with his followers. We will then analyse the effects of the re-
allocation programme on urban people’s tenure security and on the in-
dividualisation of urban land rights. We will conclude that in the per-
ipheral areas where the re-allocation programmes have taken place,
hardly anybody has obtained a legally valid title. Despite this lack of for-
mal recognition of their land rights, most people regard their tenure as
quite secure. This can to a certain extent be explained by their erro-
neous belief that their ‘tickets’ or other petits papiers provide them with
a legally secure title, but also by their de facto secure tenure resulting
from the acts and attitude of the municipal government. At the same
time, they realise that protection of rights based on a clientelistic sys-
tem is always to a certain extent insecure and vulnerable. The data de-
rive from research undertaken since the 1980s (Eichelsheim 1990;
Hesseling 1983, 1986, 1992). The research area was most recently vis-
ited in 2007.
Law relating to urban land
In Senegal, specific legislation on urban land, housing, and town plan-
ning dates from the 1970s. This is not to say that before the 1970s the
urban areas were in a legal vacuum. They were certainly not, but the
applicable legal arrangements were mainly of colonial origin and rarely
referred to the town planning aspects of fast growing cities. The Sene-
galese urban land legislation is found mainly in three texts: the Loi re-
lative au Domaine National (National Domain Law), the Code de l’Urba-
nisme (Urbanisation Code), and an order relating to requests for build-
ing permits in urban zones (Arreˆte´ relatif aux demandes d’autorisation de
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construire dans les zones urbaines sur des terrains faisant partie du domaine
national).
The National Domain Law was adopted by the Senegalese legislature
in 1964. In the law, ‘national domain’ (domaine national) is defined in
a negative sense, namely as all land that is not registered in the land
books, i.e. land that is not ‘state property’ (domaine de l’Etat) and for
which no private title exists. With this act, all land which was held un-
der customary law passed into the control of the state. The state does
not consider itself to be the owner but merely the custodian of this
land; individuals only have non-transferable ‘use rights’. This means
that, among other things, the land may not be sold; only the buildings
and other investments (wells, orchards, and other such improvements)
are transferable. The national domain is subdivided into four cate-
gories, the first of which is designated urban zones (zones urbaines).
This covers municipal territory that has been established by law. The
other three categories are agricultural zones (zones des terroirs), classi-
fied zones (zones classe´es), and pioneer zones (zones pionnie`res).2 Land
within the national domain can be converted to state property.3 This is
frequently the case in the periphery of rapidly growing cities in Sene-
gal. The state then instigates a process for the expropriation of the land
for the general good; the land is thereafter registered in the name of
the state (thus falling within the category of state property). All existing
rights to the land are thereby abrogated. Damages are only possible in-
sofar as buildings are concerned, but not when the land has been built
on illegally.4
For the individual occupant the distinction is important, since his
rights to the land differ. The allocation of land pertaining to the na-
tional domain to any individual can never be considered to include
property rights. The occupant only has ‘use rights’, which are not
clearly defined by the law. Inhabitants living on state property need to
have a settlement permit or a long lease. A permit is a precarious title
which authorises the holder to settle on a plot for a determined period.
Since these permits can be withdrawn without compensation after
three months’ notice, it hardly offers any better security to the holder
than the ‘use rights’. Long lease is an agreement between the state and
the leaseholder under which the latter pays rent to the state in return
for the legal right to occupy a plot within the state property for a period
of between eighteen and 50 years. Although it offers much better se-
curity to the holder, the long lease is hardly ever applied in a city like
Ziguinchor because of the required obligations for the leaseholder.5
The national domain of Senegal accounts for more than 95 per cent
of the national territory. Another three per cent of the national territory
consists of state property, leaving two per cent of the land in the hands
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of individuals who had acquired private title to their land holdings
prior to 1964.
In the same year that the National Domain Law was passed (1964),
a Code de l’Urbanisme also came into being. In article 1, the aim of the
urbanisation policy is put into words:
The urbanisation policy in Senegal has as its aim the integration
of the progressive and provisional arrangements of settlements
in a general policy of economic development and social pro-
gress. It is leading, notably through its rational utilisation of
land, to the creation of a framework for a propitious life for all
of the population, and to a harmonious development on physi-
cal, economic, cultural and social level.6
In pursuance of this policy, town plans were to be drawn up, including
plot layouts for the reallocation of rights in land in residential areas.
The Code also decrees that whoever wants to build a house in a town
has to be in possession of both a permit to settle as well as a building
permit. An order (arreˆte´) of 1970 regulates how one should go about
getting a building permit for a piece of land in the national domain.7 A
permit to settle is only granted after the building plans have been ap-
proved. It is non-transferable and lapses if construction has not com-
menced within two years after the initial granting of the permit.
Finally, in 1996 a number of laws and decrees were adopted that
aimed at more decentralisation, transferring competencies from the
state to local institutions such as regions, city councils and rural coun-
cils (Re´publique du Se´ne´gal 2003). According to these regulations, allo-
cation programmes and the distribution of residential plots are no
longer the responsibility of the state but of the municipal council.
Ziguinchor
In Senegal, as in most African countries, an extremely rapid urbanisa-
tion process has taken place. Senegal is one of the most urbanised
countries in sub-Saharan Africa: 46 per cent of the Senegalese people
now live in cities. Although the capital Dakar attracts 55 per cent of the
urban population, intermediary cities like Ziguinchor have also grown
considerably. At the turn of the last century, the population of Zi-
guinchor was about 1,000, in 1960 it had risen to 30,000 inhabitants,
and by 2004 the population was approximately 170,000.8 The annual
increase of more than five per cent can be attributed half to natural
processes and half to the influx of immigrants from the surrounding
villages and from other parts of Senegal. With this rapid growth in the
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city’s population has come an increasing demand for building plots. A
great area of agricultural land has been converted to residential uses.
The city of Ziguinchor is still characterised by housing plots of some
400 square metres, broad roads with trees on both sides, and single-
story houses. It is therefore not surprising that land nowadays has be-
come rather scarce in the periphery of the city. Between the 1960s and
1980s, Ziguinchor expanded outside its central districts with little or
no involvement from the local authorities. Because of the constant
growth of the population and the comparatively low supply of legalised
buildings by local authorities, people looking for housing plots have
been driven to the periphery of the town.
Until 1964 land use in Senegal was dealt with by the different ethnic
groups and their respective land tenure systems. Thus, the land of the
ever-expanding city of Ziguinchor belonged to the inhabitants of the
surrounding Diola villages. The Diola form the largest ethnic group in
the region and an important ethnic group in the municipality of Zi-
guinchor.9 Because the local government paid little attention to the
way in which the town expanded, a great variety of so-called ‘sponta-
neous’ settlements developed in the periphery of the town. With per-
mission from Diola landlords, one could easily acquire a plot of land.
As we will show later, however, this ‘anarchic’ expansion took place in
a thoroughly organised manner.
In 1964, the National Domain Law divided all land into three cate-
gories. These categories can easily be distinguished in the situation of
land tenure in the municipality of Ziguinchor.
1. Land owned privately (titres prive´s), concentrated mainly in the cen-
tre of the city.
2. Land which is state property: the greater part of urbanised space in
Ziguinchor was registered in the name of the state.
3. Land which pertains to the national domain: all land that is not re-
gistered as private or state property. This affects mainly the western
part of Ziguinchor, the less urbanised area of the city.
In the 1970s, the local authorities decided to reorganise the land situa-
tion in Ziguinchor to end the proliferation of unregulated ‘anarchic’
town development and replace it with sound town-planning regulation,
marking residential areas as well as reserving space for roads, drainage
systems, waterways, and other public facilities. This was intended to
enhance the living quality and ‘favour an active social life’ (Re´publique
du Se´ne´gal 1980, 1991). The local authorities targeted both older dis-
tricts of Ziguinchor, which are state property, and newer, ‘sponta-
neously’ developing residential areas on national domain land. The re-
allocation programmes were to be done on the basis of new plot lay-
outs. A plot layout is a plan showing the parcelling out or the subdivi-
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sion of the land into individual plots as well as the position of the ac-
cess roads and footpaths. The procedure was relatively simple. In prin-
ciple, every family head who was able to prove that he lived with his fa-
mily in the district was eligible for a plot of about 400 m. To subdivide
the land according to the plot layout, however, approximately 60 per
cent of the existing houses had to be demolished. Not surprisingly,
quite a lot of the re-allocations developed into disputes, of which rela-
tively few were brought to court (Hesseling 1990/91).
After the area was surveyed, a Plot Allocation Board was supposed to
supply each family head with a piece of paper (‘ticket’) with the num-
ber of the plot and his name. Most ticket-holders think that such a pa-
per confers ownership of the land to them, but nothing could be
farther from the truth. They additionally have to go through a long and
fairly costly procedure to obtain permission to settle (permis d’occuper)
and, should they wish to build a brick house, a building permit (autori-
sation de construire) as well. Especially in the peripheral areas of the
town, very few of such ticket-holders have ever started these proce-
dures.
As said previously, in Ziguinchor re-allocation programmes were exe-
cuted both in areas where the land is state property and in areas where
the land falls under the category of national domain land. Due to the
different rights that can be obtained in these two categories of land,
the allocation programmes have a different effect on the respective
landowners, especially with regard to the possibility of requiring private
title. When a plot is located on state property and the beneficiary has a
building permit, he can ask for a lease (bail emphyte´otique). The cadas-
tre first prepares an official report of the value of the investments
made, and after a long process the lease can be transformed into a pri-
vate title. But if the plot is part of the national domain, the state cannot
give out such a lease. The National Domain Law provides for a conver-
sion of urban (re-allocated) national domain land into state property,
but to date no land in Ziguinchor that belonged to the national domain
and was the subject of the re-allocation programmes of the 1970s and
1980s has been converted into state property. This has only been done
in the case of some new and recent re-allocation programmes. Never-
theless, anybody can deposit an application for a lease, whether his/her
plot is on national domain land or on state property, and the regional
Domain Department will even register this application, although they
will not send it to Dakar for validation. The regional Domain Depart-
ment nowadays even encourages citizens to ask for a lease on national
domain land, as they hope that a massive demand for leases will incite
the government to convert large parts of national domain land into
state property. This conversion would subsequently open the opportu-
nity to obtain a lease and ultimately a private title. Despite this encour-
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agement, not many people apply for a lease on national domain land.
They do not see the use of paying the registration fees and the first
year of the lease rent only to wait until the land on which their plot lies
is converted into state property.
It should be mentioned that no data are available with regard to the
number of people involved in a re-allocation programme who have suc-
ceeded in obtaining a private title following a lease. Registration figures
show that land titles have only sporadically been registered in the last
few decades. Until recently, there were considerably fewer than 3,000
land titles (titres fonciers) in the whole of the Ziguinchor region, an area
of more than 7000 square kilometres and approximately 450,000 in-
habitants. Most of these titles were registered prior to the introduction
of the National Domain Law in 1964 or in the delay granted by this
law. In 2006 the Domain Department registered only 190 new titres
fonciers, mostly in the new urban district of Ziguinchor, Goumel. Here,
at the end of the 1990s, a large area of rice fields on the outer confines
of the town was divided into residential lots and converted from na-
tional domain into state property.
In sum, for people inhabiting a plot which belongs to the national
domain, it is legally impossible to obtain a lease and subsequently a
land title in order to have absolute tenure security in the form of pri-
vate property. This requires a conversion of the land to state property,
which has only taken place in a few areas that have recently undergone
re-allocation programmes. In those areas, some land titles have been
registered. It seems, however, that even in areas that have been state
property for a much longer period, few land titles have been registered.
This might imply that a simple conversion of land without a clear in-
terest and commitment of the government to stimulate privatisation
cannot be expected to have much impact.
Diola land tenure: The adjiati relationship in rural and urban
settings
In order to understand the frame of reference for an urban migrant
settling on Diola land in Ziguinchor, we must know how the land ten-
ure system operates in a Diola village. The Diola have a long tradition
of sedentary agriculture activities, mainly consisting of rice production.
The best rice fields are those bordering the Casamance River and its
tributaries, threatened by the salt water of the tidal Casamance River.
These low fields, which have a high value because they are fairly
scarce, require a lot of manpower to maintain the dikes. The hydraulic
system is controlled by a small group of village elders, and this form of
rice cultivation is centuries old. The fact that many generations in-
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vested their labour in the maintenance of these fields gives an extra di-
mension to their value. The Diola are more strongly attached to their
land than groups practising shifting agriculture.
As is the case in many African countries, this also explains the exis-
tence of the following feature in the social organisation of Diola society,
based on the control over land: a sharp distinction between the indi-
genous population and strangers (both from inside and outside the eth-
nic group). Over the years, each Diola village has witnessed both immi-
gration and emigration flows. Those who control the land also control
certain aspects of these migration movements and especially the loca-
tion pattern of newcomers. These newcomers are in every way inferior
to indigenes when it comes to settling religious and political matters.
In Diola society the complex network of relations between indigenes
and migrants is called the adjiati relationship. In these local patterns of
interaction, the elders of the lineages control the newcomer’s access to
land by acting as host (adjiati).
The adjiati is a host who gives shelter and food to a newcomer in his
own house. The guest or stranger (adjaoura) finds in the house of his
adjiati his first shelter and access to the society he wants to become a
member of; his first necessities of life are cared for. He has a solid ba-
sis from which he can explore the environment (social as well) and
search for the possibilities for a new home. Then the adjiati provides
his guest with the opportunities to settle: he gives him a plot of land to
build his own house or otherwise puts him in contact with another el-
der who is prepared to cede land: the adjiati becomes landlord or ‘mid-
dle man’. It is important that the adjiati establishes all new relations
for the adjaoura. In exchange for shelter, mediation and access to land,
the adjaoura has to acknowledge the social superiority of his adjiati. He
has to treat him as some sort of father.
The so-called ‘spontaneous’ expansions of Ziguinchor originated
mostly in the way described above. These districts have their own dy-
namics in patterns of organisation, in which control over land plays a
crucial role (see also Eichelsheim 1986). The inhabitants of these
‘spontaneous’ districts consider their plot of land, on which they build
their home, as a safe place, despite the fact that these places of settle-
ment are not legalised or recognised as such by the national authorities
or those of the municipality. The feeling of security of its inhabitants
derives from the adjiati relationship. They feel protected by their adjia-
ti, to whom they have fulfilled their obligations, or still do.
After the adoption of the National Domain Law, all land subject to
customary law formally became national domain land and thus passed
into the control of the state. This happened also in the areas of exten-
sion in the rapidly expanding city of Ziguinchor, where Diola landlords
from surrounding villages lost their control over the land to the state.
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At first, this new legislation did not have much effect on access to and
regulation of land, but in the 1970s the municipal authorities decided
to legalise and upgrade the ‘spontaneous’ settlements and started the
re-allocation programme, in which they discarded the existing local
rules. The case of Abdoulaye Diedhiou, discussed below, shows that
those rules are nevertheless highly resilient. Even today, people gain ac-
cess to land through koudjiati (plural of adjiati) without state interfer-
ence. It also indicates the changes the adjiati relationship undergoes
when transplanted into an urban setting, where law and politics of the
state converge with the Diola system of norms and political leadership.
The case of Abdoulaye Diedhiou: From adjaoura to adjiati
Abdoulaye Diedhiou is a Diola from the village of Diatock, where he
was born in 1939. In 1966, he wanted to settle in Ziguinchor, and in
the ‘spontaneous’ area called Soucoupapaye he found a co-villager who
was prepared to shelter him and thus become his adjiati. For his sub-
sistence during the first years, Abdoulaye cultivated some rice fields in
the nearby village of Niaguis. At home, in Soucoupapaye, he became
more and more active in the then ruling political party, the Parti Socia-
liste (PS), and his star was rising in the hierarchy of this party. When,
in the 1970s the municipality started the re-allocation programme in
Soucoupapaye, Abdoulaye’s adjiati received five official residential
plots, marked parcels of land with a cadastre number. From him, Ab-
doulaye received two of the plots. But since he also wanted a plot for
his two sons, he was one short. To resolve this problem, he decided to
sell one of the plots he just received and to lease the other one. With
that money, he bought a much bigger parcel in a not yet legalised dis-
trict in the periphery of the town, Lyndiane.
There he met Sidy Sidibe´, a high-ranking official in the Municipal
Council. As the son of the landlord of Lyndiane, Sidibe´ occupied a
large parcel of three hectares belonging to his patrilineage. Anticipat-
ing the re-allocation programme in Lyndiane, he decided to subdivide
his parcel into smaller plots and to sell them. As a civil servant he
knew that it was prohibited to sell his land, because it was located with-
in the national domain. To avoid direct involvement in the sale, he
therefore asked Abdoulaye Diedhiou to look for people interested in
buying a plot and to handle the transactions. For his work he could
keep one of the plots.
Abdoulaye Diedhiou grasped this opportunity with both hands. He
had no problem in finding potential buyers amongst his friends and
relatives. They trusted him because he had close relations in town via
his political friends. He sold all the sites to relatives, friends, villagers,
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and co-inhabitants from Soucoupapaye in no time. After a while, peo-
ple even started coming to him asking if he had plots to sell or if he
knew somebody selling plots of land.
These transactions passed so smoothly that other landlords asked
him to sell land for them. The agricultural value of these fields had de-
creased because they had been fallow for some years due to a lack of
rainfall in the past few years and because fewer members of the patrili-
neage were prepared or able to cultivate the fields. And, after all, in the
rhetoric of Diola social organisation, the elders of the patrilineages
were considered to keep control over the fields, despite the fact they
were ‘sold’ for money. This money was seen solely as compensation for
the usufruct of the fields. In short, there were many reasons to ‘lend’ a
small part of the land to strangers who wanted to pay for it. The land-
lords left all the work to Abdoulaye Diedhiou: he divided the land into
plots, sought for buyers and established contacts between the buyers
and the landlord. As compensation, he always received a piece of the
land.
Gradually, Abdoulaye Diedhiou obtained a monopoly of all land
transactions in the area. Buyers considered his good contacts with the
outer world (read: prominent political figures who played an important
role in the municipality) as a guarantee for their high investments in –
officially illegal – transactions. In addition, he came to be considered
the adjiati of all newcomers and the highest traditional authority to
whom they could turn in case of problems or disputes.
Money was not the only requirement for gaining access to a building
site in the new district of the city. Abdoulaye’s monopoly allowed him
to sell the plots of land selectively. Many of his transactions appear to
be based on relations of trust or rather on relations of kinship (puta-
tive), because that is what the adjiati relationships were based on.
Abdoulaye Diedhiou profited greatly from his role as an intermedi-
ary. By selectively giving access to land, he could surround himself
with people who would follow him in his political activities. This en-
abled him to determine the voting results in the new district of Lyn-
diane-Golomoute. As a result, he became good friends with executives
of the largest political party. The party leaders nominated him district
chief, which gave him considerable financial advantages. Furthermore,
at the recommendation of party leaders, he took control over the dis-
pensary in the district, and he built a coranic school on one of the plots
given to him as a reward for his mediation. In short, he became a per-
son to be reckoned with in the district.
The case of Abdoulaye Diedhiou shows how urban immigrants first
seek provisional shelter, from which they investigate the possibilities to
obtain a permanent and strong foothold in the city. The last stage is
building a family house, which in turn will serve to provide shelter for
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young people from the surrounding villages who are attracted to the
town by schooling and job opportunities. Thus, members of a family
and villagers who already live in the city become more and more im-
portant as providers of first shelter in the urban environment. An im-
migrant (adjaoura) will always maintain contacts with the adjiati who
opens the way to the city for him, even after he has obtained his own
plot of land. This example demonstrates that the adjiati relationship
continues to function in the urban context. Abdoulaye Diedhiou, who
started being Demba’s adjaoura, became the adjiati for many inhabi-
tants in the new district of Lyndiane-Golomoute.
The adjiati-adjaoura relationship is not only about land. The adjiati
also seeks other means to create personal bonds with his adjaoura. In
urban areas, these are found in his contacts with the ‘outside world’:
with local government officials and political party leaders and in his
connections on a regional and national level. This implies a politicisa-
tion of the adjiati-adjaoura relationship. In Ziguinchor, the provision of
first shelter and access to land, as the most important elements in the
adjiati-adjaoura relationship, are thus gradually substituted by a
smooth introduction into the urban environment. The wider one’s net-
work of valuable contacts in the city, the more one is respected and the
more one will be chosen by urban immigrants as adjiati. In return, the
adjaoura contributes to the prestige of their adjiati.10
This new feature in the role of the adjiati in the urban context is not
opposed to the traditional order. It is recognisable and acceptable for
members of the traditional society as an expansion of the adjiati’s func-
tion, which was already, in the organisational structure of the village,
the highest political authority controlling the contacts with the outer
world. Problems arise, however, when the adjiati, out of necessity or by
choice, identifies himself too much with the outer world and neglects
his obligations towards his koudjaoura (plural of adjaoura). Such a con-
flict of interest can for instance arise during the implementation of a
re-allocation programme. In the next section we will show how the
new involvement of the municipal authorities in urban land planning
can alter the position of adjiati and the relationship with their koud-
jaoura.
Municipal involvement and its effect on customary land tenure systems
In order to gain some control over the promiscuous growth of the city,
municipal authorities have drawn up town plans for the city of Zi-
guinchor since 1969. On paper, the ‘spontaneous’ residential areas
were restructured into small building lots for housing and spaces for
roads and public use, all according to a strict grid pattern. The inten-
tion was to upgrade these ‘spontaneous’ settlements in several stages.
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First, the individual building lots, the proposed streets and the position
of public places were laid out with little concrete markers in accordance
with the plan. After that, the inhabitants had one year to adapt their
environment to the new division, which meant that all houses standing
on the newly traced roads or public places had to be demolished by the
inhabitants themselves. The Lot Allocation Board supplied each family
head in the district with a written note (‘ticket’) stating the name of the
head of the household and the number of the building lot allotted to
him. Within one year, the whole reshuffle of the district should have
been completed. In reality, many disputes originated from the alloca-
tions made by the Lot Allocation Board, and many people refused to
demolish their houses (Hesseling 1990/91).
It appeared that local politicians from the ruling PS had a consider-
able say on this board (Eichelsheim 1986:53). The subdivision of the
‘spontaneous’ settlement areas, whereby the municipality gave the then
illegal inhabitants an official building lot, appeared to be a welcome
new source of capital for these politicians. The population density in
these residential areas subject to subdivision was low, and many build-
ing lots were not distributed after the subdivision. Assigning fewer or
sometimes even no building lots to political opponents could even in-
crease the number of ‘spare’ building lots. These spare lots were then
given to members of the same faction within the party or sold to other
interested people. Members of the military elite who were born in Ca-
samance, members of the higher bureaucracy from the north, and na-
tives of Casamance who worked in Dakar or France were particularly
interested in the spare official building sites. In 1983, the prices paid
for these building lots rose to one million F CFA (E 1524) or even
more.
It will be clear that the results of this form of subdivision – heavily
influenced by politicians and political considerations – clashed with the
existent organisational structure of the district, based on customary
land tenure systems. Before the subdivision, as we have seen earlier,
the adjiati gave the usufruct of land to his adjaoura, and with that, ac-
cording to the old Diola organisational patterns, he automatically
agreed to protect his adjaoura as though he were his own son. The sell-
ing of land to people from outside the koudjaoura group was at the ex-
pense of members of that group. The needs of all members of the
koudjaoura group had to be satisfied first before ‘outsiders’ could gain
access to land. In addition, members were defined in a very inclusive
way: sons, daughters, and all other members of kin had priority over
outsiders.
Within this perspective, the position of adjiati becomes untenable
when the roles of adjiati and politician meet in the same person. A po-
litician wants to surround himself with as many followers as possible,
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even from the outside, whereas the adjiati relationship is mostly fo-
cussed on a fairly small inner circle. As described before, the politicisa-
tion of the adjiati relationship is not surprising: dependent followers
surround the adjiati as he provides the usufruct of land and other fa-
vours. According to ancient traditions, he is their political authority.
However, when he wishes to partake in regional and even national poli-
tical processes and power struggles, his role of local political leader ex-
pands to a broader horizon. He then must answer to purely political
demands, even when they may hurt his inner circle.
When, in the eyes of his adjaoura, the adjiati does not fulfil the ex-
pectations related to his role, he will lose his authority. With great ef-
fect: the adjaoura feels betrayed and will turn against him and his poli-
tical associates. High emotions usually accompany these tensions. In
Ziguinchor this resulted in a lot of land law conflicts, in which ‘outsi-
ders’ – immigrants and civil servants from other parts of Senegal –
played a prominent role. General aversions arose against everybody
and everything not originating from the Casamance, generating large
protest manifestations and violence, and ultimately even the involve-
ment of the national army.
The accumulation of protests and violence forced the Governor, in
his function as the highest representative of the government, to look
for an alternative and generally accepted arbitration commission. The
Diola association Karambeno´r (work together) was useful. On the one
hand, its leaders were strongly related to government, as many had
been civil servants in colonial times. On the other hand, since they pro-
pagandised the old values of Diola society, the members of Karambeno´r
were in general well respected in the districts of Ziguinchor. Thus, the
Governor nominated members of Karambeno´r to an arbitration com-
mission, which had to evaluate all lot allocations and, if possible, re-
solve disputes.11 This meant that a board of ‘wise men’ joined the exist-
ing administrative arbitration commission, la Commission des Litiges,
which consisted largely of civil servants. This resulted in a new ap-
proach: members of the commission went into the districts to evaluate
disputes on the spot. This was a time-consuming approach that in ef-
fect prevented the civil servants from fully cooperating, and in time
they left the work completely to the members of the Karambeno´r.
Between 15 February 1982 and 5 July 1983, members of this arbitra-
tion commission evaluated 5,171 lot allocations, of which they put 1,558
cases of conflict on record. By means of on-the-spot clarification of de-
cisions made by the Lot Allocation Board, they were able to resolve
826 disputes. Through discussion and deliberation and by examining
each case thoroughly, they were able to reconcile another 696 conflicts.
After this success, the Governor decided to formalise this form of ap-
proach, and on 8 July 1983 a new commission was set up: la Grand
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Commission Administrative.12 This commission was divided into a tech-
nical board, consisting of representatives of the Governor and the mu-
nicipality and all the departments involved, and a board of ‘wise men’,
consisting of district heads and dignitaries and members of Karambe-
no´r. In this form, the preparatory work on the spot by the board of
‘wise men’ was given the legitimacy it needed by the technical board.
The commission succeeded in evoking the old atmosphere from the
villages: long palavers under a big tree where everybody could have his
say. In the end an elder made a proposal, mostly a compromise, which
in general was accepted unanimously. Furthermore, the commission
took into account the old claims on land and the investments made by
individuals. It is also important to notice that, in the eyes of all in-
volved, the state was not publicly represented. The representative of the
Municipal Council in the commission acted as a dignitary and not as
an official. The elders of Karambeno´r solved the land disputes as the
elders in the village. The working of the commission illustrates the dis-
crepancy between the law and its perception by the citizens.
Effects of allocation programmes
The re-allocation programmes of the 1970s and 1980s have been the
subject of research (Eichelsheim 1990; Hesseling 1992). It is striking
that some peripheral districts in Ziguinchor in which the division of
plots was heavily restructured during a re-allocation programme in the
1980s remained in some other aspects almost unchanged even twenty
years after the implementation of the re-allocation programme. For in-
stance in the area of Sougoupapaye, revisited in 2006 and 2007, there
has been hardly any improvement of the roads and the services in the
area, and some of the salient conflicts are still unresolved or in the pro-
cess of being solved. In the sections below we will look at two antici-
pated consequences of re-allocation programmes, the enhancement of
tenure security and the individualisation of land tenure, and analyse
the extent to which they have materialised.
Tenure security
The large majority of the people involved in re-allocation programmes
in Ziguinchor has not gone through the process of registering their
use right permits as a first step to obtaining a lease or a titre prive´ on
their urban plot. These people expressed that they felt secure enough
in the current situation. Their feeling was based on the acts and atti-
tude of the municipal authorities and was reinforced by the possession
of the small paper (‘ticket’) delivered at the time by the re-allocation
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commission, which shows their name and the plot number, or of other
formal or informal documentary material.13 Some of them even made
investments to improve their houses. And people are continuing to
look for residential plots in the area. A schoolteacher in Soucoupapaye
expressed his feeling of security as follows:
Somebody who wants to buy a building lot in town quickly
bumps into a broker residing around the Cadastre Department.
They will propose several locations and will accompany you to
take a look. When you are interested, they present you to the
owner and discussions on the price will be held. If you agree
with the owner on a price, you will then discuss with the broker
on what price will be the official price mentioned on the muta-
tion papers on which you have to pay a 15 per cent tax to the Do-
main Department. He will then also fix his percentage on the
deal, but assures you that he will take care of everything and
that his interference will be very beneficial for you. You then
have to fill in a pile of bureaucratic papers with many seals and
present witnesses. You pay small fees for seals and paperwork
for each of which you receive receipts. It all looks very official
and reassuring. If at the end they give you the sealed note that
the building lot is on your name, you really think you are pro-
prietor of the land. It has cost you some money, but you now
are officially landowner! Moreover, look around you. When there
is a problem, for instance when your building lot is on land de-
signated for a school or mosque, the Municipal Council will give
you another building lot and will even give you some money for
your investments. So why worry? You can have confidence in
the transaction. This was confirmed by Insa Manga of the Ur-
banism Department who told me: ‘When you have a building
permission, you have right to compensation.’
Another inhabitant of Ziguinchor, Lansana Sambou, states that he feels
secure of his tenure because his uncle succeeded in changing the
name of the ‘ticket’ in his favour. Lansana Sambou’s father, Doudou
Sambou, got the famous ‘ticket’ from the Lot Allocation Board in 1978,
a small piece of paper with the number of the building lot and his
name. Doudou Sambou died in 2000, but before passing away, he said
to his elder son that the lot would be his. His elder sister would be
married soon and thus would have no need for it. Nothing much hap-
pened after his father’s death until an uncle, working in the national
agricultural research centre, advised him to change the name on the
‘ticket’. Why and how was not so clear to Lansana, so he left it all to
his uncle who did all that was necessary. It was the uncle who went to
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the tribunal and filled in the heritage papers to obtain a death certifi-
cate, a heritage certificate, a wedding certificate, and a birth certificate.
He also went to Cadastre to pay the 20,000 Francs (E 30.49) fee for
the four concrete markers which were used in 1978 to demarcate the
building lot. Lansana only paid the E 30.49 and received a new ‘ticket’
with his name on it.
His father had not built the house with durable materials but erected
the four rooms of dried mud, as most people do in this area. According
to Lansana, because the construction was not concrete, he did not need
permission from the Municipal Council. In his opinion, the situation
is okay as it is, although he would prefer that the municipality did
something with these mud roads that become violent torrents in the
rainy season. The municipality must know all these problems, as the
district head lives only 150 metres away, just near a canyon some three
metres deep:
The municipality does nothing and what can we do? Poor people
like us do not frequent official instances. We prefer to stay away
from all that. Land ownership is very complicated, demands
much paperwork and a lot of money. Furthermore, it is very
hierarchically structured, where only the very rich can obtain full
possession and become richer. We only want a home, a family
house to live in. We do not need that entire fracas. My name is
actually mentioned on the ticket, given in 1978, on top of the
number of this building lot. What do I want more? I keep it in a
metal box under my bed.
Another inhabitant of Soucoupapaye, Sidy Soly, never paid anything,
and yet he claims that the Lot Allocation Board not only gave him the
famous ‘ticket’ but also an official paper which explicitly mentioned
that his plot was his forever.
The above examples show that people feel to a large extent secure in
their tenure. This feeling is partly based on a false assumption that
their tenure is legally secure, but also on what they see happening in
practice. The municipal authorities only seldom interfere with their
houses and plots. And when they do demolish structures on a plot situ-
ated in an area designed for public infrastructure such as a school or a
health centre, people with a ‘ticket’ almost always receive another plot
in substitution.
Ignorance about the official land legislation is indeed widespread.
Even the district head of Soucoupapaye admits that he knows very little
of procedures leading to an official legalisation of the plots after the re-
allocation programme in the 1970s in his district. When inhabitants of
his district ask his advice, he can only tell them to meet the different
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departments involved in the procedure, such as Cadastre, Topography,
and the Tax Department. He tells us that in his opinion there is a great
distinction between official land tenure legislation and the daily rou-
tine. The perception of land tenure security is, he says, mostly based
on clientelism: many local people know somebody in the Lot Allocation
Board who is willing to distribute a lot number with a personal name
attached to it, the ‘ticket’. And since members of this board are highly
placed people, you can trust them. Problems only occur when these
people lose their position and are no longer able to protect you. But, he
continues: ‘Why bother? You can have permission for this and permis-
sion for that. You can have many papers with official seals and have
paid a lot of money for all those seals and permissions, but you know
as we all do: if the government wants to take your land, it will take
your land. Things can slow down if your protection is bullet proof, but
in the end you will lose your land.’ Despite a general feeling of tenure
security, most people are realistic enough to realise that such threats
are inherent to a personalised, clientelistic system.
Individualisation of land tenure
Although most people continue to live on the urban plots with their fa-
mily members, and most of these family members feel quite secure
when ‘their family’ has a ‘ticket’, in reality the ‘ticket’ grants the plot to
one person only. This orientation of urban land tenure towards a more
individual land tenure system causes many small family tragedies, as
will be shown by the case of the Sagna plot. Safietou Sagna was mar-
ried to Yaya Dieme who died in 1991. They lived in the Dieme family
house in Soucoupapaye.14 After the death of her husband, Safietou
Sagna was not ready to accept her traditional transfer to the brother of
her husband. She asked her father, then living in the village of Diatock,
if he would allow her to live in her brother’s house in Ziguinchor. This
brother, Mamadou Sagna, had bought some land in the Lyndiane dis-
trict in the year 1968. This piece of land was bought from a Serer
farmer, whose daughter still lives on another piece of the land. Mama-
dou built a house with dried mud and allowed his brother Ousmane to
live there, while he went to work in Dakar. When the authorities
decided to re-allocate the area in which Mamadou’s plot was situated,
he gave a copy of his ID to a third brother, Ahmet, and asked him to
make sure that the plot was allocated to him, Mamadou. But Ahmet
put his own name on the ‘ticket’.
Safietou’s father and Mamadou allowed her to build a house on the
corner of the building lot. As soon as the mud-dried rooms were ready,
Safietou left the house of her deceased husband and started living in
Lyndiane in 1992. The building lot was a microscopic labyrinth of min-
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uscule alleys between mud-dried rooms where doors open and close,
creating a buzzing atmosphere. This microscopic labyrinth is a small
Diatock (the native village of the family) in an urban setting and cre-
ates a feeling of security with regard to the plot considered as family
land. Finally, Mamadou retired and took the opportunity to visit Lyn-
diane. He asked his brother Ahmet to come to Ziguinchor to change
the name on the ‘ticket’, but Ahmet refused. All this time, Safietou as-
sumed that the building lot was family land and did not know that in
fact Ahmet’s name was on the ‘ticket’.
A lot of time passed, and eventually Ahmet Sagna died. Mamadou
Sagna was enjoying his retirement and still living in Dakar. It was only
in 2006 that Safietou checked with the Cadastre Department about the
building lot registration and discovered that it was in the name of her
deceased brother Ahmet. What was she to do then? For the first time
Safietou began to be anxious about her future. The four children of Ah-
met Sagna continued to live on the family lot in the house of their un-
cle Ousmane. The building lot became more and more crowded, which
from time to time created tensions between Safietou and her nephews
and nieces. And although for the moment they did not want to take
any initiative and force the situation, Safietou realised now that they –
as the rightful heirs of their father – could at any time decide to claim
the building lot and she would be compelled to leave her house. And
she had no money to move. When she went to the municipal services
for advice, she discovered how wrong her perception of the building lot
as family land had been. The ‘ticket’ had a first name and a family
name, and thus concerned only one person, in her case her deceased
brother Ahmet. In Safietou’s opinion the building lot should have gone
to her eldest brother, Mamadou, who had promised that he would take
care that the lot remained family land and that she could stay in her
house. But the municipal services also told her that the procedures to
change the name of the ‘ticket’ and subsequently obtain the property
of the building lot and the houses in the name of Mamadou are long,
complex and costly, and require the cooperation of Ahmet’s children.
After consultation with her brother Mamadou, she decided ‘to keep si-
lent’ for the time being and not to take any action.
The case of the Sagna plot is representative of what is happening in
many popular districts of Ziguinchor. It displays that the issuance of
personalised ‘tickets’ leads to an individualisation of land that often
used to be considered as family property. Many family members of
‘ticket’ holders feel secure in their tenure, either because they are una-
ware of this change or because they trust the ‘ticket’ holder to take care
of his family. When the family situation changes, or personal relations
come under strain, family members can be confronted with the inse-
curity of their tenure and come off worse. The urban land legislation
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aiming at private property of land and houses thus enhances the ten-
ure security of some, but also endangers that of others. It increases the
vulnerability of people who lack understanding of the legislation.15
Some concluding remarks
We have seen that in the Senegalese town of Ziguinchor, re-allocation
programmes have been undertaken since the 1970s. These pro-
grammes did not replace the earlier land tenure situation based on
Diola customary law, as they were naively envisaged to do. They rather
created a new, hybrid system that combined a continued importance of
the Diola adjiati-adjaoura relationship with a role for new actors in-
volved in municipal town planning. In this new urban constellation,
the position of the koudjiati became more and more politicised. This
expansion of his role was acceptable for the members of the traditional
society as long as the political ambitions of the adjiati did not result in
him neglecting his obligations towards his koudjaora in favour of the
interests of his other, ‘immigrant’, followers. When the adjiati starts to
answer to political demands that hurt his inner circle, he loses his
authority, and his koudjaora turn against him and his political associ-
ates. In Ziguinchor, this resulted in high tensions between locals and
‘outsiders’ and even in violent clashes.
The case of Ziguinchor clearly brings to the fore the well-known
truth that land tenure and property rights are institutions in which
people’s access to, use of, and control over land are highly dependent
on social relations. When these are transformed and reconstructed over
the course of time and in a different environment, land tenure is read-
justed accordingly (cf. Juul and Lund 2002). This chapter has posed
the question of the effect of this changing constellation on people’s ten-
ure security. We have seen that people in the study area feel to a large
extent secure in their tenure. Although most of them do not have a leg-
ally sound title to their land, many erroneously believe that their ‘tick-
ets’ or other documentary material does provide a formal title. Very few
really know their way in the legal labyrinth, and not every man in the
street can visit a department director for correct information. But also
those who know, from a legal point of view, that they may lose land
and home with a stroke of a pencil do not really worry. Practice proves
them right. The occasions are rare that houses are torn down without
state compensation. For the people it is enough to know that they will
receive compensation for the investments they made in case the gov-
ernment decides to upgrade the area in which their plot is located and
their houses have to be torn down. Even when their rights to land are
not legally secure, people trust the current state of laissez-faire to con-
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tinue, and expect to be protected by political strong men, through their
relationship with their adjiati, or with people involved in the municipal
land planning system, such as members of the Lot Allocation Board.
As long as this protection stands, they believe they are quite secure in
their tenure vis-a`-vis the government.
A different issue that has also been discussed in this chapter is the
effect of the individualisation of family land due to the issuance of per-
sonalised ‘tickets’. The case of the Sagan plots clearly highlights that
the enhancement of tenure security of some people usually coincides
with the erosion of that of others. The vulnerability of people who lack
knowledge of urban legislation and who are dependent on family rela-
tions can be significantly increased by the drive for individualisation of
tenure. When discussing the effects of re-allocation programmes on
tenure security, one should thus always ask the question, whose tenure
security?
Notes
1 For an extensive analysis of the conflict, see De Jong 2005. See also Evans 2000;
Foucher 2003; Lo 2006.
2 The agricultural zone corresponds generally to the land exploited by farmers or her-
ders; the classified zone consists mainly of the forest domain, and the pioneer zone
consists of previously undeveloped and unoccupied land destined for development ac-
cording to the plans of the state. See Caverivie`re and De´be`ne 1998:81-82; Elbow and
Rochegude 1989:14.
3 For a detailed discussion of the distinction between national domain and state prop-
erty, see Caverivie`re and De´be`ne 1998:85-88; Elbow and Rochegude 1989: notes 35
and 43.
4 The details of the expropriation procedure are governed by a separate expropriation
law: Law no. 76-67 of 2 July 1976, which abrogated and replaced Law no. 66-01 of 18
January 1966, relating to expropriation in the cause of public utility and other land
transactions for public utility.
5 Law no. 76-66 of 2 July 1976 establishing the Domaine de l’Etat.
6 The Urbanisation Code was abrogated and replaced by Law no. 66-49; see also De-
cree no. 66-1076 supporting the Urbanisation Code (Statutory Section); Decree no.
72-1297 modifying Decree no. 66-1076; Law no. 79-78 abrogating and replacing arti-
cle 12 of the Urbanisation Code; Decree no. 81-803bis abrogating and replacing sec-
tion II of the first title of the Urbanisation Code.
7 Order no. 6288 of 26 May 1970 relating to requests for building permits in urban
zones which pertain to national domain. See also Gadiaga 1984.
8 For an overview of the historical development of Ziguinchor, see Bruneau 1979; Trin-
caz 1984.
9 For more information on the organisation of Diola society, see Pe´lissier 1996; Tho-
mas 1959, 1968; with regard to the traditional law of the Diola, see Ki-Zerbo 1997.
10 Hesseling (1991) describes the various strategies employed by people who wish to be-
come urbanites. See also Turner 1968, whose ideas have for a long time influenced
urban developments in developing countries.
11 Decision No. 0434/GC du 16/02/1982.
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12 Arreˆte´ no. 60/GC/AA.
13 For a critical discussion concerning tenure formalisation and the importance of petits
papiers for the poor, see Durand-Lasserve 1986; Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002;
Durand-Lasserve and Selod 2007.
14 The importance of the family house in Africa has been documented e.g. by Le Bris et
al. 1987. See also Monnier and Droz 2004.
15 Despite the fact that the people in Ziguinchor are relatively well educated (the region
of the Casamance has the highest rate of primary education in Senegal), lack of
knowledge of the ins and outs of urban legislation is ubiquitous. This is illustrated
by the Sagna case. The Sagna family is a modern, well-educated family. Two daugh-
ters have their baccalaureate, one of them currently works as a teacher, the other has
entered university. All family members carry mobiles, and the youngest children reg-
ularly visit the internet cafe´. Despite their education and modern lifestyle, most of
them are not well informed with regard to urban legislation.
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11 Land tenure in Bolivia: From colonial times to
post-neoliberalism
Willem Assies1
Introduction
Since the turn of the century, Bolivia has been the scene of social and
political upheaval. The early months of the year 2000 saw the rise of
protests against the privatisation of the municipal water supply com-
pany in the city of Cochabamba and, more broadly, against new legisla-
tion on water. According to its protagonists, the ‘Water War’ resulted in
the first victory of the popular movement after fifteen years of neoliber-
alism as the privatisation was reversed and the water legislation sub-
stantially modified. In subsequent years popular protests of various
sorts continued while the 2002 presidential elections, in which Evo
Morales of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement towards So-
cialism) came in second with 20.9 per cent of the vote,2 indicated that
dissatisfaction with the established political parties and their support
for the neoliberal model was growing. In October 2003 president Gon-
zalo Sa´nchez de Lozada was forced to resign after a massive wave of
protests against the intended sale of natural gas to the United States
through Chile – Bolivia’s arch-enemy since the Pacific War (1879-1880)
when it annexed Bolivia’s coastal provinces. Vice-president Carlos Mesa
stepped in but was also forced to resign in June 2005. In December of
that year presidential elections yielded a landslide victory for Evo Mor-
ales who garnered 54 per cent of the vote in a country where, since its
return to democracy in 1982, presidents had been elected with at best
nearly 34 per cent of the vote (Assies 2004; Assies and Salman 2003;
Crabtree 2005; Kohl and Farthing 2006).
With the election of Evo Morales, Bolivia became an exponent of the
‘Left Turn’ in Latin America.3 At the same time this reflects the in-
creased significance of the ‘ethnic factor’ in some Latin American poli-
ties (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). It is this combination that explains
why in late November 2006 the new government succeeded in passing
a substantial modification of the Agrarian Reform Law – which had
been adopted ten years earlier – through Congress, aiming for a more
radical and swifter application, particularly in favour of the country’s
indigenous peoples. Similarly, the new government aims for a reorien-
tation of urban policies in the context of a new conception of develop-
ment which it describes as aspiring to ‘live well’. This makes the coun-
try an interesting case, as it illustrates the search for a new develop-
ment paradigm for a pluriethnic and multicultural country.4
In adopting a historical perspective, this chapter will provide insights
into the ways in which land tenure regimes are forged in the service of
ideas about progress, development, and nation-building. Some forms
of tenure will be privileged over others since they are expected to con-
tribute to such objectives, which are often stated grandiloquently. How
things work out on the ground is another matter, as what is promoted
‘from above’ may be contested ‘from below’. What is defined as legal or
illegal and what remains in the limbo of extra-legality – not against the
law but not recognised by law either – can be shown to be an outcome
of such local struggles and their articulation into broader societal pro-
jects.
In taking this tack, the chapter furthermore sheds light on the legal
concepts of the social and social-economic function of property and
how these concepts underpinned the post-1952 agrarian reform process
and were later preserved and re-interpreted in the subsequent agrarian
legislation of 1996 and 2006. It will be shown how, in different socio-
political contexts, such concepts provide the basis or justification for
more or less radical redistributive policies and how these policies are
contested by large landowners, who regard them as a source of legal in-
security and eventually may resort to ‘white guards’ to secure their
‘rights’.
This chapter will primarily focus on the evolution of rural land ten-
ure and then briefly turn to the question of urban land tenure and
housing.
Colonial times
When in the early 1530s the Spaniards first ventured into what nowa-
days is Bolivia, they entered a region that had been incorporated into
the Quecha-speaking Inca empire some 80 years earlier. The Aymara
polities had been subdued, and the Inca system of religion and tribute
had been introduced without bringing about profound socio-economic
changes. The two cultures already shared important traits and forms of
social organisation, such as the ayllu. This was an endogamous social
unit consisting of various kinship groups organised according to a du-
alist pattern of complementary ‘halves’, each of which collectively pos-
sessed a specific, though often discontinuous, territory. The ayllu was
the basic unit of the agro-pastoral societies occupying various ecological
levels. In the lower and warmer areas maize and vegetables could be
produced, often on irrigated land permanently possessed by the family
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who worked it. On higher levels potatoes and cold-resistant grains
could be cultivated in an intricate system of community-regulated field
and crop rotation that would allow for soil regeneration and risk
spreading5, while the still higher altitudes would be dedicated to pastor-
al use. The ayllu could be grouped into larger units or polities that in
pre-colonial times spanned areas from the western coast, through the
central Andean highlands, to the eastern mountain slopes descending
towards the Amazonian savanna and forests.
The Spanish conquest and the emergence of the silver-mining econ-
omy, centred in Potosı´, brought important changes to the Andes re-
gion. The gradual formation of large estates or haciendas to cater for
the mines, and the reducciones policy that sought to concentrate the in-
digenous population in compact settlements, in tandem with popula-
tion decline due to epidemics, resulted in a fragmentation of indigen-
ous productive and political units. It did not entail the disappearance
of the ayllu as minor ayllus were allowed to retain control over land in
return for labour services and tribute in a relationship that Platt (1982)
has characterised as a ‘pact of reciprocity’, albeit the power relations
were obviously asymmetrical.6 A series of local uprisings culminated
in the massive revolts of the early 1780s under the leadership of Tu´pac
Katari and Tu´pac Amaru in the La Paz and Cuzco regions, respectively
(Andrien 2001; Walker 1999).
The hot eastern lowlands remained on the fringe of the colonial
economy. This was the realm of a variety of indigenous societies, prac-
tising itinerant slash-and-burn agriculture in combination with hunt-
ing, fishing and gathering. In terms of culture, language, socio-political
organisation, and patterns of land and forest use – adapted to the eco-
logical conditions of the region – they were quite different from the Ay-
mara and Quechua, who were more sedentary agro-pastoralists. By the
end of the seventeenth century, the Jesuit Order had established some
missions in the Santa Cruz region, and after their expulsion in 1767,
mestizo farmers and ranchers took control in the savanna areas and set
the population to work in cattle ranching. The remoter Amazonian for-
est areas to the north became regions of refuge for people practising
itinerant lifestyles, while in the Chaco region the Guaranı´ Chiriguano
fiercely resisted any incursions into their territories until they were de-
feated in a bloody expedition in 1892.
What we should retain from this very brief overview of colonial
times is the incipient emergence of a pattern of regional differentia-
tion7 regarding land tenure and social organisation, which was a func-
tion of the pre-colonial organisation and subsequent colonial exploita-
tion of the indigenous population. Such patterns set the stage for pre-
sent-day regional divisions as well as different forms of indigenous-
peasant organisation.
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Republican Bolivia up to the 1930s
Independence, which came in 1825, brought little change to the situa-
tion of the indigenous population. Liberator Simo´n Bolivar, who be-
came president of the newly created republic for a few months, intro-
duced liberal legislation that abolished tribute and declared the lands
of the indigenous communities private property (Aylwin 2002:31; Her-
na´iz and Pacheco 2000:24). The objective was to create a class of yeo-
man farmers who would sustain the republic and contribute to the
wealth of the nation. This legislation, however, never took effect. The
Bolivian state soon found that it could not do without tribute and in
1826 reintroduced a contribucio´n indigenal. The ‘reciprocity pact’,
whereby the ayllus retained control over land in return for various
kinds of tribute, was perpetuated for the time being (Klein 2003:105),
and the ayllu, though it had undergone changes throughout the colo-
nial era,8 maintained itself as the extant form of political, socio-eco-
nomic, and cultural organisation, with permanently tense relations
with the Bolivian state and dominant classes. The indigenous-peasant
community was what has been called ‘a mini-state in conflict‘ (Carter
and Albo´ 1988).
It was only by the 1860s, when silver mining recuperated and tin
mining and other endeavours gained importance, that state depen-
dence on the tribute tax declined and liberal views on land tenure re-
emerged, and an all-out attack on corporate landholding was launched
(Klein 2003:136). In 1866 it was decreed that within 60 days indigen-
ous communities should assert their title and pay a fee of 25 to 100 pe-
sos, otherwise their lands would be sold through public auction. In
1874 a Ley de Exvinculacio´n de Tierras promoted individual titling of co-
muneros and sought to substitute the contribucio´n indigenal with a gen-
eral property tax. Once the Pacific War (1879-1880) was over, imple-
mentation of such legislation accelerated and resulted in a massive ex-
propriation of community lands in the highland and valley regions. In
many cases indigenous communities were incorporated into expanding
haciendas and became ‘captive communities’ – particularly in the high-
lands of La Paz – while in northern Potosı´ smallholders and medium-
size farms encroached upon ayllu lands (Rivera Cusicanqui and Thoa
1992:45). According to Thiesenhusen (1995:53), in 1846 over 63 per
cent of the indigenous population lived in freeholding communities,
while by the end of the century the figure was 27 per cent.9 The num-
ber of haciendas increased from about 300 to 4,000 during the last
four decades of the nineteenth century (cf. Ca´rdenas 1988:510).10 This
expropriation process triggered a cycle of revolts that continued
throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century (Ca´rdenas
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1988; Hylton 2003; Rivera Cusicanqui 2003; Rivera Cusicanqui and
Thoa 1992; Ticona Alejo and Albo´ Corrons 1997).
While during the last decades of the nineteenth century the high-
lands and valleys were the scene of hacienda expansion and resistance
by the Aymara and Quechua peasantry, the eastern lowlands were
marked by the rise of an extractive economy. Initially, the extraction of
forest products, particularly cinchona bark (for quinine), brought new
incursions into the forest areas, then from the late nineteenth century
onward, the northern Bolivian Amazon region was affected by the rub-
ber boom, which lasted until 1913. The new trade gave rise to the crea-
tion of barracas (rubber estates) and labour relations based on debt peo-
nage. In the savanna regions further to the south, cattle raising ex-
panded to supply the rubber estates, pushing the indigenous
population towards more marginal areas or incorporating them into
the ranches under conditions of virtual slavery.
The Chaco war, the 1952 revolution and the agrarian reform
The Chaco war with Paraguay (1932-1935) represented a turning point
in Bolivian history. The most important effect of this bloody conflict
was that it provided the opportunity for indigenous troops to mix with
mestizo recruits and to meet people from different parts of the country
and share the ‘democracy of the trenches’ (Rivera Cusicanqui 2003:93)
that yielded the so-called Chaco generation. The experience radically
changed the Bolivian political climate, as the land question, the Indian
question, labour issues, the country’s dependency on private mines
and its domination by a small oligarchy of tin barons and large land-
owners became themes of national debate. The war experience gave
rise to the emergence of a radical revolutionary political movement as
well as a powerful and radical labour movement. The late 1930s saw a
turbulent succession of military and elected governments. Nationalist
measures, such as the nationalisation of Standard Oil (1937), were in-
troduced as well as social legislation. A reform of the Constitution in
1938 introduced the concept of the social function of property11 and
provided some protection for community lands.
In this context new political parties emerged, most importantly the
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria (MNR)12, as well as a radical
miners’ trade union that later would become the backbone of the Cen-
tral Obrera Boliviana (COB, Bolivian Workers’ Central). In April 1952
the MNR managed to seize power and initiated a period of nationalist
reformism. The 1952 revolution brought four basic transformations:
universal franchise for all Bolivians, nationalisation of the holdings of
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the three tin barons, agrarian reform in 1953, and education reform in
1955, which introduced free, obligatory, and universal education.
In its 1942 party programme the MNR had demanded ‘a scientifi-
cally based study of the indigenous agrarian problem with the aim of
incorporating the millions of peasants that until now have been mar-
ginalised from it into national life and to achieve an adequate organisa-
tion of the agrarian economy in order to obtain maximal output’.13 This
neatly captures the attitude of the party, which aimed at assimilation of
the indigenous population into the nation through mestizaje, and at
modernisation understood largely in productivist terms. The term ‘In-
dio’ was banned from official discourse, and the rural population would
be consistently addressed as campesinos (peasants), that is in terms of
class, while downplaying ethnic or cultural features. Education was to
be another pillar for the ‘redemption’ of the Indian.
Due to internal divisions, with a left-wing pushing for redistributive
reform and right-wing landholders doing the opposite (Albo´ 2007:84),
the new MNR government did not act quickly when it came to agrarian
reform. The countryside had remained largely aloof from the April re-
volution, but the revolution opened the way for a breakdown of the sys-
tem of rural domination, which forced the MNR government to move
to control the situation. Direct action against haciendas, rural power re-
lations, and trade monopolies became widespread after the 1952 revolu-
tion and forced the decreeing of an agrarian reform in August 1953. In
the following years massive mobilisation by sindicatos (peasant unions)
and comunidades, which acted through armed militias, broke up the ha-
cienda system in the highlands and the valleys (Ca´rdenas 1988; Gotko-
witz 2003; Rivera Cusicanqui 2003; Thiesenhusen 1995:51-68).
The nature and outcomes of the 1953 Agrarian Reform
The 1953 Agrarian Reform Decree (Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos
1953)14 articulated three basic principles. First, land should go to the til-
ler; second, ownership of land should also fulfill a social function; and
third, the ownership of all natural resources was vested in the nation it-
self. The first principle aimed to make an end to relations of servitude
but did not exclude wage labour. The other two principles implied a re-
cognition of private ownership on the condition that it performed a
useful function for the national community. If this was not the case,
the land would revert to the state, which then would redistribute it.
The legislation sought to formally recognise and regularise various
forms of tenure:
– The solar campesino, or peasant housing plot, too small to meet the
subsistence necessities of a family and conceived as a supplement
to land endowment to the colono (tenant) or agricultural worker.
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– Small property, worked personally by the peasant and his (or her)
family in such a way that it could rationally satisfy their needs,
without excluding the eventual hiring of labour for specific tasks.
– Middle-sized properties, larger than small properties but not meet-
ing the characteristics of a capitalist enterprise. It could be worked
with the help of salaried workers and/or using mechanised and
technical inputs in such a way that the bulk of production is des-
tined for the market.
– Property of the indigenous communities, which was recognised ac-
cording to established law15 and was inalienable. This was the so-
called pro-indiviso (undivided) mode of recognition. A later decree
specified the modes of recognition, but as Herna´iz and Pacheco
(Herna´iz and Pacheco 2000:104-106) indicate, this modality of ten-
ure was not prioritised by the MNR government.16
– Cooperative agrarian property, which could be constituted in various
ways.
– Agricultural enterprises, characterised by large-scale capital invest-
ment, relying on wage labour and employing modern technical/me-
chanised inputs (where feasible in view of topographical factors).
Some of these categories were subdivided further, and a special regime
was introduced for the rubber-tapping and Brazil nut-producing areas,
which were dominated by barracas, and for the envisioned colonisation
areas (Herna´iz and Pacheco 2000:121-130) in the ‘underpopulated’ and
non-integrated eastern lowland regions.17 The legislation also foresaw a
complex system of ceilings to the size of properties, according to local
circumstances and classifications regarding carrying capacity. Exten-
sions exceeding these ceilings or those exploited under feudal arrange-
ments or technically deficient conditions – and therefore failing to
comply with their social function – would revert to the state for redistri-
bution or would be distributed to those who effectively worked the
land. Community land appropriated after 1 January 1900 was to be re-
turned to the original community as inalienable communal private
property of the whole community, while individually held plots within
communities were recognised as the private property of the family.
This, again, was the pro-indiviso mode of recognition in which collective
and individual titling could, at least in theory, be combined.
This classification of legally recognised forms of land tenure reflects
the ideas on development and nation-building of the 1952 revolution-
aries. However, in their study of the agrarian question in Latin Ameri-
ca, Alain de Janvry et al (2001:203) classifies the Bolivian reform as a
transition from pre-capitalism (or semi-feudalism) to a Junker road (as
opposed to a farmer road) of development of capitalism in agricul-
ture.18 This is because most landowners were able to retain part or all
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of their holdings, and only a few were classified as latifundios who suf-
fered partial or total expropriation. The remainder were classified as
medium properties, according to lax criteria that allowed for rather
large extensions, while the distribution of hacienda lands to colonos
mostly involved the plots they worked before the reform. Their obliga-
tions to the landlord ceased, but their productive resources were not in-
creased (De Janvry 1981:208-209; see also Albo´ 2007:86). This charac-
terisation of the Bolivian reform holds, as far as it goes. It suggests that
the revolution only partly achieved its manifest redistributive objectives
and therefore remained truncated.
De Janvry (1981) frames his discussion in terms of roads to capital-
ism and does not comment on the fact that the revolution and the land
reform did not take account of the multi-ethnic composition of the Bo-
livian population or of the persistence of indigenous forms of organisa-
tion such as the ayllu. As noted, the term ‘Indio’ was banned from offi-
cial discourse, the multicultural composition of the ‘nation’ was thus
declared a non-issue, and the forms of local organisation regarding
rights to land and land use were not taken into account. While the re-
form brought a break-up of the hacienda system in the valleys and part
of the highlands, the promised restitution of lands to the communities
hardly got off the ground. Rivera Cusicanqui and Thoa (1992:46, 61-
63) qualify the reform as ‘liberal and individualist’ and underline its
failure to take indigenous forms of organisation into account where
land tenure arrangements and where community and supra-commu-
nity organisation are concerned. Nonetheless, despite legislation, com-
munities largely persisted in their adherence to the pro-indiviso princi-
ple of collective title and the distribution of lands according to custom-
ary rules of inheritance, transfer, and land management.
To implement the reform, two state agencies were created: a Servicio
Nacional de Reforma Agraria (SNRA) was created in 1953 and an Institu-
to Nacional de Colonisacio´n (INC) in 1966. The pace of the reform,
however, was very much set by post-revolutionary developments, emer-
ging policy orientations, and elite power struggles. The first years were
characterised by peasant and community mobilisation in the western
part of the country, but by the 1970s attention had shifted to the east-
ern lowlands. Under the military government of Hugo Banzer Sua´rez
(1971-1978), large swaths of the lowlands, particularly in Santa Cruz,
were transferred to large landowners supposedly dedicated to commer-
cial sugar and rice production, cattle raising and, from the mid-1970s
onward, soy production (Lavaud 1991:173-180; PNUD 2004; Thiesen-
husen 1995:51-68). Further fraudulent land allocations took place un-
der the narco-dictatorships – the military governments that were
strongly involved in cocaine production and trade – of the late 1970s
and early 1980s (Solo´n 1995).
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Meanwhile, the Instituto Nacional de Colonisacio´n (INC) promoted
some ‘directed colonisation projects’, principally in the tropical Chapare
and Chimore´ regions of Cochabamba, the hot yunga valleys of northern
La Paz, and in an area north of Santa Cruz (Yapacanı´, San Julian).
However, ‘spontaneous colonisation‘ became prevalent, with peasants
from the highlands migrating to the lowlands on their own account
(Lavaud 1991:178-179). At the same time, the INC came to play a role
in land distribution, parallel to the SNRA. Both institutions became
marred by corruption, and land distribution and titling turned into to-
tal chaos. When, in 1992, the two institutions were finally audited by
the state, it was estimated that between 30 and 60 percent of the na-
tional territory was affected by overlapping titles, and that in some
cases as many as seven titles might overlap. Up to 60 per cent of the
owners had questionable property rights due to overlap, irregular pro-
cedures, and other factors (MACPIO 2001:51-53; see also World Bank
1995). Given this situation of institutional chaos and corruption, when
it came to tenure security, the fact of having a title was most often of
limited relevance. It was often the local community, organised in var-
ious ways – as ayllus or as peasant unions, as will be discussed below –
that would grant security on the condition of fulfilling obligations to
the community (see, for example, Pacheco and Valda 2003:121-153).19
After some thirty years of land reform, the chaotic and corrupted im-
plementation resulted in a renewed polarisation of land distribution.
The 1984 agrarian census, which was only partial, suggested that 86.6
per cent of the holdings it covered amounted to only 3.7 per cent of the
land (see World Bank 1995). This is the result of the post-reform frag-
mentation of landholding in the Andes region and the concentration of
landholding in the lowlands, where large ‘modern’ enterprises arose,
surrounded by a scattering of smallholders (Urioste and Pacheco
2000).
A further aspect of the reform process that deserves attention is the
way in which it affected forms of peasant-indigenous organisation. The
1953 agrarian reform Decree recognised the peasant community and
accorded it legal personality, and also recognised the sindicatos (peasant
unions), but it failed to consider the persistence of the ayllu in particu-
lar regions, such as northern Potosı´.20 According to the law, through
their legal representatives the communities could represent the inter-
ests of their members and should promote the well-being of the popu-
lation in the areas of education, housing, health, production techni-
ques, and economic and social relations, as well as promoting forms of
cooperativism. The law further specified that these communities were
independent, that no associations of communities could be established,
and that they could not become part of centrals, federations, confedera-
tions, or other public entities. The peasant community differed from
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the peasant unions, the law said, in that it did not pursue goals of class
struggle against sectors or elements foreign to the community, and be-
cause it could not become part of provincial, departmental, or national
organisms. The law recognised the sindicatos as a means both to defend
the rights of their members and to preserve those rights once gained.
Sindicatos would intervene in the implementation of agrarian reform,
and they could be independent or affiliate themselves with central or-
ganisms. This provided the framework for the top-down promotion of
peasant unions and their centralisation in the Confederacio´n Nacional
de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCB).
The union structure soon became a patronage machinery through
which the rural population became tied to the MNR-dominated state
(Rivera Cusicanqui 2003). Under the Barrientos dictatorships and gov-
ernments (1964-1969), this relationship between the state and the
CNTCB would be formalised in the Pacto Militar Campesino, and on
various occasions the peasantry would be mobilised to confront radica-
lised miners and workers. It is not the place here to delve deeply into
the vagaries of the state-peasantry (indigenous) association, but we
should note that this association was undermined by the attempt of
the Barrientos government to introduce a new rural property tax and
came definitely to an end with the heavy-handed repression of peasant
protests against the economic policies of the Banzer regime in 1974.
Under such circumstances the peasantry made various efforts to break
away from military tutelage. The most important development was the
rise of katarismo within the CNTCB, a process that involved the recup-
eration of Indian identity and a rejection of the designation as ‘peasan-
try‘, though the organisation in unions was accepted.21 The unraveling
of the Pacto Militar Campesino brought a realignment with the workers’
movement in opposition to the military regimes, and in 1979 the
CNTCB was transformed into the Confederacio´n Sindical U´nica de Tra-
bajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) (Albo´ 1991; Ca´rdenas 1988;
Rivera Cusicanqui 2003; Ticona Alejo 2000; Yashar 2005:154-181).
It should be noted here that the spread of peasant unionism resulted
in a regionally differentiated pattern of local organisation. In areas
where the hacienda system had predominated, such as the Cochabam-
ba valleys and the highlands north of La Paz, the sindicato became the
predominant form of community organisation. In other areas, however,
such as northern Potosı´, the ayllu persisted despite attempts to impose
the more ‘modern’ form of peasant unions, while in still other areas
peasant unions and more traditional forms of organisation virtually
merged (Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste, and Albo´ Corrons 1995; Yashar
2005:160-161). In other words, the legal distinction between peasant
union and community, and its disregard of the ayllu, were rather artifi-
cial.
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Tenure security 40 years later
Such aspects have to be taken into account if we want to assess the de-
gree of tenure security in different regions of the country and for dif-
ferent categories of landholders on the eve of the reform of agrarian
legislation in the mid-1990s. A further issue that arises from the fore-
going discussion is that perhaps we should distinguish more clearly be-
tween tenure security and security of access.
Let me start with the second point. Tenure security is often viewed
in terms of the secure right of an individual or a family to a certain
plot of land. The modes of community-level regulation in the Andes
and in eastern lowland Bolivia call such a concept into question. As-
signment of plots in a context of crop rotation in the highlands has his-
torically relied on collective decision-making. Rights to some plots
might resemble full ownership in the sense that while their duration
was assured, transfers would be regulated by community rules and
would be limited to intra-community transfers. In other cases collective
rules and decisions about assignments of rights to plots or access to
the commons would play a more determining role. Although the right
to a determined plot might not be secure, the access to land and re-
sources might be quite certain for stakeholders in the community who
comply with their obligations to the community, whether organised ac-
cording to the ayllu pattern, the peasant union mode, or some hybrid
organisational form that combines Andean cultural patterns with the
peasant union mode of organisation. Stakeholdership thus is the ulti-
mate criterion for tenure security or security of access.22 While it is of-
ten assumed that tenure security is the precondition for investment
and therefore for ‘development‘, this suggests an inverse logic: invest-
ment in a community effort is a precondition for tenure security.
Something similar could be said about the complex constellation of lo-
cal rights in the oriental lowlands where cultivation rights may not co-
incide with hunting or gathering rights.
This is related to the first issue. As noted, the indigenous-peasant
community can be viewed as a ‘mini-state in conflict‘. The Bolivian
state was and still is notorious for its precarious presence, at best, in
most of its territory. It hardly corresponds to the Weberian imagery of
a monopoly of violence within a certain territory, and still less to the
idea of ‘legitimate violence’. Until the 1952 revolution, control of the
rural population was mostly delegated to private local powerholders, oc-
casionally backed up by the army. With the break-up of the hacienda
system in the highlands and valleys, the ayllu and peasant union mode
of organisation gained importance in regulating local tenure arrange-
ments, while the state remained something rather remote and second-
ary. As to the eastern lowlands, state agencies promoted colonisation
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by highland peasants and increasingly favoured the creation of large
landholdings for a small but powerful local elite.
If we then seek to assess tenure security/insecurity for different cate-
gories of landholders in different regions, we can say that in the high-
lands and valleys, tenure became relatively secure in the wake of the
1952 revolution. Although a process of titling got under way, it was car-
ried out in a haphazard fashion and became increasingly chaotic. What
really mattered were arrangements on the ground among stakeholders,
organised according to patterns rooted in Andean culture and agricul-
tural systems, and with varying degrees of influence on the part of the
peasant unionism promoted after the 1952 revolution. Conflicts over
land, which can be taken as an indicator of tenure insecurity, were not
absent in this region, but in the wake of the 1953 reform and in the
context of subsequent policies, agrarian conflict definitely ‘migrated’ to
the eastern lowlands.
In the highlands and valleys, intra-community conflict came to be re-
lated to inheritance issues and would most often be resolved at the
community level through the intervention of the peasant union or ayllu
authorities. Inter-community conflicts might go back to the early re-
publican period and its drawing of administrative borders. Such con-
flicts involve more than tenure security, since they relate to local juris-
diction and territoriality.23 As we will see, such issues became increas-
ingly prominent in the course of the 1990s and represent one of the
questions to be faced by the current government. They involve the is-
sue of imagining and actually construing a plurinational state.
In the highlands and valleys, security of tenure is not the main is-
sue. The more important issue became the fragmentation of landhold-
ing among the nietos de la reforma agraria – the grandchildren of the
agrarian reform – (Urioste, Barraga´n, and Colque 2007) and the aban-
donment of the highlands and valleys (Urioste 2003) in the post-1952
agrarian policies that opened up the Bolivian market for USA dumping
and increasingly privileged the eastern lowland agro-industrial sector.
After the 1953 reform, agrarian policies became increasingly geared
to promoting the occupation of the lowlands through colonisation by
peasants from the highlands and the sponsoring of large-scale agro-in-
dustries, cattle raising, and timber exploitation. The lowland indigen-
ous peoples came under increasing pressure from this expanding fron-
tier and by the 1970s began to organise to defend themselves from
such encroachments.
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Multiculturalism and the reform of the reform
In 1982 Bolivia returned to civilian rule, and after a first attempt to re-
suscitate the national revolutionary economic model, which ended in a
deep economic crisis, under the Paz Estenssoro government (1985-
1989) a harsh structural adjustment policy was introduced that became
known as the ‘first generation reforms‘.
Meanwhile, as the grip of katarismo within the CSUTCB weakened
and traditional left-wing currents – now incorporating some elements
of indigenista discourse – became hegemonic (Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and
Monje 2004:118), new developments were taking place in the eastern
lowlands. With the help of anthropologists, the indigenous peoples of
the region had begun to organise to defend their interests. A Confedera-
cio´n de Pueblos Indı´genas del Oriente Boliviana (CIDOB) had been cre-
ated in 1982, and over the following years a series of other local organi-
sations emerged under this umbrella organisation (Diez Astete 1998;
Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and Monje 2004). In August 1990 some 300 indi-
genous inhabitants from the lowlands initiated a March for Territory
and Dignity from the town of Trinidad to La Paz, where 800 marchers
arrived after about a month. They protested the incursion of logging
companies and cattle ranchers on what they considered their terri-
tories. As one of the leaders of the march recalls:
We the indigenous made the paths to our fields and along these
same paths came the carayanas, that is, the White people. As
they were knowledgeable in documents and papers, they began
to consolidate the land, because they themselves were the autho-
rities. ‘Ok, this mine. Here is my title. What do you have? Noth-
ing, Eh?’ they would say. So we went further into the bush. We
established our villages. But the White people came, so again we
went further in, and again and again, until there came a time
when there was nowhere else to go. When a wild animal is
wounded, cornered and has nowhere to escape to, the only thing
left for it is to attack (Me´ndez Vedia 2007:72).
The march was a spectacular event that suddenly dispelled the ‘invisi-
bility’ of the lowland indigenous population and drew attention to their
plight. The moral impact of the march prompted President Jaime Paz
Zamora (1989-1993) to immediately issue several decrees recognising
four indigenous territories. He also created a commission that was to
prepare legislation regarding the indigenous peoples of the Oriente and
the Amazon. During the years that followed, more decrees were issued,
bringing the number of territories recognised in this way up to nine.24
In 1991, Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal
LAND TENURE IN BOLIVIA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO POST-NEOLIBERALISM 305
Peoples in Independent Countries (Terceros Cue´llar 2004), and during
the Paz Zamora government a project for constitutional reform was
prepared, which was to include the recognition of the ‘pluri-multi’ com-
position of the population.
Multi-culturalist reforms under neoliberalism
That reform package was further elaborated under the Gonzalo ‘Goni’
Sa´nchez de Lozada government (1993-1997)25 and ratified in early
1995. A new article 1 recognised the multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural
nature of the Bolivian population, and article 171 recognises, respects
and protects the social, cultural and economic rights of the indigenous
peoples. It specifically mentioned their rights to Tierras Comunitarias
de Origen (originary community lands) and recognised the legal person-
ality of indigenous and peasant communities and sindicatos, as well as
the judicial function of the natural authorities of the indigenous and
peasant communities as a form of alternative conflict resolution. Boli-
via thus entered the era of multi-culturalism. Vigorously pursuing the
neoliberal macro-economic course that had been set out in 1985, the
Sa´nchez de Lozada government introduced a series of ‘second genera-
tion’ reforms, including ‘capitalisation‘ (privatisation linked to a contro-
versial reform of the pension system) of the major public enterprises.
Other reforms included elements of multi-culturalism, such as the
Popular Participation Law (1994), a decentralisation measure that cre-
ated over 300 new municipalities, an education reform (1994) which
introduced bilingual education, and new agrarian and forestry legisla-
tion (1996), among others.
Reform of the agrarian legislation was prompted by the 1992 ‘Boli-
bras’ scandal.26 This had exposed CNRA-INC corruption and resulted
in the ‘intervention’ of the institutions in order to conduct a juridical
audit. The initially foreseen intervention period of three months proved
far too short to make sense of the chaos, and in the end the suspension
of activities of the institutions lasted until 1996. Meanwhile, new agrar-
ian legislation was initiated with the support of the World Bank
(1995).27 In 1994 the Sa´nchez de Lozada government presented an in-
itial proposal, called ‘INTI’ (Ley del Instituto Nacional de Tierras), which
was conceived as an instrument for institutional ordering without
touching upon tenure issues, which were to be dealt with in a future
new land law. The general orientation was one of market enablement
and market-assisted reform. In response, peasant and indigenous orga-
nisations presented a hastily drafted counterproposal, the ‘INKA’ law
(Ley del Instituto Nacional Kollasuyo-Andino-Amazo´nico).
By early 1995 a commission was created to formulate new legisla-
tion, consisting of government, business sector and indigenous and
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peasant representatives (Terceros Cue´llar 2004:38). Complex negotia-
tions began in which, on various occasions, ‘consensus’ was reached
and then undone by unilateral interventions by the executive. Such in-
terventions prompted the indigenous and peasant organisations to call
for a March for Land and Territory, Political Rights and Development
in August 1996. New negotiations revealed the fragility of the alliance
between the lowland indigenous organisation CIDOB, which had
gained some important concessions regarding territorial rights, and
the CSUTCB and CSCB (Confederacio´n Sindical de Colonizadores de Bo-
livia), respectively representing the highland ‘peasant-workers’ and the
‘colonisers’ from the highlands who had established themselves in the
eastern lowlands. These last two organisations withdrew from the ne-
gotiation process and accused the CIDOB of treason. On the other
hand, commercial enterprises – in particular those of the Santa Cruz
region – also vehemently opposed the proposed legislation because it
did not fully open up the market in land and contained stipulations
about the social-economic function of land instead of recognising abso-
lute ownership rights. The new law was nonetheless approved in par-
liament, and on 18 October 1996 vice-president Vı´ctor Hugo Ca´rdenas
promulgated the Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Ley No.
1715) commonly known as Ley INRA (Instituto Nacional de Reforma
Agraria) (CIDOB 1996; Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and Monje 2004; Herna´iz
and Pacheco 2000; Loayza Caero 2000; Salvatierra G. 1996; Terceros
Cue´llar 2004).
As a result of this process, the new law is a ‘hybrid’, which only
partly liberalises the land market. It is therefore classified as a special
case by Deere and Leo´n (2000) because it is not an all-out market-or-
iented reform, as was the case in many other Latin American coun-
tries, but retains elements of social justice (see also Urioste and Pache-
co 2000). The INRA law distinguishes between properties that con-
form to a ‘social function’ and those that have to comply with a ‘social-
economic’ function. In the first category we find the lands that should
contribute to the well-being and economic development of their own-
ers, according to the carrying capacity of the land. Lands in this cate-
gory are not subject to land tax. They are:
– The solar campesino or residential plot, which may not be divided or
mortgaged but can be sold under certain conditions.
– Small properties that provide the owner and family with a liveli-
hood and thus ensure their economic survival. These holdings, too,
cannot be divided or mortgaged but may be sold under certain con-
ditions.
– Communal properties, which are collectively titled to the corporate
unit for subsistence purposes. They cannot be sold, mortgaged or
divided.
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– Tierras comunitarias de origen are the habitat of indigenous or origin-
ary peoples and communities, where they live according to their
own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation.28
Lands that should comply with a social-economic function should be
dedicated to agrarian production, forestry, research, eco-tourism or bio-
diversity protection. In this category we find:
– Medium-size agrarian properties, which can be sold and mortgaged
and are subject to land tax.
– Commercial agri-business enterprises, which can be sold and mort-
gaged, and also have to pay land tax.
Land tax was intended to stimulate market-led redistribution of rural
property. However, the taxation rate was established in direct relation
to the value of the land as declared by the owner and therefore became
ineffective as an incentive for market-led redistribution.29
Land redistribution could also occur through two other mechanisms:
reversion and expropriation. Reversion – without indemnification – to
the state could occur as a result of ‘abandonment’ of the land. Payment
of the land tax, however, was considered proof that the land was not
abandoned. Expropriation – with an indemnification according to the
self-declared tax value – could occur if the socio-economic function was
not fulfilled or related to public utility goals. Reverted land would be-
come part of the stock of the tierras fiscales (public lands), which were
preferably to be redistributed in favour of peasant and indigenous com-
munities (not individuals) by way of endowment (dotacio´n), at no cost.
Peasant and indigenous organisations could thus demand land from
the state, when and where it was available. The other mechanism fore-
seen was the grant (adjudicacio´n) at the market rate, through public
auction.
The process was to be accompanied by a clarification (saneamiento)
of land rights to be concluded ten years after the introduction of the
law. This could take three modalities: first, on request of the interested
party (saneamiento simple, SAN SIM); second, ex office, as a result of ca-
dastral survey (saneamiento integrado al catastro legal, CAT SAN); and
third, in the tierras comunitarias de origen (TCO SAN) where the rights
of third parties were to be clarified.
The INRA law was the outcome of negotiations among a series of in-
terest groups. Those who gained the most, theoretically at least, were
the indigenous peoples of the lowlands. They saw the territories recog-
nised by Supreme Decrees between 1990 and 1992 confirmed as
TCOs, which would be provisionally titled pending clarification of the
rights of third parties. The law also admitted sixteen new demands for
TCOs in the lowlands and opened the way for further demands. How-
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ever, it provided little solace for the highland indigenous peasantry, as
it largely implied a confirmation of the status quo of fragmented land-
holding that had resulted from the 1953 reform. And for those who mi-
grated to the lowlands, the promise of reversion and redistribution of
lands that did not fulfill a social-economic function remained unful-
filled.
Although INRA was required by law to complete the process of title
clarification within a ten-year period, this activity has been exceedingly
slow and frustrating in many cases. Regulating legislation was issued
in July 1997 and was strongly criticised for its highly technical lan-
guage, the demanding conditions to enter the clarification procedure,
the complex and bureaucratic nature of the procedure itself, and the
room it left for discretionary decisions (Terceros 2004:77, 95). By May
2005, of a total of some 107 million hectares subject to the clarification
process, nearly 15 million (fourteen per cent) had effectively been clari-
fied, 37.5 million hectares (35 per cent) were being processed, while for
54.8 million hectares (51 per cent) the process had not yet begun
(INRA 2005; see also BID 2005:3 and Kay and Urioste 2007).30
Progress in accomplishing this task has depended heavily on multi-
lateral and international cooperation. The Inter-American Development
Bank and the World Bank have supported title clarification projects in
the Departments of Santa Cruz and La Paz and part of the Beni De-
partment, areas regarded as crucial for export agriculture (see BID
2005:11). The Danish government has strongly supported the titling of
TCOs; the Dutch were involved in setting up a cadastral survey in the
Department of Chuquisaca,31 while the International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development supported the clarification and titling of areas
where conservation objectives and indigenous claims overlap. For its
part, the European Union supported ‘alternative development‘ in the
Chapare region, while USAID sponsored land titling lands in that
same region (BID 2005:9; Farthing and Kohl 2005).
A number of difficulties with the titling process have been identified
by the Inter-American Development Bank (BID 2005). To begin with,
it objects that only part of the clarified area has also been inscribed in
the property register (cadastre), which it attributes to bureaucratic pro-
cedure and to problems with payment for the land received. According
to the BID, Supreme Decree 27145 of August 2003 may help to over-
come these problems. This ordinance extended the term of payment
for adjudicated lands from one to ten years.32 The decree also made it
possible to convert small properties, which have to comply with a social
function, into medium-size property, which has to comply with a so-
cial-economic function and can be mortgaged (BID 2005:3-5).33
In the second place, the BID (2005:8) claims that the World Bank-
supported project for clarification of titles in the Santa Cruz and La
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Paz Departments has not only contributed to clarification covering
some 1.9 million hectares, but also has identified 500,000 hectares of
public lands for redistribution. INRA (2005), however, only mentions
45,606 hectares for distribution in the whole country, and in negotia-
tions between highland peasant-indigenous organisations and a minis-
terial delegation in September 2000, during the Banzer administration
(1997-2002), the 3.8 million hectares available for distribution was a
figure plucked from the sky by the minister (Defensor del Pueblo
2003). This suggests that realistic numbers are hard to obtain and sub-
ject to quite a bit of political manipulation. It also suggests that redis-
tribution is severely limited as a result of pressures by the large land-
holders who circumvent the INRA law by fictitious subdivisions, or by
moving herds from one place to another – ‘cattle tourism‘ – to convince
inspectors that the land is fully used.34
In the third place, the BID signals that where TCOs are concerned,
at the national level 5.9 million hectares have been clarified and titled,
while 12.5 million hectares are being processed. These figures fall far
short of the total of 32 million hectares demanded as TCO. Here we
may observe a number of things. First, that the process of TCO delimi-
tation and titling is rather complex, costly and bureaucratic and that,
despite international backing, it has proceeded slowly. Second, the pro-
cess involves clarification and settling rights acquired by third parties
(terceros). This means that the numbers of hectares clarified under the
SAN TCO model do not simply refer to areas clarified to the benefit of
indigenous peoples, but include also the lands claimed by others. Ro-
mero Bonifaz (2001:221) suggests that this may amount to nearly 60
per cent of the area clarified under the SAN TCO model. Ever since
the proclamation of the INRA law, not only its own deficiencies but,
above all, the lack of political will to implement it without bias in fa-
vour of the landholding elites of the eastern lowlands have generated
frustration and conflict (Assies 2003; Villanueva I. Arturo D. 2004; see
also Pacheco, this volume).
Forest and subsoil resources fall under different legislation. Forestry
concessions, which were reconfirmed under the 1996 Forestry Law on
the argument that they preceded the Agrarian Law, overlap with
TCOs.35 For the TCOs this constitutes a grave problem that has led to
criticism by the ILO. Similarly, mining concessions, oil exploitation
and transportation affect the TCO (Martı´nez 2000). Such problems,
among other things, prompted indigenous people and peasants from
the lowlands to undertake their ‘Third March’ for Lands, Territories
and Natural Resources in June-July, 2000. Ensuing negotiations re-
sulted in a modification of the procedure for TCO regularisation and a
special regime for the former rubber-producing and now Brazil nut-
producing northeastern Amazon region. Nonetheless, in one of its
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manifestations of bad faith, the Bolivian government signed an agree-
ment in September 2001 with the commercial interests in the Santa
Cruz region that went completely against what had previously been
agreed with the indigenous-peasant sectors (Assies 2003; Villanueva I.
Arturo D. 2004).
Two other issues deserve brief discussion. In the first place, when
the INRA law was finally promulgated, the CSUTCB condemned it
and has sought to modify it substantially or to replace it with a law of
its own making. In contrast to this stance, by the late 1990s new move-
ments consolidated in the highlands and sought to use the INRA law
to their benefit. Particularly in Oruro and Potosı´, a movement for the
‘reconstitution’ of the ayllu emerged from the mid-1980s onward, and
by 1997 this process culminated in the formation of the Consejo de Ayl-
lus y Markas del Qullasuyu (Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu,
CONAMAQ) (Choque and Mamani 2003; Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and
Monje 2004:324-348). This competitor takes the CSUTCB to task for
being sindicalista and propagating a ‘peasant-worker’ identity while at
the same time criticising the confrontational style of the CSUTCB
(Choque and Mamani 2003:167; Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and Monje
2004:336). CONAMAQ’s affinities lie more with the lowland CIDOB
and its often more pragmatic way of negotiating with government dele-
gations, sometimes verging on cooptation.36 The point to make here is
that CONAMAQ and similar organisational efforts that stress ‘tradi-
tionality,’ cultural revalorisation, ayllu-based development, etc.,37 cre-
ated the climate for TCO demands in the highlands (Rada Ve´lez 2003).
Initially, it was often thought that the TCO model would only apply
to lowland conditions and the particular practices of shifting agricul-
ture of that region’s indigenous peoples. A first TCO demand in the
highlands was filed by the Uru of the Popoo lake area.38 In 1999 this
demand was followed by a demand for 2.5 million hectares by the Que-
chua communities in the Northern Lipez province of Potosı´, who ar-
gued that the INRA law ‘not only applies to the ethnic groups of the
Oriente or Bolivian Amazon but also to the indigenous peoples of the
occident of our country, given the principle of generality of the law’
(Merz and Calizaya 1999:61). By mid-2003 the number of TCO de-
mands in the highlands had risen to 103, claiming nearly 12 million
hectares. According to Rada Ve´lez (2003), 62 of these demands can be
classified as micro-demands that do not exceed 15,000 hectares and
therefore will not allow for real territorial management. The meso-de-
mands (up to 500,000 hectares) number 36 and refer to community
and inter-community spatialities with limited possibilities for territorial
management, while five macro-demands refer to extensions over
500,000 hectares that would allow for a partial reconstitution of histor-
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ical territories, resource management, and some margin for indigen-
ous autonomy.39
We have seen that the 1953 agrarian reform law left open the possibi-
lity of combining collective communal title with individual titling, ac-
cording to the pro-indiviso principle. This combination was ruled out by
the 1996 INRA law that forced an either/or option. This has been
questioned by Pacheco and Valda (2003) and Urioste (2003), who high-
light the complex local combinations between private family property
and community property and argue in favour of juridical formulas of a
‘mixed’ nature.40 In contrast to this proposal, which would allow for
more market-based land allocation albeit according to community regu-
lations, Rada Ve´lez (2003) argues that the INRA law allows for the con-
version of collectively or individually titled lands into TCO and that this
can be the basis for a voluntary regrouping of properties that over-
comes the extreme fragmentation that has occurred in many cases.
This avoids an individual titling of lands that, in view of their exten-
sion, will not provide possibilities for productive development. Instead,
he advocates forms of community production as a more viable way
ahead.41 Additionally, he argues that the proposal of ‘mixed’ titling mis-
understands the territorial character of the TCO, which implies that
they are more than just a form of tenure.
That brings us to a second point, the governability of the TCOs and
their place in indigenous strategising. In this respect, it should be
noted that the INRA law is strictly about property. The term tierras co-
munitarias de origen was invented precisely to avoid any clear reference
to territories, because it was thought that recognition of a domain – im-
plying recognition of political authorities and jurisdiction – might lead
to a fragmentation or ‘balkanisation’ of the country (Vadillo 1997:343).
This contrasts with the case of Colombia, for example. In that country
the resguardos are recognised as collective property and at the same
time, at least theoretically, became political-administrative units on a
par with municipalities. The interesting thing here is to note that the
Bolivian Popular Participation Law of 1994, which was concerned with
administrative decentralisation, did involve a certain recognition of in-
digenous authorities and allowed for the creation of indigenous muni-
cipal districts under an indigenous subalcalde. It is becoming increas-
ingly clear that in various cases, indigenous groups have devised a dual
strategy. On the one hand, they stake their claims for TCO with the
agrarian authorities, and on the other, they pressure the municipalities
in which they find themselves to create an indigenous municipal dis-
trict that coincides with the TCO. It is a dual strategy of territorialisa-
tion. The next step then would be to part company with the original
municipality and become a municipality in its own right. While such
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efforts were part of silent strategising, by the mid-2000s they were pro-
pelled to the forefront of the national political agenda.42
Searching for new ways after neoliberalism
The election of Evo Morales, Bolivia‘s first indigenous president who
took office in January 2006, has brought a change in the country’s po-
litical climate, and among other things, the new government seeks to
address some of the issues discussed here. During the election cam-
paign the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) proposed a Pacto por la Tier-
ra (Pact for Land), and in late November 2006 it pushed an agrarian
reform bill (Ley de Reconduccio´n de la Reforma Agraria) through Con-
gress.43 It does not replace, but substantially modifies, the 1996 INRA
law and aims to speed up and broaden redistribution of land in favour
of indigenous and peasant communities (Urioste, Barraga´n, and Col-
que 2007:201-202). The intention is to redistribute some 20 million
hectares in favour of this sector, and according to government sources
some 2 million hectares have already been identified as public lands
that can be granted to indigenous and peasant communities.
One controversial aspect of the new law is that the social-economic
function of land is further specified and that it will be verified through
on-site inspection every two years. While peasant and indigenous orga-
nisations demanded verification every six months, the opposition de-
manded a five-year period on the argument that if it were otherwise,
banks would not be willing to supply the credit needed by farmers and
agri-business. Lands that do not fulfill their social-economic function
will revert to the state, which can then grant them to indigenous com-
munities as collective property or adjudicate them through public auc-
tion. In fact, this is not really different from the 1996 legislation and
the preference it established for granting land to indigenous and pea-
sant communities; however, in June 2006 the Morales government is-
sued a supreme decree that established that reverted land would only
be granted to indigenous and peasant communities as collective prop-
erty. The opposition advocated the possibility of individual grants. A
further controversy revolved around expropriation for public utility or
necessity with a compensation that takes market value into account.
The new legislation stipulates that the needs for ethnic reproduction
can be a cause for expropriation, and the government intends to apply
this, for example, to cases in which indigenous people live under con-
ditions of virtual slavery. The opposition wanted to limit the potential
scope of this principle by specifying that it would apply only to four in-
digenous peoples. Another issue was that according to the new legisla-
tion, decisions on agrarian rights by the director of the INRA can only
be appealed at the National Agrarian Tribunal in Bolivia‘s capital Sucre.
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According to the opposition, this reflects an undue centralisation of
agrarian justice.
This question of centralisation and decentralisation of agrarian jus-
tice is related to another controversial issue that will have to be ad-
dressed by the Constituent Assembly that started to meet in August
2006, namely that of ‘autonomy‘. Over the past few years the move-
ment for autonomy at the department level has developed, led by the
Santa Cruz Civic Committee, where agri-business interests are promi-
nently present. The type of autonomy they pursue would, it is sus-
pected, tighten the grip of local elites on local government and on
agrarian justice to the detriment of the poor and the indigenous sec-
tors. This has triggered a lively debate in which a spate of counterpro-
posals has been forwarded. These include ideas about indigenous
autonomies at various scales and levels, for example to address the gov-
ernability problems of TCO discussed above. The outcome of the pro-
cess is difficult to foresee, but it suggests a profound administrative
and institutional redesign of the Bolivian state in which the chances of
it becoming ‘plurinational and intercultural, with autonomies’ (Albo´
and Barrios Suvelza 2006) cannot be discounted.
An urbanising country
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, urbanisation in Bolivia ac-
celerated after the 1952 revolution and was further boosted by the
structural adjustment measures since the mid-1980s. In 1950 the
country had about 2.7 million inhabitants, of whom 708,568 (26 per
cent) lived in urban areas, while by 2001 it had 8.2 million inhabitants,
of whom 5,165,882 (62 per cent) lived in urban areas, defined as areas
with more than 2,000 inhabitants.44 Due to the development policies
after 1952, Bolivia’s urban system became structured around what is
called a ‘central axis’ consisting of the agglomerations around the cities
of Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz-El Alto.45 The metropolitan re-
gions of these cities account for 67 of the 156 cities in the country and
concentrate 45 per cent of the urban population (Guardia B. 2004;
Ministerio de Desarrollo Econo´mico 2005b).
The process of rapid urban expansion has been disorderly and with-
out the necessary investment in public services. It is characterised by
irregular urbanisations and plots that have not been legalised, though
in contrast with other Latin American countries, most urban housing
plots have been acquired through purchase and sale contracts rather
than through illegal invasion. In such processes loteadores (urban devel-
opers) play a key role. They purchase tracts of rural land and subdivide
it into housing plots which then are sold through a system of install-
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ments. These are private transactions that do not involve legal titles to
the land, often because such lands are situated in a legal limbo as they
are classified as rural, though their incorporation into urban areas is
tolerated.
According to estimates, about 50 per cent of Bolivian households live
in dwellings46 they own as a result of a sale and purchase transaction
(Guardia B. 2004:168; Szalachman R. 1999). Especially for the lower
income sectors, the plots they can purchase often lack proper docu-
mentation or title and fail to comply with urban regulations, and addi-
tionally the conditions of access and services are insufficient. There are
other forms of access to housing including the cedida, a tenure situa-
tion in which a dwelling is temporarily lent, which is not at all uncom-
mon (Beijaard 1995). Beijaard even found that, at least in La Paz, it oc-
curs more frequently than renting. The cedida modality often involves
kinship relations. On the other hand, the weak development of a for-
mal rental market is often attributed to the post-revolutionary legisla-
tion regulating this form of tenure, which makes eviction very difficult
and sets the maximum rent to be paid at ten per cent of the cadastral
value of the property (IADB 2003; ILD n.d.).
For our purposes the regulations and forms of registry of urban real
estate are of particular interest. In 1887 a Ley de Inscripcio´n de Derechos
Reales (Law on the Registry of Real Rights47) was enacted and re-
mained operative until its modification and actualisation in 2004. Ac-
cording to this law, in each of the nine department capitals, a central
office was to be established where mutations in rights to real estate
could be inscribed on a voluntary basis in order to validate them and to
protect them from claims by third parties. These offices are part of the
judiciary, and they operate separately from the cadastre, which should
be managed by the municipalities. When the registry of real rights was
initiated, it was based on so-called folios personales, where the names of
the persons involved in property transfers were manually recorded in
‘books’, without much further information on the property itself, such
as its location, size, etc. The system was therefore quite unreliable.
Efforts at modernisation were undertaken in the late 1980s with the
introduction of computerised index cards, and in 2001 further efforts
were undertaken with the introduction of the folio real, which is related
to the property rather than to the person claiming rights to it (ILD n.
d.). It was only in late 2004, however, that the 1887 legislation was
modified and updated, and clear stipulations about the way in which ti-
tles to real estate could be registered were introduced, specifying its lo-
cation, size, borders, etc. The objective was to create an integrated sys-
tem for the registration of real rights to real estate in both urban and
rural areas. As we have already seen, the clarification of property rights
in rural areas has proceeded extremely slowly. For urban areas a new
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initiative was taken from the late 1990s onward, with the support of
the Inter-American Development Bank.
This registration system operates independently of the cadastres that
are to be managed by the municipalities, though some efforts at inte-
gration seem to have been made. One needs to keep in mind, however,
that until the introduction of the Popular Participation Law of 1994,
municipal administrations functioned only precariously in the nine de-
partmental capitals and in about ten larger cities. With the Popular Par-
ticipation Law the 314 provincial sections, administrative units that un-
til then only existed on paper, were transformed into municipalities
and assigned various responsibilities. They would also receive twenty
per cent of the national tax income, to be distributed according to po-
pulation size. Little progress seems to have been made, however, where
municipal cadastres are concerned, and where they exist, they seem
mostly to be in rather poor shape.
The creation of a legal framework for new initiatives regarding urban
land and the legalisation of irregular settlements was started in 1998
in an attempt to restructure the national housing policy.48 In June of
that year, the Banzer government signed a loan contract with the Inter-
American Development Bank with the objective of supporting the im-
plementation of a National Housing Policy. One component of this
programme was the regularisation of urban property rights. In May
2002 a Law for the Regularisation of Urban Property Rights was en-
acted, which was slightly modified in 2004. Implementation guide-
lines were issued by the end of that year charging the Vice Ministry for
Urban Development and Housing with the execution of the Program
of Support for Housing (PROVIVIENDA). The Vice Ministry was to
sign Agreements of Shared Responsibility with the municipal govern-
ments of La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Sucre in order
to carry out pilot projects of regulation of urban property rights. These
projects were to be the beginning of a rapid and massive conversion of
informal into formal properties.
The law seeks to promote titling and inscription in the Registry of
Real Rights of all urban real estate, whether inscribed or not in the
Registry on 31 December 2000, and it introduces extraordinary, tem-
porary procedures for the regularisation of municipal properties inhab-
ited by occupants before 31 December 1998. In the first case settle-
ments or urbanisations will be selected for regularisation. If there are
conflicts with third parties, the Ministry of Housing and Basic Services
will initiate an adverse possession procedure that should result in a
swift resolution in favour of the occupants of the terrain.49 A further
possibility is that the municipal government seeks to mediate between
the occupants and the third party. If this fails, it can proceed to expro-
priation on the grounds of public utility and necessity, provided the oc-
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cupants have agreed to pay for the land at a price established by the
municipality and have deposited that sum in a bank account in favour
of the municipality. The municipality pays for the land according to ca-
dastral value. In the second case, exceptionally, municipalities are
authorised to sell terrains they own to the occupants if they have been
present at least since 31 December 1998. Green areas and areas zoned
for other collective uses may not be sold. The remaining terrains will
be sold at cadastral value, and the occupants can receive a mortgage
credit of up to 95 per cent of that value.
According to the Ministry of Economic Development, 61,557 terrains
had been processed by the pilot programme by May 2005 and were
awaiting approval by the respective municipalities (Ministerio de Desar-
rollo Econo´mico 2005a). However, while the Ministry of Economic De-
velopment presented the pilot project as successful, the Instituto Liber-
tad y Democracia (ILD n.d.) signaled various difficulties, of a technical
nature but also related to politicisation of the programme, for which
reason it was suspended in El Alto. According to this evaluation, ‘the
most important programme for regularisation of urban land in Bolivia
had limited reach and could not fulfill its objectives, despite its ade-
quate design and the institutional reforms it introduced’. Although its
design was inspired by the ILD-sponsored experience in Peru, there
were also some differences that, according to the ILD, accounted for
the failures. One problem identified is that the PROVIVIENDA pro-
gramme did not concentrate competencies and functions but rather
acted as a coordinator, leaving decisions to municipal governments and
their political priorities. According to the ILD another problem is that
the Registry of Real Rights was not reformed and modernised, in con-
trast to the Peruvian case where a simplified registry process was set
up.
The current government of Evo Morales has established some guide-
lines for a housing policy based on the principle that access to housing
is a human right. It seeks to recuperate the role of the state and has
announced the objective of creating a million homes in five years to
benefit the low-income sectors. It also seeks to establish a land bank in
50 priority municipalities and the assignation of public lands for urba-
nisation projects as well the implementation of cadastral systems in
some 60 municipalities, both to facilitate urban planning, manage-
ment, and territorial ordering, and to enhance the legal security of
property rights. Such policies should also contribute to development,
or ‘living well’, in cities where individual exclusion as it now exists is to
be replaced by intercultural integration. However, these guidelines have
only begun to be implemented so far.
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By way of conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to provide an overview of the develop-
ment of land tenure systems in Bolivia, taking account of their region-
ally differentiated nature. This overview shows the pull and push be-
tween indigenous land tenure systems and state regulation and the
way this transpires in designs for land tenure legalisation which, in
turn, are oriented by political circumstance and development policies
or models pursued. Designs for land tenure legalisation in Bolivia have
ranged from attempts at replacement of indigenous tenure systems to
what Hoekema (2006) has called forms of incorporation or recogni-
tion. Replacement to the detriment of indigenous landholding, for ex-
ample, was the state strategy that emerged in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, imbued with liberalism and racist ideologies. It al-
lowed for land-grabbing and an expansion of the hacienda. Certain
forms of incorporation were present in the post-1952 policies. The re-
forms introduced after 1993, in the context of neoliberal structural re-
adjustment, moved in the direction of the recognition type, which is
clearly linked to the ‘rhetorical constitutional recognition of multicul-
turalism’ (Van Cott 2000a).
The 1953 agrarian reform sought to bring an end to feudal relations
and introduced the notion of the social function of landownership.
Although it referred to the indigenous community and stipulated that
community lands were inalienable, the reform privileged individual
tenure and formally sought to promote modernisation. Overall eco-
nomic policies, however, resulted in a virtual ‘abandonment’ (Urioste
2003) of the indigenous peasantry of the highland and valleys . Mean-
while, in the eastern lowlands a sector of large landholdings was conso-
lidated. As a consequence of indigenous-peasant mobilisation, the
1996 legislation maintained the notion of the social function of landed
property, which came to cover the solar campesino, small properties,
communal properties, and the tierras comunitarias de origen (TCO),
while medium-sized properties and agrarian enterprises were to fulfill
a social-economic function and could be sold and mortgaged. Although
the legislation included some mechanisms for redistribution, these
have hardly been effective, and particularly in the eastern lowlands con-
flicts have increased in recent years.
The 1996 agrarian reform legislation addressed the territorial claims
of the lowland indigenous peoples, albeit in a limited way. And its im-
plementation has been an extremely slow and frustrating process. It
brought little solace for the highland indigenous peasantry. Their
plight is only partly a result of tenure systems and is due much more
to general agrarian and macro-economic policies. Some have argued
that promoting a land market might be helpful in bringing a redistri-
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bution toward more efficient producers, but others have argued that sa-
neamiento interno, negotiated regrouping of access to resources within
communities that hold collective title, may probably be more effective
(Kay 2005; Rada Ve´lez 2003; Zoomers 1998).
The 1996 legislation addressed indigenous territorial claims in a
limited way in the sense that it understood the tierras comunitarias de
origen as ‘lands’ rather than spaces for social and cultural reproduction
and self-governance. It thus stopped short of what Hoekema (2006)
would call recognition. We noted that recently, indigenous commu-
nities - ‘mini-states’ as Carter and Albo´ (1988) called them, referring to
the Aymara communities in particular - have pursued a dual strategy
in staking territorial claims through agrarian legislation and seeking
further recognition of their local organisational structures through the
Popular Participation Law, which would then result in the formation of
indigenous municipalities and bring territory and self-governance to-
gether; land being not just an asset but also a space for social and cul-
tural reproduction (see also Urioste, Barraga´n, and Colque 2007). The
albeit sometimes reluctant occupation of spaces opened up by neolib-
eral multiculturalism, as Hale (2002, 2004) has called it, and the frus-
tration with the limits of such multi-culturalism and with neoliberal
policies in general, can help us understand much of what has been
going in Bolivia in recent years. At present, and in the years to come,
the country is likely to be a fascinating laboratory for the development
of post-neoliberal alternatives, including issues of land tenure, land
management, and territoriality in a diverse society.
Notes
1 This chapter is partly based on an article previously published in The Journal of Pea-
sant Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 569-611 and has greatly benefited from the editing
process for this journal. A first draft of the article was presented at the Conference
‘Land, Poverty, Social Justice and Public Action,’ organised by the Institute of Social
Studies (ISS) and the Inter-Church Organisation for Development and Cooperation
(ICCO), 12-14 January 2006, at The Hague, in the Netherlands.
2 Gonzalo Sa´nchez de Lozada of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaro (MNR, Na-
tionalist Revolutionary Movement), who had been the architect of the neoliberal
structural adjustment policies in 1985 and had been president between 1993 and
1997, when he presided over a series of ‘second generation’ neoliberal reforms, gar-
nered 22.5 per cent of the vote and eventually won the presidency.
3 The rise of the ‘New Left’ is reflected, to a greater or lesser degree, in the electoral
processes in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Ve-
nezuela.
4 It is commonly assumed that indigenous people constitute the majority of the Boli-
vian population. According to Bolivia’s 2001 census, the country counted nearly 8.3
million inhabitants of which 62 per cent (of those over fifteen years old) declared
themselves to belong to some indigenous people, principally the Quechuas (31 per
LAND TENURE IN BOLIVIA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO POST-NEOLIBERALISM 319
cent) and the Aymaras (25 per cent) of the Andean highlands and the colonisation
areas in the eastern lowlands, while the remaining six per cent accounts for some 30
different indigenous peoples in the eastern Amazonian lowlands (Instituto Nacional
de Estadı´stica 2003). For a recent, in-depth study of ethnic identification in Bolivia,
see Molina and Albo´ (2006).
5 By planting various small fields with the same crop the risks deriving from weather
circumstances (frost, rainfall, etc.) would be diminished. If in one field the crop
failed, in another it might at least yield something. A classic, and still authoritative,
account is the one by Murra (1980). As Goodale and Sky (2000:4) put it, ‘the inter-
nal organization of ayllus can best be conceptualised as a set of ‘Chinese boxes,’ with
each territorial and kinship unit part of an ever larger set of ethnic units, which cul-
minate in one grand unit …’. They further comment on ayllu land tenure that ‘[A]
way to envision how this works is to imagine a large quilt, covered with many differ-
ent patches’.
6 This arrangement provided the basis for a system of indirect rule and the division of
the colonies into a repu´blica de espan˜oles and a repu´blica de indios.
7 Three large regions are often distinguished in present-day Bolivia. The highlands (al-
tiplano) roughly correspond to the present day Departments of Potosı´ and Oruro and
part of La Paz. The valleys (valles) correspond to parts of the Departments of Cocha-
bamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija. The lowlands (tieras bajas) include the oriente region
(the Department of Santa Cruz), the Chaco (parts of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and Tar-
ija), and the Amazon, which covers the Departments of Pando and Beni as well as
the northern parts of the La Paz and Cochabamba Departments (cf. Terceros Cue´llar
2004:23).
8 The hereditary principle was gradually replaced by an elective system, and the ayllu
came to incorporate a civil-religious cargo system and became more ‘territorialised’.
9 According to Lavaud (1991:173) the number of communities (freeholding) declined
from 11,000 in 1847 to 3,779 by 1950. Community freehold here in the sense that
the ‘reciprocity pact’ and, where applicable, colonial titles to community lands were
respected.
10 Haciendas would be worked under the colonato system according to which workers re-
ceived a small plot to work on their own in return for a number of days of work on
the hacienda lands, as well as a series of other obligations. The system tended to be
more rigid in the highlands than in the more mercantilised valley regions.
11 Ideas about the social function of property can be traced back to late nineteenth-cen-
tury Catholic social doctrine and early twentieth-century West European social consti-
tutionalism. Private property is respected on the condition that it contributes to the
well-being of the population. The issue then becomes the definition of this contribu-
tion and its measurement.
12 The other two important emerging parties were the Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolu-
cionario (POR) and the Stalinist Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario (PIR).
13 ‘Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de accio´n inmediata,’ re-
produced in Arze Cuadros (Arze Cuadros 2002:605-643).
14 On the drafting of the decree, see Arze Cuadros (2002:160-161).
15 That is, communities that had managed to have their lands recognised under the late
nineteenth-century legislation.
16 The pro-indiviso mode worked through a system of double titling in which the com-
munity was titled but heads of households also received a certificate of their share in
the community lands.
17 Although redistributive land reform was on the agenda, Latin American governments
also promoted the occupation (colonisation) of the Amazon region in order to avert
redistribution and for geopolitical reasons. Redistributive reforms were therefore ac-
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companied by state-sponsored colonisation projects and ‘marches to the East’ (Peru,
Bolivia) or to the West (Brazil). The promise was to give ‘land without people to peo-
ple without land’, without taking into account that such lands were often used by in-
digenous peoples and, therefore, were not ‘without people’. State-directed colonisa-
tion schemes often failed to live up to their stated aims, but ‘spontaneous’ colonisa-
tion without state support came to play an important role.
18 Following Lenin’s classic 1899 study of the development of capitalism in Russia (Le-
nin 1979).
19 Although a presidential decree of 1955 stipulated that lands not worked for a period
of three years would automatically revert to the community, which then could redis-
tribute them, this decree had little effect. Tenure security rather depends on ‘internal
pacts’ within the local community (Urioste, Barraga´n, and Colque 2007:216).
20 The selvı´colas (woodland or jungle dwellers) of the tropical and sub-tropical lowlands
were set apart since they were considered to be in a ‘savage state and have a primitive
organisation’ and were to be protected by the state.The Summer Institute of Linguis-
tics and the New Tribes Mission came to Bolivia to bring them into ‘civilised life’.
21 Often a distinction is made between katarismo and indianismo. Whereas katarismo
emphasizes both class and ethnic identity, looking at reality ‘with two eyes’, indianis-
mo solely stresses ethnic identity.
22 More recently, this has given rise to a debate about the rights of residents, people
who most of the time live in a city or temprorily migrate to engage in rural wage la-
bour as part of their livelihood strategy but also retain their rights in the community
by complying with local obligations. Although they retain rights to community lands,
the modes of land use may change, for example by giving priority to cattle raising in-
stead of agriculture.
23 An instance of this kind of longstanding boundary dispute is the ‘war’ – in contrast
to ritual battles – between the Layme, the Qaqachaca and the Jukumani ayllus on the
border between the Departments of Oruro and Potosı´. In 2000 this dispute escalated
into extreme interethnic violence, claiming some 50 lives. It is far beyond the scope
of this essay to discuss this episode or similar disputes and their resolution through
the intervention of state agencies, international development agencies and NGOs.
24 The decrees are reproduced in Repu´blica de Bolivia 1996.
25 Taking account of opinion surveys, Sa´nchez de Lozada invited a moderate Katarista
leader, Vı´ctor Hugo Ca´rdenas, to join him in the race for the presidency, and Ca´rde-
nas became Bolivia’s first indigenous vice-president (Albo´ 1994; Van Cott 2000a).
26 Education Minister Hedı´m Ce´spedes and his Brazilian associates had obtained
100,000 hectares irregularly.
27 It should be stressed, however, that the push for reform of agrarian legislation also
had other antecedents. In 1983-1984 the CSUTCB had elaborated a Fundamental
Agrarian Law which was presented to President Siles Zuazo in 1984 ‘wrapped in ri-
tual Aymara textiles’ (Albo´ 1991:316), in line with katarismo uses. Albo´ highlights that
this proposal was not simply about redistribution of lands but contained an outline
for a new vision of the state. It centred on the community, the originary right to
lands and resources, the recognition of authorities and jurisdiction, among other
things. It also proposed the creation of a Corporacio´n Agropecuaria Campesina (CORA-
CA), which would be involved in marketing produce and procuring inputs and would
be managed autonomously by the peasant-indigenous organisations (the proposal is
reproduced in Urioste, Barraga´n, and Colque 2007:251-269). The initiative actually
gained some ground and received support from Dutch development cooperation,
among others, but it soon floundered due to ‘administrative problems and over-di-
mensioning’ (Albo´ 1991:333).
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28 The definition used in the law is clearly inspired on ILO Convention 169. The TCO
mode was basically geared to respond to the demands of the indigenous peoples of
the eastern lowlands and to legalise large extensions of land including various com-
munities.
29 By 2000, in the context of an ‘economic reactivation’ program launched by the Ban-
zer government (1997-2002), the land tax was reduced to insignificance.
30 For earlier critical overviews of the process, see Romero Bonifaz (2001, 2003). Funda-
cio´n Tierra (2004:30) comments that ‘Saneamiento has been carried out as if agrarian
reform has already ended and all that remains to be done is the legal formalisation
of property rights’.
31 For a critical evaluation, see Herna´iz et al. 2001.
32 This caused alarm among indigenous-peasant organisations because the extension of
the term of payment would further undermine the reversion mechanism that should
make land available for distribution through endowment, at no cost.
33 This was only one move in an ongoing ‘war of positions’ and overt and covert pres-
sures of indigenous-peasant organisations, on the one hand, and would-be entrepre-
neurs, on the other (Villanueva I. Arturo D. 2004).
34 By the mid-1990s a Movimiento Sin Tierra (Landless Movement, MST), similar to its
Brazilian counterpart, emerged in Tarija and then expanded to Santa Cruz and other
lowland departments (Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and Monje 2004). Through the occupa-
tion of unused or underused lands, or properties that do not comply with their so-
cial-economic function, the movement seeks to force a genuine redistribution and to
fend off evictions based on dubious title or simple encroachment by large land-
owners. Agrarian conflict has definitely migrated to the eastern lowlands and is in-
tensifying there with landowners organising ‘white guards’. In November 2001 six
landless peasants were killed, as well as one attacker, in what is known as the ‘Panan-
ti massacre’. Crabtree (2005:61) characterises the situation as a ‘political time bomb’.
35 According to law the TCO would have exclusive rights to the forest resources within
their perimeter. The government, however, argued that forestry concessions granted
before full legalisation of the TCO constituted ‘acquired rights’.
36 Much of the history still has to be written. The CIDOB itself is subject to splits and
realignments, as is CONAMAQ (Garcı´a Linera, Leo´n, and Monje 2004).
37 This goes in tandem with a formalisation and codification of organisational struc-
tures and regulations as, for example, in the Estatuto de la Organizacio´n Originaria de
Ayllus de Curawara Marrka, Provincia Sajama, Primera Seccio´n – Depearamento Oruro,
1999 (typos in the original) and its corresponding Reglamento Interno.
38 The Uru are considered the most ancient surviving people of the Andes region, living
around the Popoo lake in Bolivia and the Titicaca lake in present-day Peru. The story
goes that the Incas considered them so poor that they only required them to fill a
reed with fleas as tribute to the empire.
39 In 82 of the cases, the demand is for endowment, and in the remaining 21 cases, the
demand is to convert lands titled to the community under the 1953 legislation into
TCO.
40 Our studies on Mexico suggest a similar pattern: while people may be interested in
certification of individual or family rights, they do not relinquish community regula-
tions and hesitate about or reject the individualisation, titling and registration pro-
grammes promoted by government agencies.
41 The debate over more market-based and individualised resource allocation versus
communal management is ongoing and, on the one hand, will have to take account
of the often extremely complex forms of community- and inter-community-based re-
source management and allocation under difficult climatic and soil conditions while,
on the other hand, it should take account of the changing situation that has been
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characterised in terms of a ‘new rurality’, highlighting the complex combinations of
rural, urban and long-distance migration livelihood strategies that are affecting
modes of land use and tenure (Giarracca 2001; Kay 2005; Urioste, Barraga´n, and
Colque 2007).
42 For a recent contribution to the debate over the complex interrelationship between in-
digenous land tenure and territoriality in a context of social and economic change
see Urioste, Barraga´n and Colque 2007.
43 The law was approved in the Chamber of Deputies, where MAS is in the majority, on
15 November, but sessions of the Senate were boycotted by the opposition until two
suplentes (alternate senators) from the opposition and one senator made it possible to
adopt the law. Outside Congress, indigenous and peasant organisations and agri-busi-
ness interests mobilised in favour and in opposition to the reform proposal, respec-
tively. At the time a list of large landholders circulated, which documented how poli-
tically well-connected families had acquired huge extensions of land under previous
governments (for a detailed account see Fundacio´n Tierra 2007).
44 Note that this implies that the rural population is still growing in absolute terms.
45 In 1988 the city of El Alto became independent from La Paz.
46 The term vivienda includes independent houses, separate room(s) inside a larger
building or on a plot shared with other dwellings, apartments that consist of a num-
ber of rooms in a larger building or on the same plot as other dwellings but that, in
contrast to the category of separate room(s), have private service connections, and, fi-
nally, improvised dwellings.
47 Real rights refer to the ius ad rem of ancient Roman law, which establishes the rights
of a subject to an object of economic value and guarantees protection against claims
by third parties. Real rights not only refer to private ownership but include rental,
usufruct and other sorts of rights, provided that they are duly registered.
48 Since the mid-1920s, something like housing policies have existed in Bolivia under
various modalities without, however, coming near to really addressing, let alone sol-
ving, the problem of the housing deficit. By 1998 it was decided to extinguish the
Fondo Nacional de Vivienda Social (National Fund for Social Housing, FONVIS),
which had been created in 1992. Like most of the earlier initiatives, it was riddled
with corruption and had achieved very little. In 1998 a market-oriented National Pro-
gram to Subsidise Housing was launched, but this also seems to have been hardly ef-
fective.
49 Depending on the documentation the occupants can produce, they must have peace-
fully occupied the terrain for five or ten years. The adverse possession procedure does
not apply to public lands and cannot be invoked in cases of secondary or derived real
rights, such as renting, usufruct, guardianship, etc.
LAND TENURE IN BOLIVIA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO POST-NEOLIBERALISM 323

12 Problems undermining the titling and tenure
security of common-property lands: The case of
indigenous people of Bolivia’s lowlands
Diego Pacheco
Introduction
The recognition of indigenous jurisdictions has occurred in several
countries of Latin America in the last decade as a process closely linked
to the reforms of the state, not only as a result of indigenous people’s
protests and mobilisations (Assies 1999) but also in relation to the last
wave of the twentieth-century decentralisation policies (Pacheco 2007).
According to Van de Sandt (2003:125), one of the most notable features
of the Latin American new constitutional frameworks is that for the
first time in history they have come to acknowledge the multi-cultural
and pluri-ethnic character of Latin American societies and states, incor-
porating or reformulating the recognition and protection of indigenous
people’s rights.
It is now widely understood that property rights refer to an overlap-
ping bundle of rights and that there are multiple sources of property
rights, such as: the state, customary law, religious law, project law, and
local laws that provide the bases for claiming property rights (Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan 2002; Nkonya and Meinzen-Dick 2005). This sce-
nario has also been called a polycentric legal system (Lund 1998),
which suggests that legal and property relations do not evolve in a line-
ar fashion from the customary to the formal in a sort of legal central-
ism but that they can coexist in a given context (Manji 2006a).
Bolivia is a country marked by legal pluralism where individuals as
holders of rights and duties, and as members of different social net-
works, are subject to various legal orders (Prill-Brett 1994). In fact, Bo-
livia has initiated the implementation of the 1995 constitutional man-
date of recognising legal pluralism and certain territorial rights guaran-
teed by the state (Van Cott 2000b) in order to ensure collective tenure
security for indigenous peoples. In Bolivia as in other Latin American
countries – such as Colombia and Panama – new legal arrangements
for indigenous territorial autonomy have emerged, implying that indi-
genous peoples are allowed to govern themselves, within a certain terri-
tory and to a specific extent, according to their own cultural patterns,
social institutions, and legal systems (Assies and Hoekema 1994). And
it has been understood that in order to realise the foregoing postulates,
indigenous peoples must have a clear delimitation of their common-
property areas or territorial jurisdictions.
It is nowadays recognised that individualisation, titling, and registra-
tion (ITR) programmes often do not deliver the security they promise
and are difficult to implement. As a result of the critique of such pro-
grammes, the World Bank Policy Research Report (2003d) takes a
more flexible approach to communal titling. This report, drawn up by
Klaus Deininger, argues that at lower levels of development, communal
titling may be more cost-effective and may deliver a rather acceptable
degree of tenure security.1 However, the Bolivian experience shows that
the formalisation of indigenous2 rights to common-property areas is a
lengthy and complicated process ridden with uncertainty. In Bolivia,
the land regularisation process has not only been permanently delayed
but has also been hindered and distorted by the three powers of the
state: executive, judicial, and legislative (CEJIS 2001). This chapter ana-
lyses the broad set of hurdles in the process of titling common-prop-
erty areas that obstructs the fulfilment of the promise of giving legal
land tenure security to indigenous people. Taking the institutional ana-
lysis literature (e.g. Ostrom 2005) as a point of departure, I highlight
the three main problems we encounter in the regularisation of com-
mon-property areas, namely problems of a contextual, motivational, or
informational nature.
In order to analyse the extent to which these problems are mani-
fested in the context of Bolivia‘s lowlands, I discuss two demands for
regularisation of common-property lands or originary community lands
(Tierras Comunitarias de Origen or TCO) made by the indigenous peo-
ple of Guarayos and by the Chiquitanos-Monte Verde, both located in
the Department of Santa Cruz. It is important to notice that after
roughly twelve years of initiating the processes of land regularisation,
only half of the Guarayos TCO has been titled, while the process in the
Chiquitano TCO was formally concluded in 2006, and they received a
legal title in July 2007.
In this chapter I shall first compare the already titled part of the
Guarayos TCO with the area that has not yet been titled and analyse
the extent to which contextual factors are creating problems in the ti-
tling process and how this impacts indigenous people’s tenure security.
Second, by comparing the cases of the titling process carried out in the
Guarayos and Chiquitanos TCO, I seek to assess the influence of moti-
vational and informational factors in the land regularisation process
and how they impact tenure security.
I shall show that the rural context is highly dynamic, with a variety
of actors making their moves in order to influence the regularisation
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programme. Indeed, although these programmes were being carried
out, encroachment on forest land in the de facto possession of indigen-
ous peoples increased. The programmes themselves seem to provide
incentives for state officials and indigenous persons to become in-
volved in corrupt practices and free-riding. Asymmetric power relations
and lack of local control mechanisms contribute to this dynamic. I
further discuss how the problem of the Samaritan dilemma contributes
to delays in the process of land regularisation and maximises the im-
pact of the inefficiencies in the land regularisation process.
This chapter is divided into six sections, including this introduction.
The second section discusses the tenure situation of the indigenous
people of Bolivia‘s lowlands as well as the main antecedents of the
TCO land regularisation procedure. The third section introduces the
theoretical framework developed in order to give a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the problems that are likely to affect land regu-
larisation procedures and tenure insecurity. In the fourth section I dis-
cuss some aspects of the research carried out in the two TCO selected
for this study, namely the difficulties in achieving tenure security
through the titling process and the problems created by the titling pro-
cess itself. The fifth section is dedicated to a discussion of the main
findings in light of the theoretical framework adopted for this study.
And in the final section I summarise the main conclusions.
Background
Historically, the population of Bolivia‘s lowlands3 consisted of indigen-
ous groups who formed extended families and lived in domestic units
that developed highly mobile lifestyles adapted to their tropical forest
habitat. They combined shifting cultivation of small fields with hunt-
ing, fishing, and gathering. But particularly since the end of the nine-
teenth century, their access to forest lands has come under pressure as
their areas of forest use were not recognised, and they were not legally
empowered to defend them. Indeed, as soon as the new, independent
Republic of Bolivia was constituted in 1825, the national government
began a formal process of confiscation of indigenous people’s forest-
lands by declaring them to be part of the national domain, since these
areas were considered ‘empty’ and, even if they were inhabited, it was
thought that these populations did not deserve the same citizens’ rights
as other Bolivians (Fawcett 1910).
In the course of the nineteenth century, indigenous people’s forest-
lands were drastically reduced, and they were often forced to retreat to
ever more remote and impenetrable refuges. In the twentieth century
they faced an aggressive entry of forest concessionaries in a selective
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search for valuable tree species. In the 1970s, with the help of anthro-
pologists, a process of indigenous organisation got under way, bringing
together traditionally rival groups, in order to defend the areas needed
for their socio-cultural reproduction or indeed for sheer survival. In
1990 this organisation process enabled them to undertake a historical
March for Territory and Dignity from the city of Trinidad to La Paz, the
seat of government, located in the highlands at an altitude of nearly
4,000 metres. It is argued that for most Bolivian people, indigenous
groups did not exist until they presented their land claims for com-
mon-property regularisation.4 With this march the indigenous peoples
of the lowlands successfully pressured the government of Jaime Pas
Zamora (1989-1993) to recognise eight territories they had been able to
control despite all the encroachments and invasions.5
At that time, there were two types of forestlands accessed and used
by indigenous people through customary law: (1) consolidated lands
where the main settlements of the community were located and which
were mainly devoted to shifting agriculture and small-scale livestock
raising, and (2) open-access forest areas for hunting and gathering for-
est products. These two types of areas were held by indigenous people
under de facto customary–property rights. In some cases these forest-
land areas did not form a single unit but were usually scattered around
the demarcated and fenced land of the large estates that had en-
croached upon the areas traditionally used by the indigenous popula-
tion.
Customary law contains long-standing principles accepted by all
community members, which are adjusted to suit specific village situa-
tions and which are applied flexibly. Individuals are responsible for en-
forcing the rules within the community boundaries. Such rules usually
reflect the following principles: (1) community members are entitled to
use land but are not allowed to sell or mortgage forestlands; (2) all
community members, regardless of gender and age, have equal access
to the forest resources. Communities respect the right of ‘first come-
first served’ in claiming land and forest products and the right of ‘who
works will benefit’ in utilising common resources. In some indigenous
communities, however, the land was individually divided, correspond-
ing roughly to 50 ha per person;6 (3) precious and/or scarce forest pro-
ducts (e.g. game) are usually shared within the community, in that de-
limited areas are designed for hunting, and there are hunting regula-
tions according to dry or wet seasons; (4) the village community as a
whole – and not only the local leader – has the right to make decisions
regarding the management of natural resources. This includes the de-
cision to entrust individuals and/or groups with certain parts of the
land, e.g. agricultural fields; (5) outsiders, who ask for forest or land re-
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sources, are usually granted access to the resource if they promise to
live according to the indigenous groups’ principles.7
Regarding organisational arrangements, there are three major deci-
sion-making levels: (1) the community assembly, the major decision-
making body; (2) an elected committee of leaders whose composition
and responsibilities may vary from one locality to another but which
usually intervenes in the resolution of local disputes; and (3) a local lea-
der who is the visible head of the community. All authorities are
elected and removed freely according to their performance in carrying
out their duties. Communities belonging to the same indigenous
group are organised in an indigenous ‘subcentral’ __ a democratically
elected body in charge of managing both internal and external affairs
of the indigenous group as a whole.
Indigenous groups of Bolivia‘s lowlands have obtained legal titles
since the mid-twentieth century in three ways: (1) titles acquired
through claims of lands by Catholic and Protestant churches for the in-
direct benefit of indigenous people; (2) titles granted by the state as
common-property areas only at the level of small communities and in
very specific areas of the country; and (3) titles granted in 1996 to indi-
genous groups who participated in the first indigenous march for terri-
tory and dignity – eight in total – using Supreme Decrees, though the
total surface of the territory had to be validated through the new forest-
land regularisation process in a period of ten months (Herna´iz and Pa-
checo 2000).8
As noted earlier, the Bolivian legal framework has never favoured in-
digenous peoples. The demand for legal titling of indigenous territories
since the beginning of the 1990s showed that the biggest threat to ten-
ure security of indigenous people was the progressive encroachment of
agricultural estates, timber entrepreneurs, livestock ranchers, and
small-scale farming migrants from the highlands on their forestland
areas, significantly reducing the areas they occupied de facto.9 The
threat to tenure security consisted in the impediment to continue exer-
cising withdrawal rights in their open forest areas. Because of Bolivia‘s
particular historical process, tenure security for indigenous people is
very closely related, on one hand, to getting legal forestland tenure
and, on the other, to collectively defending the achieved legal property
rights.10
In the year 1996 a new agrarian law was approved in Bolivia __
known as the INRA11 law. The goals behind this new legal design were
to achieve a more efficient and transparent land administration system,
to clarify the land tenure situation, to identify public land suitable for
the settlement of small-scale farmers, and to promote a more sustain-
able use of Bolivia’s land resources (World Bank 2006). The new law
established new types of land property rights and a special common-
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property regime for indigenous people: the Originary Community
Lands or TCO. Although indigenous leaders were demanding the ti-
tling of indigenous territories, the new law designated the common-
property areas as TCO to make explicit the difference between this type
of property and the conventional understanding of indigenous terri-
tories, which includes jurisdiction and ownership rights regarding re-
newable natural resources. Indigenous groups thus can gain formal
collective proprietory rights over forestlands that they have occupied de
facto. All of the community’s members have withdrawal rights – the
right to make use of the forestland – but no alienation rights that
would allow them to sell or lease their forestland. The process of TCO
land regularisation is in practice a metre by metre battle between indi-
genous and other rural actors that due to different circumstances are
living within or claiming rights within the areas demarcated as TCO
demands.
The INRA law also adjusted the state organisation for land adminis-
tration and judicial conflict resolution by developing a new organisa-
tional framework for land administration and dispute resolution. The
National Institute of Agrarian Reform or INRA was established to un-
dertake the land titling procedure, and a National Agrarian Tribunal or
TAN was created to resolve land disputes. Additionally, the Land Super-
intendence was established to oversee sustainable land management.
In order to delimit rural land property rights, a process of land regular-
isation was launched, including all regions and rural actors, indigenous
populations among them. The regulatory framework for land titling is
very complicated and expensive, though for indigenous people a speci-
fic procedure has been elaborated: the TCO land regularisation process
or SAN-TCO. According to the 1996 law, the clarification of land rights
was to be executed in a ten-year period (through 2006), but since pro-
gress over the past ten years has been very modest, the period has re-
cently been extended for an additional seven years (to 2013).
During the process of land regularisation for the indigenous peoples,
the assessment of the rights of individual landholders – the so-called
‘third parties’ – is linked to the fulfilment of the Socio-Economic Func-
tion (FES). This means that state officials should verify that the clai-
mant is effectively working the area claimed. In practice, this implies a
very strong emphasis on the development of agricultural production
and cattle-raising activities because it has been more difficult to verify
the FES regarding forestry and biodiverse uses of forestland.
An indigenous group can obtain formal proprietory rights to the tra-
ditional forestlands that they have occupied de facto by filing a legal
TCO titling claim with the central government. After the reception of
the claim, two reports have to be elaborated by agencies of the Bolivian
government: (1) a report of the spatial and economic needs of the indi-
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genous people, which determines the amount of forestland that should
be titled in favour of the indigenous groups according to its socio-eco-
nomic needs, and (2) a certification of indigenous origin, which deter-
mines whether the claimant is indeed an indigenous group. Subse-
quently, land regularisation fieldwork is undertaken, consisting of the
demarcation of the TCO frontiers and the verification of the FES for in-
dividual landholdings within the area demanded as TCO. In some
cases this demarcation and verification are outsourced to private com-
panies because INRA lacks the technical and administrative capacities
to carry out the regularisation process, but such outsourcing rarely oc-
curs in the SAN-TCO process. Table 12.1 highlights the principal steps
in the SAN-TCO land regularisation procedure.
Table 12.1 Steps of the land regularisation process
Step Entity in charge Description
Formulation of the
land claim
Indigenous people Indigenous people formulate the forestland
claim.
Presentation of the
land claim
Indigenous people Indigenous people present the claim to the
Bolivian government.
Admission of the
land claim
National Director of
INRA
The INRA admit the land claim in order to
initiate the land regularisation process.
Certification of
indigenous identity
State entity in charge
of indigenous people
topics
The Bolivian government certifies if the
claimers are considered indigenous people.
Geo reference INRA national The physical delimitation of the TCO
boundaries is carried out.
Determinative
resolution of the
land regularisation
process
INRA national The INRA formally initiates the process of
TCO land regularisation.
Report of indigenous
spatial needs
State entity in charge
of indigenous people
topics
The Bolivian government establishes how
much forestland is required by the
indigenous people to satisfy their
subsistence needs.
Public campaign INRA departmental Local people are informed about the land
regularisation process.
Demarcation
fieldwork
INRA departmental
or land regularisation
enterprises
The delimitation of the TCO limits and of
the parcels of individual owners within the
TCO is developed.
Technical and
juridical evaluation
INRA departmental
or land regularisation
enterprises
The evaluation of the legal documentation
of the parcels of individual owners is carried
out.
Determination of
land price for parcels
subject to
adjudication
Agrarian
superintendence
The land price for land adjudication to
individual possessors of land within the
TCO is determined.
Publication of results INRA departmental
or land regularisation
enterprises
The results of the land regularisation
process are presented to the local people.
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In order to avoid conflicts between indigenous people and individual
private landholders within the TCO area, the law determines that the
latter should be titled only if they hold legal papers and fulfil the FES.
Thus, the process of land regularisation in a TCO implies the revision
of the legal documentation supporting the possession of the land and
the verification of the FES of such landholders in tandem with the
TCO demarcation. According to the Agrarian Law indigenous peoples
should be compensated with the same amount of forestlands as that
titled to landholders settled within the TCO area. Therefore, the TCO
land regularisation process is aimed at identifying, on the one hand,
which actors living within the demanded TCO area are considered legal
landowners, and on the other, expelling those who settled illegally and
demarcating the frontiers of the forestland belonging to each TCO.
In theory, indigenous people who have obtained legal title to a TCO
should be protected from the biggest threats to tenure security that
have emerged in Bolivia‘s lowlands in the last few decades. Neverthe-
less, the forestland regularisation process has been slow and bureau-
cratic, and the achievements are below the indigenous peoples’ expecta-
tions. At present, from among 52 TCO claims only 30 have been titled
(partly), representing only five million ha out of the twenty million ha
demanded as TCO. This is because the land regularisation is exces-
sively bureaucratic, procedures are complex, and agreements among
Step Entity in charge Description
Mistakes or
omissions retrieval
(to request)
INRA departmental The re-evaluation of some specific observed
mistakes is undertaken.
Final resolution of
the process
INRA national Resolution determining that the land
regularisation process has been concluded.
Notification of final
resolutions
INRA departmental The results of the land regularisation
process are notified to the landholders.
Resistance to TAN
resolutions
Persons considered
affected by the
process
Individual and collective owners if they want
can appeal the results of the land
regularisation process.
Resolutions of
endowment and
titling
INRA national Resolutions for granting land rights to
indigenous people and individual parcels’
owners are carried out.
Payment of
adjudication land
prices and land
regularisation fees
Buyers of land Individual land owners who possess land
legally are required to pay for the land
acquired.
Titling President of the
Republic
Titles are signed up.
Resolution declaring
land regularised area
INRA national The final resolution indicating that the area
has been declared titled is undertaken.
TAN = National Agrarian Tribunal; INRA = National Institute of Agrarian Reform
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rural actors are difficult to reach. Also, the regulations of the INRA law
were modified three times, and there have been problems in achieving
rural actors’ consensus with respect to the assessment of the FES and
the verification of individual landholders’ property records (Betancur
2003).
The problems likely to undermine land regularisation processes
and tenure security
The legal recognition of common-property areas
Formalising land tenure systems has been one of the most persistent
policies regarding rural development in the last few years, particularly
favouring individual private landholding because there was a wide-
spread belief that individual, secure, and transferable property rights to
land promotes investment, resource conservation, and efficiency (Helt-
berg 2002).
Although the common-property literature has pointed out that lega-
lising customary tenure has major benefits for local people, only re-
cently has there been a shift in the international donor community to-
wards an understanding of the positive results of titling common-prop-
erty areas (World Bank 2003d), making it easier for some developing
world countries to move to legalisation of customary tenure. Common
property refers to resources under communal ownership where access
rules are defined through community membership (Heltberg 2002).
This shift is related to the growing recognition of the benefits that can
be derived from transferring control over natural resources from cen-
tral governments to local bodies (Katon, Anna Knox, and Dick 2001). It
is understood that communal ownership may give sufficient security of
tenure since rules are enforced by legitimate local authorities and enjoy
widespread acceptance. Also, it is argued that traditional rights tend to
be even more secure when official land codes give legal recognition to
communal systems or at least do not undermine them (Heltberg
2002).
The question is, however, how traditional common-property rights
can be recognised at the level of the group. The answer is mainly re-
lated to the procedures that the process of customary tenure legalisa-
tion aiming at providing for a ‘group right’ should follow in practice.
Fitzpatrick (2005) argues that there is no unique best practice model
for legally recognising customary tenure but that a typological frame-
work for developing legal responses to customary tenure can be devel-
oped that takes account of the nature and causes of tenure insecurity.
According to this author, there are four possible models, of which three
are relevant for the case at hand: (1) the minimalist approach in which
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customary tenure is recognised without a great deal of intervention in
the groups’ internal or external affairs; (2) the agency method in which
the state seeks to identify the agents and to transform the institutions
that recognise and manage customary land relations; and (3) the meth-
od in which interventions allow customary groups to incorporate and
establish written constitutions for the governance of their own affairs.
The literature on legalisation of customary tenure usually assumes
that this is a straightforward process, meaning that once central gov-
ernments have made the decision to legalise indigenous forestland ten-
ure, for example, there are no additional variables that can significantly
hinder such a process. In fact, there is little literature analysing the
problems of land tenure regularisation, and it is often assumed that
land titling projects can improve tenure security almost automatically,
though there is some evidence to the contrary in practice.
Heltberg (2002) mentions that there are costs, difficulties, and dis-
tortions associated with the titling process that mostly benefit the
wealthy and better educated people, leading to unfair outcomes, con-
flicts, and inefficiencies. There is some empirical evidence collected in
Honduras, Bolivia, and Mexico showing that individual land titling pro-
jects have triggered new conflicts, not only because there may be var-
ious subjects with superposed agrarian rights or because of inheritance
problems but also because of the incapacity of bureaucracies and the
mistaken assumptions about social organisations’ property rights (De
Ita 2003; Herna´iz et al. 2001; Jansen and Roquas 1998). Studies of
processes of demarcating and titling common-property forestlands in
Latin America do not describe the conflicts regarding land regularisa-
tion but are rather focused on understanding their history and the
forces that come together and underlie the conflict (Offen 2003). There
are, however, some studies that touch upon the conflicts in scenarios
of common-property titling. For instance, in Colombia conflicts are re-
lated to the lack of political will of the national land agency’s officials
in charge, resulting in a substantive delay in the titling schedule and
in a lack of coordination between those officials and indigenous com-
munities’ organisations (Ng’weno 2000). It has also been observed in
other countries, such as Vietnam, that legalising customary land for
community groups – in accordance with customary law – may achieve
a high level of acceptance by community groups but can create con-
flicts with wider public-goods objectives related to land allocation and
may not help to clarify land tenure in situations in which there are
overlapping and contested claims to the same land (World Bank
2004a).
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The difficulties for titling customary tenure
Titling a given forestland area as common property is not an isolated
process. It is embedded in a situation characterised by political, social,
economic, and biophysical issues, which I denote as contextual factors.
As mentioned previously, in Latin America there has been a strong po-
litical shift towards the recognition and titling of community forestland
on the basis of customary tenure. However, in each of the countries
where such titling processes take place, they are shaped by distinctive
characteristics.
The most important contextual factor is related to the different rural
actors’ interests regarding land use, which in tropical areas is the clash
between agricultural uses and forestry uses, which is also a manifesta-
tion of the clashes between individual landholders and community
landholders. Forestry systems based on customary tenure are prevalent
in many tropical forest areas inhabited by indigenous populations. To
date, at least a quarter of the world’s forests (246 million ha) are pos-
sessed by indigenous community groups in common-property arrange-
ments, which means that their access to forest resources has more
than doubled in the last fifteen years, and can be expected to do the
same in the next fifteen years (White and Martin 2002). However, vast
forest expanses are still being converted to agricultural purposes, a land
use decision that is contingent upon its costs against the expected in-
come from agricultural or forestry-related activities. In fact, according
to the FAO, deforestation in tropical areas occurred at a rate of 7.3 mil-
lion hectares per year between 2000 and 2005 (FAO 2005).
There are also distinctive socio-economic stakeholders, and it has
been observed that generally indigenous people are the poorest among
the poor. As a result of the distinctive interplay among socio-economic
interests regarding tropical forestlands, stakeholders are able to develop
mechanisms to pressure governments to establish legal and adminis-
trative frameworks for implementing and enforcing titling procedures
that benefit their own interests. If legal procedures are to be more re-
sponsive to local people’s needs, complicated mechanisms may have to
be designed to develop the land titling task. Several Latin American
countries have been characterised by the presence of dichotomised
land tenure structures and the conflicting interests between forestland-
holders. The powerful are likely to create barriers to access to forest-
lands for the less powerful. In such situations state law most often
tends to favour the interests of the medium- and large-scale land-
holders.
In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of these con-
textual issues and their impacts on local people, I used the Institutional
Analysis and Development (IAD) theoretical framework outlined in
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Figure 12.1 below. The IAD is a multiplex conceptual map showing
contextual variables, an action arena, and patterns of local actors’ inter-
actions and outcomes (Ostrom 2005), which helps to explain the inter-
action of complex variables in specific action situations.
According to this conceptual map, the titling process of community for-
estlands is influenced by some contextual variables such as the biophy-
sical characteristics, socioeconomic structure, and legal-administrative
systems. My empirical analysis assesses this scenario by looking at the
extent to which contextual variables influence different outcomes re-
garding the land tenure security of indigenous people claiming com-
munity forestlands.
Local land owners tend to filter, modify, adapt and sometimes even
ignore the formal de jure rules, interpreting the meaning of the land re-
forms and transforming the rules in form into rules in use. Also, the
way in which local forest users respond to government policies and to
the particular bundles of rights available to them depends on other fac-
tors, such as the presence of valuable land and forest products, market
opportunities, and social networks connecting local users to market ac-
tors and government agencies, among others. Therefore, formal rules
are reframed at the local level depending on power relations among ac-
tors, information and knowledge capabilities, and existence or lack of
control mechanisms. I have identified the most important variables
that are at play when talking about action situations in Table 12.2.
Contextual factors are in constant interplay with local actors’ interac-
tions in the creation of specific action situations. In the titling process
there can be at least four action situations that result from the interac-
Figure 12.1 The institutional analysis and development framework
Exogenous Variables
Biophysical/
Material conditions
Socioeconomic
Legal and 
administrative
Action 
Arena
Action
situations
Participants
Interactions
Evaluative 
Criteria
Outcomes
Source: Ostrom 2005.
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tions between: (1) the donors and the government; (2) the government
and state officials in charge of carrying out the titling on the ground;
(3) the direct beneficiaries and other rural interest groups or land-
holders; and (4) the government and both local and rural interest
groups. In this context, donors are represented by the international co-
operation that provides the funding for carrying out the titling process.
The national and departmental governmental levels represent the enti-
ties and leading persons in charge of enforcing the state law’s regula-
tions for the titling process. State officials are the technicians who do
Table 12.2 Problems likely to undermine the common-properties’ titling process
Contextual problems
C1 Biophysical: Distinctive biophysical features of the TCO areas.
C2 Socio-economic: Contested interest of rural actors’ groups regarding forestlands
involved in the process of land regularisation and titling.
C3 Legal system: Legal and administrative problems related to the titling procedures.
Motivational problems
M1 Free-riding: Not contributing to a joint effort, as the contributors benefits from
what others contribute.
M2 Rent-seeking: Rents are returns on activities that cannot be competed away in an
open competitive process. There is a possibility of tied aid opening opportunities
for rent-seeking since the recipient country must purchase goods and services
from the donor country.
M3 The Samaritan dilemma: The Samaritan (donor) is confronted with choosing
between helping and not helping. If the Samaritan extends help and the recipient
exerts great effort, the Samaritan will be benefited substantially as will the
recipient __ but from the recipient’s perspective, they could be even better of if
low effort was expanded.
M4 Asymmetric power relationships: In many situations, individuals face other actors
with greater command over key resources. Frequently, power is distributed in a
highly skewed fashion, and actors are embedded in the context of a pre-existing
distribution of economic and political power.
M5 Corruption: Individuals who are allocated enforcement powers may hold up
formal action unless illegal rewards are made available to them.
Informational problems
I1 Trust-monitoring: The bigger the community and/or the larger the relevant terrain,
the more important the development of explicit rules and monitoring
mechanisms.
I2 Principal-agent situations: Much of productive life is organised in hierarchies in
which individuals in decision-making situations are arrayed in a series of
superior-subordinate positions. All hierarchies involve delegated authority to
agents who may have their own separate goals.
I3 Adverse selection: This occurs when individuals know their own characteristics __
have private information __ but others do not share this private information. This
usually occurs when the selection of beneficiaries or future employee is a non-
random process that tends to select for the least-productive individuals.
Note: Based on Ostrom et al. 2001
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the fieldwork necessary for demarcating and verifying the legality of
claims to forestland. The beneficiaries are local communities that will
benefit from the titling process. Finally, the interest groups are the
landholders who are in permanent interplay with the TCO benefici-
aries or indigenous people as simply neighbours or as competitors in
the use and exploitation of forestlands.
My empirical analysis assesses these action situations by looking at
the extent to which there are problems resulting from local actors’ in-
teractions hindering the titling process of indigenous common-prop-
erty areas. These are problems of dysfunction that stand in the way of
achieving joint benefits. In the institutional analysis literature they are
typified as motivational and informational problems (Ostrom et al.
2001). The first category stems from people’s inadequate motivation to
contribute to the production of joint benefits even when participants
have complete information. The second category is related to problems
of missing information or asymmetric information about the actions
being taken by actors or about the characteristics of these actors, ex-
acerbating, in turn, the motivational problems (id.)
The empirical enquiry
In the foregoing I discussed the common belief that legalising com-
mon-property forests is a straightforward process leading automatically
to tenure security. My empirical research is aimed at analysing: (1) the
factors helping or hindering the titling of common-property areas of in-
digenous people of Bolivia‘s lowlands and then impeding their enjoy-
ment of tenure security as a result of the titling process; and (2) the ex-
tent to which new problems have arisen as a result of the land titling
process, making it difficult for indigenous people to achieve tenure se-
curity.
In order to explore these two issues, I have selected two TCOs, each
belonging to a particular indigenous group, taking into account that
the TCOs selected should favour a comparison of the two scenarios
that I have described in terms of contextual, motivational, and informa-
tional problems. I have taken the Guarayos and Chiquitanos-Monte
Verde TCOs as the case study sites, both located in the Department of
Santa Cruz as shown in Map 12.1. For my PhD dissertation I carried
out fieldwork in this region and have a detailed knowledge of the on-
going land titling processes there. My case study methods are qualita-
tive, and my findings are based on a review of secondary information
and a few extensive visits to some of the communities located in each
of the TCOs where I carried out interviews with the principal leaders
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of the indigenous settlements in 2005. Additional interviews were car-
ried out in early 2007 to update previous information.
According to Betancur (2003), the Monte Verde TCO is a symbol of
the indigenous struggles in Bolivia not only because of the technical,
political, and juridical irregularities that have been committed in the
land regularisation process in this TCO, but also because of the indi-
genous mobilisations for titling its common-property areas. The titling
Map 12.1 Location of case study areas
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of this TCO was demanded almost a decade ago. The land claim was
presented by the Chiquitanos’ indigenous organisation in 1996 in the
context of mobilisations and negotiations over the new Agrarian Law
(Tamburini and Betancur 2003). The regularisation process took a dec-
ade, and only in 2007 did the Chiquitanos receive their TCO title.
The Guarayos TCO is another emblematic case. While it faced the
same problems as the Chiquitanos-Monte Verde TCO, it is in addition
an example of disunity among the indigenous inhabitants themselves
and its repercussions on the titling process.12 In 1997 the Instituto Na-
cional de Reforma Agraria (INRA) geo-referenced the area demanded by
the Guaraya indigenous people. This resulted in the ‘immobilisation’ of
an area of 2,205,537 ha on 11 July 1997, which means that for the time
being the status quo should be maintained. In order to carry out the
process of clarification and titling, the immobilised area was then di-
vided into six polygons to facilitate the legalisation process by giving
priority to the less populous and therefore less conflicted areas. The
INRA thus eschewed addressing land conflicts among different actors
in the region, and this approach meant that the areas claimed for the
TCO but located in the vicinity of the agrarian frontier remained in a
legal limbo. As a result, informal transfers and conflicts among differ-
ent actors increased. Through this piecemeal process of legalisation by
polygons, a little over half of the area demanded by the Guarayos has
been titled since their demand was presented in August 1996.
The two peoples involved are among the first indigenous groups for
whom the land regularisation programme has been initiated. The Chi-
quitano is an indigenous group located in the dry-forest area of the De-
partment of Santa Cruz. It was not traditionally a cohesive group, but
rather the result of the coexistence of a variety of ethnic groups differ-
entiated by cultures and languages who developed a somewhat com-
mon cultural identity in the course of time and as a result of outside
interventions (Dı´ez Astete and Murillo 1998). In the mid-seventeenth
century Jesuit priests brought forest-dwelling groups together in sev-
eral missions. With the expulsion of the Jesuits a century later, some of
them had their forestlands despoiled and were forced to work in live-
stock and on agricultural ranches. In the 1990s a few were able to ob-
tain a legal title to their lands. By the 1980s the Chiquitano people had
become involved in the process of organisation among the lowland in-
digenous peoples, and by the mid-1990s the new organisations filed
demands for various territories with the Bolivian authorities, totalling
some 1.4 million hectares. The regularisation process was only initiated
in 1999, however. In the case of the Monte Verde TCO roughly 1 mil-
lion hectares were claimed for some hundred different indigenous
communities with a total of about 10,000 inhabitants. However, after a
lengthy and conflictive regularisation process, the INRA finally issued
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a titling resolution, and the Monte Verde TCO received its final title in
early July 2007 under the government of Evo Morales.
The Guarayos indigenous group is located in the north of the De-
partment of Santa Cruz. Like other indigenous groups, the Guarayos
used to move freely around in the forests until they were contacted,
grouped, and settled first by Jesuit priests and later by Franciscans at
the beginning of the 1880s. The mission era lasted from the 1840s to
the 1940s, during which the Guarayos became involved in agriculture
and cattle raising. By the mid-twentieth century a process of secularisa-
tion of the missions began, and pressure on Guarayo forest lands in-
creased as a result of settling by migrants from the Andes region, ex-
pansion of livestock and agricultural ranches, and the activities of tim-
ber companies. Beginning in the 1960s Guarayos were able to legalise
some forestland, but most of it remained untitled. In 1996, during the
mobilisations around the adoption of the INRA law, they demanded
that 2.2 million ha of their forestlands be designated as TCO, and by
now titles have been issued to approximately 1.5 million hectares.
The influence of contextual variables on the TCO land regularisation
process can most clearly be seen in the case of the Guarayos TCO be-
cause it allows us to compare areas that have been titled with areas that
have not yet been titled, helping us to understand how contextual fac-
tors affect tenure security in these areas. Whereas the northern part of
the Guarayos TCO is suitable for the development of forestry activities
and further removed from the agrarian frontier, the biophysical charac-
teristics of the southern part make it attractive for expansion of the
agrarian frontier by middle- and large-scale entrepreneurs, and this has
stood in the way of the titling process. Soybean producers have moved
into the southern part of the forestlands claimed by the Guarayos, and
the economic stakes in this area are higher, resulting in greater admin-
istrative and technical problems in the delimitation and recognition of
property rights.
With respect to the legal framework, we can note that an important
hurdle in the titling process in general is the complex regularisation
procedure, not only for individual landholdings but also for common-
property areas (see Table 12.1). In addition, the INRA does not comply
with the norms, regulations, schedules, or plans for title regularisation,
and uses technical and legal subterfuges to delay the titling process.13
When we look at how the interaction among local actors affects ten-
ure security in the Guarayos and the Chiquitano TCO, we can see
some variations between the two cases. Whereas the Chiquitanos have
demanded that the whole area they claim should be titled at the same
time, which implies that all the problems regarding the titling process
should be solved before finishing it, the Guarayos have undertaken the
contrary strategy of pursuing the titling process by parts,14 so some
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parts of the TCO have already been titled while others have not. We
thus have two broad scenarios in the titling of indigenous peoples’ tra-
ditional common property areas and the way in which the titling pro-
cess may affect tenure security among indigenous people.
Discussion of findings
Following the analytical framework presented before, in this section I
discuss my findings in relation to contextual, motivational, and infor-
mational factors and their effects on the titling process and the achieve-
ment of tenure security.
Contextual problems
The contrast between the northern and southern part of the Guarayos
TCO lends itself most clearly to an assessment of contextual factors. As
noted, due to its biophysical characteristics the southern part is under
strong pressure from medium- and large-scale landowners dedicated to
soybean production. A variety of actors are competing for access to
these lands, each of them holding a specific perspective on land use.
In this context, deforestation rates in the area increased between 1991
and 2001, and deforestation has further accelerated between 2001 and
2004 (MDS 2005). The start of the titling process seems to have trig-
gered a more rapid expansion of agricultural entrepreneurs into the
southern forestland areas of the Guarayos TCO because they see it as a
last chance to claim ownership rights in those areas which in their
view were ‘open access areas’ despite their de facto use and occupation
by indigenous people. The pending implementation of the 1996 agrar-
ian legislation prompted illegal practices – or rules in use – among
some local actors. According to the law – the formal rules – new land
occupations after 1996 are illegal, but the law has been disobeyed. One
of the most common practices has been the clearing of large swaths of
forest land because deforestation was presented as proof of long-term
productive use and compliance with the social-economic function re-
quirement in a context where control mechanisms to verify the produc-
tive history of plots are weak or absent. As a result, in the course of the
regularisation process, plots deforested after 1996 have not been con-
sidered illegal.
Because of the stakes involved, the regularisation process in this area
is highly contested. On the one hand, indigenous people have con-
stantly denounced the ways in which INRA has favoured individual
landholders and uncritically accepted their phoney claims. Such denun-
ciations, however, have turned out eventually to work against the indi-
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genous, because the suspensions of the demarcation process provided
an opportunity for the individual landholders to encroach on new for-
est lands and to invent new arguments to uphold their claims. Tenure
insecurity among the indigenous is reflected in their loss of open forest
areas and even in the invasion of agricultural lands of the consolidated
areas. The issuing of a legal title to the southern part of the TCO would
be one element in achieving a degree of tenure security at least more
or less equivalent to that which they enjoyed before the regularisation
process started.
Motivational problems
While contextual factors in combination with differential power rela-
tions have led to a slowing down and derailing of the regularisation
process, as illustrated by the case of the Guarayos TCO, motivational
and informational problems have also played their part. A look at the
different strategies pursued in the Guarayos and the Chiquitano-Monte
Verde cases provides further insights.
(i) Free-riding
The people of the Monte Verde TCO have chosen to demand the titling
of the whole territory at once. This strengthened their territorial iden-
tity and ensured collective action in defence of their territory because it
curbed the possibilities for free-riding. A main shortcoming of this
strategy is that it is time-consuming, and they only received their title
in July 2007. In the Guarayos TCO, the option for titling in parts made
it possible for community leaders to free-ride the joint effort of TCO
consolidation. This strategy allowed individuals to pursue personal ben-
efits instead of dedicating themselves to the collective goal. Among the
most common practices is the selling – on ‘behalf’ of the community –
of pieces of TCO forestland to individual non-indigenous landholders
and the sale of possession certificates to help them to consolidate their
property rights in the course of the regularisation process.
In this situation indigenous people barely act as a cohesive group
capable of collective action to influence the regularisation process, as
there are groups and individuals who pursue their own interests and
look at the land regularisation process only as an opportunity to make
a profit on the common asset, the forestlands. This is supported by the
fact that before starting the regularisation process, the TCO claimed it
was not clearly viewed as a unified territorial entity but rather as a con-
gregation of small communities, each with a small given territory. Cur-
rently, we observe that these micro-territories are in a process of inclu-
sion into major territories as a result of the strengthening of supra-
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communal TCO-wide organisation,15 though there is still a long way to
go.
(ii) The Samaritan dilemma
Something that can be characterised as the Samaritan dilemma has of-
ten arisen in the context of the TCO land-titling process in Bolivia.
Since the INRA does not view funding and technical help from inter-
national cooperation as a temporary measure, major inefficiencies oc-
cur in the land regularisation process. Governmental expectations of
bail-out in case of financial trouble weaken incentives to economise
and improve efficiency, and in fact breed inefficiency. The titling pro-
cess in Guarayos and Chiquitania was financed by the Danish DANI-
DA, which repeatedly extended the INRA budget even though the insti-
tute did not reach the agreed targets.
This has created inefficiencies on the side of the INRA authorities
who were sure that the donor would always supply new financial re-
sources in order to finish the task, despite these inefficiencies and de-
lays. Samaritans are furthermore faced with the puzzling problem that
their dominant strategy is always to extend help, since in doing so they
are better off, no matter what the recipient does. The issue is that once
the recipient understands that this is the best strategy for the Samari-
tan, the recipient’s best response is to expend a low level of effort (Os-
trom et al. 2001). The relationship between INRA and DANIDA is a
case in point. The situation resulted in help being extended with low
targets being achieved.
(iii) Asymmetric power relationships
In Bolivia, individuals have different shares of economic and political
power: indigenous people suffer higher rates of poverty, while the non-
indigenous population has consistently enjoyed better living condi-
tions. As a result, indigenous people have little to no capacity to exert
influence over the state agencies and judicial courts because they lack
economic assets and, until recently perhaps, political influence. Power
asymmetries certainly also affect issues of tenure security. Medium-
and large-scale landowners claiming forestland in de facto possession
of indigenous peoples have developed strong networks for exerting
pressure and for defending their group interests, which are strongly re-
lated to the economic power they hold. For instance, an attorney linked
to the Agricultural and Livestock Association of Bolivia’s Lowlands (Ca-
mara Agropecuaria del Oriente or CAO), an organisation of medium-
and large-scale landowners, was the first director of the INRA and the
first president of the National Agrarian Tribunal TAN. Also, the second
National Director of the INRA (1999-2003) was a person closely re-
lated to the CAO. There are plenty of examples of the asymmetric
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power relationships in the land regularisation process, and I will dis-
cuss some of the most important ones.
First, significant increases of individual landholdings as well as
claims to them were observed after the claims of the Guarayos and
Chiquitanos had been formally accepted by the INRA. Administrative
and judicial irregularities that benefit such land-grabbers have been
documented, and arguably the INRA has contributed to conflicts sur-
rounding the regularisation process since despite the agrarian legisla-
tion and its regulations, during its fieldwork it measured parcels that
did not show any landholders’ effective possession. Second, in 1997
authorities of the Forestry Superintendence developed resolutions to re-
cognise ownership rights for forest concessionaries overlapping the
Chiquitano-Monte Verde TCO jurisdiction (Tamburini and Betancur
2003), which were in turn ratified by INRA’s authorities.16 Third, the
INRA responded to the pressure of individual landholders – so-called
‘third parties’ – within the Guarayos and Chiquitano-Monte Verde
TCOs by paralysing the land regularisation process and promoting
meetings of conciliation with illegal land possessors, bypassing the le-
gal and technical norms that should guide the process (Tamburini and
Betancur 2003). Fourth, despite being clearly in irregular, not to say il-
legal, possession of plots, some private landholders affected by the reg-
ularisation process have repeatedly sought recourse to the National
Agrarian Tribunal (TAN) and have thus managed to delay the titling
process.
In 2001 the National Agrarian Tribunal ordered a review of the Chi-
quitano-Monte Verde regularisation process from the initial stages of
juridical and technical evaluation – a step that had been concluded the
previous year after spending more than USD 1 million (Betancur 2003;
CEJIS 2001). The TAN also opened the way for legalising fake titles,
cancelling a regulation of the INRA law that declared inexistent the ti-
tles obtained through fraudulent and irregular procedures (Tamburini
and Betancur 2003).
Finally, after seven years of work, the INRA presented the results of
its efforts. According to this report, of the 159 individual claimants in
the Chiquitano Monte Verde-TCO, 93 should be awarded a surface area
of roughly 136,000 ha while the other 66 claimants to a surface area
of 360,000 ha should be expelled. Some of them filed another injunc-
tion with the TAN, largely based on phony documentation and on the
INRA’s mistaken procedures in the past (Tamburini and Betancur
2003), which once more delayed the titling process. The Chiquitano-
Monte Verde TCO thus became a showcase of the systemic bias of the
INRA and TAN in favour of private ‘third parties’ affected by indigen-
ous common-property claims.
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In the Chiquitano-Monte Verde TCO, violence occurred when some
non-indigenous forest exploiters who were declared illegal continued
deforesting for agricultural activities. In reaction, Chiquitano commu-
nities installed control posts to defend their territory, which met with
violent reactions from these land traders.17 When the indigenous peo-
ple denounced the presence of paramilitary persons in the TCO, penal
processes were initiated against Chiquitano leaders (Betancur 2003;
CEJIS 2001). Death threats against the president of the Chiquitano or-
ganisation were also common (Perez 1996).
Under the government of Evo Morales, who assumed office in early
2006, a difficult process seeking to achieve more balanced power rela-
tions has been undertaken by the Vice-Ministry of Lands through its
investigations of cases of illegal land-grabbing, which are quite com-
mon in Bolivia. The penal processes initiated in early 2007 on the ba-
sis of technical-legal enquiries into the status of the Laguna Corazo´n
and the Yasminka estates, both situated in the Guarayos TCO and both
acquired unlawfully, merits special attention. In the first case the Vice-
Ministry identified the crimes of material and ideological deceit, the
use of falsified documentation, perversion of the course of justice, and
undue influence on appointments. In the second case a similar series
of criminal actions was exposed. The two estates belong to the family
of Branco Marincovick who currently is the President of the Santa Cruz
Civic Committee, known for its strong links to the land-grabbing elites
of the region.18
(iv) Corruption
It is very difficult to prove corruption in the real world, but there is an-
ecdotal evidence that corruption has been an issue throughout the land
regularisation process and has implicated most of the actors involved.
The most evident cases of corruption relate to the verification of the so-
cial-economic function. For instance, the ‘loan of cows’ or ‘cattle tour-
ism‘ among livestock estates is a common practice, so that the bor-
rowers could show that they were effectively engaged in cattle-raising.
This practice has been denounced by indigenous community leaders
on several occasions, particularly in the context of the Chiquitano-
Monte Verde TCO regularisation process (Tamburini and Betancur
2003).
Corruption allowed non-indigenous actors to enter the forestlands
claimed for the TCO and to obtain titles in fraudulent ways. One can
also suppose that bribing was a common practice and that it involved
some indigenous community leaders and state officials, though this is
very difficult to prove.19 Indigenous leaders used to sell possession per-
mits in the forestlands of the Guarayos TCO, authorising individual
landowners to develop productive activities in the lands belonging to
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the indigenous people. In addition, INRA officials have condoned the
illegal agreements between corrupt indigenous leaders and illegal in-
truders using the legal figure of the conciliations, which aim to reach
an agreement between competing landholders. For instance, one of the
Guarayos TCO communities originally claimed an extension of 2,000
ha but at the end of the titling process will only receive 200 ha because
of corruption at all levels.20 An important aspect favouring the indigen-
ous people’s corruption is the development of co-optation mechanisms
by the government through the carrying out of development pro-
grammes financed by the international cooperation (CEJIS 2001),
which result in weakening of the indigenous organisations.21 Corrup-
tion is furthermore favoured by the fact that most of the time local peo-
ple do not know about their leaders’ activities, since leaders typically
did not keep community members informed.
The COPNAG (Central Originaria de Pueblos Nativos Guarayos) is
the organisation that represents the Guarayo, but it is divided into two
factions. One group consists of former leaders and their followers, and
the other of leaders who were not in leading positions at the time the
illegal land transfers occurred. On the basis of various accusations, an
emergency assembly was held in October 2004 and adopted a resolu-
tion in which it publicly denounced various ex-leaders as the intellec-
tual and material authors of irregular land transfers within the TCO.
In January 2006 an extraordinary assembly of the COPNAG created a
Disciplinary Tribunal, composed of representatives of the community-
level organisations, to further investigate the case and come up with a
report within six months.
On the basis of a preliminary report, another extraordinary assembly
was held in March 2006. On that occasion it was decided to impose
moral sanctions (expulsion from the COPNAG, repudiation) and to in-
itiate legal actions against the ex-leaders involved in trafficking land. At
the same time the possible participation of people occupying leader-
ship positions at that time was denounced, and they were asked to
prove their innocence within 90 days. A consultative assembly was
then planned that would have the power to dismiss those involved in
land transfers from leadership positions. This decision was ratified by
the Disciplinary Tribunal and by the community level organisations
but not by the COPNAG leadership.
Another assembly was convened by the community-level organisa-
tions – which according to the COPNAG statutes are authorised to call
such an assembly – and was held on 27 and 28 October, 2006. It
elected a new COPNAG leadership, with Elida Urapuca as President.
This new leadership, however, is unrecognised by the former leaders
and by local institutions, though it is supported by the umbrella organi-
sation CIDOB and by most of the community-level organisations. The
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other COPNAG faction organised its own extraordinary general assem-
bly in February 2007 and elected a new directory, which is recognised
by some local institutions but garners scant support among the com-
munity-level organisations and is not recognised by the CIDOB.
According to the final report by the Disciplinary Tribunal, the irregu-
lar transfers in the Guarayos TCO involved 482,000 hectares and a
sum of USD 1.2 million. The report denounces the involvement of
both former and present COPNAG leaders and asks INRA to return all
lands that have been irregularly transferred to the TCO. These con-
flicts, which derive from the organisational debility of the Guarayos
and the strong pressures of an informal land market that resulted in
the corruption of many leaders, have stood in the way of the recupera-
tion of the Guarayo territory and have facilitated the occupation of
parts of the area originally claimed as TCO by other regional actors.
Informational problems
(i) Trust-monitoring
Indigenous people have identified monitoring as an essential factor in
successful titling of their common-property areas. This is because the
asymmetric information makes indigenous people more vulnerable in
the land regularisation procedure. Indigenous organisations cannot ex-
pect favourable results from the regularisation process if they limit
their interventions to the legal procedures signalled by the formal law
(CEJIS 2001).
The SAN-TCO involves practices that indigenous people are not fa-
miliar with such as the use of GPS and a technical juridical jargon that
regularly plays against their interests. Therefore, indigenous people
need to develop relationships of trust with the technicians and to build
capabilities to monitor the set of actors involved in the regularisation
process. In practice, however, it has been very difficult to develop trust
relationships or to effectively monitor the entities in charge of the
SAN-TCO.
Ostrom et al. (2001) argue that the bigger the community and/or
the larger the relevant terrain, the more important the development of
explicit rules for enforcing monitoring mechanisms. This argument
may explain why it has been more difficult in the Guarayos TCO to de-
velop an explicit monitoring mechanism than in the Chiquitana-Monte
Verde TCO,22 since it comprises a larger territory and more heteroge-
neous communities composed of local people and small-scale farmers
that have migrated from the highlands. In Monte Verde there were
fewer problems since they are a more cohesive indigenous group and
are more able to closely monitor the process developed by the INRA’s
teams.23
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(ii) Principal-agent situations
In hierarchical organisations, individuals are arrayed in a series of
superior-subordinate positions, the former being the principal and the
latter the agents who only enjoy delegated authority and are supposed
to comply with the orders given by the principal (Miller 1992). In hier-
archies, information is a scarce commodity, and there is a permanent
tension between the individual self-interest and group efficiency (Os-
trom et al. 2001). The INRA, as the entity in charge of the regularisa-
tion programme, suffers the same problems affecting any hierarchy.
However, in the land regularisation procedure there is an additional
puzzle, which is how to control subordinates who have the expertise
that the principals lack. This is even more relevant since in the land
regularisation process most intervening professionals are attorneys and
surveyors, and large gaps of knowledge exist among them and their
principals, which become progressively wider as one ascends the hier-
archy. This gives the local agents the option to free-ride on the targets
of the INRA and to advance their own individual interests. It has been
signalled that the acts and decisions of local public officials have been
almost unrelated to legal mandates when they affected the interest of
powerful local people (CEJIS 2001).
The Guarayos TCO leaders argue that the technicians in charge of
the clarification process have developed their own rules, which they
have imposed on the local population, but that their superiors who are
supposed to monitor the clarification process were unaware of this.24
(iii) Adverse selection
Adverse selection usually occurs when beneficiaries are selected in a
non-random process that tends to select the least-appropriate indivi-
duals (Ostrom et al. 2001). In the situation of common-property titling,
in which all indigenous groups inhabiting a certain area are selected
for the titling process, there is the problem that TCO claims started be-
fore indigenous groups had a cohesive demand for common-property
and strong organisations for monitoring the process, controlling free-
riding, and deterring corruption. The Guarayos TCO was most affected
by such problems.
Tenure security in the Guarayos and Monte Verde TCOs can be eval-
uated according to the criterion of the permanent impediment to exer-
cise withdrawal rights in open forest areas that were in de facto posses-
sion of indigenous peoples and the encroachment on the consolidated
forestland areas.25 This is because indigenous people systematically lost
lands where they gathered forest products, hunted and pastured, as
well as those areas they cultivated.26 From the foregoing discussion of
the contextual, motivational, and informational problems, some conclu-
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sions regarding tenure security among the indigenous people can be
drawn.
First, the TCO land-titling processes have had contradictory impacts
on tenure security in indigenous people’s territories. Combinations of
biophysical and socioeconomic factors have played against indigenous
communities as they attracted medium and large entrepreneurs who
developed illegal strategies for accessing the indigenous people’s forest-
land and created tenure insecurity that had not existed, or at least was
less acute, before the regularisation process began. The cure in this
case has been worse than the illness. Second, motivational problems in
combination with ill-conceived indigenous people’s strategies, such as
titling the TCO by parts, has undermined their capacity for collective
action. When the TCO eventually is titled, the organisations will re-
main weak, and this will stand in the way of comprehensive natural re-
source management. On the other hand, a correct titling strategy has
served to curb internal motivational problems, though motivational
problems on the side of state officials have been difficult to control. In-
formational factors may attenuate the impacts of motivational pro-
blems or exacerbate them. In the Chiquitano-Monte Verde TCO, infor-
mational problems might successfully be handled, while in the Guar-
ayos TCO the lack of capabilities to manage informational problems
has increased the impact of the motivational problems and has thus
contributed to tenure insecurity.
In general, I conclude from my interviews that communities have
suffered a decrease of tenure security in the areas they possessed de
facto as a result of the titling process, at least until the TCO titles are
granted to them. The titling process triggered attempts at last minute
land-grabbing by ‘third parties’. The final issuing of TCO titles will es-
tablish de jure ownership, but as with any title, the security this sug-
gests will depend on the capacity to enforce legal title and have it re-
spected. Cases from Brazil, Colombia, and other Latin American coun-
tries show that even demarcation and legal titling of indigenous lands
and territories does not bring real security if the political will or the
state capacity to prevent encroachment by third parties is absent and
the indigenous organisation is no match for third parties.
Conclusions
Bolivia‘s legislation was made under the expectation that people would
sit still until the state law satisfactorily resolved forestland ownership
problems through the probing of each actor’s rights to a given piece of
forestland. This expectation was unrealistic. As could be anticipated,
the parties involved have proved to be dynamic and able to change state
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laws into rules-in-use adapted to their own interests. Contextual, moti-
vational, and informational factors, with a different significance for the
different actors, have played an important role in the process and its
outcomes.
Regarding contextual factors, I found that indigenous people located
in areas well-endowed with natural resources have more incentives to
follow their own self-interest, which erodes the tenure security of the
community as a whole. Conversely, indigenous people with less incen-
tive to resign the common good may gain some local power as a result
of the regularisation process. However, regardless of the strength of in-
centives to pursue the common good, indigenous peoples face the pro-
blem of controlling the implementation bureaucracy, which delays and
distorts the titling process. As we have seen, the INRA bureaucracy, un-
til at least 2003, was directed by persons with a history of serving large
landowner organisations, and at lower levels the influence of local
power groups was far from negligible. And NGOs, such as the Santa
Cruz-based Centro de Estudios Jurı´dicos e Investigacio´n Social (CEJIS),
which trains indigenous leaders and provides legal assistance, have on
various occasions been the target of violent attacks.
In the cases studied here, indigenous people’s tenure security in
areas that were considered to be in their de facto possession decreased
since the SAN-TCO triggered the occupation of these areas by intru-
ders. The significant increase in the number of non-indigenous indivi-
dual landowners within the TCO after the regularisation process
started can largely be explained by three of the above-mentioned fac-
tors, namely asymmetric power relationships, trust-monitoring, and
principal-agent situations. There are also cases of tenure insecurity
caused by the indigenous people themselves, through land transactions
between indigenous people’s leaders and illegal intruders which are
then ratified by the INRA. Here corruption and adverse selection are
significant factors. It is also important to note that small-scale farmers
who migrated from the highlands and were invited to occupy an indi-
genous territory in order to justify the FES have created tenure insecur-
ity in some communities because of the factor of free-riding. Even the
motivational problem described as the Samaritan dilemma, which
might be considered almost neutral, may have important implications
for tenure insecurity, since inefficiencies on the side of the government
create the conditions for other actors to act illegally. Therefore, regard-
ing contextual, motivational, and informational problems, I found that
overall they lead to tenure insecurity and make the titling of TCOs dif-
ficult.
There were also some problems that were controlled and solved in
practice. The most important instrument to demand respect for the le-
gal rights of indigenous people involved social mobilisations, either at
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the local or national level. In the last fifteen years we have seen three
important indigenous people’s marches from the lowlands to La Paz in
order to pressure the Bolivian government to recognise indigenous
people’s territorial rights.
Where actions to obtain some balance in the asymmetric power rela-
tions are concerned, it is important to mention the support of NGOs
for indigenous people, particularly in the defence of their land rights
as well as by providing information and facilitating access to the agrar-
ian state agencies, and by developing training programmes for indigen-
ous leaders. The capacity of the indigenous organisations to make re-
commendations and suggestions has benefited from the technical sup-
port of persons and organisations facilitating the formulation of viable
and pertinent proposals (CEJIS 2001). Furthermore, the positive atti-
tude of the international community regarding indigenous topics,
which were at the centre of the agendas of Bolivia‘s cooperation agen-
cies in past few decades, has been influential. Finally, on this interna-
tional level the development of juridical norms such as ILO Conven-
tion 169 is worth mentioning.
Notes
1 Such collective titling can occur at various scales or levels. In Bolivia a peasant com-
munity (understood as a settlement) may apply for a collective title. In the case that
concerns us here, we are dealing with the territorial claims of indigenous peoples,
and such territories may encompass various communities/settlements.
2 In this article we will use the term indigenous to refer to the indigenous peoples in
the tropical eastern lowlands of Bolivia. In terms of international law the much larger
Quechua and Aymara populations of the highlands would also be considered indi-
genous, but Aymara organisations in particular have insisted that they should be con-
sidered originary, emphasising that they were there before the arrival of the Spanish
and before the later creation of an independent Bolivian state in 1825.
3 Bolivia’s lowlands comprise most of the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando.
4 Interview, Carlos Leigue, Vice-president Management Committee of Monte Verde
TCO, Concepcio´n, 13 February 2007.
5 In the following years Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1991, reformed its Con-
stitution in 1994/95 and, with the enactment of new agrarian legislation, created the
legal figure of Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (Originary Community Lands, TCO) as
a form to legalise collective tenure of indigenous peoples. The 1996 agrarian legisla-
tion opened the way for new demands for the recognition, legalisation and collective
titling of indigenous territories. See Assies, this volume.
6 Interview, Filemo´n Mamani, vice-president of the Central of Yotau´ Community. 18
February 2007.
7 Interview, Manuel Pen˜a, Concepcio´n, 12 February 2007, president of the CCIC (Cen-
tral of Indigenous Communities of Concepcio´n), Francisco Mangary, member of the
Cabildo of Monte Verde Community, 14 February 2007, and Toma´s Candia, leader of
the OICH (Chiquitano Indigenous Community), Concepcio´n, 13 February 2007.
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8 The INRA law’s regulation converted the period of TCO land regularisation in more
than 700 days (20 months) at least (CEJIS 2001).
9 Interview, Manuel Pen˜a, Concepcio´n, 12 February 2007, president of the CCIC (Cen-
tral of Indigenous Communities of Concepcio´n); Angel Yubanore, responsible for
land and territory of COPNAG (Confederation of the Guarayo People), 17 February
2007; Filemo´n Mamani, vice-president of the Central of Yotau´ Community, 18 Febru-
ary 2007.
10 Interview, Carlos Leigue, vice-president of Management Committee of Monte Verde
TCO, Concepcio´n, 13 February 2007.
11 The law created the National Agrarian Reform Institute, which replaced the agrarian
reform institutions that had been created in the context of the 1953 agrarian reform.
12 Since the Guarayos and Monte Verde TCO claims were presented before the approval
of the INRA law, they should have been titled within a period of ten months after en-
actment of the law (1996).
13 Some of the main issues were the approval of the manuals for the evaluation of the
social-economic function of land, the procedures for the notification of interested par-
ties, and the calculation of the surface to be included in the TCO (Betancur 2003).
CEJIS (2001) notes that the norms and regulations developed by the INRA often con-
tradict the stated objectives of the agrarian legislation. The verification of the social
economic function of land is biased in favour of large landowners, studies for the as-
sessment of the spatial needs of indigenous peoples are used to reduce the surface of
their territorial claims in favour of entrepreneurial groups and forest concessions,
and the National Agrarian Tribunal tends to give more support to entrepreneurial
claims than to indigenous people.
14 This was a strategy pushed by the government in order to present results to the inter-
national cooperation financing the titling process and in order to reduce the pressure
of the indigenous organisations over areas requested by interested third parties (Be-
tancur 2003).
15 Interview, Filemo´n Mamani, vice-president of the Central of Yotau´ Community, 18
February 2007.
16 In 1997 the Forestry Superintendence granted forest concession rights to non-indi-
genous people in an extension of 120,000 ha of native forests (Betancur 2003).
17 Interview, Daniel Leigue, Forestry Committee Santa Monica, 14 February 2007.
18 Viceministerio de Tierras, Informe de Gestio´n 2007.
19 Interview, Carlos Leigue, vice-president of the Management Committee of Monte
Verde TCO, Concepcio´n, 13 February 2007; Filemo´n Mamani, vice-president of the
Central of Yotau´ Community, 18 February 2007.
20 Interview, Filemo´n Mamani, vice-president of the Central of Yotau´ Community, 18
February 2007.
21 An example is the hiring of the principal community leaders in order to develop stu-
dies of spatial needs and projects related to territorial management.
22 Interview, Filemo´n Mamani, vice-president of the Central of Yotau´ Community, 18
February 2007.
23 Interview, Manuel Pen˜a, Concepcio´n, 12 February 2007. President of the CCIC (Cen-
tral of Indigenous Communities of Concepcio´n).
24 Interview, Angel Yubanore, Responsible for Land and Territory COPNAG, 18 Febru-
ary 2007.
25 Interview, Carlos Leigue, vice-president of the Management Committee of Monte
Verde TCO, Concepcio´n, 13 February 2007.
26 Interview, Lorenzo Pasabare, Counterpart of the CCIC (Central of Indigenous Com-
munities of the Chiquitania) in CEJIS (Center for Juridical Studies and Social Re-
search), Concepcio´n, 15 February 2007.
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13 Land tenure and tenure regimes in Mexico:
An overview
Willem Assies and Emilio Duhau1
Introduction
In 1992 Mexico reformed its famous revolutionary article 27 of the
Constitution, which had paved the way for redistributive agrarian re-
form and the creation of a ‘social property sector’ consisting of ejidos
and agrarian communities, where members would hold land in usu-
fruct. The 1992 reform ended the redistributive reform process and ac-
cording to its proponents sought to enhance tenure security through
certification. The reform opened the way for privatisation of lands in
the social property sector under the expectation that this would dyna-
mise the agrarian sector. With this reform and a new Agrarian Law
that was enacted soon thereafter, Mexico joined the wave of Latin
American land law reforms that had been pioneered by Chile in 1974
and that sought to undo the collective property sector that had been
generated under previous agrarian reforms in favour of individual pri-
vate landholdings (Deere and Leo´n 2000).
This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of land tenure
and tenure regimes in Mexico. It first discusses the colonial roots of
the agrarian structure and the nineteenth-century liberal land policies
which resulted in the concentration of landholding in the hands of a
tiny elite and thus created the conditions for peasant participation in
the Mexican Revolution and the subsequent agrarian reform which cre-
ated a social property sector. It then shows how by the 1930s the re-
form sector consolidated in the context of an emerging import-substi-
tuting development model in which the agrarian sector was increas-
ingly relegated to a subordinate role to provide cheap staple crops,
cheap labour, and cheap inputs. State regulation became an increas-
ingly important feature of this model. By the mid-1960s, however, the
agrarian sector began to show signs of stagnation, which gradually dee-
pened into crisis. The 1992 reform of the Constitution and agrarian
legislation was part and parcel of the structural adjustment policies
adopted from the early 1980s onward and took place in a context of
state withdrawal and trade liberalisation. It was expected that by mak-
ing the privatisation of lands in the social property sector possible, and
bringing them under a civil law regime instead of under agrarian law,
a dynamic land market would develop, and new investment would be
attracted. We shall see, however, that although certification of family
holdings progressed fairly rapidly and may have helped to consolidate
property rights and to sort out some boundary conflicts, the step to full
private property under civil law occurred only in a very limited number
of cases. The outcomes of the reform show that land policy and tenure
regime reforms should be viewed in the broader context of agricultural
and rural development and macro and trade policies. Land policy and
tenure regime reform are insufficient by themselves, as Baranyi, Deere
and Morales (2004:37) put it, to promote sustainable rural develop-
ment and reduce poverty if a level playing field is not created for the
survival of Latin American family farms and domestic-oriented agricul-
ture.
From colonial times to the revolution
When the Spanish arrived in 1519, the population of what nowadays is
Mexico was some 20 million, divided over about 120 different ethnic
groups. By the end of the sixteenth century only some 2 million re-
mained. Upon their arrival the colonisers initially introduced the enco-
mienda, which meant that a certain number of natives were given into
the custody of the conquering soldiers who should take care of their
evangelisation in return for tribute in labour and in kind. The abuses
to which this system gave rise, as well as the rapid population decline
caused by wars, famines, and new contagious diseases, led to measures
by the Crown and the introduction of the New Laws of the Indies
(1542) that were intended to regulate and ultimately eliminate the enco-
mienda. The state now assumed control over the native labour force
through the repartimiento system, whereby Indians were forced to work
for the Spaniards on a rotational basis for a fixed wage. Second, the
state sought to resettle the remaining population through a policy of re-
ducciones or congregaciones by which they were to be concentrated in
pueblos de indios. Such villages were to be granted an ejido2 where the
Indians could hold their livestock. Other forms of possession, also in-
troduced for the criollos (people of Spanish descent born in Latin Amer-
ica) and mestizos (people of mixed descent) were the tierras de reparti-
miento or family plots in usufruct, which could be lost if one left the
village or did not cultivate the land for three consecutive years, and the
propios or village lands that could be rented out to cover the costs of lo-
cal administration. During the three centuries of colonial rule, the
Spanish Crown distributed thousands of titles and escrituras (deeds)
that laid the legal groundwork for the present-day agrarian commu-
nities. The evolving legal framework for colonial rule, with its complex
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system of administration of two ‘commonwealths’, a repu´blica de espa-
n˜oles and a repu´blica de indios, was consolidated in the Laws of the In-
dies (1681), an assortment of more or less significant decrees and laws
that formally institutionalised a Spanish version of ‘indirect rule‘ that
viewed the Indians as a ‘separate nation’ under the tutelage of the
Spanish colonial state. However, despite these protective intentions,
the communal property of the natives was subject to various forms of
appropriation by the colonisers, whether through mercedes (royal land
grants) or the confirmation of de facto occupation through composi-
ciones, sales, or outright usurpation. This process was reinforced with
the rise of the mining economy and the northward advance of the colo-
nial frontier leading to the consolidation of the hacienda, the large es-
tates practising various forms of labour control, ranging from wage la-
bour to forms of leasing and sharecropping. The rise and consolidation
of haciendas were closely associated with a boom in stock-raising in the
sixteenth century when newly imported cattle and sheep rapidly multi-
plied in their new environment and brought about an unprecedented
and calamitous ecological transformation. By the end of the century,
the herds began to die off as pastures were eaten more quickly than
they could regenerate (Simon 1997). It is estimated that by the end of
the seventeenth century, over half of the arable and grazing (agostadero)
land in New Spain was in the hands of the colonisers who, in contrast
to the natives, acquired full ownership of those lands (Secretarı´a de la
Reforma Agraria 1998:21).
Although the leaders of the independence struggle (1810-1821)
sought to do away with the haciendas, in fact no significant change in
the agrarian structure was achieved. The newly dominant classes made
attempts to attract Europeans to colonise the vast northern region of
the republic, menaced by US expansionism,3 but due to the political in-
stability that reigned up to the late 1860s, no significant contingents of
colonisers arrived. Meanwhile, as the anti-clerical liberals gained power
after the expulsion of dictator Santa Ana (1855), concern grew over the
vast areas of land that in the course of time had come into the posses-
sion of the Church, which occasionally might lease them but most of-
ten did not; it was said that these lands were in mano muerta (dead
hands), which impeded the progress of the country.4 In 1856, during
the government of Benito Jua´rez – of Zapotec descent – Minister Mi-
guel Lerdo de Tejada therefore promoted the Ley de Desamortizacio´n de
Bienes de Corporaciones Civiles y Eclesia´sticas, also known as the Lerdo
Law, which sought to grant lands held by civil or religious corporations
to those who leased them. This was one of the causes for the civil war
that broke out in 1857. In 1857 the Lerdo law was incorporated into a
new Constitution (art. 27). Whereas the original law had exempted eji-
do lands (the village commons) from the desamortizacio´n (the lifting of
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inalienability), the new Constitution dropped this exemption so ejido
lands could now also be ‘denounced’ and bought by private parties that
claimed to have rented them. Despite some opposition that argued for
a redistribution to the benefit of those with insufficient lands, includ-
ing the native population, the liberal sentiment won the day, which
viewed indigenous forms of communal tenure as an impediment to
progress and modernity. Even if the intention of the Lerdo law may
have been to create a sector of freeholding yeoman farmers, this objec-
tive was not achieved, and instead, as a result of a process of land-grab-
bing, the latifundios (large holdings) ended up being consolidated.5
Further concentration of lands took place under the long authoritar-
ian rule of General Porfı´rio Dı´az, the Porfiriato (1877-1910). This was a
period of political stability at gunpoint, agro-export-driven economic
growth, consolidation of the hacienda system, incipient industrialisa-
tion, and railway line construction. During this period the Decreto sobre
Colonizacio´n y Compan˜ı´as Deslindadoras (Decree on Colonisation and
Demarcation Companies) of 1883 and the Ley sobre Ocupacio´n y Enaje-
nacio´n de Terrenos Baldı´os (Law on the Occupation and Alienation of
Barren Lands) of 1894 shaped land policies. The two measures sought
to identify lands presumably without owner in order to incorporate
them through demarcation and sale to private parties. Some 50 compa-
nies were given concessions to carry out the demarcation process, for
which they were to receive one-third of the surface demarcated. Be-
tween 1883 and 1910 they demarcated 59 millions of hectares and re-
ceived 20 millions of hectares, or over ten per cent of the national terri-
tory, in compensation. The remaining 40 million hectares became pub-
lic lands that subsequently were mostly acquired by large landowners,
mining enterprises, and railway companies. Whereas the demarcation
companies mostly worked in the relatively unpopulated north of the
country and on the Pacific coast, the allocation of supposedly ‘barren’
lands mostly occurred in the more populous central states of the coun-
try, for which the social repercussions were much more incisive and
created the breeding ground for revolutionary turmoil. Although de-
marcation and allocation formally required that the lands were ‘barren’,
few communities or smallholders could present a title or esritura to
support their claims, and most therefore lost their lands in the process.
The liberal policies of the republican governments, which were taken
to their ultimate consequences during the Porfiriato, thus resulted in a
huge concentration of landholding, with 87 per cent of the land occu-
pied by rural holdings in the hands of 0.2 per cent of the landowners.
The concentration of landholding and the (semi-)proletarisation of ru-
ral labour during the republican period, which brutally increased dur-
ing the Porfiriato, was to fuel the first ‘peasant war of the twentieth
century’ (Wolf 1973).6
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Revolution and agrarian reform
What in 1910 began as essentially a middle-class revolt against the re-
election bid of dictator Porfı´rio Dı´az soon turned into a generalised ci-
vil war. Warfare lasted for seven years and claimed about one and a half
million lives. In 1911, in the central state of Morelos, indigenous pea-
sant communities that had lost their lands to expanding sugar-cane-
growing haciendas rose under the leadership of Emiliano Zapata to
fight for ‘Land and Liberty’. They drafted the famous Plan de Ayala
which called for the immediate return of lost lands to the communities
and the distribution of part of the hacienda lands among landless pea-
sants and began to effectively implement the programme in their areas
of influence (Womack Jr. 1970).7 In the northern state of Chihuahua,
Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa emerged as a military leader and issued an ex-
propriation decree in 1913, followed by an agrarian law, intended to ap-
ply nationwide, in 1915. This law reflected the circumstances in the
north where freeholding ranchers had come under pressure from large
cattle ranch expansion, but where the economy was also more diversi-
fied, and miners, industrial workers, middle-class members, etc.,
played an important role. Villa’s proposal did not aim for a revival of
traditional communal structures. Instead, large estates were confis-
cated and came under state control to finance warfare, while a rather
Table 13.1 Landed and landless rural population in Mexico on the eve of the revolu-
tion
Rural population Number Percentage Surface x 1,000
hectares
Percentage
With land
Hacendados
Rancheros
Smallholders
Comuneros
Subtotal
8,431
48,633
109,378
150,000
316,442
0.2
1.3
3.0
4.2
8.7
113,800
9,700
1,399
6,069
130,968
86.9
7.4
1.1
4.6
100.0
Without land
Administrators
Leasehold (arrendatarios)
Sharecroppers
Indentured labourers
Subtotal
4,561
312,314
1,536,685
1,425,115
3,278,675
0.1
9.0
42.6
39.6
91.3
TOTAL 3,595,117 100.0
Source: Secretaria de Reforma Agraria 1998:35
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limited redistribution of lands to individual farmers took place to pro-
mote economic development and social well-being. A third major fac-
tion, the Constitutionalists, was led by Venustiano Carranza and had
its base in the states of Sonora, Coahuila, and Nuevo Leo´n where agrar-
ian problems were less acute. It was under pressure from his more ra-
dical supporters that Carranza issued a decree on the return of lost vil-
lage and community lands in early 1915. The decree declared nil all
alienation of lands, waters and forest lands carried out in contravention
of the 1856 Lerdo Law, which exempted ejido lands from the desamorti-
zacio´n process, as well as concessions and demarcations to the detri-
ment of villages and communities that had been practised after 1876
(Katz 1996; Secretaria de Reforma Agraria 1998:39-46).
These proposals provided the groundwork for the new article 27 of
the 1917 Constitution (Thiesenhusen 1995:34-35). This article stipulated
that all lands and waters originally belong to the nation, which can
transmit them to private parties as private property under certain con-
ditions. Large estates would be divided up, and villages, rancherı´as
(small farmers’ settlements), and communities lacking sufficient lands
and water had the right to be given such lands, which should be taken
from adjacent properties while respecting smallholdings. A ceiling for
private properties was to be established. Church-sponsored institutions
were barred from owning land not specifically related to their function.
Co-ownerships, rancherı´as, villages, congregations, tribes, and other cor-
poraciones de poblacio´n that in fact or by law preserved their communal
state were to be able to use their common properties. Carranza’s 1915
decree on the return of lost village lands was reconfirmed and elevated
to the constitutional level. In the case of the breaking up of large es-
tates, compensation was foreseen, but it would be based on tax rather
than market value and paid in five per cent bonds over twenty years.8
Article 27 established the legal framework for an agrarian reform
based on the principle that land belongs to the tiller. It created a ‘social
property sector’ which was to consist of ejidos and comunidades agrarias
(agrarian communities). The ejidos would be created as a result of peti-
tions by hacienda workers who would then be collectively allocated part
or all of the hacienda land. Comunidades agrarias would result from the
recognition and/or restitution of lands taken from peasant commu-
nities or other corporate groups. Lands in the ‘social property sector’
could not be sold or transferred. The main difference between the two
components of the ‘social property sector’ resided in the fact that re-
quirements for ejido internal organisation – consisting of a General As-
sembly and elected governing boards – were stricter. Because the comu-
nidades agarias were hardly ever promoted by the post-revolutionary
governments, many indigenous communities were organised accord-
ing to the ejido scheme, while a large proportion of the comunidades
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was not inhabited by indigenes (Secretaria de Reforma Agraria
1998:108-110).9
As we shall see, the pace of reform implementation would be set by
considerations of political expedience while the modality of redistribu-
tion and tenure – the tenure regime – would depend on ideology and
the overall development policy pursued. Effective large-scale redistribu-
tion only got under way during the government of La´zaro Ca´rdenas
(1934-1940) and then would slow down and pick up under subsequent
governments, pursuing various development models, until in 1991 Pre-
sident Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced his initiative for a substan-
tial reform of article 27, which formally brought the process of redistri-
butive reform to an end.
1920-1934: Post-revolution reconstruction and retrenchment
After the last turmoil of the revolutionary period Alvaro Obrego´n be-
came president and was succeeded by Plutarco Elı´as Calles, who re-
mained the strongman behind subsequent presidencies.10 Despite re-
volutionary rhetoric the changes that took place in this period were
rather modest and perhaps most significant in the areas of education
and culture, as reflected in the famous murals, the rise of indigenismo,11
and secular education. Under Obrego´n, land distribution hardly pro-
gressed, while under the Calles presidency it was stepped up, but only
rather unproductive land was distributed, and no serious effort was
made to provide the beneficiaries with resources to work the land. Both
Obrego´n and Calles regarded the ejido as a transitional arrangement
that should usher in the creation of small private farms.
Reforms, including the land reform, met with the firm resistance of
the Church, among others, which promoted the cristero rebellion
(1926-1927) in central and western Mexico. To counter such opposition
and to unite the ‘revolutionary family’ – the political leaders and local
caudillos (political-military strongmen) who dominated the country
since 1920 – Calles organised the National Revolutionary Party (PNR)
in 1929 that under different names would rule the country until De-
cember 2000.12
1934-1940: The Ca´rdenas years
Under La´zaro Ca´rdenas, who managed to escape from Calles’s control
by sending him into exile, reformist policies received a new impetus,
and, for better or for worse, the revolution was transformed into per-
manent structures. Labour, organised in a new Confederacio´n de Traba-
jadores Mexicanos (CTM, Mexican Workers Confederation), the peasan-
try, organised in a Confederacio´n Nacional Campesina (CNC, National
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Peasant Confederation), the military, and a popular sector that included
the middle class and public employees were turned into the main pil-
lars of the revolutionary party, renamed the Partido de la Revolucio´n
Mexicana (PRM, Party of the Mexican Revolution) in 1938. This new
coalition and the organisations that underpinned it provided support
for industrial relations reforms, land reform, the promotion of national
industry, and the nationalisation of oil companies. Over the years, these
organisations became increasingly dependent on and controlled by the
government party in symbiosis with the state apparatus. The corpora-
tist structures of the Mexican pyramid of domination – based on the or-
ganisation of society according to functional groups – came into being.
Land distribution was strongly stepped up during the Ca´rdenas gov-
ernment for various reasons. The agro-export model that had come into
being from the mid-nineteenth century onwards suffered from the
1929 Wall Street crash and subsequent depression. Like other Latin
American countries, in the wake of the crash Mexico adopted a model
of import-substituting industrialisation, but in the Mexican case this
was accompanied by a strong emphasis on rural development (Golla´s
2003:229). The crisis also prompted the expulsion of a million Mexi-
cans from the United States. Rural unrest erupted in the states of San
Luis Potosı´ and Veracruz (Martı´nez Saldan˜a 1991; Thiesenhusen
1995:36-37). Rather than considering the ejido a transitional arrange-
ment that would soon be dissolved to give way to smallholder private
property, it now came to be considered a permanent institution that
would help in the modernisation of the countryside and support a new
development model adopted in the wake of the 1929 crash. The ejido
was propagated as genuinely Mexican and ‘neither socialist nor capital-
ist’. In the ejidos, land would be held communally, and each of the
members would be entitled to use a parcel. Political control and a cer-
tain measure of representation were achieved by interweaving the af-
fairs of the comisariados ejidales (ejido executive boards) with various
state institutions and through the CNC structure in an intricate hier-
archical network of institutions (see also Bizberg and Meyer 2003
:202). The ejido was not only a form of organisation of production but
also a mechanism of political control and peasant representation. Cred-
it from government agencies was to be channelled through the CNC,
and CNC members would be favoured in the process of land distribu-
tion. In return, they were expected to be loyal clients and vote for the
ruling party.
During the Ca´rdenas government more than 20 million hectares
were redistributed – twice as much as in the preceding nineteen years
– benefiting nearly 800,000 peasants, while between 1917 and 1934
about 950,000 peasants had benefited from redistribution. By 1940
22.5 per cent of the agricultural land and 47.4 per cent of arable land
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was in the hands of the ejidos. The share in irrigated land rose from
thirteen per cent in 1930 to 57.4 per cent ten years later, and the share
of rain-fed land rose from 14.2 per cent to 46.5 per cent. At the same
time, under pressure of the reform drive, private owners subdivided
their lands in order to avoid expropriation. If 481,000 owners con-
trolled 123 million hectares (255 hectares on average) in 1930,
1,122,000 owned 100 million hectares (89 hectares on average) in
1940 (Secretaria de Reforma Agraria 1998:59). Although this suggests
deconcentration of land ownership, in many cases the subdivision was
only a formal one, the land going to family members or prestanombres
(people ‘lending’ their name).
1940-1992: From the ‘Mexican Miracle’ to neo-liberalism
The Ca´rdenas period was one of reformism and modest improvement
of the condition of the masses, with policies favouring the rural sector.
The following period13 saw a reversal of policy trends and a greater em-
phasis on industrial development, which became known as stabilising
development. Meanwhile, the hold of the state over national politics
and social organisations became more rigid, and the corporatist party
machinery was perfected. In 1946 the PRM was renamed Partido Revo-
lucionario Institucional (PRI), now with the peasant, worker, and popu-
lar sectors as its three pillars.14
While industrial production rapidly increased and Mexico became
known as a miracle of economic growth, under the Camacho, Alema´n,
and Cortinez presidencies (1940-1958) land distribution was sharply re-
duced, and policies were geared to the promotion of large-scale private
agriculture, for instance by the construction of massive irrigation pro-
jects concentrated in northern and northwestern Mexico.15 As a result
of such investments and a policy of unaffectability that halted further
expropriations, the concentration of land ownership grew, and a new,
modernised, private commercial sector emerged. The ejido sector and
smallholdings increasingly came to serve as a pool of cheap labour for
commercial agriculture and urban areas, as well as a supplier of low-
unit-cost foodstuffs. Productivity was boosted by the initial impact of
green revolution technology. By the late 1950s land distribution policies
made a return in response to large-scale peasant unrest and land inva-
sions in the northern states led by the leftist independent Unio´n Gener-
al de Obreros y Campesinos de Me´xico (UGOCM, General Union of
Workers and Peasants of Mexico) (Bizberg 2003a).
By the 1960s, the Mexican miracle was losing steam, and political
and social unrest mounted. The student protest of 1968 and its savage
repression are often viewed as a turning point marking the rise of op-
position forces. The early 1970s saw the emergence of radical rural
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movements involved in land invasions and of guerrilla activity in var-
ious parts of the country. To counter such trends, a new period of refor-
mist policies started during the first years of the Luis Echevarrı´a presi-
dency (1970-1976) in an effort to shore up the damaged image of the
Mexican political system. This included some degree of political liberal-
isation and efforts to improve the conditions of the urban and rural po-
pulations, which included a brief renewal of land redistribution (Biz-
berg 2003b; De Grammont 1996b:25).16 After 1973, however, a gradual
policy reversal took place, a trend that was to be continued under the
Jose´ Lo´pez Portillo presidency (1976-1982). One of the issues that pla-
gued the Mexican economy, framed after the import-substitution mod-
el, was the increasing balance of payment deficits resulting from capi-
tal goods imports, as well as growing imports of basic foodstuffs to
make up for the poor performance of the agrarian sector in this re-
spect. In response, Mexico devalued its peso in 1976.
Meanwhile, a New Federal Agrarian Law had been passed in 1971,
which was meant to speed up the handling of demands for land, while
it tightened state control over the social property sector. During subse-
quent years various investment plans targeting rural areas were
launched. By the mid-1970s the Mexican economy seemed to be saved
by the discovery of vast oil and gas deposits on the east coast. The ‘pet-
rolisation’ of the economy was translated into ambitious plans for inte-
grated national development, and in 1980 a Sistema Alimentario Mexi-
cano (SAM, Mexican Food System) was launched to regain food self-
sufficiency17 mainly through support for the surplus-producing peasan-
try (Fox 1993). The non-surplus-producing peasantry, or nearly 80 per
cent of total producers, were ignored. And, while designed to empha-
sise rain-fed peasant production, SAM became a generalised grain pro-
duction policy. At the same time, the regulation of crop prices, coupled
with rising inflation and budget cuts after 1981, meant that the benefits
for the peasantry were rather limited. Illegal renting out of ejido land to
commercial farms increased along with proletarianisation, landless-
ness, and migration.
By 1982 world oil prices plummeted, triggering the Mexican crisis
followed by IMF-prescribed austerity policies and a dramatic break with
the economic model that had emerged since the 1930s.18 This meant
severe cut-backs in public spending, while staple crop prices remained
low and production costs increased, resulting in an agrarian crisis that
above all affected the ‘social property sector’ and triggered widespread
loan default among ejidatarios.
During the period reviewed here, Mexico underwent a profound
transformation promoted by the industrialisation policies and an eco-
nomic growth averaging six per cent per year during the ‘miracle’ years
between 1940 and the late 1970s. Meanwhile, whereas in the 1940s
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some twenty per cent out of a population of nearly 20 million lived in
urban areas, by the mid-1990s 73 per cent of a total population of
nearly 90 million lived in urban areas.
Rural Mexico on the eve of the 1992 ‘reform of the reform’
By the 1980s the agrarian reform process, which began with the Mexi-
can revolution and went on until 1992 when redistribution officially
came to a halt, had resulted in the creation of some 28,000 ejidos and
the recognition of some 2,300 comunidades, which together made up
the social property sector. They comprised a little over half of the Mexi-
can farmland and some 3.5 million beneficiados (beneficiaries), about a
third of the agrarian workers (Jones 1996; Mackinlay and Juan de la
Fuente 1996; Robles Berlanga 2003; Thiesenhusen 1995:29-49). The
typical or average ejido possessed some 2000 hectares, of which two-
thirds were used collectively, and the rest was used individually as the
parcels of 74 ejidatarios and nine posesionarios (possessors, who are not
official members of the ejido). These people would live in the urban nu-
cleus of the ejido together with 29 avecindados (neighbours, who live in
the urban nucleus but do not possess ejido land and are not members).
The average ejidatario would possess 9.2 hectares in two parcels and
have access to 28 hectares of the commons. Distribution was unequal,
however, and a little over half of all ejidatarios with rights to a parcel
possessed less than five hectares. Non-agricultural activities accounted
for about half of their income (Mohar Ponce n.d.:31-32; Robles Berlan-
ga 2003).
As a land tenure institution, ejidos and communidades were regulated
by law as corporations (though very different from business corpora-
tions). Tenure rights had three distinctive features: they could not be
transferred to third parties, they could not expire, and they could not
be seized through an injunction. These three features implied that eji-
dal and agrarian community tenure were constituted as a non-market-
able kind of use rights and that the exercise of rights was, at least for-
mally, subject to federal government surveillance through its agrarian
branch. In practice, much would depend on local power relations and
shifts therein.
The main features of the ejidal corporate organisation were as fol-
lows until 1992. First, when it came to productive organisation, the eji-
dos and agrarian communities could opt for collective exploitation of
the land according to agrarian law, though in practice the great major-
ity chose to subdivide the arable land into individually held and culti-
vated parcels. Second, the land was owned by a legal subject (the agrar-
ian corporation) which was different from the individual peasants (eji-
datario or comunero) who constituted the group.
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Also, the corporate organisation of the ejido meant that there were
several internal authorities with specific functions: the asamblea (as-
sembly), which was the highest authority of the ejido and was made up
of all the members of the ejidal community; the comisariado ejidal (ejido
executive board), a body of three people elected by the assembly from
amongst its members; and the comite´ de vigilancia (oversight commit-
tee) that supervised the comisariado administration. Until the 1992 re-
forms, the comisariado ejidal enjoyed ample discretionary powers, both
de jure and de facto. These powers were important when land was lo-
cated near an expanding city, since not all the ejidatarios had the same
opportunity to decide if land was to be urbanised, and not all of them
obtained the same benefits from the sale of land (illegal or otherwise).
Usually, those who benefited the most were those in control of the co-
misariado ejidal and the comite´ de vigilancia. Very often the members of
these two organs belonged to the families of the old chieftains and of
the eminent members of the town.
On the other hand, the ejido system represented the most significant
legal expression of the relationship between the peasantry and the state
in post-revolutionary Mexico. Unlike other developing countries, where
rural communities’ land rights can often be traced back to pre-colonial
arrangements, ejido tenure was the result of a redefinition of the posi-
tion of the peasantry within the political system during the decades
that followed the Revolution. Through this form of land tenure, pea-
sants were assigned a specific position as subjects-of-law and, conse-
quently, gained a new status in the political system. Indeed, one of the
bases for the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary Mexican state was
generated through these agrarian institutions. The support that succes-
sive federal administrations received from the so-called ‘peasant sector’
was organised through the ejidos and comunidades. In other words, they
were both a product and a supporting element of the Mexican political
system. Thus, it is possible to understand the paternalism which pre-
vailed in the relationship between the agrarian communities and the
government. Agrarian institutions have functioned as if peasant organi-
sations owed their existence as subjects-of-law to the government.
Their rights to land were constituted from the top, as an act of the
state, and their disappearance also depended until 1992 on a unilateral
act on the part of the government authorities in the name of public in-
terest.
The features of ejido tenure rights, together with its corporate organi-
sation, played a double role in the history of the agrarian reform. On
the one hand, they gave the agrarian communities effective protection
against losing their lands, a loss that could derive from the operation
of market forces. This, together with the maximum size established for
agrarian private property, prevented a monopoly of land in the hands
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of a reduced number of landowners, as was the case before the Revolu-
tion. In this sense, restrictions imposed by agrarian law on ejido and
communal land tenure allowed for the permanence of agrarian com-
munities as such. Legislation was rather restrictive in the sense that
transactions of individual parcels (rentals and sales) were prohibited,
the commons could not be divided, membership of the ejido was con-
trolled by the Agrarian Reform Bureaucracy - which tended to discou-
rage incorporation of new members in order to avoid fragmentation
into small plots - and ejido parcels and rights could only be bequeathed
to a single descendant or the spouse. Ejidatarios would formally lose
their rights if they did not work their land for a year. These restrictions,
on the other hand, also meant that the communities did not have the
right to decide on the future of their land, for example in the context
of urban expansion.19 In practice, such detailed legal stipulations re-
sulted in all sorts of extra-legal or ‘illegal’ arrangements according to lo-
cal power relations, in which the agrarian bureaucracy was but a player
that most often had to negotiate its presence rather than enforce elabo-
rate and detailed legislation (Nuijten 1998). From the point of view of
the technocrats who would promote the 1992 reform, the legislation in
itself and the ways in which it was circumvented formed a source of
tenure insecurity. Furthermore, although ejidos and agrarian commu-
nities effectively were communities of sorts, we should not infer that
they were always harmonious communities or that disputes over land,
resources, and power were absent, a consideration which points to an-
other possible source of insecurity.
Alongside the ‘social property sector’ a private sector existed, which
by the 1990s consisted of about one and a half million production
units, half of the number of production units in the ‘social property
sector’. Of those in the private sector no more than 15,000 possessed
large businesses, concentrating nearly half of the value of rural produc-
tion, and 150,000 held small private operations. The rest were small-
holders mainly producing for subsistence and engaging in further
‘complementary’ activities (Bartra 2004:23; Robles Berlanga 2003; see
also Otero 2004).
It should be noted that some 4 million agricultural workers had no
land of their own (Arroyo Sepu´lveda 2001) and that part of the land
distributed, especially after the Ca´rdenas reform drive, was less suitable
for agriculture, while institutional support for the ‘social property sec-
tor’ decreased. Many rural families therefore supplemented their in-
come with other economic activities, which included, notably, long-dis-
tance migration to the US.
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Reform of the reform: ‘Liberty and Justice’ replaces ‘Land and
Liberty’
It was against the backdrop of the NAFTA negotiations in November
1991 that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced his initiative
to reform article 27 of the Constitution. ‘Liberty and Justice for the
Countryside’ was what he promised because, as Stephen (2002:67)
notes, ‘ending the government’s obligation to redistribute land made
the slogan “Tierra y Libertad” obsolete.’ ‘Liberty’ now meant to
strengthen individual property rights over the ejidatario’s parcel and
therefore to deconstruct collective decision-making, in line with neolib-
eral thinking and echoing some of the nineteenth-century liberal land
reform attempts.
While NAFTA negotiations played a role, the reform proposal was
also inspired by World Bank recommendations (Heath 1990) which
suggested titling of ejido lands irrespective of parcel size, simplification
and clarification of restrictions for private farmers on holding size and
land use, ending restrictions on renting and sharecropping by ejidatar-
ios, allowing ejidatarios to sell their land to other members of the ejido
(but not to outsiders), improving management of communal lands, ex-
tending credit to individual ejidatarios on the basis of credit worthiness,
ceasing to have the whole ejido bear the burden of loan default, and
providing credit wholly in cash so that ejidatarios could decide what in-
puts to buy and what crops to plant. These were aspects of what
broadly was defined as tenure insecurity, which was to be addressed by
a reform of article 27 and agrarian law. Furthermore, any efforts at re-
distribution – another source of insecurity – would be cancelled.
To sustain his reform proposal, President Salinas argued that: (1)
there was no more land to redistribute and that now the task would be
to improve productivity; (2) federal agrarian tribunals should be created
to substitute the administrative-jurisdictional procedures to resolve ten-
ure issues within and between ejidos and/or communities; (3) in order
to capitalise the countryside, security was needed and that while ceil-
ings on rural property would remain in force, associations with socie-
dades mercantiles (mercantile societies) should be made possible, among
other things to achieve economies of scale; (4) individual small proper-
ties would be protected and that, given that redistribution would be
ended, they would no longer need certificates of unaffectability; (5) new
forms of association among different forms of tenure, through share-
holding, should be stimulated in order to achieve economies of scale,
while at the same time ejido and community tenure would be constitu-
tionally protected, along with the territorial integrity of indigenous peo-
ples20, and that housing plots would be the exclusive property of their
inhabitants (Secretaria de Reforma Agraria 1998:76-79).21
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The initiative came as a shock, since it had been preceded by unilat-
eral economic liberalisation that apparently was to pave the way for
NAFTA. Agricultural trade had been liberalised in 1990, subsidies had
been cut or sharply reduced, guarantee prices for all crops but maize
and beans had been eliminated, crop insurance had been abolished,
and development bank credits had been retargeted to serve only pea-
sant growers whose operations were deemed profitable, while commer-
cial growers had to borrow from commercial banks (Gates 1993).
Meanwhile, encouraged by Salinas, the official CNC and UNORCA had
formed a Consejo Agrario Permanente (CAP, Permanent Agrarian Coun-
cil),22 which initially denounced the initiative as a ‘counter-reform’.
Through a policy of heavy pressure and manipulation, the government
managed to gain some reluctant support from the ‘officialist’ organisa-
tions, leading to deep divisions within these organisations, while the
autonomous organisations were sidelined in the process. The outcome
was that all organisations were put on the defensive and the reform
was pushed through, resulting in the debilitation and splintering of
the rural movements that had seemed to be so strong in previous years
(Bizberg 2003b; Foley 1995; Secretaria de Reforma Agraria 1998).
The reform of article 27 was approved by early January 1992, and
implementing legislation followed in February 1992. The main provi-
sions of the new legislation can be summarised as follows (based on
Cornelius and Myhre 1998):23
1. The government’s constitutional obligation to distribute land is
ended.
2. Private landowners can make capital investments on their land
without risking expropriation, since improvement will not lead to a
reclassification of the land.
3. Land rights disputes between ejidatarios, and between ejidos and/or
private holders, are to be settled by a decentralised system of presi-
dentially appointed Agrarian Tribunals.24
4. Ejidatarios can obtain individual certificates of their land rights if
their ejido agrees to participate in the Programa de Certificacio´n de
Derechos Ejidales y Titulacio´n de Solares (PROCEDE, Program for the
Certification of Ejido Land Rights and the Titling of Urban House
Plots25). Participation in the programme requires an initial meeting
by the ejido assembly, attended by half of the members plus one. If
this cannot be carried through, a second meeting can be called for
which no quorum is established. The decision to participate in the
certification programme may or may not lead to a future decision
to privatise or disband the ejido. Privatisation means that the certifi-
cates under agrarian law are turned into ownership titles (dominio
pleno) under civil law. This can occur in two ways: (1) full privatisa-
tion and therefore disbanding of the ejido; or (2) partial privatisation
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whereby the ejido assembly allows members who wish to do so to
apply for dominio pleno. It is also possible for agrarian communities
to convert into ejidos (and vice versa) and then to convert to the do-
minio pleno regime.
5. Ejidatarios who have had the boundaries of their parcels certified
have the right to legally sell, rent, sharecrop or mortgage their land,
but the decision to sell ejido lands to outsiders must be approved by
a two-thirds vote of the ejido general assembly, witnessed by a gov-
ernment representative. A quorum of 75 per cent of the ejido mem-
bers is required for a vote to privatise, but the necessary quorum
drops to 50 per cent if a second or third meeting is needed. If the
legal quorum is present, it takes two-thirds of the vote to permit pri-
vatisation of land within the ejido. The common lands can similarly
be sold off for commercial development.
6. Ejidatarios are no longer required to work the land personally in or-
der to retain it, which means, for example, that migrants can leave
their parcels under a sharecropping arrangement or can have it cul-
tivated by others from inside or outside the ejido, without running
the risk of losing their land rights.
7. To prevent excessive concentration of privatised ejido land, legal lim-
its on maximum property size will continue to be enforced. The in-
dividual limit for agricultural land is 100 hectares. For grazing land
the limit is set at the land needed for 500 large animals, and forest
property cannot exceed 800 hectares. Corporate entities are limited
to 2,500 hectares per company, and mercantile societies are re-
quired to have at least 25 individual members. Joint ejido-private
firm production associations may not own more than their total
membership would be permitted to acquire as individual land-
owners.
8. Ejidatarios who opt not to sell or rent their land can enter into joint
ventures with outside investors or form associations among them-
selves to maximise economies of scale. They can also sign long-
term production contracts with outsiders.
9. The ejido sector is open to foreign direct investment, but foreign in-
vestors may not own more than 49 per cent of the land owned by
the enterprise.
The reform generated both expectations and apprehension. According
to its proponents, it merely legalised the ongoing extra-legal practices
in the ejidos (such as the sale and rental of lands), freed the ejidatarios
from the dead hand of state ‘paternalism’, and would help to overcome
the crisis in the sector through increased tenure security, an inflow of
capital, increased productivity, and the promotion of entrepreneurial
forms of organisation.26 Critics foresaw a reconcentration of landhold-
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ing and pointed to loopholes in the new legislation that would allow
this (Cornelius and Myhre 1998:3-4; Foley 1995:65n; Gledhill 1997).
They also pointed to the conjunction of the reform with trade liberali-
sation in the NAFTA context and the dismantling of state support for
the ‘social property sector’. Under such conditions they foresaw a mas-
sive new wave of migration to the cities.27
By late 1992 the PROCEDE certification programme got under way,
initially aiming for certification of the social property sector’s area in
two years while critics predicted widespread rejection of the pro-
gramme. As De Ita (2006) notes ‘[A]fter ten years of operation neither
has occurred. The arable land area of Mexico has still not been entirely
certified, yet there was also no massive rejection of PROCEDE.’ And an
official government report, which provides an overview of the 1992-
2005 period and announces that PROCEDE will be phased out in Au-
gust 2006, elliptically states that:
[T]he critique by some peasant organisations that affirm that
PROCEDE privatises ejido lands has turned out to be un-
founded.
Through the adoption of dominio pleno or the bringing in of
common use lands into mercantile societies, only 1,466,000
hectares, representing 1.4 per cent of the lands in the ‘social
property sector’, have been converted to private property. At the
same time, 1,276 new ejidos have been created, amplifying the
‘social property sector’ by 387,000 hectares.28 In sum, only one
per cent of ‘social property sector’ land has been privatised.
Some 60 per cent of those desincorporadas lands29 have been
needed for the growth of cities, for which their desincorporacio´n
was necessary (Secretarı´a de la Reforma Agraria 2006, our
translation).
This is a rather curious statement in that it turns vice into virtue and
actually admits that some main objectives of the 1992 reforms – pro-
moting private property and associations with the private sector in or-
der to capitalise the ejidos – have not been achieved. In conjunction
with De Ita’s (2006) comments, this suggests that ejidos and – at a la-
ter stage – agrarian communities have ‘voluntarily’30 joined the certifi-
cation programme without, however, scrambling for privatisation, with
the exception of some areas of incorporation of ejido lands into urban
expansion schemes. Galeana (2004) argues that if individuals seek to
obtain full ownership titles, this is related to opportunities to sell their
land for urbanisation rather than to ask for credit. In some cases the
acceptance of certification may have been a way to settle internal dis-
putes.
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Practising ‘Liberty and Justice’
According to the Registro Agrario Nacional (2005), of the 29,942 agrarian
nuclei (27,664 ejidos and 2,278 comunidades), 28,709 (96 per cent) had
‘voluntarily’ adhered to the PROCEDE programme. A total of 26,031
agrarian nuclei (87 per cent of the national total) had been regularised
through the dispatching of 8,421,108 certificates and titles: 4,649,590
parcel certificates, 1,738,247 common use certificates – which grant
access to a percentage of common use lands – and 2,033,271 house plot
titles. The programme thus certified or titled some 76.2 million hectares
and benefited some 3,843,798 people. Of those 76.2 million hectares,
23,009,640 were certified as parcels, 52,951,034 were certified for com-
mon use,31 and 300,335 hectares were titled, presumably as housing
plots, as the new 1992 law prescribes.
By the end of March 2005, the PROCEDE programme had mea-
sured 85,562,262 hectares out of the 103,515,321 hectares belonging to
the ‘social property sector’, that is, 83 per cent. Progress in coverage,
however, was uneven across the states of the Federation. Generally, cov-
erage in the northern states was greater than in the south. The advance
in the northern states may be related to less severe demographic pres-
sure on ejido lands and an already existing clearer definition of land
tenure rights, due to the agricultural potential of the lands (Zepeda
2000). The southern states, in contrast, were characterised by a higher
number of smaller ejidos, higher demographic pressure, and more diffi-
cult access due to their rugged geography. In the state of Oaxaca, 62
per cent of the land was held by agrarian communities, which were
also mostly indigenous.
The PROCEDE programme advanced by tackling the least proble-
matic areas first. By 2003 it was reported that 4,735 (15.5 per cent) of
the then existing 30,513 agrarian nuclei (ejidos and comunidades) had
problems. A quarter of these problem cases had rejected the PROCEDE
programme, twenty per cent were involved in disputes over limits, and
ten per cent suffered internal conflicts (cf. De Ita 2006). The agrarian
nuclei that accepted the programme possibly took it as an opportunity
to update membership lists32 and to sort out and consolidate tenure.
What then about the expected benefits of the 1992 constitutional re-
form and the new agrarian legislation? Zepeda (2000:271), paraphras-
ing Galilei’s ‘Eppur si muove’ (‘Nonetheless, it moves’), argues that de-
spite the reform ‘nonetheless…it does not move’. As already noted, con-
trary to what some expected, in only a few cases was dominio pleno
opted for, and no vibrant land sales market has come into being except
for peri-urban areas. Sometimes this has been attributed to the fact
that private property unlike ‘social property is subject to taxes‘ (Brown
2004; cf. De Ita 2006). However, there are many indications that sug-
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gest other reasons for this lack of interest in privatisation. For most of
the ‘social property sector’, land is much more than a simple commod-
ity. Often its ‘conquest’ has been the result of a long struggle, and los-
ing it would mean becoming a simple day labourer (Zepeda
2000:272). Moreover, most of the ‘social property sector’ serves as a re-
fuge economy geared to subsistence production that is complemented
by other activities (De Janvry, Gustavo Gordillo, and Sadouleth
1997:203-204; World Bank 1998:11). As Gledhill (1997) argues, only
fifteen per cent of the ejidatarios could be viewed as commercially vi-
able producers on the eve of the ‘second agrarian reform’, and they,
along with the stratum of relatively prosperous private small farmers,
suffered the devastating effects Mexico‘s structural adjustment shock
treatment. His research between 1991 and 1994 identified a clear pat-
tern of ‘richer peasants reducing their rental of land and switching to
production of lower value crops’ (see also Gledhill 1995), which points
to a process of ‘agricultural involution’.
This brings us to the question of land rental markets. It is often as-
serted that enhanced tenure security – perhaps less a result of changes
in the legal framework than of implementation of PROCEDE (Deinin-
ger et al. 2001) – has contributed to a vitalisation of rental markets,33
though comparison with the pre-1992 situation is quite difficult. After
all, the reforms were justified with the argument that renting was a
‘widespread’ though illegal practice. The consequences of such en-
hanced rental market activity are not clear, however. According to De
Janvry et al. (1997:201-202), those ejidatarios with smaller plots and
greater involvement in off-farm activities and migration are the ones
who rent out their land without losing their tenure rights in the ejido.
The operational area of small ejido farms thus decreases as a result of
land rental and migration, and, according to the authors, this abandon-
ment of small farms can be expected to accelerate. This is a symptom
of what they call the ‘severe crisis of the ejido sector’, a crisis that an-
nounced itself in the mid-1960s and that only deepened under struc-
tural adjustment in the 1980s and free-trade measures in the 1990s.
In contrast, Deininger et al. (2001), who are rather optimistic about
the Mexican reform, assert that in ‘non-certified ejidos it is the large
farmers who rent in land and the small farmers who rent out while
the opposite is true in certified ejidos’. They suggest, invoking the ‘in-
verse size-productivity relationship,’34 that ‘in non-certified ejidos, the
rental market tends to contribute to land concentration instead of redis-
tribution towards smaller producers’ and that in this situation ‘rental
markets might actually decrease efficiency’, whereas in ‘certified ejidos
the exact opposite is true’. Several other documents, however, also sug-
gest that small producers generally enter the rental market from the
supply side and then engage in other activities.35 The inconsistencies
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in the argument presented by Deininger et al. (2001), which also fil-
tered into the World Bank (2003d:120-121) Policy Research Report,
have been pinpointed by Baranyi, Deere and Morales (2004:34). The
World Bank’s own research (Olinto, Klaus Deininger, and Davis
2000:6) shows that small farmers were more prone to rent out their
land, while larger farmers would rent in. Other studies (Concheiro Bo´r-
quez and Quintana 2003; Lewis 2002) also suggest processes of land
concentration and do not support the ‘win-win’ scenario of increased
land access for the poor and renting out of land by the rich as pre-
sented by the World Bank.
As to credit, access to which was expected to increase as land could
be used as collateral, De Janvry et al. (1997) argue that the 1992 reform
took place in the context of an ‘institutional vacuum’. During the
1980s many public institutions were privatised, scaled down, or liqui-
dated. Access to credit, but also to insurance, markets, modern inputs,
and technical assistance had been severely reduced, and hardly any al-
ternative institutions had emerged to cater for the ejido sector. They
note that the number of ejidatarios with access to credit increased due
to the cre´dito a la palabra (credit without collateral) programme that
was launched in the context of the National Solidarity Program (PRO-
NASOL) on the eve of the 1994 elections. It is one of what have been
called ‘neopopulist solutions to neoliberal problems’ (cf. Knight
1996:4). While the number of people receiving credit temporarily in-
creased, the total amount of credit to which the ejido sector had access
decreased, and access to credit decreased again – from 30 per cent of
ejido households in 1994 to twenty per cent in 1997 – once the elec-
tions were won,36 and the programme was phased out (World Bank
1998:16) and replaced with focused programmes aimed at human capi-
tal formation,37 such as PROGRESA under the Zedillo administration
(1994-2000) and OPORTUNIDADES under the Fox government
(2000-2006).
The ‘institutional vacuum’ together with the ‘profitability crisis’,
which was due to trade liberalisation, inefficient marketing channels,
‘adjustment noise’ after the 1995 peso crisis, and the world market
price decline (World Bank 1998:9-10), resulted in a sort of technologi-
cal involution (De Janvry, Gustavo Gordillo, and Sadouleth 1997; Zepe-
da 2000:286), which also affected the private sector, ‘better off’ stra-
tum of peasants and farmers. Manual labour replaced machines, local
seeds took the place of ‘improved’ seeds, fertilizer use dropped – trends
that had been present before 1992 and that were not reversed by the
reform of the legal framework, as propaganda had it. Market liberalisa-
tion for agrarian products initiated in 1982 took place in a context of
overproduction of basic grains in the USA and Europe and a ferocious
struggle for markets to get rid of the ‘surplus’. The low-priced exports
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by the USA of maize and beans provoked a crisis among the Mexican
producers, which only grew more profound after the ratification of
NAFTA. Between 1985 and 1990 the principal products of rain-fed
agriculture, which is the realm of the small and medium-sized produ-
cers, fell by 0.60 per cent per year, and between 1990 and 1994 they
fell by 4.35 per cent per year. Between 1990 and 1994 rain-fed maize
production fell by 4.64 per cent annually and that of beans by 2.63 per
cent. At the same time, a process took place known as the ‘privatisation
of maize’, that is, an increase in production on irrigated land by agrar-
ian enterprises in the north of the country (Rubio 1999:43-44), effect-
ing a brutal decline in income for the smaller producers in the south.
The crisis of small and medium Mexican agriculture only deepened
after the NAFTA treaty became operative on January 1, 1994. It was a
treaty between unequal partners. Production costs were higher in Mexi-
co, while USA agriculture was strongly subsidised, and the average size
of exploitations was much larger. During the negotiations Mexico ac-
cepted a generous duty-free import quota and an above-quota tariff for
maize and beans that it never enforced (World Bank 1998:9). Mexican
imports of grains and oil-seeds increased from 8.8 million tons in
1993 to about 20 million tons in 2002. Before NAFTA, at most 2.5 mil-
lion tons of maize were imported per year, but by 2001 6 million tons
were imported. Unemployment and poverty in rural Mexico increased,
and according to official data, 70 per cent of the rural population was
poor (cf. Go´mez Cruz and Rindermann 2003; Quintana and Vı´ctor
2003).
Farmers had already started to mobilise when the NAFTA plans be-
came public, demanding exemptions for various products, such as
maize, beans, and dairy products. In response, in 1993, the govern-
ment launched the PROCAMPO programme. This was a subsidy that
was to compensate for income losses and assist the adjustment to the
removal of price guarantees and market supports. It covered maize,
beans, wheat, cotton, soybeans, sorghum, rice, barley, and safflower. It
was paid per hectare, and payments were expected to be constant for
ten years and then to be phased out in the subsequent five years,
though in real terms payments actually declined by five per cent per
year.38 It was another instance of ‘neopopulist solutions to neoliberal
problems’ as the income subsidy was sufficient to keep peasants and
farmers growing their crops, but insufficient to help them make the
transition to other commercial crops, also given the virtual absence of
technical assistance and the subsistence logic of much of the peasant
sector.
Protests increased over the course of the 1990s with the emergence
of the El Barzo´n movement, led by farmers affected by the scissors
movement of increasingly rigid credit conditions and falling prices,
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which drove them into bankruptcy (see De Grammont 1996a). The
pace of protest was set by the lifting of nearly all import restrictions on
agricultural products under NAFTA by 2003 and the issuing of the
USA Farm Bill in May 2002. By 2002 mobilisations converged in the
movement El Campo no Aguanta Ma´s (The Countryside Endures no
More), which in early 2003 forced the Vicente Fox government to sign
a National Accord for the Countryside, an accord that was considered
minimal or insufficient by many farmer and peasant organisations
(Bartra 2004). They had demanded a renegotiation of the NAFTA agri-
culture chapter, a revision of article 27 of the Constitution, and the re-
cognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. These were not included in the
rather lengthy and confused document – counting 282 paragraphs –
that was eventually ratified during a lacklustre ceremony.
One of the points of the agreement was to revise agrarian legislation,
which by March 2005 resulted in the presentation of an initiative for a
new Federal Agrarian Law in the Chamber of Deputies. Since then,
however, the legislative process has stalled and was to be taken up by
the newly elected Congress after the July 2006 elections.
Low-income illegal settlements and tenure regularisation on
peri-urban ejido lands39
Besides the agrarian and peasant questions addressed through the
agrarian reform and the land distribution process, ejidos and commu-
nities whose lands were situated on the outskirts of fast-growing urban
centres would, sooner or later, face a situation in which those lands
could be assigned for urban uses such as public utilities, urban devel-
opment projects, or housing. And, in fact, ejido lands have been and
still are absorbed for all kinds of urban uses. But up to 1992, only in
the case of low-income housing could the process of ejido land develop-
ment be controlled illegally by ejidatarios themselves. The incentives
for the subdivision of land come from the obvious fact that it offers eji-
datarios the opportunity to make more money than with agricultural
production. Besides, in many cases, it concerns lands of minimal or no
agricultural productivity. But it is clear that the urbanisation of ejido
lands is almost inevitable, to an extent, when they are located on the
fringes of rapidly expanding cities. So far, subdividing land and selling
plots to low-income urban dwellers has for ejidatarios been the main
way to keep control over land development initiatives and to obtain
good earnings with minimum investments.
The development of low-income settlements on ejido lands can be di-
vided into two main periods. The first period runs from the mid-1940s
to the beginning of the 1970s, and the second from the creation of the
376 WILLEM ASSIES AND EMILIO DUHAU
Commission for the Regularisation of Land Tenure (Comisio´n para la
Regularizacio´n de la Tenencia de la Tierra, CORETT) in 1973-1974 to the
mid-1990s. This can be regarded as a transition period during which
ejidatarios and irregular land developments on ejido lands adjusted their
practices and adapted to the new legal framework.
During the first period, agrarian communities resorted to the ‘urban
area device’ in order to legitimise the sale of plots. Originally designed
to house peasants on their land, this legal figure was used as a loop-
hole to create housing settlements in peri-urban areas. Up to the pre-
sent day agrarian legislation allows for a tract of the ejidos’ land to be
set aside for the ejido’s village or ‘urban area’ (zona de urbanizacio´n eji-
dal) where besides ejidatarios’ houses, avecindados may be admitted and
sold a plot. Avecindados, which literally means neighbours, are defined
as those who are not ejidatarios but who are willing to live in the ejido
village and to devote themselves to an activity which is ‘useful to the
community’ (artisans, shopkeepers, etc.).
Despite the legal prohibition to designate ‘urban areas’ for reasons
other than to meet the communities’ needs, between 1950 and 1970
the creation of such areas was systematically used by ejidos in the per-
iphery of Mexico City as a mechanism to establish low-income settle-
ments on ejido lands. According to Ann Varley, 91 per cent of the ejidos
around Mexico City had at least started the procedures leading to the
constitution of an urban area by 1970. The fact that people who settled
as avecindados outnumbered the ejidatarios by up to six times shows
that the legal notion of the urban zone was used to legitimate the sub-
division of land in order to develop low-income settlements (Varley
1985).
Given that the generalised resort to this device provoked numerous
conflicts opposing settlers and ejidatarios, ejidatarios and their internal
authorities, and local authorities and settlers, increasing pressure be-
gan to be felt by the federal authorities involved, and the artifice of the
‘urban area’ lost its legitimating power. Besides, by then, the issue of
‘irregular settlements’, concerning ejidal as well as private and public
lands, had become a central dimension of the ‘human settlements’ na-
tional agenda (Duhau 1998), which included the development of sev-
eral procedures and programmes for the ‘regularisation‘ of those settle-
ments. To regularise irregular settlements established on ejido lands, in
the early 1970s a federal commission was created, the CORETT. With
the CORETT, what would turn out to be a long-lasting regularisation
process was institutionalised. The effect was that it stabilised the expec-
tations of the social actors involved and, in that way, indirectly contrib-
uted to the reproduction of a rather ordered, albeit irregular, market in
ejidal land. The scope of CORETT action can be appreciated if we con-
sider that during the period 1974-2000, at a national level, it regu-
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larised land tenure for urban uses over a surface area of roughly
136,000 hectares, and issued more than 2,191,000 property titles for
housing plots.40
Thus, during several decades, ejidatarios have been irregularly subdi-
viding and selling their lands, mostly to low-income dwellers; some-
times on a small scale, as when an ejidatario subdivides and sells plots
in an individually owned parcel, sometimes on a massive scale, as
when ejidatarios collectively decide to urbanise lands owned in the
same way. Particularly in these latter cases, the sale of plots becomes a
real planned subdivision: the layout of the streets and the size of the
plots are standardised, a range of prices per square meter is established
according to the location of the plots, and usually the plot is paid for in
instalments.
How to explain the tolerance of agrarian and urban authorities to-
wards agrarian communities that illegally urbanise their lands? It can
be summarily explained by considering several factors regarding the
question of low-income housing in Mexico, and the socio-political ratio-
nale that for decades has driven the relationships between agrarian
communities and the state. First, despite the public social housing pro-
grammes institutionalised since the 1970s, there have been huge num-
bers of families that do not have access to those programmes and can-
not afford any of the housing alternatives existing on the formal hous-
ing market (Duhau 1998). By selling cheap, unserviced plots to these
families, ejidatarios have performed a valuable service for the state,
since this alleviates social conflicts around housing issues arising from
unfulfilled housing needs. There is a basic cultural element here: ejida-
tarios are not seen by low-income households as ‘speculators’. Although
by urbanising their lands they do get an important share of the urban
revenue without investing almost anything, usually they are seen as or-
dinary peasants. Within the cultural heritage of the agrarian reform, eji-
datarios are not accorded any public responsibility, including that of
paying taxes over their lands, since they have traditionally played a pas-
sive role as victims rather than beneficiaries of agrarian policies. Sec-
ond, within the organisation of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party), which was the national ruling
party for seven decades until 2000, peasant organisations had the func-
tion of providing social support for campaigns and elections; support
that would have been difficult to obtain if public authorities prosecuted
them for selling ejido lands. Third, the public authorities in charge of
the agrarian reform, once they had fulfilled the obligation to distribute
available lands, had very little to offer to improve the revenues and the
economic condition of ejidatarios, mostly operating as subsistence farm-
ers. Should agrarian authorities devote themselves to law enforcement,
their main activity would have been that of prosecuting ejidatarios in
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suburban areas for selling their lands. Arguably, tolerance towards this
informal land market has functioned as a compensation for the impli-
citly admitted social and economic failure of the agrarian reform. Final-
ly, the fact that there are enough buyers to support the informal ejidal
land market, and that the process of irregular urbanisation of those
lands has usually taken place without causing significant conflicts, also
contributed to the institutionalisation of the ejidal land tenure regulari-
sation programmes in charge of the CORETT since 1973.
Regarding the features of this programme and the question of ten-
ure rights that it involves, the following must be emphasised. First,
although the legal rule according to which ejido land sales were null
and void formally applied until 1992, this was in fact offset by the cer-
tainty that, given the presence and stability of CORETT, regularisation
of land tenure would eventually take place. Second, regularisation of
land tenure in irregularly urbanised ejido lands is a form of state inter-
vention that requires minimal assignment of budgetary resources,
since the CORETT is supposed to be self-financing and to fund its op-
erational costs from the charges levied on beneficiaries (Azuela 1994).
This means that low-income settlers on ejido lands pay twice for acquir-
ing a plot. First, they pay for the ‘purchase’ of a plot (legally invalid),
and when the regularisation procedure takes place, they pay a sum for
the associated costs, including a compensation payment for the con-
cerned ejidatarios whose lands are ‘expropriated’ for reasons of public
interest, that is, the regularisation of a low-income settlement. Third,
although the CORETT’s regularisation actions, as such, cost the state
very little, they have major social and political implications (although
some of these are subject to debate; Iracheta 1989; Legorreta 1994;
Varley 1989). Fourth, over the last three decades, tenure regularisation
concerning ejidal lands but also other forms of land rights has been a
core urban policy consistently applied by the Mexican government, par-
ticularly in Mexico City and its metropolitan area (Duhau 1998). As a
result, the informal land market has become a preferred way for low-
income households to gain access to housing. Given the continuous ex-
pansion of illegal settlements, though recently the pace has slowed
down, regularisation has become a routine form of state intervention
in the field of low-income housing, particularly in Mexico City. There
can be no doubt that it delivers a loud and clear message about the gov-
ernment’s attitude to informal development to all actors involved in the
process.
With the 1992 changes in the ejidal land tenure regime, ejidal land –
particularly when located in a peri-urban area – becomes susceptible to
being incorporated into the formal real estate market. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to information collected by the Procuraduria Agraria, this has
happened only in a few cases. Between 1992 and 2003, at a national le-
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vel, only 25 ejidos have contributed lands to businesses societies, and
less than half of the cases imply the constitution of a real estate busi-
ness oriented to urban subdivisions and housing projects (Procuradurı´a
Agraria 2004b). Why do ejidatarios persist in informally selling land
even though they now have the possibility of engaging in formal real
estate businesses?
In spite of the current possibility of converting ejidal land to a full
private property regime and selling it legally to outsiders, the tenure
rights concerned must first be certified by the PROCEDE programme,
and after that specific procedures must be followed in order to convert
them from the ejidal tenure regime into freehold. Additionally, once
these requirements are satisfied, the subdivision and conversion of eji-
dal land to urban uses are always subject to procedures laid down in
planning regulations. By 2003, the first step had been taken by 82.4
per cent of 30,077 agrarian nuclei, that is, 24,792 ejidos and commu-
nities, almost three-quarters out of them located in the northern Mexi-
can federal states. Of the certified agrarian nuclei, only 1,595, account-
ing for 0.7 per cent of the surface of the ‘social property sector’, have
been converted to a full private property regime. At the same time, al-
ways according to the Office of the Agrarian Attorney, 6,194 agrarian
nuclei show irregular settlement developments (Procuradurı´a Agraria
2004b), almost four times the number of privatised ones. Therefore, it
is clear that subdividing and selling land irregularly continues to be ex-
tensively practised.
Apparently, for ejidatarios a powerful reason for not taking the sec-
ond step and becoming freehold proprietors is to avoid paying land
taxes as well as municipal fees like those for the provision of potable
water and, in a more general way, to avoid becoming liable private pro-
prietors. But we also have to take account of the fact that being an eji-
datario or comunero usually signifies not only being the owner of a
piece of land, but a member of a landed corporation recognised and
acting as a local power. This condition would disappear once the cor-
poration was dissolved or many individually owned parcels were segre-
gated from the ejido.
Last, but not least, irregularly subdividing and urbanising their
lands, instead of becoming partners of a real estate society, keeps ejida-
tarios in control of the process and the resulting profits, while having
to invest almost no cash resources. By contrast, entering into a partner-
ship with a private developer would imply that it is the latter who
would contribute the financial resources needed to carry out the formal
real estate development, and who would surely try to take control of
the business. Additionally, what private developers usually want from
ejidatarios is to buy their land, mainly under advantageous conditions,
rather than to enter into a partnership with them.41
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By way of conclusion
In this chapter we present an overview of the evolution of land tenure
and tenure regimes in Mexico in the context of changing power rela-
tions and accumulation regimes. From the colonial economy, a hacien-
da system emerged that consolidated under the liberal legislation of
the second half of the nineteenth century in the context of an increas-
ingly agro-export-oriented economy. By the early twentieth century this
had resulted in an extremely skewed distribution of landholding which
contributed to making the Mexican revolution the first ‘peasant war of
the twentieth century’ (Wolf 1973). Initially, however, the revolution did
not substantially change the agro-export orientation of the Mexican
economy, nor did it bring about a substantial redistribution of land. De-
spite the Zapatista inspiration of constitutional article 27, the post-revo-
lutionary regimes regarded the ejido as a transitory form of tenure and
privileged private ownership.
A new development model of import-substituting industrialisation
emerged in the early 1930s. Initially, and in contrast to most other La-
tin American countries, the agrarian sector was assigned a privileged
role in this new model and received extensive government support.
Land redistribution peaked under the Ca´rdenas government, which
consolidated the ejido as a form of tenure and experimented with col-
lective ejidos. In the 1940s, policy emphasis shifted away from the
agrarian sector, which was now assigned the role of providing cheap
food for an increasingly urbanising and industrialising country. The
‘social property sector’ became subject to increasing state regulation,
and an intricate system of price regulation and subsidies emerged. At
the same time, policies tended to favour the development of the private
sector and the production of high-value exportables. This gave rise to a
dual agrarian structure and a deepening regional differentiation be-
tween ‘the north’ and an impoverished ‘south’, where additionally most
of Mexico‘s indigenous peoples can be found. The ‘social property sec-
tor’ increasingly became a reservoir of cheap labour and subsistence-or-
iented production on gradually fragmenting parcels (minifundia). The
1982 Mexican crisis brought an end to the 1970s’ brief flurry of devel-
opment policies oriented toward the ‘social property sector’, and free
trade policies contributed to a deepening crisis of this sector.
It was in this context that the 1992 reform initiative was taken. On
the one hand, one of its stated aims was to reduce state intervention
and regulation, and on the other hand, it was to promote a market in
land by opening the way to privatisation of lands in the ‘social property
sector’ so that land would be allocated to the most efficient user. An ex-
tensive ‘voluntary’ programme for certification of lands in the sector
was launched. This, however, did not result in massive privatisation, as
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some had expected, nor in the emergence of a vibrant land market.
Land rentals increased, but it is not clear if this was really related to
certification (World Bank 1998:26), and it should also be noted that
most of the transactions remain informal. It is also doubtful whether
this rental market really benefits the poor (Baranyi, Deere, and Morales
2004:34; Concheiro Bo´rquez and Quintana 2003). Quite probably, the
effects are regionally differentiated and depend on the quality of the
land, which is low in most cases. At the same time, land is much more
than a commodity, and membership in an ejido or agrarian community
may bring benefits and securities that account for the persistence of
this form of organisation.
The 1992 reform failed in its intention to dynamise the agrarian sec-
tor, in a context of economic liberalisation and implementation of the
NAFTA agreement, as is reflected in the continuing crisis of the ‘social
property sector’ and in the protest movements led by private sector
farmers. The reform took place in the context of an institutional va-
cuum, created by the dismantling of state agencies and services in pre-
vious years, and a profitability crisis of most of Mexico‘s agriculture re-
sulting from trade liberalisation. It therefore did not bring about the
expected ‘agrarian transformation’ (Secretarı´a de la Reforma Agraria
1998) because, as Zepeda (2000:275) puts it, ‘the peasantry does not
live by legal security alone’. The ‘development‘ path pursued by Mexi-
can governments since 1982 may have benefited a small group of ex-
port-oriented private enterprises and some large agro-industrial con-
glomerates, such as the tortilla industry, which benefited from the liber-
alisation of importations of basic inputs – often heavily subsidised in
their countries of origin.42 In such a context, tinkering with the land
tenure regime and promoting privatisation and freehold as the ulti-
mate forms of tenure security cannot be expected to be the ‘silver bul-
let’ that will dynamise Mexican agriculture.
One of the reasons put forward to justify the 1992 reform was that
the prohibition on the sale of social property sector land in fact created
an illegal land market. However, we have argued that, although such a
market certainly existed, the newly opened possibility to enter the legal
market seems to be hardly attractive for the peasantry in the social
property sector, which is reflected in the fact that the option to convert
to freehold was made only in a very few cases. Even under conditions
of mounting market pressure, as in peri-urban areas, informal transac-
tions apparently continue to be the rule rather than the exception.
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Notes
1 Parts of this chapter were earlier published in the Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 8,
No. 1, January 2008 under the title “Land Tenure and Tenure Regimes in Mexico: An
Overview.” We thank the Journal editors and anonymous reviewers for their com-
ments.
2 At the time the term ejido referred to the village commons. After the revolution the
term came to be used to designate a self-governing tenure institution created in the
context of the agrarian reform.
3 In 1847 the US invaded Mexico and annexed Texas.
4 The church may have controlled nearly half of the land (Skidmore and Smith
1997:228).
5 During the French intervention (1864-1867), Emperor Maximilian von Habsburg re-
fused to return lands to the Church but sought some sort of an alliance with the pea-
sant and indigenous population by returning their communal lands and seeking
some sort of agrarian reform, though given the political circumstances and the fact
that many of the supporters of the emperor had reaped benefits from the desamorti-
zacio´n process, the attempts at agrarian reform remained without effect.
6 The second half of the nineteenth century had already seen a series of revolts
throughout the country (Wolf 1973).
7 Under the post-revolutionary regimes these lands would be individualised.
8 The original article 27 is reproduced in Silva (1959:250-255).
9 For an overview of indigenous landholding and tenure, see Robles 2000.
10 Obrego´n was elected in 1920, to be followed by Calles in 1924. After some constitu-
tional engineering, including the extension of the term of office to six years, Obrego´n
was re-elected in 1928 but was assassinated three weeks later. During the following
six years three presidents held office, but the real power behind them was Calles, the
jefe ma´ximo.
11 Indigenismo began as an intellectual current that in the Mexican case became the in-
spiration for official state policy in relation to the indigenous population.
12 In 1938, during the Ca´rdenas government, the party was renamed the Party of the
Mexican Revolution (PRM), and in 1946 it became the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI). The re-namings were accompanied by reorganisations of the representa-
tion of corporate interest groups and the reduction of the formal presence of the
armed forces.
13 The 1940-1970 period covers the presidencies of Avila Camaco (1940-1946), Miguel
Alema´n Valde´s (1946-1952), Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958), Adolfo Lo´pez Mateos
(1958-1964) and Gustavo Dı´az Ordaz (1964-1970).
14 The popular sector included the middle class and public employees.
15 At the same time rural-urban migration rapidly increased as well as labour migra-
tions to the US.
16 The policy shifted away from redistribution and meant that expectations of groups
whose principal demand was still centred on land could no longer be channelled
through the official organisations. Independent agrarista organisations formed the
Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala (CNPA) (Bizberg 2003b:207). On the other
hand, the 1970s saw the rise of independent productivista organisations that sought
to gain control over the productive and commercialisation process and by the early
1980s would form the Unio´n Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas (UN-
ORCA), which was more adept at pragmatic negotiating with the government. The
private sector created an independent organisation in the 1980s, the Consejo Nacional
Agropecuario (CNA), which was officially recognised in 1984 in the context of govern-
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mental attempts to repair relations with the sector, after the break during the Eche-
varı´a government.
17 Grain imports had risen from 1.4 per cent of national consumption in 1970 to 36 per
cent in 1979 (Fox 1993:69).
18 In 1986 Mexico entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and a
few years later negotiations over inclusion in the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment began.
19 The way to legally incorporate ejido land into this process was not through the pea-
sants’ will, until the 1992 reforms, but through an expropriation procedure that had
to be ratified by the President of the Republic, if ejido and community land was con-
cerned. The issue is further addressed in Duhau, this volume.
20 The proposal for a reform of article 27 virtually coincided with another reform that
was to recognise indigenous peoples’ rights, after Mexico had ratified the 1989 ILO
Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
in 1990, being the first Latin American country to do so. The 1992 constitutional re-
form was rather limited (Hindley 1996), however, and debate resurged with the Za-
patista uprising in January 1994, leading to a renewed reform effort in 2001, the re-
sults of which were also quite unsatisfactory for the indigenous movements. With its
indigenous population of over 10 million, or about eleven per cent of the total popu-
lation, Mexico counts the largest indigenous population in Latin America in absolute
terms (Ramirez 2006).
21 Within government circles a certain division existed between campesinistas, as for ex-
ample Gustavo Gordillo (1992), with Maoist antecedents, and ‘modernising techno-
crats’. Whereas the former argued that the ejido still had a role to play, the latter were
in favour of its dissolution (Cornelius and Myhre 1998).
22 The agrarista CNPA refused to join the Council.
23 Full texts of article 27 and implementing legislation can be found in Procuradurı´a
Agraria 1998.
24 The new legislation created new institutions: the agrarian tribunals with jurisdiction
to settle disputes, which before had been an attribution of the president; the Procura-
durı´a Agraria or Agrarian Ombudsman; a deconcentrated National Agrarian Registry;
and the Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria (Ministry of Agrarian Reform), charged with
the coordination of agrarian policies and the general ordering of property.
25 That is, house plots in the nu´cleo urbano (urban core or housing area) of the ejido.
26 A report by Soloago (2003) summarised the expected benefits as follows: ‘First, they
would encourage investment in ejido land, as farmers gained greater land security
and therefore a higher expected value of future income and investments in the land.
Second, the reforms would increase the supply of credit, as farmers could now use
their land as collateral for a loan. Third, the ability to engage in rental and sale trans-
actions would promote a more efficient allocation of land among agricultural produ-
cers, as land would be passed from less to more productive farmers.’
27 Often a World Bank study is cited, according to which trade liberalisation would
cause an additional 400,000 people to migrate over a ten-year period, on top of the
1.1 million who would have migrated anyway. Although this would depress urban
wages that would be offset by lower food prices and thus contribute to Mexico’s com-
parative advantages (Foley 1995; Young 1995).
28 This reflected the rezago agrario (agrarian backlog) of demands for land that had been
pending for years. No new demands were admitted, but in the state of Chiapas the
government saw itself forced to continue redistribution in the wake of the 1994 Za-
patista rebellion.
29 Lands moved out of the ‘social property sector’.
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30 As De Ita (2006) notes, joining the program was rather induced. Governmental insti-
tutions illegally required PROCEDE certification for access to other programmes that
were meant to ease the pain of trade liberalisation and structural adjustment (see
also Appendini 1996:4).
31 ‘The fact that the common use category is twice as large in surface as the parcel cate-
gory is quite notable. On the one hand this reflects, over time, the decreasing quality
of lands allocated to the “social property sector” in the course of the reform process,
and on the other hand it reflects the turn to cattle raising among above average
smallholders whose off-farm activities allow them to “accumulate capital“ in the form
of livestock.’
32 Paradoxically, the PROCEDE program included the incorporation of avecindados and
posesionarios, which contributes to further fragmentation of landholding (Concheiro
Bo´rquez and Quintana 2003).
33 The World Bank (1998:26) wonders whether PROCEDE has contributed to the devel-
opment of rental markets. Although the rate of land transactions is higher among
people with titles than among people without, increases in the rate of transactions
between 1994 and 1997 were the same in both groups. The perceived ‘PROCEDE ef-
fect,’ of a higher rate of transactions among people with title, may have to do more
with the program’s ‘selection bias’ because it first targeted the most accessible and
well connected ejidos.
34 This is an old argument for redistributive reform, but a distinction should be made
between land and labour productivity. Land may be more productive in small-scale
operations due to more intensive and unremunerated, but marginally less productive,
labour.
35 The World Bank (1998:28) also points to the persistent informality of transactions
(although they may be recorded in writing) and notes that (1) this may render the
PROCEDE cadastre obsolete in a few years and (2) this may indicate that new institu-
tions have not yet sufficiently penetrated the ejido sector or that it is not considered
important to formalise transactions. See also Robles 2003.
36 This time more or less ‘clean’ in contrast to the 1988 elections that had brought Sali-
nas de Gortari to power.
37 Perhaps the ‘neo-corporativism’ of Salinas’s ‘social liberalism’ fell in line with the ‘so-
cial capital’ vogue to be replaced by the more individualistic PROGRESA and OPOR-
TUNIDADES approaches, which emphasise ‘human capital’.
38 For a comment see Cord and Wodon 2001.
39 Concerning the antecedents and main traits of irregular/illegal urbanisation of ejidal
lands, we mainly base ourselves on Azuela 1989 and Duhau 1998.
40 See Comisio´n para la regularizacio´n de la Tenencia de la Tierra – CORETT (2001).
www.corett.gob.mx/Avances, 08-07-2001.
41 This issue is further discussed in Duhau, this volume.
42 The adherence of the Bush administration to bio-fuel programmes exposed the disad-
vantages of this bet and the precariousness of Mexican food security and sovereignty.
As production for strongly subsidised bio-fuel programmes became more profitable
than exporting low-quality maize to Mexico, the price of tortillas in that country sky-
rocketed and triggered a veritable tortilla crisis. The deliberately debilitated local pro-
ducers catering for the domestic market are not in a condition to expand production
rapidly.
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14 A case study on the implementation and
outcomes of the 1992 reforms on the Mexican
agrarian property institutions: An ejido in the
frontier of the urbanisation process
Emilio Duhau
Introduction
This study focusses on an ejido – a property institution created by the
Mexican agrarian reform, which we will discuss in more detail below –
in a peri-urban setting. The ejido Santiago Teyahualco is located on the
periphery of Mexico City’s Metropolitan Zone (ZMCM).1 Though its
lands are currently mainly assigned to agrarian uses, they are sur-
rounded by land dedicated to urban uses and activities (manufacturing,
commerce, housing projects, irregular settlements). Therefore, we are
dealing with an ejido whose location makes it reasonable to assume
that in the medium/long term its lands will be converted to urban
uses. Our focus on an ejido in a peri-urban context means that this
study can tell us little about the issue of property rights in truly agrar-
ian contexts in Mexico, but it allows us to see how the new agrarian
legislation enacted in 1992 defines and guarantees ejidal property
rights as well as the degree to which it allows for the accommodation
of local property arrangements, in a context that offers many incentives
and opportunities for land rent-seeking. Since the ejidal and communal
agrarian property institutions in Mexico were created by state law, the
aim of this study is to analyse the impact of legal changes concerning
agrarian property rights and property rights regularisation rather than
to analyse a process of legalisation of extra-legal forms of land tenure.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a
brief description of Mexican agrarian property institutions; the main
changes they suffered as a result of the legal reforms introduced in
1992; the general impact of these reforms and the main results of the
programme for ejidal property regularisation that accompanied them;
and the general evolution of conflicts over agrarian property after those
reforms. The second part is dedicated to the case of the ejido Santiago
Teyahualco. It begins with a description of the ejido and its local con-
text; discusses the observed effects of the 1992 reform on certainty con-
cerning property rights; the evolution of land uses and land rent appro-
priation strategies, linking them to the new rules defined by the Agrar-
ian Act; observed conflicts over the exercise of property rights; the ratio-
nale behind the ejidatarios’ refusal to adopt freehold tenure; and some
issues associated with the ejidatarios’ juridical culture.
The description of the Santiago Teyahualco ejido and the analysis of
its evolution in terms of property rights and land uses are based on var-
ious sources: direct field observation and data collection; open inter-
views with ejidatarios, members of the Comisariado Ejidal and the Vigi-
lance Committee, the visitor of the Agrarian Attorney’s Office (Procura-
durı´a Agraria) assigned to the ejido; and a number of documents
concerning the ejido’s creation, functioning, and governance, as well as
the Tultepec Municipality Urban Development Plan which is currently
in force.
A short overview of the recent evolution of Mexican agrarian
property institutions and rights in Mexico
Ejidos and comunidades
In a technical-juridical sense, ejidos and comunidades agrarias (agrarian
communities) are agrarian property institutions regulated by the Agrar-
ian Law involving collective as well as individual property rights. They
were created in the context of the agrarian reform and the process of
land redistribution, which was one of the main outcomes of the Mexi-
can Revolution (1910-1917). The exercise of ejidal or communal prop-
erty rights implies the mediation of a collective entity or corporation
consisting of the group of duly recognised and registered ejidatarios or
comuneros in each agrarian nucleus (i.e. each ejido or comunidad).
In all, more than 101 million hectares, or 55.4 per cent of the na-
tional territory, are held in Mexico by ejidos and comunidades (Procura-
durı´a Agraria 2004d:20). While two-thirds of lands granted to ejidos
and comunidades were (and still are) held collectively, individuals in
most ejidos and many comunidades have had long-term use rights to
particular parcels that they cultivate independently.
The main difference between ejidos and comunidades has to do with
the origins of property rights. While ejidos (by far the most important
of the two) are the result of land grants assigned by the state to groups
of landless peasants, comunidades hold their lands as a result of the sta-
te’s recognition or restitution of pre-existing property rights concerning
specific lands. Together these two property institutions created in the
course of the agrarian reform process make up what in Mexico is
known as the ‘social property sector’, where, as we shall see, property
rights are subject to specific rules.2 Given that our case study concerns
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an ejido and that it would take too much space to explain other legal
differences between ejidos and comunidades, from now on I shall only
refer to the former.
Lands comprising ejidos are classified into three types: human settle-
ment lands, common use lands, and parcelled lands. Human settle-
ment lands are those allocated to the ejidal village. Common use lands
may be used by all the ejido’s members and are regulated through col-
lective decisions. Parcelled lands are the plots of lands that were as-
signed to each ejidatario for him/her to use and exploit individually un-
til the 1992 reform, and that after that reform are recognised as per-
taining to each ejidatario as a proprietor who receives a certificate
through the ejidal property regularisation programme.
Ejidos do not need to consist of these three elements, and many eji-
dos are made up of either common use lands and the area allotted to
the ejidal village only, or the latter and parcelled lands only. In the case
of ejidos whose lands are classified as forest or rainforest, subdivision is
not allowed. As we shall see, the ejido of Santiago Teyahualco, our case
study, has no common use lands. Currently, two-thirds of all ejidal
lands in Mexico are common use lands, and only 31 per cent is par-
celled out. The common use lands are usually non-irrigated and non-
arable (Procuradurı´a Agraria 2004a).
As local communities, ejidos are composed of all the people inhabit-
ing the ejidal village. But as self-governed and legally recognised cor-
porations, they have always exclusively constituted (and still do) the
group of recognised and registered ejidatarios. This means that
although they also have specific rights acknowledged by law, indivi-
duals recognised as ejido settlers (avecindados – who live in the ejido vil-
lage but have no rights to ejido lands) and de facto possessors of par-
celled land (posesionarios – whose temporary use rights to land not cur-
rently in use by an ejido member may be recognised by the ejido
assembly) do not take part in the ejido’s binding collective decisions
(Brown 2004:12). The ‘supreme organ of the ejido is the assembly
where all ejidatarios participate’ (Ley Agraria). Besides the assembly as a
self-governing body, ejidos have an administrative body (Comisariado
Ejidal) constituted by three ejidatarios, elected by the assembly through
secret ballot, and a surveillance body (Comite´ de Vigilancia) constituted
by another three, similarly elected ejidatarios.
Prior to the 1992 constitutional reform and according to the former
Ley de Reforma Agraria, collective property rights over ejidal lands as
well as individual agrarian rights (see box) over ejidal common use and
parcelled lands were non-transferable and were inalienable (other than
through inheritance) and could not be leased or mortgaged (Brown
2004:24).3 These restrictions were originally intended to protect pea-
sants from being despoiled of their lands as well as to preserve the so-
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cial character of ejidal lands and to avoid the reconstitution of latifun-
dia. This also explains why, although the Mexican agrarian reform al-
lowed private property alongside the social property sector, in agrarian
legislation it was contemplated only under the form of pequen˜a propie-
dad (small property). Small agrarian proprietors can currently own 100
to 300 hectares of irrigated land, depending on the crop it will be used
to farm, or the equivalent in several types of rain-fed land. All in all, in-
cluding urban areas, private property – which basically falls under the
civil law regime – accounts for 38 per cent of the national territory,
compared to 55.4 per cent in the social property sector ruled basically
by agrarian law.
The Ley de Reforma Agraria in force up to 1991, defined the ejidal
corporation as the proprietor of the lands granted to it (Ley de Refor-
ma Agraria: art. 51 A), while it called agrarian rights the rights held
by each ejidatario over common use lands or over the parcel or par-
cels granted to him or her (id. art. 69). In other words, the agrarian
law defined the ejidal land as a collective property of the ejidal cor-
poration, but the rights held by each ejidatario over parcelled or com-
mon use land as use rights.
Despite the aforementioned legal rules of non-marketability of ejidal
and communal lands, five main types of irregular/illegal moves around
ejidal collective property rights and individual agrarian rights were
common:
1) The informal leasing of individually held parcels (Quintana, Con-
cheiro Bo´rquez, and Pe´rez Avile´s 1998);
2) The sale of a parcel, usually to another ejidatario or resident of the
same ejido (Quintana, Concheiro Bo´rquez, and Pe´rez Avile´s
1998:8).
3) The illegal subdivision of ejidal common use or parcelled lands,
mostly to sell building plots for low-cost housing in ejidos and comu-
nidades whose lands, due to their proximity to urban agglomera-
tions, were susceptible to being transformed to urban uses (Duhau
1998:Ch. 4).
4) The allotment or cession of arable parcels to individuals other than
those having the right of inheritance of agrarian rights;
5) The de facto holding of agrarian rights by inheritance from the ori-
ginal holder without due registration in the National Agrarian Reg-
ister;
6) The subdivision of a parcel among multiple successors of an ejida-
tario (Brown 2004:24).
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In sum, prior to the 1992 reforms, there was an informal (illegal) ejidal
land market as well as a set of informal practices concerning the ces-
sion of land rights to ejidatarios’ inheritors or other people pertaining
to ejido communities. According to some authors the ‘illegal market
transactions were estimated at around 50 per cent of the best ejido and
communal land’ (Martı´nez et al. 1990, cited in Quintana, Concheiro
Bo´rquez, and Pe´rez Avile´s 1998:8).
Within the legal framework defined by the former Ley de Reforma
Agraria, there were three main kinds of tenure insecurity. The first con-
cerned disputes over land possession and boundary limits between eji-
dos and between ejidos and comunidades or private proprietors, as well
as intra-ejido disputes for similar reasons. The second concerned the de
facto creation, through illegal selling and informal allotments and ces-
sions of land, of a class of landholders who did not have formally re-
cognised agrarian rights and therefore were in a precarious tenure con-
dition.4 The third source of land tenure insecurity came from the legal
provision stating that the agrarian rights held by an ejidatario could be
withdrawn for different reasons, among them: in the event that he/she
does not cultivate his/her parcel personally or with his/her family dur-
ing the course of two or more years, or if the ejido has adopted the re-
gime of collective exploitation, he/she does not execute the tasks as-
signed during the same amount of time; or when the parcel is given a
forbidden use (Ley de Reforma Agraria: art. 85). Thus, the ejidatarios
who did not cultivate their parcels or gave them a forbidden use (such
as leasing them) could be denounced by other ejido members – usually
with the interest of obtaining the agrarian rights at stake for them-
selves. This kind of dispute made land possession uncertain and was a
permanent source of internal conflict (Zepeda 1999:15-16).
Main changes in agrarian property institutions and rights after the reforms
enacted in 1992
In 1992, article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which originally
formed the basis for agrarian reform, was modified. This brought land
redistribution formally to a close and opened the way for new agrarian
legislation, which was introduced soon after the reform of the Consti-
tution to replace the 1971 Ley Federal de Reforma Agraria. The explicit
purposes were: (1) to give peasants and agrarian actors in general cer-
tainty about their land property rights; (2) to liberate peasants from
state tutelage; (3) to allow the social property sector, that is, ejidal and
communal lands, to benefit from private investments; and (4) to make
agrarian property rights marketable (cf. Tellez 1994).
In order to accomplish these ends, the new Ley Agraria included a
number of provisions implying a deep transformation of the ejido as a
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property institution, which can be summarised as follows. First, ejidal
property rights were redefined to make them resemble private property,
or ownership rights. On the one hand, ejidal parcelled lands are cur-
rently allowed to be leased out to or sharecropped by anyone and may
be transferred or sold to another ejidatario pertaining to the same ejido
or to an ejido settler, and the right to use them can be given as a guar-
antee for bank loans.5 On the other hand, common use lands can be
contributed as an investment in business enterprises, and the individu-
ally held parcels can be converted to dominio pleno, that is, freehold un-
der civil law. It is important to emphasise that the former group of
new property rights can be exercised by each ejidatario without asking
permission from the Assembly or any external authority, but that in or-
der to make the two latter possibilities effective, the authorisation by a
qualified majority of the Assembly members is required.
Second, while they did exist before the legal reforms of 1992, nom-
inally the ejidal corporate bodies were the same as they are now, and
provisions currently enforced substantially empowered the assembly
and, therefore, ejidatarios at large, by attributing to this body some out-
standing capabilities. Among them, recognition and regularisation of
individually held parcels and of ejidal village plots; decisions on the al-
location of common use land to a business corporation; and authorisa-
tion of the adoption of the freehold regime over parcelled lands. Addi-
tionally, the new agrarian legislation curtailed the attributions held by
the comisariados ejidales, reducing them to the application and registra-
tion of Assembly decisions, and the administration of ejidal goods and
facilities.
A third group of remarkable changes introduced by the new agrarian
law concerns the role played by government officials and bureaucrats
in the working and governance of ejidos, and in the exercise of ejidal
property rights. Before the reforms, ejidal property relations and rights
were widely mediated by a federal agrarian bureaucracy exerting a
strong tutelage on ejidos’ internal life and decisions. In addition, there
was no independent judiciary in charge of mediating agrarian property
disputes and protecting agrarian property rights. Now there are agrar-
ian courts that are autonomous from the government and its agrarian
branch. And an Agrarian Attorney Office (Procuradurı´a Agraria) has
since been created as an advisory and dispute-mediating agency, which
although it can attest to the accomplishment of the formalities required
for those ejidal Assemblies, where matters like the association with a
business corporation or the adoption of the freehold regime are
decided, it cannot take any binding measure or decision concerning
the internal life of ejidos and the exercise of ejidal property rights.
Fourth, in order to allow the new contents of ejidal property rights to
be exercised, in 1993 the federal government launched the Ejidal
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Rights and Ejidal Villages Plots Certification Program (PROCEDE),
aimed at regulating collective and individual ejidal property rights by
mapping and measuring collectively held lands, individually held par-
cels and ejidal village plots, and extending the corresponding certifi-
cates of rights.
Nevertheless, despite the stated objective of giving certitude about
property rights, the current agrarian act shows several loopholes and
establishes some regulations that may be subject to different interpre-
tations. Among the former is the issue of the posesionarios (de facto
holders) of parcels. In fact, in order to regularise all existing land ten-
ure conditions, the Agrarian Act creates the posesionario tenure status
by giving the assembly the capability of recognising posesionarios, but it
states nothing concerning the rights they have, other than those of re-
ceiving the tenure certificate and using the plot of land whose posses-
sion was recognised by the assembly (see box).
REGLAMENTO DE LA LEY AGRARIA - CHAPTER III
About the regularisation of de facto landholders (posesionarios)
Article 36. The Assembly may regularise the land possession of de
facto landholders (posesionarios), (…)
Article 37. The de facto landholders (posesionarios) recognised by the
Assembly will have the rights of use over the parcels concerned, ex-
cept in those cases in which the Assembly decides to grant them ad-
ditional rights over other lands or goods pertaining to the ejido.
(…)
Article 40. If the Assembly, when regularising land possession by de
facto landholders, does not define their rights in the corresponding
minutes, it will be assumed that they only acquire the rights of
using their parcel (…)
As to the property rights on subdivided lands, the currently enforced
Ley Agraria makes four main provisions. First, ejidatarios can freely des-
ignate their inheritor by registering a succession order list with the Na-
tional Agrarian Register (see box). If an ejidatario does not register that
list, his/her property rights will be assigned in the first place to his
wife/her husband or to his male/her female partner, and successively
to one of his/her children, to one ascending relative, or any other peo-
ple economically dependent on him/her.
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The combined result of the 1992 reforms and [the] certification pro-
cess has been to convert what was once thought of a household re-
source into the individual property of the ejidatario (…). Other family
members have few legal rights over the ejidal land rights (…) … if
the ejidatario decides to sell the land (…) his family cannot stop him
or her. His family only has the right of first refusal to purchase the
land themselves from the ejidatario if they want to keep the land.
Furthermore, the ejidatario now also has the right to select the in-
heritor of his or her choice, whereas under previous law the ejidatar-
io had to transmit his or her rights to a member of his or her im-
mediate family (Brown 2004:16).
Second, ejidatarios can utilise their individually owned parcels directly
or concede its use or usufruct to any other ejidatario or third party un-
der any legal arrangement (renting, sharecropping, etc.) without asking
permission of the assembly or any other internal or external authority.
Third, ejidatarios can hand over or sell their property rights over indivi-
dual parcels to another ejidatario belonging to the same agrarian nu-
cleus, or to an ejido settler (avecindado). Fourth, once the Ejidal Assem-
bly has authorised the adoption of freehold tenure (civil law property
regime - dominio pleno) over subdivided lands, the ejidatarios interested
in doing so can adopt it for their individually owned parcels by asking
the National Agrarian Register to remove it from its registers and issue
the corresponding property title which then can be inscribed in the
Public Register of Property. To be approved, the assembly’s authorisa-
tion for adopting freehold requires the favourable ballot of a two-thirds
majority of members assisting at a meeting called for that purpose.
The law stipulates that a quorum of two-thirds of the ejido members is
required in the first calling, or in the second calling a quorum of one-
half plus one (Ley Agraria 1992). As we shall see, it is mostly around
these provisions that conflicts, controversies, and irregularities regard-
ing the exercise of property rights over individual parcels arise in the
ejido Santiago Teyahualco.
General evolution of agrarian institutions, ejidal property regularisation, and
agrarian land property conflicts after the 1992 reform
The Agrarian Attorney Office, as well as Agrarian Courts and the pro-
gramme for the certification of agrarian property rights (PROCEDE),
were put into operation with remarkable celerity and efficacy. This
clearly reflects the priority the federal government accorded the imple-
mentation of the new agrarian legislation, which it expected to tackle
ongoing agrarian conflicts and to attract private investment – foreign
394 EMILIO DUHAU
capital included – to the Mexican countryside. The latter has not oc-
curred thus far, but the performance of the new agrarian public bodies
and some statistical figures they have released give us an overview of
the main results and induced effects of the implementation of the
1992 agrarian legislation reform.
PROCEDE not only progressed quickly during its first years of opera-
tion but brought into focus – given its mission of measuring, counting,
etc. – an accurate image of the ejido’s reality that was not previously
available. According to data released by the Procuradurı´a Agraria, up to
December 2003, of a total of 30,077 agrarian ‘nuclei’ (ejidos and comuni-
dades), 24,792 had been already certified (83.1 per cent), among them
23,543 ejidos. That corresponds to 68.8 million hectares and roughly 3.2
million agrarian rights holders (Procuradurı´a Agraria 2004b:8).
But what about the commodification of ejidal lands? As noted, the
new agrarian legislation provides two main ways for putting them on
the private property market. The first consists of contributing common
use lands to a business endeavour, be it about agrarian production or,
depending on the location of the ejido, about real estate projects (tour-
ism, housing, leisure). The second way involves the adoption of free-
hold tenure on parcelled lands. As to the former, up to December 2003
the paltry number of 25 certified ejidos had contributed a total of 13,078
hectares of common use lands to business enterprises (id.:22-23).
Concerning the second path, again by December 2003, 1,595 agrar-
ian nuclei (5.6 per cent) had adopted freehold tenure on parcelled
lands, involving a total surface of 732,625 hectares, that is 0.7 per cent
of the area held by agrarian nuclei (id.:10). Yet, what is still more re-
markable is that the adoption of the freehold regime had been until
then virtually non-existent in rural localities (i.e. those having up to
2,500 inhabitants), and only 2.8 per cent of the cases corresponded to
ejidos and comunidades located in localities with 2,500 to 15,000 inhabi-
tants (id.:16). This means that 97 per cent of the freehold adoption
cases were linked to urban and peri-urban settings in the vicinity of ag-
glomerations with more than 15,000 inhabitants and that rural ejidos
had been virtually untouched by the theoretically expected privatisation
fever. To be more accurate, it seems evident that ejidatarios are only
prone to and interested in being private owners if they have opportu-
nities of capturing differential land rents arising from the conversion
of their lands from agrarian to urban uses.
Conflicts around ejidal property and the role of agrarian courts
When the 1992 reforms were enacted, a great number of agrarian con-
flicts and disputes were ongoing. The Agrarian Mixed Committees (Co-
misiones Agrarias Mixtas) – the non-judiciary bodies in charge of deal-
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ing with them – passed them on to the newly created Agrarian Courts.
But, as could be expected, thousands of other conflicts and disputes
came to light once these courts as well as the Agrarian Attorney Office
began to operate.
The Agrarian Attorney Office (AAO) was created to advise ejidal
bodies and ejidatarios in matters concerning the due use and interpreta-
tion of ejidal property rights and to mediate property rights disputes.
Therefore, it is a body which is expected to deal with such disputes as
far as possible by way of voluntary accords before they are brought to
the courts. It is for that reason that the statistics compiled by the AAO
on the disputes that it sought to resolve between 1992 and 2003 give a
reasonably accurate picture of their territorial distribution, main
causes, and actors.
As we can see in Table 14.1, up to December 2003, almost 670,000
agrarian disputes were attended by the AAO. Individual property rights
were the main cause of conflict, accounting for 66.3 per cent of the
cases. Upon seeing these figures, it might be thought that the provi-
sions of the new agrarian legislation have induced a great number of
land conflicts. But one should not overlook that one of the main virtues
of the new agrarian rules and public bodies is precisely that they have
allowed the conflicts and disputes that plagued the Mexican country-
side to be channelled through them in peaceful ways.
As to the Agrarian Courts, they are composed of a higher agrarian
court (Tribunal Superior Agrario) and 49 ordinary courts (Tribunales
Unitarios Agrarios), which up to May 2005 had altogether received
more than 345,000 cases, of which a quarter have been resolved by
means of voluntary agreements (Tribunal Superior Agrario 2005). If
anything, the growing credibility of this previously non-existent agrar-
ian judiciary can be derived from the fact that the number of claims it
received has been rapidly growing from one year to the next since
1992. Thus, while during its first six years of functioning it received
around 109,000 claims (Zepeda 1999:15), in the following eight years
it received more than twice that number.
In contrast to the rest of the national judiciary, agrarian courts have
operated from the beginning by way of oral procedures, which has gi-
Table 14.1 Controversies concerning individual property rights posed before the
agrarian attorney office national figures (%) 1992-2003
Posession of a parcel 33.1
Inheritance of ejidal rights 33.2
Ejidal villages' plots 11.6
Parcels' boundaries 7.9
Other 15.8
Source: Procuraduría Agraria, 2004
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ven people access to them by merely showing up. In spite of that,
when an ordinary court’s judgment is appealed, the resolution of a case
may take up to two years (Zepeda 1999).
The case study: The ejido of Santiago Teyahualco
The setting
Situated in the municipality of Tultepec, which currently forms part of
Mexico City’s Metropolitan Zone, the ejido of Santiago Teyahualco was
constituted in 1930 on 462 hectares of land expropriated from the Car-
tagena estate and granted to landless peasants from the village of San-
tiago Teyahualco (Comisio´n Nacional Agraria 1930), who had peti-
tioned the government to be benefited with a land endowment since
1925 (Comisio´n Local Agraria del Estado de Me´xico 1928). It is worth
taking into account that until 1992, the Agrarian Reform Act allowed
landless peasants to ask the federal government for land endowments
and the state was obliged to satisfy their land applications, taking lands
that were eligible for expropriation.
The ejido of Santiago Teyahualco has no common use lands. It con-
sists of the ejidal village called Colonia 10 de Junio, ejidal roads, irriga-
tion utilities, some public facilities such as a primary and a secondary
school, and 207 individual parcels. Most of these parcels have an area
of roughly 2.3 hectares, although there are smaller ones.
The composition of the soil makes Teyahualco’s lands suitable for
the cultivation of grains and fodder, and traditionally the parcels have
been used to cultivate maize and a kind of fodder called alfalfa, as well
as for raising dairy cattle. Because irrigation water nowadays is con-
taminated by domiciliary and industrial waste, ejidatarios are not al-
lowed to produce maize for human consumption. Common local opi-
nion holds that the raising of dairy cattle and dairy production have
been decreasing for the last two decades because of the urbanisation of
surrounding areas, the growing circulation of vehicles on the ejido’s
roads, and the limited scope of the local market. Therefore, at present,
only around twenty ejidatarios continue raising dairy cattle. Neverthe-
less, a dairy products cooperative is in operation, in which roughly ten
ejidatarios participate. All in all, the income that most ejidatarios obtain
from the exploitation of their parcels is not sufficient to make a living,
and most of them hold jobs or engage in petty entrepreneurial activ-
ities outside the ejido, making those who live exclusively on their par-
cels’ production a minority.
As we can observe on the satellite image, Santiago Teyahualco is at
present almost completely surrounded by land dedicated to urban uses
and activities: housing projects and irregular settlements to the south
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and west, and manufacturing plants, workshops, and warehouses to
the east and south. Given Teyahualco’s peri-urban setting, ejidatarios
are currently facing many incentives to give up agrarian activities and
either allocate their parcels to other kinds of endeavours, or simply sell
them to outsiders. Viable alternative uses are manufacturing plants,
warehouses, production services, low-cost formal housing projects, and
irregular settlements. There already exist several, rather small, informal
settlements as well as a limited number of workshops and warehouses.
As to formal housing projects, large housing developers usually seek to
acquire large tracts of land at once, a condition hardly attainable in
Teyahualco, given that, as we shall see, there are many Tuyehualco’s eji-
datarios that are not willing to sell their parcels.
In any case, according to the municipal urban development plan ap-
proved in 2003, the likely evolution of land uses in Santiago Teyahual-
co would imply ‘an irregular process of land sales and a disorderly mix
of industrials, services, housing and agrarian land uses’. Remarkably,
the plan itself allocates almost all Teyahualco’s lands to two main uses:
light, middle, and small-sized industries in the northern portion and a
metropolitan services centre in the southern one, but includes neither
housing developments nor agrarian uses (Gobierno del Estado de Me´xi-
co 2003). It is clear that the state and municipal governments are con-
vinced that given the current pollution of the water used for cultivation
and the growing urbanisation of the municipality, the lands of Teya-
hualco should to be used for manufacturing industries and services.
Threats to certainty about property rights
Ejidatarios as such, that is, those people whose property status has been
confirmed in the PROCEDE certification process, and those who have
been recognised by the Ejidal Assembly as ejido settlers (avecindados),
whose rights over definite parcels have been recognised by the Assem-
bly and have been registered in the National Agrarian Register, can be
said to enjoy irreversible property rights. In contrast to the former
Agrarian Reform Act, which stated several actions conducive to the loss
of agrarian rights, among them the desertion of the ejido or the as-
signed parcel for more than two years, the 1992 Agrarian Act has
made ejidal individual property rights irreversible, save in cases of their
voluntary transfer or expropriation for reasons of public benefit.
What could be observed to this regard in Teyahualco is that if, for in-
stance, an ejidatario irregularly subdivides a parcel and sells plots for
housing construction, he/she may be prosecuted under the charge of
‘clandestine subdivision’ and eventually might be jailed, but that would
not affect his/her ejidal property rights. This clearly contrasts with the
situation under the former legal framework when, because of an Ejidal
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Assembly’s request made before the agrarian authorities in 1991 (Se-
cretarı´a de la Reforma Agraria 1991), 31 ejidatarios were dispossessed of
their parcels for having deserted them for more than two years (Tribu-
nal Unitario Agrario De´cimo Distrito 1993).6
Therefore, it can be said that under the present conditions, for recog-
nised ejidatarios and posesionarios, the threats to their status as agrarian
proprietors do not arise from the legal framework itself but from the
contextual factor of the ongoing urbanisation process in combination
with the shaky economic situation experienced by many of them. The
urbanisation process implies that arable parcels are losing their appeal
against potentially more profitable urban land uses. The shaky eco-
nomic conditions many ejidatarios are suffering mean that they may be
prone to accept disadvantageous land deals.
Land uses evolution and current strategies of Teyahualco’s ejidatarios
In cases of ejidos such as Teyahualco which, given their peri-urban loca-
tion, are facing circumstances that are at odds with their continuity as
agrarian endeavours and which do not have common use lands, it
seems that the rules of the game as defined by current agrarian legisla-
tion also impede the adoption of collective strategies regarding land
Figure 14.1 Ejido Santiago Teyahualco – Satellite image
Source: Google Earth
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uses and property rights. As each ejidatario or posesionario can give any
use to their parcel(s), unless it is forbidden by local regulations, or just
sell them without concern for the opinion or support of the other ejida-
tarios, we can expect that a plethora of individual strategies will
emerge. In Teyahualco we observed the following.
Between 1994 and 2005, roughly following legal provisions, eigh-
teen ejidatarios sold the rights over their parcels. Of these eighteen,
three sold rights over two parcels. Some of the buyers were other Teya-
hualco’s ejidatarios, but others were outsiders. In these latter cases, the
sellers promoted the recognition of the buyer by the Ejidal Assembly as
ejido settler (avecindado) as a way of legitimising the transaction. It
seems that in these cases of sale to outsiders, the sellers benefited
more because the prices they obtained were related to future uses con-
templated in the municipal zoning plan: uses like warehouses, work-
shops, and industrial plants. The buyers expect that turning the land to
such uses will be possible in view of the zoning provisions in the pre-
sent Municipal Development Plan, which will be implemented once
the Ejidal Assembly approves the adoption of dominio pleno.
A small number of ejidatarios have subdivided their parcels and sold
the plots for housing construction. This is a rather risky alternative,
since it is illegal.7 And it is much less profitable than selling a whole
parcel; which is either legal or can be made legal by taking advantage
of certain legislation loopholes, as is the case when ejidatarios promote
the recognition of an outside buyer as avecindado. If anything, it is
clear that in Teyahualco, irregularly subdividing a parcel for selling
housing plots is not well regarded. The most active, informed, and eco-
nomically stable Teyahualco’s ejidatarios, generally the younger genera-
tion, deplore that senior ejidatarios pressed by personal or family needs
have sold their lands at prices they consider derisory.
Some ejidatarios are renting out their parcels in order to have them
cultivated at the same time that they engage in other economic activ-
ities, sometimes linked to fodder production. A number of them
(around ten) take part in a dairy products cooperative. Some ejidatarios
within this group rent out their parcels to have them cultivated and ob-
tain some income, while the future of Teyahualco’s lands is defined.
Among them are those who, being foreign to the ejido and having leg-
ally acquired one or more parcels, expect to profit from the uses in-
tended by the municipal zoning plan, which they expect will be possi-
ble once freehold is adopted.
A fifth group is composed of ejidatarios who seek to obtain better in-
comes from their parcel than they might obtain through maize or fod-
der production, or from dairy cattle raising. They have opted to rent
out fractions of their parcels or to apply them to non-agrarian uses
themselves: mostly warehouses, metallurgical workshops, and soccer
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fields. The soccer fields, of which there are around twenty, are rented
during the weekends and allow their owners to obtain, by local stan-
dards, pretty good incomes (of the order of a monthly amount of USD
800 each). In any case, these are uses that, although irregularly intro-
duced, do not involve an offence and benefit from the blind eye of local
authorities.
Finally, there are a number of ejidatarios, mostly senior ones, who
continue cultivating their parcels themselves and are fixated on the eji-
do as a local community and as an agrarian endeavour. All in all, in
spite of the non-agrarian uses already introduced for Teyahualco’s
lands, according to estimations of several rather knowledgeable key in-
formants, roughly 80 per cent of the parcels are still cultivated. And in-
deed, if we examine the satellite image minutely, this estimate does
not seem to be too far off the mark.
Conflicts and disputes about property rights and ejido functioning
As might be expected from the statistics on agrarian conflicts released
by the AAO, in Teyahualco disputes concerning individual property
rights are also the most numerous. In the words of the lawyer acting
as AAO’s visitor in Teyahualco, there are two main reasons why this
type of conflict arises. First, there is the issue of inheritance of property
rights, which most often arises when an ejidatario did not register a
succession order list, or when the validity of the registered list is chal-
lenged by one of the potential beneficiaries. In such cases the appeal is
usually based on assumptions about the absence of the due conditions
for the ‘real’ expression of the will of the deceased (insanity, severe ill-
ness). It seems that this type of conflict is not very different from those
arising commonly in Mexico (and almost everywhere) around inheri-
tance rights. We should, however, note a specificity of ejidal property
rights that probably explains why many of Teyahualco’s ejidatarios avoid
expressing their will through a succession order list. According to the
agrarian law, an ejidal parcel can only be inherited by one person. We
can suppose then that ejidatarios do not deposit their succession order
list to avoid family conflicts while they are alive.8
A second cause of conflict involves parcel boundaries. Although at
the moment of implementation of the PROCEDE certification all these
boundaries were measured by the National Institute of Statistics, Geo-
graphy and Informatics (INEGI) and approved unanimously, in many
cases there were well-known differences between the customarily ac-
cepted boundaries and those formalised in the ejido map issued by IN-
EGI. Therefore, it seems that in order to have their rights formalised
and regularised as soon as possible and to avoid delaying PROCEDE’s
completion, some ejidatarios accepted a measurement of boundaries
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that did not reflect realities on the ground and was therefore not satis-
factory in the long run.
According to the aforementioned informant as well as interviewed
ejidatarios, another kind of conflict frequently observed in Teyahualco
concerns the occupation of one or more fractions of a parcel by rela-
tives of a deceased ejidatario whose eviction is requested by the parcel
inheritor. This kind of situation occurs when an ejidatario wishes to
hand on ‘a tract of land’ to all his/her nearest relatives, without taking
into account the legal nullity of the intended distribution. In such a
way, many poorly informed ejidatarios, instead of contributing to their
relatives’ welfare, sow the seeds of bitter disputes that, at least in Teya-
hualco, are usually only settled in an Agrarian Court.
The issue of the adoption of a freehold regime
Teyahualco is an ejido whose regularisation by PROCEDE was accom-
plished early, dating from 1994 (Ejido de Santiago Teyahualco 1994),
and during the twelve years that have elapsed since then, the Ejidal As-
sembly has been called many times with the specific aim of voting to
authorise the adoption of the private property regime. But so far the eji-
datarios promoting this change have not been able to obtain the two-
thirds majority required. Though it was not possible to find out when
the last attempt took place, according to the ballot results of an Assem-
bly conducted in February 2002, where 109 of the total of 193 ejidatar-
ios were present, 67 voted for and 42 against the authorisation of do-
minio pleno (Ejido de Santiago Teyahualco 2002). Such ballot results
show not only that there is still a significant minority opposed to do-
minio pleno, but that there is also a considerable number of Teyahual-
co’s ejidatarios who either remain indifferent concerning the future of
the ejido or, more probably, did not go to the meeting in order to ob-
struct the formation of the required quorum. Although the adoption of
the dominio pleno on the parcelled lands of an ejido does not necessarily
imply its dissolution, in the case of Teyahualco that would be the most
probable outcome, given both its peri-urban location and the fact that
it has no common use lands.
Some senior ejidatarios expressed the opinion that for them adopting
the dominio pleno would imply losing many things, among them a way
of life. This is an idea that they do not verbalise as such, but express by
invoking specific burdens like having to pay property taxes and drink-
able water fees, which as ejidatarios they do not currently pay. Accord-
ing to a lawyer who acts as an informal advisor to the present president
of the Comisariado Ejidal, there are other specific circumstances that ex-
plain why a number of ejidatarios are against the adoption of the free-
hold regime. There is an apparently shared belief that due to a long-
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standing boundary dispute between the Tultepec municipality and the
neighbouring municipality of Tultitla´n, in case of the ejido’s dissolu-
tion, its lands would be reclaimed as part of Tultitla´n’s territory, regis-
tered in its cadastre as private property and taxed according to the high-
er land values applied in this municipality.
Meanwhile, some of Teyahualco’s apparently well informed ejidatarios
believe that because of the imminent construction of a highway that
will cross through the ejido, many parcels will be expropriated. They as-
sume that the affected ejidatarios would obtain a much better cash com-
pensation if they adopted freehold tenure over their parcels. Therefore,
the dominant point of view among the younger and better informed eji-
datarios is that the authorisation of freehold by the assembly is not only
desirable but its adoption constitutes an increasingly pressing issue.
Nevertheless, we have so far no evidence supporting the supposition
that freehold tenure will be authorised by the assembly in the near fu-
ture. If not for other reasons, because many ejidatarios fear that they
will be unable to cope with the charges and duties that they believe
would arise from having the status of private proprietor. Therefore,
they will probably continue abstaining or voting against it. But we also
have to consider what land means to those who, as is surely the case
among the older ejidatarios of Teyahualco, assume themselves to be
peasants who got their land because they fought for it. As Quintana et
al. write, ‘For the Mexican peasantry, land transactions are determined
by the conception they have of land as a multifaceted space used for
production and as a place to live. For them, land also means territory,
the foundation of their history and their social identity (…) Land, more
than merchandise of factor of production, is a strong referent of iden-
tity. It represents the recognition of social authority, and it is a patri-
mony, a place of residence, a source of status, and a foundation of the
local and regional structure’ (Quintana, Concheiro Bo´rquez, and Pe´rez
Avile´s 1998:5 and 7).
Abiding by, interpreting and using the law
Something that attracts the attention of outside observers concerned
with local juridical cultures the first time they arrive in Santiago Teya-
hualco and talk to ejidatarios about the ejido’s affairs and problems is
their usually poorly informed notions about agrarian legislation as well
as municipal competencies. We observed two main types of confusion
in this respect.
The first has to do with the scope of the agrarian law, the ejido’s
autonomy, and the local authorities‘ competencies. The ejidatarios, in-
cluding the best informed among them, do not seem to be clear about
the difference between the effects of the adoption of freehold tenure
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and land use changes. They tend to think that adopting freehold over a
parcel is equivalent to the authorisation to introduce any land use. We
even heard a very active ejidatario talking about the municipal zoning
provisions – which he is opposed to – as follows: ‘the ejido is above the
municipal power’. Here we have to take into account that ejidos func-
tioned during many decades as agrarian bodies that generally also
managed local utilities and public facilities and were used to dealing
more frequently with federal and state agrarian bureaucracies than
with municipal powers. Additionally, ejidos were perceived – and still
are to a large extent – not only as collective property institutions but as
local powers.
Thus, having experienced the ejido as a local power until very re-
cently, largely autonomous from the municipality, it is not surprising
that Teyahualco’s ejidatarios are still prone to ignore municipal compe-
tencies as well as being unaware of the role of municipal authorities
and urban legislation and ordinances in the regulation of land use in
areas that, as is the case of Santiago Teyahualco, are subject to the ur-
banisation process.
The second type of confusion concerns the contents of the agrarian
law at large and the meanings of private property, as well as the duties
that being a private landowner entails. In general, in this regard the
less educated ejidatarios exhibit many misunderstandings or simply
gross ignorance (see box).
Conversation between a senior female ejidatario and a research assis-
tant:
Q: Mrs. B, what is your opinion about dominio pleno?
A: I think it is desirable.
Q: Why do you think it is desirable?
A: I don’t know, really.
But the more informed and educated ejidatarios also seem not to be
free of some confusion. We can mention for instance the member of
the comisariado ejidal who counselled a hydraulic engineer – who
worked with the ejido regarding irrigation facilities – about the regulari-
sation procedures concerning a housing plot he had irregularly ac-
quired in another ejido. When explaining to the engineer what he had
to do, he expressed a number of misunderstandings about the issue.
Among others, he confounded the capabilities given by the law to the
ejidal assembly to regularise and recognise the land tenure of posesio-
narios and ejidal village settlers with the procedures that have to be fol-
lowed to regularise irregular settlements on common use or parcelled
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ejidal lands. We also heard another member of the same body saying to
an ejidatario that ‘according to the current agrarian act, the issue of the
succession order list is not nowadays as it was before, and that now an
ejidatario must mention on the list one and only one successor’. If
those who are in charge of administering the ejido’s affairs, to whom
most ejidatarios usually resort to deal with the ejido’s day-to-day affairs,
transmit to their fellows these kinds of false ideas and misinformation,
it is not difficult to understand why a good number of ejidatarios are
lost when it comes to the current meanings and scope of the ejido and
the ejidal property rights.
It is probably these generalised confusions and misunderstandings,
therefore, as well as some tricky issues posed by the agrarian act that
explain why even though wishing to comply with the law, many ejida-
tarios fail to do so and also fail to profit from the optimal strategies po-
tentially within their reach of their now enhanced individual property
rights. Instead, they frequently settle for deals over their lands that re-
duce these possibilities. At the same time, precisely because of their
lack of adequate information, many ejidatarios seem susceptible to ma-
nipulation by their better informed colleagues. However, what Teya-
hualco’s case shows is that the 1992 agrarian property reforms have
clearly empowered ejidatarios at large vis-a`-vis government bureaucra-
cies and local leaders.
In addition, Teyahualco’s case shows that regarding the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of the law, ejidatarios currently enjoy access to a
couple of bodies they widely trust, namely the Agrarian Attorney Office
and Agrarian Courts. They trust the former probably because it is a
body without the capacity to make decisions, but which is dedicated to
helping and advising ejidatarios in dealing with their collective as well
as their individual land/property affairs. Teyahualco’s ejidatarios usually
resort to the assigned AAO’s Visitor, whom many of them refer to as
‘our delegate’, mostly when facing a conflict over their rights or when
they wish to file a complaint or request.
Notwithstanding, Teyahualco’s ejidatarios, as seems to be the case
with ejidatarios all around the country, are bringing their cases increas-
ingly before Agrarian Courts. Sometimes, according to the aforemen-
tioned AAO’s Visitor, ejidatarios do this by ignoring her and resorting
directly to the courts and hiring a trial lawyer to represent them.
Final remarks
So far, it is apparent that the current agrarian legislation, while consid-
erably enhancing the ejidatarios’s security and protection regarding
their property rights, has made it rather difficult for them to define
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and adopt collective strategies to their benefit by exercising those rights
when facing contextual factors that are at odds with the continuity of
agrarian activities. In fact, those senior Teyahualco’s ejidatarios who are
against the adoption of freehold tenure probably fear that this would
imply the erasing of the ejido’s basis as a collective endeavour and a lo-
cal community, and most likely they are right.
A closer examination of the property rights provisions contained in
the current agrarian act shows us that beyond being inspired by a will
of liberating ejidatarios from government tutelage and promoting the
commoditisation of ejido lands, these provisions are flawed by some
ambiguities and loopholes. Among them are those concerning de facto
landholders (posesionarios) and the supposed restrictions concerning to
whom an ejidatario can turn over his/her rights to a parcel. These lat-
ter, as we have observed in Teyahualco, can be easily bypassed, and
probably for the better.
Finally, one thing that has to be emphasised regarding the main out-
comes of the 1992 Mexican agrarian property reforms is the conveni-
ence of distinguishing between land property rights security and pro-
tection, and the freehold tenure regime itself. This is a distinction that
individualistic property theories seem to fail to take into account. While
it is evident that Mexican peasants have seized the advantages offered
by the agrarian rights certification process and the possibilities opened
to them by the enhancement of their property rights, generally without
much reticence, the great majority of the ejidos have so far not opted
for freehold tenure. This refusal is expressed through the reluctance of
many Teyahualco’s ejidatarios to become private owners, despite their
lands being currently situated on the frontier of the urbanisation pro-
cess.
Notes
1 Here I call the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City the conurbation composed by both
the Federal District (Mexico’s capital) whose urban area is called ‘Mexico City’ and is
subdivided into sixteen administrative partitions (Delegaciones) and 28 municipalities
pertaining to the neighboring State of Mexico. Until the year 2000, the urban area of
this conurbation spread over roughly 140,000 hectares. Officially, however, the
ZMCM comprised the Federal District plus 59 municipalities, many of which did not
yet form part of the conurbation.
2 In this essay I broadly follow the working definition of property and ownership stated
by De Janvry et al. (2001:2): ‘(W)e start here from the proposition that property over
a resource is composed of a multiplicity of rights that include access, the appropria-
tion of resources or products, provision of management, exclusion of others, and alie-
nation by selling or leasing (…).These different rights over a particular land parcel
may be held by different actors (….). It is only ownership that conveys the accumula-
406 EMILIO DUHAU
tion of all these rights.’ I will use the terms ‘private property’ and ‘freehold’ as trans-
lations of the Spanish term dominio pleno to refer to this type of ownership.
3 Additionally, then as now, ejido parcels could not be legally subdivided (including
upon inheritance) in order to avoid fragmentation into economically unviable hold-
ings, a prohibition that often was flouted, which was tolerated by the agrarian autho-
rities.
4 These de facto landholders were recognised, under the label of posesionarios, by the
Ley Agraria enacted in 1992, and their rights over the parcels they keep can currently
be regularised by Ejidal Assemblies or, when faced with the Assembly denial, claimed
before an Agrarian Court. The number of ejidal landholders not having their land
use rights formally recognised prior to 1992 can be inferred from the fact that,
among 3.2 million people whose agrarian land rights were certified up to 2003 by
the PROCEDE, thirteen per cent or about 422,000 ejidal landholders obtained a certi-
ficate of land use rights as posesionarios (Procuradurı´a Agraria 2004c:7).
5 Nevertheless, banks do not currently accept ejidal parcels as a loan collateral (World
Bank 1997).
6 The request to withdraw the agrarian rights of these 31 ejidatarios was made in 1991,
that is, before the new Ley Agraria was in force. Therefore, the subsequent legal pro-
cess was conducted and concluded in accordance with the principle of no retroactivity
of legal rules, following the provisions of the former Ley de Reforma Agraria.
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History and current challenges
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Introduction
Land reform has been central in the Chinese Communist Party‘s
(CCP) rule of China. First, it played a major role in the CCP‘s original
claim to power in the 1930s and 1940s, as it was through massive land
redistributions that the many poor land tenants and landless farmers
came to recognise the CCP as representing their interests. Land reform
was also a method for a new social stratification, urging the poorest to
revolt (fanshen) against the existing ruling elite, an essential move in
the CCP‘s grab for power and part of their communist revolution (Hin-
ton 1972). Once power was firmly in the hands of the CCP, land re-
form again played a major role in experiments with collectivisation in
the 1950s and 1960s, when large people’s communes were formed, in-
troducing collective ownership and management of the land. Since the
late 1970s, land reform has continued to be an important element of
the CCP‘s policy to stay in power. Following the challenge to legitimacy
that came with Mao Zedong‘s death and the shock the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966-1976) caused in Chinese society, the CCP sought new legiti-
macy in providing stability and economic prosperity (Zheng 1997). The
reform policies that were initiated to develop such prosperity consisted
of another land tenure restructuring. Based on local experiments, a na-
tional policy to give farmers household use rights to plots of land was
initiated and later adopted in legislation.
This country study of land reform in China will discuss the historical
development of land tenure regimes under CCP rule. It will trace the
historical roots that gave rise to the last decade of land tenure reform,
during which existing experiments and policy-based land tenure ar-
rangements were legalised in national legislation with the introduction
of the 1998 Land Management Law and the 2002 Rural Land Contract
Law. The study will further look at the extent to which the new laws
have been implemented and what this has meant for tenure security.
Finally, it will analyse what the major challenges are at this moment
and what role the new Property Law, introduced in 2007, can play in
solving existing problems.
As the concept of land tenure security is central in this chapter, we
should define and examine the concept of land tenure security before
starting the historical overview of land reform in China. Land tenure
security can generally be defined as existing when an individual per-
ceives that he or she has rights to a piece of land on a continuous ba-
sis, free from imposition or interference from outside sources, as well
as the ability to reap the benefits of labour and capital invested in the
land, whether in use or upon transfer to another holder (Place, Roth,
and Hazell 1994:19). However, rather than defining land tenure secur-
ity as something that either exists or does not exist, it is more accurate
to think of it as a continuum that can be measured by three criteria:
breadth, duration, and assurance. Breadth is a measurement of the
quantity and quality of the land rights held and may include the rights
to possess land, to grow or harvest crops of one’s own choice, to pass
the land on to heirs, to sell land or to lease it to others, to pledge land
rights as security for credit, to prevent trespass, to protect against state
expropriation, among many other rights (Knetsch 1993). Land tenure
rights are not a single entitlement in any land system but are multiple
and varied and can be analogised to a ‘bundle’ of sticks. Breadth mea-
sures the quantity and quality of the sticks that make up the bundle.
Duration measures the length of time for which these rights are valid
(Place, Roth, and Hazell 1994:20). Typically, the same duration applies
to every stick in the bundle of rights, but this is not necessarily so. In
general, as duration lengthens, tenure security improves. However,
duration need not be perpetual to create an adequate incentive frame-
work for land investments and improvements. Assurance, the third cri-
terion, is a measurement of the certainty of the breadth and duration
of the rights that are held. If an individual is said to possess land rights
of a specific breadth and duration but cannot exert, enforce, or protect
those rights, they have no assurance. A land ‘right’ that cannot be ex-
erted or enforced is not a right at all.
This chapter is based on several sources. First, it uses the existing
body of written primary and secondary sources about land tenure ar-
rangements in China. In addition, it uses nationwide survey data col-
lected over the last ten years by the Rural Development Institute and
Renmin University (Prosterman, Schwarzwalder, and Jianping 2000;
Schwarzwalder et al. 2002; Zhu et al. 2006). The quotations in the text
used to illustrate larger historical events have been drawn from a case
study on the history of land reforms carried out in Rendikou Village in
Puyang County in Henan province.
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Pre-1949 land reforms by the communists
It is worth reviewing the early history of Chinese Communist land-re-
form measures, because some of the issues faced and approaches ta-
ken remain live and debated reform options in China today.
Ever since its founding, the CCP has been keenly aware of the pro-
blem of landlessness that Chinese farmers faced and has constantly
placed land reform as one of its top priorities in its fight with the Na-
tionalists for control over China.1 Soon after it established its first ad-
ministrative region in northern Jiangxi Province in the early 1920s, the
CCP promulgated its first land law, setting up the basic framework of
communist land reforms: confiscation of land from landlords and dis-
tribution of the confiscated land among peasants with little or no land
(Jinggangshan Land Law, December 1928). There are five salient fea-
tures in this law. First, the land confiscated is owned by the administra-
tive region government (id., at art. 1) and its use rights are allocated to
peasant households. Second, while the land is mainly allocated to pea-
sants for individual farming (id., at art. 1(i)), the law allows allocation
to peasants for joint farming (id., at art. 1(ii)) and to administrative re-
gion government farms (id., at art. 1(iii)). Third, the term of peasants’
right to farm the land owned by the administrative region is unspeci-
fied. Fourth, sale of the confiscated land is prohibited (id., at art. 2).
Fifth, land is allocated on an egalitarian basis, and men and women
have equal right to allocated land (id., at art. 4(i)). With the expansion
of the communist-controlled area, the Land Law of the Soviet Republic
of China2 was adopted in 1931. Unlike the earlier communist land law,
the new Land Law did not explicitly attest that land is owned by the
government; instead, it emphasised that the confiscated land be ‘dis-
tributed among poor and middle peasants’ (Land Law of the Soviet Re-
public of China, art. 1) and ‘all temple land and other public land shall
be granted to peasants without condition’. The lawmakers intended to
give peasants full ownership (id., at art. 6).3 Second, this Land Law was
simply silent on the allocation of confiscated land to peasants for joint
farming or allocation of such land to government farms. Third, it al-
lowed lease and sale of land among peasants, but landlords were still
prohibited from purchasing land back, and rich peasants were prohib-
ited from engaging in land speculation (presumably, purchase with in-
tent of resale) (id., at art. 12).
The most important communist land law before the founding of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949 was the Platform of Chinese Land
Law adopted at the CPC national land conference on 13 September
1947. For the first time, the Chinese Communists declared the explicit
principle that China would adopt ‘a land system of land to tillers’ (Plat-
form of Chinese Land Law, art. 1). In order to fulfil this principle, the
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Platform further provides that except for large forests, irrigation pro-
jects, large mining sites, large and contiguous tracts of grassland and
wasteland, and lakes, all land confiscated from landlords and the land
traditionally owned by communities shall be distributed among all ru-
ral residents and owned by individuals (id., at art. 6). All rural resi-
dents, regardless of age and gender, are entitled to the same share of
land (id.). It requires that land ownership certificates be issued to all
landowners (id., at art. 11). It also provides that landowners ‘have the
right to freely manage and sell the land, and lease the land under cer-
tain circumstances’(id.). Local communist governments promulgated
specific rules for implementing the Platform. For example, the North-
east Administrative Commission adopted an implementing rule for the
Northeast Liberated Region requiring that a region-wide uniform land
ownership certificate be designed by the commission and issued to all
landowners by governments at county level (Supplemental Measures
for Implementing the Land Law Platform in the Northeast Liberated
Region, art. 11). In its implementing rule, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-
Henan Border Region government made a distinction between arable
land and the land used for fish farming, fruit production and bamboo
growing and let peasants decide whether to distribute these categories
of non-arable land for private ownership (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-
Henan Border Government Supplemental Measures for Implementing
the Land Law Platform, art 7).
Land reforms in the 1950s
While the CCP had made a start experimenting in land reform and dis-
tributing land from landlords to poor and landless peasants in all areas
under their control, widespread redistribution did not start until it
gained power and founded the People’s Republic in 1949. At that time,
land distribution was still highly unequal. As shown in Table 15.1, less
than ten per cent of the population (elites such as landlords and rich
peasants) owned nearly 52 per cent of the arable land and more than
57 per cent of the population (consisting of middle/poor peasants and
farm labourers) owned only 14.9 per cent of the land.
On 28 June 1950, the Chinese communist government promulgated
the first land reform law that was applicable to all parts of China (ex-
cept for Taiwan, which was then governed by the Nationalists who had
fled the mainland after their defeat in China’s civil war). The Land Re-
form Law of the PRC embodied the major provisions of the Platform
on land allocation and land ownership. The law provided that China
adopts a ‘peasant land ownership system’ (Land Reform Law of PRC
1950, art. 1). The land confiscated from landlords, except for that
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owned by the state in accordance with this law,4 was to be allocated to
poor peasants ‘fairly, rationally and uniformly for them to own’ (id., at
art. 10). The law also stated that all landowners are allowed to freely
manage, sell and lease their land (id., at, art. 30).5 To provide evidence
of land ownership, the law required that a land ownership certificate
be issued by the people’s government to landowners (id., at, art. 30).
The Land Reform Law also authorised the regional people’s govern-
ment6 to promulgate implementing rules, taking into consideration lo-
cal circumstances (id., at art. 39). The measures of one of the regional
people’s governments, the Mid-Southern Military and Administrative
Committee, on implementing the Land Reform Law approved by the
State Council and promulgated by the Committee in 1950 are worthy
of note. Among the substantive provisions on the rights of landowners
which these measures contain, are that land may be inherited by the
owner’s spouse, children and other direct relatives upon the owner’s
death (Measures of the Mid-Southern Military and Administrative
Committee on Implementing the Land Reform Law, art. 9(vii)) and
may be mortgaged, sold and leased without restriction for most land-
owners (id., at art. 9(ix)).7 The measures also emphasized the need to
respect women‘s land ownership rights (id., at, art. 9(viii)). They expli-
citly allowed women to have full rights to the land they owned free
from others’ interference upon marriage, divorce and remarriage (id.).
Although the Land Reform Law required issuance of land ownership
certificates to all landowners, it did not spell out any formalities con-
cerning the certificates. However, under the Mid-Southern Region’s im-
plementing rule, each landowner was given an option either to have
his or her own certificate or to have a single certificate covering all land
in the household (id., at art. 9(xi)). It further required that all names of
individual owners in the household be listed on the certificate if a
household certificate is to be issued (id.).
In a separate measure, the land in the suburban areas previously
owned by landlords was confiscated and placed under state ownership
Table 15.1 Rural land distribution before 1950 land reform in mainland China
Class Household
%
Population
%
Land
%
Land/household
(mu)1
Land/person
(mu)
Landlord 3.79 4.75 38.26 144.11 26.32
Rich peasants 3.08 4.66 13.66 63.24 9.59
Middle peasant 29.20 33.13 30.94 15.12 3.05
Poor peasants and
labourers
57.44 52.37 14.28 3.55 0.89
Other 6.49 5.09 2.86 6.27 1.83
Source: Du (1996)
1 Mu (亩) is a common measurement unit of land in China. 1 hectare equals 15 mu.
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(Regulation of Suburban Land Reform 1950, art. 9). Use rights to such
state-owned land were to be allocated to peasants who had little or no
land ‘fairly, rationally and uniformly’ (id). To secure peasants’ use
rights to such land, state-owned land use rights certificates were to be
issued to peasant land users (id., at art. 17). However, the land users
could not lease, sell or leave state-owned land idle (Land Reform Law
of PRC 1950, art. 27). The land-reform programme distributed 46.7
million hectares of land to about 300 million peasants, thus covering
about one-half of China‘s total arable land and more than 60 per cent
of the total rural population (CIRD:31-32). The ‘land to the tiller’ pro-
gramme proved a noteworthy success in increasing agricultural pro-
ductivity: annual grain production went up from 113.2 million tons in
1949 to 166.8 million tons in 1953, and further to 192.7 million tons
in 1956. This 70 per cent increase in grain production was accompa-
nied by an increase of 85 per cent in total farm income during the
same period (id., at 32; Gensheng 2001:3-4).
Interviews with elderly farmers in Henan Province, recounting their
experiences with the 1950s land reform, demonstrate the extent to
which these reforms were appreciated by poorer farmers. One farmer
recalls: ‘Peasants were extremely happy about land distribution. No one
would be against additional land, right? More land means more secur-
ity to our livelihood. We the ordinary people finally had more land to
cultivate. We vouched to put all our efforts in the land.’ Meanwhile an-
other farmer illustrates the amount of courage it took to participate in
the reforms: ‘We were in high spirits during the land distribution pro-
cess. But some of us were quite scared that powerful landlords might
take the land back or take revenge on us, so some of us secretly re-
turned the land distributed to us to the landlords so as to avoid possi-
ble conflict. We were a vulnerable group after all and could not really
stand up to rich and powerful landlords. You never know when this
group of rich people would “rise up” again or how long the Party’s
power would last.’
Collectivisation of Chinese agriculture
Despite the positive experiences with land distribution and the im-
proved agricultural output, private ownership and individual farming
on rural land did not remain the policy for long. Soon after the comple-
tion of these rural land reforms, the Chinese government introduced
the concept of collective farming following the example of the Soviet
Union. In 1955, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party issued the Decision on Agricultural Cooperation, formally
launching the movement to collectivisation. Collectivisation through
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legislative measures began in 1956 when the National People’s Con-
gress’ Standing Committee passed ‘The Charter of Agricultural Produc-
tion Cooperatives’.8 Although the charter did not legally change private
ownership, it established the creation of public ownership of rural land
as a goal for collectivisation.9 According to the charter, all land owned
by members of the cooperative ‘must be submitted to the cooperative
for uniform use’ (Charter of Rural Production Cooperatives, art. 17).
Each member was allowed to keep no more than five per cent of the
village’s average landholdings per capita as private plots (id.) Contribu-
tors of land were entitled to some compensation for their land contri-
bution, but such land compensation was not to be more than compen-
sation for labour contribution (id., at art. 18).
Such cooperatives were soon converted into collectives. Accordingly,
the nominal private ownership of farmland under the cooperative sys-
tem was transformed into formal collective ownership only three
months later when the Third Plenary Session of the National People’s
Congress passed ‘the Charter of Advanced Agricultural Production Co-
operatives’ in June of 1956. The Charter explicitly stated that collective
members ‘must transform privately owned land, draft animals, and
large farm equipment and other major production means into collec-
tive ownership’ (The Charter of Advanced Agricultural Production Co-
operatives 1956, art. 13.). Private plots were absorbed into collective
ownership; individual households, however, were allowed to keep own-
ership of the residential land (id., at art. 16).
Despite problems with farm management and production incentives,
the collectivisation campaign proceeded rapidly. By the end of 1958,
the agricultural collectives were abruptly merged into Rural Peoples’
Communes. Approximately 90 per cent of the rural population became
commune members within half a year. From an ownership aspect, the
fundamental characteristic of the commune was the abolition of the
last vestiges of private property. The commune took sole ownership of
all property, except for foundation plots which was later announced as
collectively owned in 1962. Participating in production activities gov-
erned by the collective authorities on the collective’s land and with the
collective’s equipment and inputs was the only means of personal earn-
ings for the commune members. Under this system, none of the farm-
ers had an individual stake in the land; they worked together on the
land. The communes effectively severed farmers from their land.
The collectivisation campaign proved to be a huge disaster to China‘s
agriculture and Chinese people. Grain production declined substan-
tially for three years in a row starting in 1959, leading to perhaps the
planet’s worst famine of the twentieth century.10 Having realised the
grave consequences of the commune system that had completely
strangled farmers‘ incentives for farming, a mild reform in an attempt
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to reduce the size of the collective was conducted in early 1960s. The
Central Committee passed Revised Regulations on Rural People’s
Commune (commonly called the Sixty-Article Regulation) in 1962. The
regulation attests that the production team, the lowest of the three-level
collective ownership, would be the ‘basic accounting unit’ (The Central
Committee of CPC Revised Regulations on Rural People’s Commune
[hereinafter Sixty-Article Regulation], art. 2) ‘for at least 30 years’ (id.,
at art. 20). All land within the sphere of the production team is owned
by the team (id., at art. 21). The team may designate five to seven per
cent of the team’s land as ‘private plots’ and allocate that land for
‘member households to use for long term without change’ (id., at art.
40). It also allows the team collective to allocate ‘appropriate amount
of firewood mountain as ‘private mountain’ for member households ‘to
operate … for a long term without change’ (id.). With respect to mem-
bers’ houses, the regulation notably declares that ‘members’ houses are
owned by members in perpetuity’ (id., at art. 45). The significance of
the Sixty-Article regulation is that it stopped the course heading for es-
calation of the scale of the collective entity through administrative mer-
gers and reinstated the level of the collective closest to farmers, namely,
the production team, as the basic accounting unit responsible for all
operational activities within its geographical boundaries. With respect
to property rights, the regulation established the rule that collective
ownership of land is exercised at the production team level; use rights
to some of such team-owned land may be allocated to collective mem-
bers as ‘private plots’ for individual household farming. The regulation
functioned as the basic framework regulating collective farming and
land ownership till the decollectivisation campaign in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
However, recovery from disasters brought by the giant people’s com-
munes was a slow process, and further complicated by the society-wide
‘Cultural Revolution‘ which began in the mid-1960s: social instability
was ubiquitous in every walk of life, even the most remote areas were
not spared; political struggle rather than economic production became
the national as well as personal goal, while grain production decreased.
During the 1970s, about one-third of the rural population did not have
a stable food supply (Zhang, Li, and Shao 2006).
Interviews with elderly villagers looking back at the collective farm-
ing system and the communes portray the disappointment some farm-
ers felt when their newly acquired land was incorporated in the com-
mune. One farmer stated: ‘People felt discouraged and dismayed. They
had thought they could own the land and the good life was just an inch
away. Some began to resent Communist rule, but no one dared to say
it openly.’ Other villagers talked about the economic inefficiency of the
commune system; one of them stated: ‘We reported to work every day
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but scamping was the rule rather than the exception. Long ago before
the sun began to set, every worker had already begun to pack their
things and got ready for leaving.’ Other interviews illustrate the politi-
cal atmosphere that existed in villages and the amount of insecurity
this caused: ‘The propaganda was widespread. Loudspeakers located in
several corners of the village propagated the positive side of collectivisa-
tion. We were told that we were moving toward communist society. It
depicted a very rosy picture of our future, but we did not really know
what was going on. A better educated villager told me that a political
movement was going on. When I probed further, he could not clearly
tell me what sort of political movement that was.’ The disaster the
commune experiment led to has left a deep impression on the elderly
villagers interviewed in Henan. One villager recounts: ‘The previous
years of collective agriculture and three years of natural disasters from
1959 to 1961 caused severe famine. All the villagers had to eat bran
which was used to feed pigs. We suffered from oedema. My two chil-
dren were too weak to go to school, and they lay in bed for almost 1
year. If such conditions kept persisting, we had two choices: die or re-
volt.’
Decollectivisation under the Household Responsibility System
After ten years of the Cultural Revolution and more than twenty years
of collective farming, China‘s rural economy came to the edge of col-
lapsing prior to the tenure reform beginning in the late 1970s. Indeed,
1977 per capita grain production was lower than that of 1956 (Carter
and Zhong 1988:5; Lardy 1986:91). The sluggish performance in the
farm sector was accompanied by extremely slow growth in peasant in-
comes. In 1978, the average annual rural income was 133 yuan per ca-
pita, and more than 250 million rural people suffered semi-starvation
(Statistics Bureau n.d.).
When the new leadership began to clean up the huge mess of collec-
tive farming after Mao’s death in 1976, the most imperative issue was
to decide whether to abandon collective ownership of land and, if so,
what rural land system to adopt.
Although private ownership of land was deeply rooted in Chinese
history and the Chinese communists had strenuously pushed forward
a ‘land to the tiller’ programme before and immediately after they took
power, more than twenty years of collective farming promoted and in-
sisted on by paramount leader Mao Zedong between the mid-1950s
and mid-1970s had left a political legacy of public ownership. The new
leadership was clearly aware that any tenure reform would be derailed
if it crossed the threshold from public to private ownership.
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With the death of Mao Zedong, the new reform-minded leadership
headed by Deng Xiaoping began to explore the way to bring rural Chi-
na out of poverty and famine in the late 1970s. At the same time, a
group of poor farmers in Anhui Province, driven by the need for survi-
val, invented a land-contracting system in which collectively owned
land was contracted to participating farmers for private farming who,
in return, were committed to meeting collective demands for quota
grain, taxes and fees based on the quantity of the land allocated to each
participating farm household. This land contracting system would later
become known as the household responsibility system (HRS).
The same occurred in other villages in China, as the Chinese people
were disappointed with collective farming which for many had been
disastrous. As one villager from Henan recounts: ‘We were sick and
tired of so-called “communist goals”. We did not want a utopia. We
simply wanted a good material life. We wanted to have a say in our
own land and production, not to be told what to do by some bureau-
cratic cadres.’ It was in this period that experiments with HRS also
started in Henan. Another villager states: ‘The village head and the
cadre of the production team were distant relatives of many of the villa-
gers. They could not bear to see us suffer. They clandestinely divided
the land among the villagers and let them manage the land. But cadres
only attempted such a move after Fengyang County and several places
in our provinces experimented with HRS and were unpunished by
higher authority. Our neighbouring villages soon followed suit. HRS
became a very pervasive practice in no time.’
This new form of private farming aroused a fierce debate among pol-
icymakers (Xiang 2001). The key issue in the debate was whether this
new model represented a negation of Mao, with its design to replace
collective ownership of land with private ownership. The pragmatic fac-
tion of the new leadership argued that the new model of farming was
merely an experimental way of organising farm production aiming at
motivating farmers, instead of changing rural land ownership. Thus, a
mechanism was created, with a feature of separation of use rights to
land from ownership of land in which the collective entity would con-
tinue to hold ownership but use rights to land would be allocated to
members of the collective for individual farming. This approach of em-
phasising decollectivisation of farming practice apparently worked be-
cause most decision-makers realised the damage that had been brought
to China‘s agriculture by collective farming. A compromise was
reached among decision-makers about introducing a new land system,
later called the HRS, throughout the country.
By 1983, virtually all arable land had been allocated to individual
households, usually on a per capita (though sometimes on a per work-
er) basis, and more than twenty years of collective farming had finally
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come to an end.11 This land-contracting system immediately demon-
strated its huge advance over collective farming and received strong
support from central leaders.
The land reforms made during this period correlate with positive devel-
opments in productivity, income and income distribution. Grain pro-
duction increased by 8.6 percent per year during the first years of
HRS, in 1980-1984 (SBS 1980, 1984). These productivity increases
had a dramatic impact on farmer incomes and consumption patterns,
both in absolute and relative terms. Between 1979 and 1984, average
net income for rural residents increased by eleven per cent annually,
compared to an average annual increase of 8.7 per cent for urban resi-
dents, narrowing the income gap between urban and rural residents
from 3.03:1 to 2.49:1 (SBS n.d.). The gap in consumption between ur-
ban and rural residents also narrowed during this period, from a ratio
of 2.8:1 to 2.3:1 (Xinhua News Agency 2003).
Further improvements to the HRS
The first move that China took in improving the HRS was to lengthen
the duration of farmers‘ individual land rights and expand the breadth
of such land rights. The initial land rights that farmers received under
HRS were uncertain, usually for a term of one to three years, subject
to local decisions (Runsheng 2003:38). At the end of each term, collec-
tive cadres conducted a land readjustment within the village in re-
sponse to demographic changes occurring during that term to ensure
absolutely egalitarian possession of land rights among all members of
the village.12 The breadth of farmer’s rights had been restricted in sev-
eral ways. A compulsory production plan was in force to the extent that
farmers were required to produce and sell to the state a certain amount
of grain at a price much lower than market price. Nor were farmers al-
lowed to transfer their land rights.
To address these tenure insecurity issues, the Chinese central gov-
ernment decided to standardise allocation of land rights for private
farming. The first step was to lengthen the duration of farmers‘ land
rights under HRS. In 1984, the Central Committee issued an impor-
tant Document No. 1. In order to reverse local practices of contracting
land to farmers for very short periods, the document required farmers’
land rights be prolonged to fifteen years nationwide. In addition, the
document formally sanctioned an emerging rural land rights market
by allowing transfers of such rights.13
However, the document did not make any rules on how to assure
implementation of the extended term or facilitate transfer of land
rights. Studies done by RDI and other organisations showed that the
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new fifteen-year rights were still subject to a mechanism of a ‘small re-
adjustment’ every year and a ‘big readjustment’ every three to five
years, which effectively cut farmers’ land rights to a term ending at the
next readjustment (Kung and Liu 1996). The uncertain duration of
rights to a specific landholding greatly limited the scope for any rural
land rights market, leaving room only for short-term transfers. The
grain quota remained in place, and farmers were required to set aside
at least part of their contracted land for growing grain, which repre-
sented a limitation on farming autonomy.
Capitalising on the pervasive existence of unregulated land readjust-
ment practices, local governments and cadres of collectives in some ru-
ral areas started to introduce mechanisms that presented even more
serious threats to farmers‘ tenure security in the late 1980s and
through the 1990s. Typical among them were the so-called ‘two-field
system’,14 ‘scale farming‘15 and ‘recontracting’ farmers’ land to non-vil-
lage bosses.16 Although these mechanisms took different forms, they
shared a similar feature: taking back farmers’ contracted land through
compulsory land readjustment. Because these schemes facilitated rent-
seeking by local officials and collective cadres, they rapidly spread
throughout large areas of the country. Central government responses
to these new threats to farmers’ land tenure security are discussed be-
low.
The duration of farmers‘ land use rights was addressed again nearly
ten years after the 1984 issuance of Document No. 1, when the central
government decided in November 1993 to extend the term of use
rights to collectively owned arable land for another 30 years upon the
expiration of the fifteen year rights nominally mandated in 1984.17
Although the 1993 Document No. 11 stated that ‘[i]n order to avoid fre-
quent changes in contracted land and prevent land from being further
fragmented, no readjustment in response to population changes
should be promoted within the contract period’,18 it did not provide
any guidelines on how to implement this policy.
It was not until four years later – when farmers‘ fifteen year land
rights (though still generally nominal and nonexistent in practice) were
about to expire in most villages in China – that the Chinese govern-
ment for the first time put forward a series of specific policy measures
to restrict the land readjustment practice that had been conducted as a
norm in most rural villages since the adoption of HRS. The measures
were contained in Document No. 16, issued in mid-1997.19 These pol-
icy measures include explicit prohibition of village-wide big readjust-
ments, serious restrictions on small readjustment, prohibition of intro-
ducing the two-field system in villages so far unaffected by such prac-
tices, and banning the practice of taking back farmers’ contracted land
for ‘scale farming.’ These new policy measures were widely interpreted
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as mandatory policy guidelines for implementation of a second round
of contracting.
As compared with the new land system that was about to emerge
under Document No. 16, China‘s rural land tenure system during the
first round of contracting (1983-1998) bore the following characteris-
tics. First, virtually all rural households had access to some arable land.
Rural landlessness was virtually non-existent. This is a major accom-
plishment. Broad, virtually universal access to land has provided impor-
tant household nutritional and income security throughout rural China
(Burgess 2001) and creates a solid foundation for rapid and broadbased
rural growth.20 Second, landholdings were distributed among house-
holds in a substantially egalitarian fashion, usually based on one equal
land ‘share’ per household member. While land per capita differences
among regions resulted in inter-regional discrepancies, differences
within villages and localities were remarkably small. Third, the land
system rules and practices were not uniform throughout the country.
Collective ownership of land and allocation of specific parcels to indivi-
dual households have been essentially universal throughout China
since 1983. However, the duration of those rights, the specificity with
which the use rights are defined, the prevalence and type of adminis-
trative land readjustments undertaken, and other important qualitative
aspects of the land use rights varied considerably among regions and
among localities within regions. Finally, most villages have attempted
to balance two competing objectives in establishing and implementing
land system practices: continuing equal per capita access to land for
welfare or subsistence purposes and stable, secure land use rights for
productivity purposes. To this was added the desire of local cadres to
make individual profit through continued meddling in land allocations.
As discussed above, in most Chinese villages the resultant of these var-
ious pressures was a practice of periodically readjusting household
land rights to reflect demographic changes in the village and the indivi-
dual household. The frequency and extent of those readjustments were
not uniform, however, among those villages.
Legalisation of the existing practices and policies
Thus, the HRS system was developed first informally through local ex-
periments and was subsequently formalised in the 1984, 1993 and
1997 policy directives. It was not until the adoption of the 1998 Land
Management Law (LML) that the original experiments and policies ob-
tained a firm legal basis, legalising 30-year land use rights. This law
was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-
gress on August 28, 1998. The second round of land contracting,
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which was to start in 1999, some fifteen years after the first round of
HRS contracting had started under the 1984 policy document, was
thus to be done on a legal basis.
The 1998 LML attempted to address three major shortcomings re-
lated to rural land tenure security in China under the original HRS
policy: the short or uncertain duration of the use term, the lack of writ-
ten land use contracts, and the practice of frequent land readjustments.
Concerning the duration of use term, the law states that ‘collectively
owned land shall be contracted to the members of the collective eco-
nomic entity for... 30 years’(Land Management Law, art. 14). On docu-
mentation of land rights, article 14 further required that ‘the contract
issuing party and the contracting party execute a contract stipulating
the rights and obligations of the two parties’ and that ‘farmers‘ land
contracting rights shall be protected by law’. Equally important, article
14 embodied into law the land readjustment provisions of Document
No. 16. It ruled out village-wide big readjustment while allowing small
readjustment only to be conducted among ‘isolated households’ upon
‘consent by two-thirds of villagers or villager representatives and ap-
proval by township government and county government agencies in
charge of agriculture’.
However, the 1998 LML devoted only one article to the actual proce-
dures and content of the rural household contract between the collec-
tive owner and the household land user, leaving much unclear, and
failed to deal with a vast range of issues with respect to the farmers‘
30-year rights. Thus, after more than three years of further drafting
and deliberation, the Standing Committee of China‘s National People’s
Congress adopted the Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) – the first
modern Chinese law to deal exclusively with the issue of rural land ten-
ure – on 29 August 2002. The law came into effect on 1 March 2003.
The RLCL sets forth a series of rules addressing a very broad range of
tenure issues. The legal framework governing land readjustments un-
der the RLCL is composed of three basic rules. First, article 27 sets up
the general principle of prohibiting all kinds of readjustment during
the 30-year term with only a narrow exception for ‘a natural disaster
that seriously damaged the contracted land and other special circum-
stances’ under which a small land readjustment may be conducted.
Second, in order to further restrict these narrowly permitted small re-
adjustments under special circumstances, the RLCL reiterates the im-
portant procedural requirements that the consent of two-thirds of the
villager assembly or two-thirds of villager representatives as well as ap-
proval by the township government and the county agricultural admin-
istrative body must be obtained prior to the commencement of such a
readjustment. Third, the law validates those contracts (where already is-
sued under the 1993 and 1997 policy documents or the 1998 LML)
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that contain a complete prohibition of land readjustment. In the mean-
time, it also explicitly invalidates any provisions of land contracts that
violate the mandatory legal rules with respect to land readjustment
(Rural Land Contracting Law, art. 55).
Regarding the breadth of farmers‘ 30-year rights, the law stipulates
that farmers’ land rights include ‘rights to use, profit from, and trans-
fer land rights, and the right of autonomy over production operations
and disposition of products’ and ‘the right to receive the corresponding
compensation‘ for the land taken by the state or collective for non-agri-
cultural purposes (id., at art. 16).
On the right to carry out land transactions, the RLCL further states
that farmers‘ land rights ‘may be transferred [to other village house-
holds], leased [to non-village households], exchanged, assigned, or
transacted by other means in accordance with law’(id., at art. 32). The
LML, however, strictly forbids using collectively owned arable land for
construction or other non-agricultural purposes (Land Management
Law, art. 41 and 63),21 thus limiting transfer of land-use rights only for
agricultural purposes.22 In order to safeguard farmers’ interests in land
from being violated by local officials through various kinds of compul-
sory land transactions, the RLCL emphasizes the principle of ‘equal
consultation, voluntariness and with compensation‘ (Rural Land Con-
tracting Law, art. 33), establishes farmers as ‘the party to any transac-
tions of’ rural land use rights (id., at art. 34), and explicitly prohibits lo-
cal officials to ‘intercept or reduce’ the proceeds from such land trans-
actions (id., at art. 35).
It is important to note that prior legislation, although permitting
transactions of rural land use rights, had not provided any guidance
with respect to the scope of this right and the procedures to exercise
this right,23 and the RLCL filled this legal vacuum. For example, the
RLCL requires that transactions of rural land rights be proven with a
‘signed contract’ and that such transaction contracts should contain ele-
ments like ‘the name and address of each of the parties; name, loca-
tion, area and quality class of the land to be transferred; the transfer
period and the starting and ending dates of the transfer contract,...
transfer fees and the payment methods’. To prove farmers‘ land rights,
the RLCL requires that written contracts be issued to farmer house-
holds (id., at art. 21). In addition, the RLCL mirrors legal requirements
for documenting urban land use rights by requiring that county gov-
ernments issue land rights certificates to farmers to affirm such rights
(id., at art. 23). Such requirements are extremely important to protect
farmers’ land rights because these written land documents provide
powerful evidence in any dispute resolution24 process and offer deter-
rence against possible violations.
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The RLCL also contained improved provisions on the ‘assurance’ as-
pect of tenure security. Unlike the dispute resolution provisions in the
1998 Land Management Law and Administrative Review Law, which
require exhaustion of administrative reviews before a complaint can be
filed with the People’s Court (Land Management Law, art. 16; Adminis-
trative Review Law 1999, art. 30), the RLCL explicitly gives farmers a
choice between consultation, mediation, arbitration and suing in the
People’s Court (art. 51 and 52). Because cadres of collectives and local
government officials are themselves often parties to land disputes, re-
quiring administrative review would make little sense. Enabling ag-
grieved farmers to seek judicial redress directly could substantially im-
prove farmers’ ability to resolve such disputes satisfactorily.
Notably, the RLCL contains a series of well-articulated remedial and
penalty provisions with respect to the protection of farmers‘ land
rights. It establishes very clear and strong rules prohibiting violations
of farmers’ land use rights by local officials, including illegal land read-
justments, taking back the farmer-contracted land and re-contracting it
to others, and forcing farmers to plant crops against their will. Civil pe-
nalties, including monetary damages and restitution, and equitable re-
medies to forestall or reverse the illegal action now apply to any such
violations (id., at art. 54).
Implementation of LML and RLCL and current land tenure
security challenges
Studies conducted since the introduction of the 1998 LML and the 2003
RLCL portray a mixed picture of both success and failure in the imple-
mentation of these laws. The most important sources currently available
for understanding the implementation of land law in China are the na-
tionwide surveys conducted by Prosterman, Schwarzwalder, and Jianp-
ing (2000), Schwarzwalder et al. (2002), and Zhu et al. (2006).
Such empirical research demonstrates that since the introduction of
the 1998 LML, some progress has been made. First, since 1998 many
farmers (78.9 per cent) have become aware of their 30-year land use
rights, a necessary condition for implementation (Zhu et al.
2006:791). Second, the 2005 survey found that 82.6 per cent of the vil-
lagers reported that their villages had started to implement the new
laws and had carried out a second round of contracting of 30-year land
use rights (Zhu et al. 2006:792). As a result, 63.2 per cent of the farm-
ers have received some form of documentation attesting to their thirty
year land use rights (either contract or land certificate) (Zhu et al.
2006:789). And where, prior to the 1998 LML, land readjustments
had been common, a 2002 survey found that 82.1 per cent of the farm-
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ers interviewed reported that their village had not conducted a land re-
adjustment since the completion of the second round of contracting,
which had started in 1999, even though it should be noted that only
three years had passed at the time (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002:169).
The data from the last survey also point to implementation chal-
lenges. Farmers’ awareness is mostly limited to an understanding of
the broader outlines of the laws, while they lack knowledge of impor-
tant details about their rights (Zhu et al. 2006). And even though
many villages have started to implement the laws and two-thirds of the
farmers now have some form of documentation of their rights, only
10.4 per cent of the farmers possessed a document – either contract or
certificate – that met all the requirements of the RLCL (Zhu et al.
2006:789). Furthermore, although earlier surveys signalled a decline
in land readjustments (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002), the latest survey,
when compared to earlier surveys, found a continued and increasing
incidence of prohibited land readjustments (Zhu et al. 2006:794).
Perhaps most alarming, and not part of earlier surveys, is the in-
crease in farmers losing their land use rights through compulsory land
acquisitions initiated by local governments or village leadership, with-
out receiving satisfactory compensation. Since 1998, such land takings
occurred in 26.8 per cent of the villages where farmers were surveyed,
and the data about when such takings occurred show a steep increase
since 2000. In addition, 65.5 per cent of the farmers whose land had
been taken said they were dissatisfied with the compensation received.
In a third of the cases, no compensation was paid even though it was
promised, and only 21.8 per cent of the farmers were consulted about
the amount of compensation to be paid, even though a compensation
minimum and consultation about compensation are provided for in
the law (Zhu et al. 2006:782-783). Although the current LML explicitly
prohibits the embezzlement and misappropriation of such compensa-
tion (Land Management Law, art. 49 (ii)), embezzlement practices are
not uncommon.25 Making matters worse is the fact that farmers who
have lost their land without proper compensation have only rarely used
their improved remedies under the RLCL. Only 7.8 per cent of them
demanded a hearing on compensation, 4.7 per cent filed a grievance
with the government about compensation, and 0.9 per cent filed a law-
suit in court to demand more compensation (Zhu et al. 2006:783).
Feeling that there is nowhere to turn, many farmers have rallied in
protest. In 2005, according to figures reported by the Ministry of Pub-
lic Security, there were 87,000 protests and other ‘mass incidents’ re-
lated to land loss (Erie 2007).
Based on these data, it becomes clear that even though China has le-
galised its existing land tenure policies and has increased the duration
and breadth of land use rights, aspects of the laws are not well imple-
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mented, threatening the assurance element of land tenure security,
and so threatening land tenure security itself.
The 2007 Property Law: What good will it do for tenure security?
In 2007, after more than a decade of deliberation, China adopted the
Property Law. 26 The law is heralded by some as a major watershed in
China’s development and seen as a major step towards better protec-
tion of land rights.27 The Chinese press, for example, reported that the
law may help Chinese farmers to safeguard their rights when faced
with land expropriations (Xinhua News Agency 2007). It is said to do
so through specific provisions on land expropriation and the law’s rules
on compensating farmers for land lost (Xinhua News Agency 2007;
Beck and Guo 2007). The Washington Post quoted a Chinese dissident
stating: ‘This is the first law in our country for property protection.
The public can at least cite a specific law when their property rights
are violated’ (Fan 2007).
Although the functional role of the Property Law should not be exag-
gerated, it is important to note the significant improvements on farm-
ers‘ land rights under the Property Law. First, the Property Law clari-
fies a longstanding ambiguity concerning the nature of farmers’ land
rights by defining such rights as usufructuary property rights. From a
legal perspective, property rights are stronger and enjoy better and en-
hanced protection than obligatory rights created by contracts. This arti-
cle enhances the breath of land tenure security of farmers’ rural land
use rights. Second, article 126 provides that when the present 30-year
term expires, ‘the holder of land contracting and operation rights may
continue contracting the land in accordance with relevant laws’. This is
the first time that Chinese law has clarified the uncertainties with re-
spect to farmers’ present 30-year land rights when they expire.
Through this renewability clause, the law may create a de facto perpe-
tual land right for farmers because the central government and legisla-
tive intent clearly favour long-term security for farmers’ land rights.
Thus, the law enhances the breadth of farmers’ land tenure. Third,
with respect to compensation for land takings, article 42 of the prop-
erty Law reiterates the requirement to pay for loss of land, resettlement
subsidy and loss of standing crops and fixtures under the LML, and
further requires the government to ‘make arrangement for social secur-
ity costs, secure the livelihoods of the disposed farmers and protect
lawful interests of the dispossessed farmers’. The added measures and
principles are certainly an improvement on existing compensation
laws. Fourth, article 132 explicitly provides for the first time that the
holder of rural land rights, when such rights are taken through state
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expropriations, are entitled to the compensation package as provided
under article 42, including compensation for loss of land, the largest
component of the compensation package as prescribed under the LML
(Wang 2007:289). As we know, existing laws require that the compen-
sation for loss of land be owned and retained by the collective owner
(Regulations for Implementing the PRC Land Management Law, art.
26). The new Property Law clearly strikes down the exclusive right of
the collective owner to the compensation for loss of land. Fifth, article
132 also requires the compensation to be paid to the holder of use
rights to the land taken by the state while it is silent on the eligibility
of unaffected villagers whose contracted land is not taken. This may at
least arguably be interpreted as avoiding an egalitarian distribution of
the compensation among all villagers followed by a village-wide land
readjustment that will substantially reduce tenure security for all villa-
gers. Sixth, article 99 explicitly allows partition of common property
under either of two situations: substantial cause for partition or loss of
the basis for holding the property at issue as common property. Article
105 makes such rules applicable to usufructuary rights including rural
land rights. These stipulations open a door for rural women to parti-
tion their land shares from household landholdings when they move
out of the household as a result of marriage and divorce. This is a big
improvement on existing laws governing rural women’s land rights
that are silent on the partitionability. Seventh, article 59 defines collec-
tive landownership as ‘owned collectively by all members of the collec-
tive’,28 filling a definitional vacuum with respect to who should own
collective land. From a legal perspective, this definition at least charac-
terises rural land as jointly and indivisibly owned by all members of
the community rather than by a group of ‘social elite’ (e.g. villager
committee or collective cadres) as conventionally perceived.
However, the Property Law fails to further improve farmers‘ tenure
security in several aspects. First and most notably, it maintains the ex-
isting prohibition of mortgage of rural land rights (Property Law, art.
184). The fourth draft of the Property Law contained a provision per-
mitting rural land use rights to be mortgaged for loans under certain
conditions, but it was unfortunately removed when the law was finally
adopted based on unjustified grounds. Second, article 245 provides that
when a plaintiff seeks the remedy of restitution on the ground of
wrongful possession, the claim must be filed within one year of when
the wrong possession starts. Compared to international practice, a one-
year limitation seems rather short for a claim based on property rights.
This may also facilitate unlawful possession of farmers’ land rights
through illegal re-contracting or scale farmings. Third, it fails to define
the ‘needs for public interests’ under which the state may expropriate
rural land as widely expected during the debate on drafting of the Prop-
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erty Law. Given the current problems related to land expropriations,
this is an important omission. It is hoped that future amendments to
the LML will provide more clarity on the circumstances under which
expropriation is allowed.
Further clarification should be made, either through judicial inter-
pretation or legislative explanation, on the provisions that at least see-
mingly heighten tenure security for farmers. Two examples are offered.
First, article 42 requires the government to make arrangements for so-
cial security costs for the dispossessed farmers. However, the wording
of the provision is not entirely clear regarding whether the social secur-
ity costs are a supplemental compensation or merely a replacement of
all or part of the three traditional categories under LML. Given the fact
that China will establish a minimum livelihood social security safety
net for all farmers, there should be no reason for the local government
to use all or part of the dispossession compensation to finance the so-
cial security benefits that all farmers are supposed to have. It appears
that a certain type of authoritative interpretation is imperatively
needed. Otherwise, the local government may take advantage of this le-
gal vacuum to reduce their financial obligations to restore the dispos-
sessed farmers’ livelihoods. Second, article 132 appears to specify that
the holder of rural land rights, when the land is taken, is entitled to
the compensation package as provided under article 42. Previous laws
did not specify who is entitled to the compensation package when part
of the village’s land is taken. This often results in egalitarian distribu-
tion of compensation among all villagers followed by a big land read-
justment. However, under article 59, allocation of compensation for
loss of land is decided by members of the collective, giving rise to a
possibility that such land compensation will be allocated among all vil-
lagers followed by a land readjustment. It appears necessary to have an
authoritative interpretation based on the spirit of article 132 that only
farmers whose contracted land is lost to state expropriation are entitled
to such compensation.
Conclusion
Over the years, China has executed several rounds of massive land re-
forms, completely changing existing practices several times over. Re-
sults have been mixed, some ending in a huge disaster, such as the
horrible famine during collectivisation, while others have had more po-
sitive results, improving agricultural production and leading to greater
tenure security for farmers.
China‘s many land reforms from the 1920s until the 1970s are ex-
emplary of two extremes: private landownership-oriented land reforms
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before or soon after the Communists took power, and socialist land re-
forms when its powerbase was consolidated. Post-Mao land rights re-
forms are somewhat special, as unlike the ‘shock approach’ of other
transitional post-socialist systems, an evolutionary approach was
adopted, including immediate legalisation and privatisation.29 China
sought a balance between adhering to socialist ideology and a market-
based economic system that would foster economic growth and in-
creased agricultural production. This led to a series of changes, intro-
duced in an incremental fashion, slowly moving land tenure towards
more privatised and legally recognised forms.
Although different and sometimes opposite in content, the various
land reforms share some common methods of operation. Most impor-
tantly, periods of experimentation, with the use of ad hoc, policy-based
rules and small-scale arrangements, are followed by large top-down re-
form movements, during which relatively uniform rules are applied to
widely different contexts.30 Such experimentation has led to creative so-
lutions to existing dilemmas. For instance, with this experimentation
approach, the HRS system was developed at a time that this was neces-
sary but not yet universally politically acceptable.
However, the top-down reform method has undermined the realisa-
tion of changes introduced for enhancing tenure security. First, some
of the original experiments based on experiences in some areas may
not be successful in other areas, causing considerable difficulties or
even outright disaster, as happened during collectivisation. Second, and
perhaps more important for the current land tenure issues, is that the
top-down manner of policy formation combined with the post-Mao
fragmentation of power has severely challenged implementation. In
China‘s currently fragmented power structures, local governments, of-
ten cooperating with local land developers, have a large amount of local
autonomy and have been able to thwart the implementation of Beij-
ing’s policies and laws they deemed unfavourable.31 In addition, reach-
ing the Chinese masses from Beijing continues to be a major chal-
lenge, strongly affecting the possibility of creating sufficient awareness
to initiate grassroots invocation of the norms introduced.
Options for improvement include changes in existing legislation.
First, China‘s current land laws include vague rules about the circum-
stances under which land can be expropriated, leaving a large amount
of discretion to local governments known for pursuing their own inter-
ests over those of farmers. Second, the LML provides insufficient com-
pensation, especially when compared to the market values of the land
taken. Third, the prohibition of mortgages on land use rights, as regu-
lated even in the latest Property Law (Property Law, art. 184) which
strongly affects the breadth of current land tenure arrangements, could
be abandoned. This prohibition was installed to protect arable land and
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avoid reckless mortgages leading to foreclosure, although such protec-
tion could be achieved through an effective zoning system and im-
proved banking practice. It is questionable, however, whether such leg-
islative changes will be politically acceptable at the moment. Some of
the suggested changes, such as the possibility of mortgaging land use
rights to arable land, were parts of earlier drafts of the Property Law
but were explicitly changed to appease anti-reform elements within the
Chinese national polity.
While these and possibly many other legislative changes may en-
hance land tenure security on paper, they will be useless if not success-
fully implemented. As demonstrated above, even the existing legisla-
tion is not well implemented, as farmers lack awareness of their rights,
land certificates and contracts have not been properly issued, prohib-
ited land reallocations continue, and land is expropriated without fol-
lowing proper procedures or paying due compensation. The weak im-
plementation of law, combined with limited access of farmers to re-
dress mechanisms, strongly undermines the assurance element of
tenure security in China, even though the legalisation of the HRS has
led to better duration and breadth.
It seems that the improvement of assurance requires action directed
at the land bureaus enforcing the law, at courts and other adjudicative
bodies able to deal with land conflict cases, and at farmers and social
organisations representing them to build their capacity to invoke the
law.32 Underlying many of the implementation issues is a question of
power distribution. Methods have to be found to successfully limit the
current power and autonomy of local governments cooperating with lo-
cal land developers and to enhance the power of farmers. It seems that
such a shift in power requires special empowerment measures such as
allowing farmers to organise themselves, enhancing their access to jus-
tice institutions and intermediaries necessary to represent their rights
there, and giving greater freedom to the media to report on ongoing in-
justices. While some of these suggestions may seem sensitive in the
current polity, they may help to prevent further widespread social un-
rest, which itself could ultimately undermine the central authority.
Notes
1 In these cases the illegality has to do with the State of Mexico Penal Code, which ty-
pifies non-authorised land subdivisions in order to sell building plots as a criminal
offence.
2 The subdivision of ejido parcels is prohibited by agrarian law to avoid fragmentation
into economically unviable units.
3 The great majority of non-landowning Chinese agricultural families were tenant
farmers rather than landless labourers.
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4 The Soviet Republic of China, also known as the Jiangxi Soviet existed from 1931 to
1934, as an independent government established by the Communist leaders Mao Ze-
dong and Zhu De in Jiangxi province in southeastern China.
5 The lawmakers’ intention to grant to peasants full ownership is more visible when
comparing the language of land allocation in article 6 and the language of article 8
concerning allocation of the confiscated farming tools and draft animals. Article 8
specified that the confiscated tools and draft animals should be ‘allocated to poor and
middle peasants for use in cultivating land’, and the users should pay a user fee.
6 Several categories of land are listed as state-owned under the Land Reform Law: large
tracts of forestland, the land on which large irrigation facilities are erected, large
tracts of wasteland, large tracts of salt-producing land, mines, rivers, lakes, harbours.
The large and contiguous tracts of land for growing bamboo, fruits, tea and mulber-
ries which were previously owned by landlords were also converted to state owned
land. See Land Reform Law of PRC 1950, article 18 and 19.
7 Unlike the Platform, which allows land lease only under ‘certain circumstances’, the
Land Reform Law does not contain such a restriction.
8 A region was composed of several provinces. Regional people’s government was abol-
ished in the mid-1960s when the Cultural Revolution began.
9 The landowners who were previous landlords but currently did not engage in agricul-
tural production were prohibited from possessing such rights to transfer for ‘a cer-
tain period’ after the land allocation. See Ibid.
10 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the Decision on ‘the Charter
of Rural Production Cooperatives’, People’s Daily, Mar. 18, 1956.
11 Charter of Rural Production Cooperatives, article 1, in which it states, ‘(c)ollectives
shall uniformly use its members’ land, draft animals and agricultural production
tools, and gradually realize the goal of public ownership of these production means’.
See also Decision of the Sixth Plenary Session 1955. The decision defined agricultural
cooperatives as a form of semi-socialist organisation in the transition to full public
ownership of rural land.
12 Fifteen to 30 million incremental deaths occurred, as agricultural production plum-
meted. See Peng 1987:639; Weigeln-Schwidrizik 2003.
13 Ibid., at 172. See also Qinghe 1992.
14 As household and village population numbers change, land readjustment is designed
to ensure absolute equality of per capita (or sometimes per worker) landholdings in a
given community. Not all land readjustments are of the same magnitude. ‘Big’ or
comprehensive readjustments involve an overall change in the landholdings of all
farm households in the village. In a big readjustment, all farmland in the village is
given back to the collective entity and reallocated among village households so that
each household receives entirely new land. A ‘small’ or partial readjustment consists
of adding to or taking from a household’s existing landholdings when that house-
hold’s size changes. Under small readjustments, households that neither add nor
lose members will continue to farm the same landholding. Such readjustment for po-
pulation change is not found in any of the world’s highly developed agricultures but
can be found in a few customary tenure regimes. There are also historical examples
in a few other societies; and it appears to be contemplated, though with a far longer
duration of 49 years and ‘readjustment’ in the fiftieth, in the Old Testament refer-
ence to reallocation in the ‘year of the Jubilee’ (Leviticus 25:23).
15 Central Committee of CPC’s Notice on Rural Work in 1984 (Document No. 1 of
1984), issued Jan. 1, 1984.
16 The two-field system breaks with the typical pattern of distributing all farmland on a
per capita basis. Instead, cultivated land is divided into two categories: ‘consumption
land’ and ‘responsibility land’. Consumption land is divided in each village on a per
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capita basis to meet each household’s basic needs. The remaining land is contracted
to farm households as responsibility land through a variety of methods which in
many cases results in a non-egalitarian land distribution. On top of the regular grain
quota farmers pay for the use of consumption land, an additional contracting fee is
typically charged for responsibility land. For an analysis of the two-field system and
its implementation in China, see Prosterman, Hanstad, and Ping 1994.
17 Scale farming involves the consolidation of small, labour-intensive farms into larger,
mechanised farms. Scale farming can be accomplished through a variety of ap-
proaches, but typically involves the contracting of large areas of arable land to a few
farmers or the operation of large-scale farms by the collective land owner. Recollecti-
visation of farmland was the ultimate goal of at least some experiments with scale
farming in the early 1990s. For a discussion of scale farming and its relevance to
China, see Prosterman, Hanstad, and Ping 1998.
18 Compulsory re-contracting means that cadres of the collective, usually in cooperation
with township officials, take farmers’ land back and re-contract it out to non-villagers
or corporations including foreign corporations, without consulting farmers and with
no or little compensation to the farmers whose land is affected. The motivation be-
hind re-contracting is rent-seeking by cadres of the collective, who cannot legally im-
pose contracting fees on the land allocated among village households but can impose
such fees on the third-party contractor through the process of re-contracting. For a ty-
pical case of re-contracting as it still occurs in present-day China, see the Licun case
discussed in Van Rooij, this volume. See also Van Rooij 2006b: ch. 9.
19 The Central Committee of CPC and the State Council’s Policy Measures on the Cur-
rent Agricultural and Rural Development, Nov. 5, 1993 (Document No. 11 of 1993).
See also the more general ‘Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Some Issues
Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure’, adopted by
the 14th Central Committee of the CCP at its third plenary session on 14th Novem-
ber 1993, article 31 available in LEXIS (database on-line), News Library, BBCSWB File
(18 Nov. 1993).
20 Document No. 11, sec. 1.
21 Notice Concerning Further Stabilizing and Protecting the Rural Land Contracting Re-
lationship (1997) No. 16, issued by the Central Committee on August 27, 1997 (here-
inafter Document No. 16).
22 Empirical studies show that – at the country level – broad-based access to land is as-
sociated with higher rates of economic growth (Deininger and Olinto 2000: 3-4, 9).
23 Making exceptions for the construction of collectively owned enterprises, rural hous-
ing (although not more than one per household, art 62) and other buildings with
public facilities to be used by the collective.
24 Construction on collectively owned arable land is only allowed after a procedure in
which the collective land ownership is converted to state ownership, following which
the land use purpose can be converted, if certain procedures are followed, including
compensating farmers for land use rights lost. See LML, article 43-49.
25 The 1998 LML had simply repeated the general principle that ‘land use rights may
be transferred in accordance with law’ (art. 2).
26 In recent discussions, Chinese officials stated that the Peoples’ Court will refuse to
consider any farmer’s complaint about the non-payment of compensation in takings
of land for non-agricultural purposes if the farmer cannot produce one of these docu-
ments showing that the farmer holds rights to the land in question.
27 For examples see Van Rooij, this volume.
28 This property law provides general rules applicable to all kinds of civil law relation-
ships that arise from the ownership and use of property. (Property Law art. 2 (i)) The
law defines two forms of property: movable and real property. (Property Law art. 2
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(ii)) Property rights include both full ownership rights, as well as more limited rights
including usufructuary rights and security property rights such as mortgage and the
right of pledge. (Property Law art. 2 (iii) Finally, the law distinguishes a tripartite dif-
ferentiation of state, collective and private property rights. And even though the law
stipulates that such ownership rights, and actually all property rights, are protected
(Property Law art. 4) in the 2004 Constitution (art. 16 of the 1982 Constitution after
amendment in 2004), the law also states that it maintains a basic socialist economic
system with public property playing a dominant role and diverse forms of ownership
developing side by side (Property Law art. 3) (Editorial 2007).
29 See for examples of positive accounts of the new law Beck and Guo 2007 and Wang
2007. For more skeptical views see Beck and Guo 2007, Erie 2007 and Wang 2007.
30 See also Wang 2007:129 which clearly states that ‘rural collective economy entity, or
villager committee, or villager group is not the owner of collective property’.
31 Compare with Taylor who distinguishes between the shock approach and the evolu-
tionary-institutionalist models concerning legal reforms in Central and Eastern Eur-
ope (Taylor 2007:84). She follows Roland 2000:328.
32 We mainly discussed this for the development of the HRS into the LML and RLCL,
but it also applies to the development of land redistribution from the small-scale,
communist-controlled regions in the 1930s and 1940s to the large-scale land redistri-
bution in the 1950s. The massive switch towards collectivisation and ultimately to
people’s communes was also one that started with local experimentation, at the time
in Henan province in which 27 cooperatives were formed into one immense com-
mune of 9,369 households. See Luo 2003:19; Spence 1990:578-579.
33 For more detail, see Van Rooij, this volume.
34 For more detail, see Van Rooij, this volume.
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16 Land loss and conflict in China:
Illustrated by cases from Yunnan province
Benjamin van Rooij1
Introduction
In the 1980s China introduced the Household Responsibility System
(HRS), a policy which gave China’s rural households a fifteen-year use
right to a plot of land (Yang 2003). Under the HRS, such a use right
was allocated to households, while China’s rural land remained
collectively owned, in most cases, by the village collective (VC). Since
1998 the revised Land Management Law (LML) legalised and length-
ened the HRS policy into a legally recognised, 30-year land use right
(LML § 14.1), which is to be established through a land use contract
(LML § 14.1), including the right of transfer (LML § 2.2). In 2003, the
Rural Land Contract Law (RLCL) provided further detail as to the rights
and duties concerning the household land use rights, especially con-
cerning the content of land use contracts(RLCL § 21) and the transfer
of the use rights through exchange, lease, or assignment (RLCL § 32-
43). In addition, the 2003 RLCL provided farmers with extensive legal
remedies against infringements of their rights, establishing very clear
and strong rules prohibiting violations of farmers’ land use rights by
local officials. Violations are punishable through civil liability, adminis-
trative sanctions, and even criminal penalties (RLCL § 54-61). In addi-
tion, the 2003 RLCL has broadened access to justice possibilities for
aggrieved farmers by allowing direct appeals to court (RLCL § 51).2
Thus, on paper at least, it seems that the 1998 and the 2003 laws have
strengthened household tenure security.
Empirical research has demonstrated that although full implementa-
tion is still an ideal, progress has been made in the realisation of the
law’s norms (Prosterman, Schwarzwalder, and Jianping 2000;
Schwarzwalder et al. 2002). Such research found that already by 2000,
and even more in 2002, most farmers were aware of their 30-year land
use rights, and in most villages the implementation of the 30-year land
use right system had begun. It also demonstrated that a growing num-
ber of farmers (app. 45 per cent in 2002, and 63 per cent in 2005)
have received some form of documentation attesting to their 30-year
land use right (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002:168; Zhu et al. 2006:788).
Progress has also been made in relation to land readjustments. These
are practices of redistribution of collective land use rights within the
collective, which had been common prior to the 1998 LML and which,
since the 2003 RLCL, have been largely banned in order to enhance
tenure security. A 2002 survey found that 82.1 per cent of the farmers
interviewed reported that their village had not conducted a land read-
justment aside from those necessary for distributing the 30-year land
use rights in the first place (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002:169).3
Despite the stronger formal recognition of farmer’s land use rights
and the progress made in the implementation of the new laws, land
tenure security remains weak in China. The largest threat has been a
sharp rise over the last decade of cases in which farmers lost their land
use rights and received little to no compensation (Zhu et al. 2006:782-
783). This has led to an increase in land disputes and protests initiated
by farmers resisting the taking of their land and demanding more
compensation (Erie 2007). China’s land loss conflicts pose a puzzle:
How is it possible that land loss conflicts continue despite the progress
made in the lawmaking and implementation of the LML and RLCL? In
order to analyse this question, knowledge about what causes such con-
flicts is necessary; in addition, it is important to find out to what extent
the existing problems are related to the efforts made at enhancing land
tenure security as adopted in the LML and the RLCL. The analysis of
China’s land loss conflicts will enhance our understanding of current
bottlenecks in rural land tenure security in China and future directions
for land reform.
The present chapter seeks to understand which factors explain Chi-
na‘s land conflicts. It makes a critical assessment of the current litera-
ture by combining existing primary and secondary sources with data
gathered during a year of fieldwork in Yunnan province. During this
fieldwork, several cases of land conflicts in peri-urban villages near
Yunnan‘s capital Kunming were studied in detail.4 Findings from this
fieldwork are used to illustrate and critically analyse data from second-
ary and primary sources about such regulation in China.
In addition, the present chapter will conclude with observations
about what the ongoing land loss disputes mean for rural land tenure
security in China.5 For this analysis, the chapter distinguishes land ten-
ure security in terms of its breadth, duration, and assurance.6 Follow-
ing Ostrom, the breadth of the land use rights can be evaluated by
checking which bundles of rights farmers have, including: access, with-
drawal, management, exclusion, and alienation (Ostrom 1999:339).
Duration covers the time limitations of land tenure rights. Assurance,
following Place, Roth, and Hazell (1994), is made up of ‘the assurance
in exerting rights and the costs of enforcing these rights which should
not be inhibiting’.
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This chapter first discusses four land loss cases from Yunnan pro-
vince and then briefly outlines current land loss conflicts in China.
After this, using Yunnan and other cases, the chapter continues to ana-
lyse the causes of the land loss conflicts. It first looks at the relation-
ship between the land loss conflicts and the existing land legislation.
In addition, it analyses the incentives for land development that have
caused such conflicts. Finally, it analyses the existing systems of checks
and balances in place to control land acquisition and protect farmers
from losing their land, both those systems initiated by farmers them-
selves and those organised through state institutions. In the conclu-
sion, the chapter discusses what China’s land loss conflicts mean for
the country’s land tenure security.
Four land loss cases from peri-urban Kunming
Data derived through fieldwork in Yunnan province provide illustra-
tions of how land acquisition conflicts occur in real-life situations in
one particular area of China. This section discusses four such cases.
‘We are going to lynch him,’ shout the angry Xiaocun7 farmers some
twenty kilometres south of Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province,
as they turn towards the Village Committee (VC)8 headquarters to find
their village president. These Chinese peasants feel cheated as they
have discovered that each of them has lost 10,000 RMB (about USD
1000) in compensation for their arable land loss. The farmers have lost
their land due to forced state expropriation to build a highway to the
provincial capital Kunming. They do not suspect, rather, they think
they know for certain that their own village leadership has somehow ta-
ken their money. As the mob prepares for violence, the scared village
chairman, the democratically elected leader of the village, tries to ex-
plain that it was not him but the bureaucratically appointed superior
township leadership that took the money. The village leader speaks to
no avail, as the angry farmers still beat him up badly. Afterwards, the
shaken village president resigns, and the county police are called in to
patrol the village for more than a month to prevent further unrest.9
A couple of years earlier, in Jiacun village, just ten kilometres north
of Xiaocun, farmers also rallied against their local VC over land. The
first conflict involved the construction of a Buddhist temple. When an
energetic young monk convinced the village leadership to support his
plans for the restoration of the Jiahuasi village temple, a large plot of
land (60 Mu10) in sub-village one was assigned for construction. Be-
cause of the sensitivity of religious construction, the Buddhists were
careful not to upset any of the local stakeholders and offered an extre-
mely generous compensation for the farmers’ arable land loss,
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200,000 RMB/Mu, more than twice the usual amount paid in this
area (80,000 RMB/Mu) and well above the statutory minimum of
18,000 RMB/Mu (six times the average annual agricultural output of
the three proceeding years, which cannot have been higher than the
3000 RMB a year that farmers make on Jiacun’s prime land) (LML §
47.2). Furthermore, the owners of two houses located on the former
temple premises which were to be demolished for the construction de-
manded 600,000 RMB in compensation. Monk Li expressed his frus-
tration to me during one of our conversations: ‘Their houses cost no
more than 80,000 RMB to rebuild. They know we are powerless to re-
fuse their demands, so they just ask what they like.’ This case was
settled, and the temple paid 300,000 RMB. The temple further helped
pay for a new road from the highway to the temple that crosses Liujia’s
most important industrial area. Cynically enough, the Buddhists’ gen-
erous compensation did not prevent village unrest directed at the new
temple. In the months that followed, villagers believed that the temple
had taken more land than it had compensated for and organised pro-
tests against the temple and their own VC leadership. The protests
came to a boiling point during the 2001 democratic VC elections, in
which a majority of the farmers tried to nominate a mentally disabled
villager as their village leader to show their dissatisfaction about these
land practices.11
The elections did not end the land protest in Jiacun village. In 2002,
when a new school was to be built on a 23 Mu plot of land in sub-vil-
lage three, villagers rallied once more. They protested against the
amount of compensation they had been offered for their land use
rights over the land on which the school was to be built. The VC had
offered to pay them 100,000 RMB per Mu. The amount offered was
generous by local standards and well within the above-mentioned legal
minimum compensation for land taken by the state of about 18,000
RMB. The villagers in sub-village three were dissatisfied with this
amount because they thought it was unfair that other farmers in sub-
village one had received 200,000 RMB per Mu from the Buddhist tem-
ple construction project. At first, when the VC refused to pay more
than they had offered, the angry farmers turned to higher levels of gov-
ernment. They wrote petitions (shangfang), and the government sent
teams to Liujia to investigate the situation. Their petitions were in vain
as all higher-level government teams ruled in favour of the VC‘s school
project and found that the compensation was in order. At this time, the
VC decided to start construction, and the land was cleared and pre-
pared for building the school. The villagers of sub-village three did not
give up. First, they tried to sabotage the project itself by cutting down
the power-lines at the building site. When this did not help stop the
project, they turned on the VC itself.12 One day, angry villagers sur-
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rounded the VC headquarters and blocked the gate so that no one
could leave or enter. They even locked the only entrance to the building
to force their demands on the village’s democratically elected leader-
ship. This act of physical protest forced the VC to negotiate with the
villagers. It was clear from the start that their demands could not be
fully met because it would set a precedent for high compensation pre-
cluding other construction projects in the village. Elected village head
Mr. Yang was able to forge a compromise under which the farmers
would get 100,000 RMB per Mu land and retain small plots of land on
the outside of the school premises on which they could build shops.
In Licun Village – located some 50 kilometres southwest of Jiacun –
local leadership converted arable land to construction land. The leader-
ship believed that 2004 was the right time to begin doing so, because
the new highway would soon create a fast connection with Kunming,
which would certainly bring development and thus enterprises in need
of construction land to the area. To start using this land for construc-
tion, the VC leadership leased several plots of arable land from farm-
ers, who had the land use rights. The farmers received 500 RMB per
year per Mu for wet land and 300 RMB per year per Mu for dry land, a
total of 12,000 or 7,200 for the remaining 24 years of usage rights that
the farmers still had.13 The VC then took this land and leased it to en-
terprises to construct premises on, for lump sums ranging from
80,000 to 90,000 per Mu. According to the VC leadership the enter-
prises would receive land contracts for changqi (long term), which actu-
ally meant indefinitely. ‘We did this because the law does not allow
transfer of ownership, but we actually wanted to sell the land itself to
the firms,’ Licun Village’s CCP secretary explained one day. He knew
that what they did was in violation of the Land Management Act (LML
§ 43.1 and § 63.1). ‘If we had gone by the book we would never have
been able to sell the land of the villages, all the costs of compensation
and procedural fees to the land bureau would have raised the price per
Mu to about 170,000 RMB per Mu, and there is no company willing to
pay that.’ Villagers in Licun felt cheated out of their land, as they have
not received the satisfactory compensation for losing their land rights
and furthermore suspect their leadership of keeping the profits made
on this land deal. In total, after payment of compensation, the VC
made over 1.5 million RMB.14 Farmers have stated that they do not
know how the 1.5 million is being used. They do not believe the VC‘s
explanation that all of the money is being invested in village develop-
ment for roads and electricity projects. The farmers think that the
group of family and friends who have held power over Licun for dec-
ades used the money for their own personal benefit. They have no way
of proving this and only voice their anger in the privacy of their homes.
The men say they felt helpless as they could not refuse land requisi-
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tioning, nor could they protest. They say that complaining to the town-
ship government is of no use as they are old friends and even family of
the VC. According to the unhappy farmers, there is nowhere they can
go with their problems. Unlike Xiaocun’s and Jiacun’s active protesters,
Licun’s farmers seem to have accepted the situation as a fact of life.
Not even the new election system gives them hope, as they say it is
dominated by the same tight group of powerful Licun leaders who will
be able to exclude anyone who threatens their dominion.
China’s land loss conflicts: An overview
From these cases we see that farmers lose their land use rights in sev-
eral manners and for several reasons, involving different actors. First,
there are cases that involve land loss following expropriation. In some
cases the state (at various levels of administration, depending on the
case) expropriates arable land use rights for public interests, such as
building roads or government premises. In these cases the state will or-
der the expropriation but also pay for compensation. While land use
rights holders have a legal right to compensation (RLCL § 16.2), the
compensation is payable to the village committee (VC), the village
elected body of self-government, which is not a part of the state.15 The
VC thus plays an intermediary role as it negotiates the amount of com-
pensation payable and divides the compensation amongst rights
holders.16 Expropriation not only takes place for construction for public
use, but also in cases where collectively owned arable land is to be used
for commercial construction purposes, by private or semi-private par-
ties, other than those for rural housing, collective enterprises, or village
public utilities. In these cases the LML provides that such construction
requires conversion of ownership from the collective to the state, and
is thus also an expropriation (LML § 43). Following an approval proce-
dure for the land use conversion from arable to construction, as well as
the expropriation and thus the conversion of ownership from collective
to state, the land developer leases or buys the land use right from the
state. Meanwhile, the land developer has to pay compensation to the
VC, which negotiates the amount, manages it, and divides it amongst
rights holders.
In a second type of land loss case, farmers lose their arable land use
rights without expropriation. Such cases include collective construction
projects that are allowed on collectively owned arable land, including
the construction of collectively owned enterprises and collective pre-
mises such as schools or VC buildings. In these cases land loss is lar-
gely a village affair, where the VC has to come up with measures to
compensate those farmers who have lost their land. Rights holders are
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entitled to receive compensation for losing their land rights in this
manner. However, the law provides little detail as to how much and
how this is payable.17 In another type of case, farmers lose their land
rights because the VC illegally leases or transfers such land use rights
for commercial construction to third-party land developers. As stated,
such practices are in violation of the LML which stipulates that con-
struction on collective land for non-collective uses is only possible after
expropriation, while specifically forbidding the direct lease or transfer
of land use rights to collective arable land for such non-collective con-
struction purposes (LML § 43.1, 63.1). They occur because smaller, pri-
vately owned enterprises often do not have the resources to pay for
these procedures, which require great lump sum payments at the start
of the business venture, when there is little security about its profitabil-
ity.18 As these practices are illegal, China‘s land law does not provide
provisions concerning compensation. In these cases, sometimes VCs
have used the proceedings made from the land lease or transfer to pay
compensation to households who have lost their land use rights, or in
other cases to pay a dividend to all collective members.19 In all these
different situations, conflicts have occurred when farmers were unsatis-
fied with the amount of compensation they received after having lost
land use rights.
Yunnan is no exception, as numerous farmers in China have lost
their land without sufficient compensation (Cai 2003; Chen 2003:39;
Guo 2001b; Xiao 2003:257-259). Many Chinese farmers have voiced
their anger about land-grabbing through demonstrations. And this is
only the tip of the iceberg, as many Chinese peasants do not even rally
in protest when their land is taken away. The official number of de-
monstrations in 2005 was 85,000, involving over 3 million citizens, of
which a significant part concerned land acquisitions. According to a re-
cent study, 25 per cent of all farmers has been affected by land use
rights losses, of which two-thirds have not been satisfied with the com-
pensation (Zhu et al. 2006). The problem is widespread; one commen-
tator notes that an ‘economic war is going on at the local level in China
today especially on the fringes of expanding urban areas’ (Subrahman-
yan 2004). Alarmingly, the conflicts are becoming increasingly violent,
with strong clashes between farmers, police, and hired thugs. In the
worst case so far, armed police in Shanwei village in Guangdong pro-
vince were called in to control a mob of 10,000 people who were pro-
testing against the construction of a wind power plant on their land
without sufficient compensation. The mob had gathered on site in or-
der to demand the release of three of their appointed negotiators who
had been detained earlier. As the 1,000 armed police officers faced the
protestors, things turned ugly. Following an exchange of tear gas canis-
ters and bricks and home-made explosives, the police opened fire,
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shooting to kill. Their live ammunition wounded over 100 villagers
and killed between three and twenty villagers, according to eyewitness
accounts (Ang 2005). After the incident, police sealed off the village,
and one villager stated to the press: ‘The riot police are gathered out-
side our village. We’ve been surrounded. Most of the police are armed.
We dare not go out of our home. We are not allowed to buy food out-
side our village. They asked nearby villages not to sell us goods. The
government did not give us proper compensation for using our land to
build development zones and plants. Now they have come to shoot us.
I don’t know what to say’ (id.).
The central government knows that the land loss conflicts are a vol-
cano waiting to erupt. In a speech made on December 29, 2005, Pre-
mier Wen Jiabo voiced his concern that farmland seizures were provok-
ing widespread social unrest, stating: ‘We absolutely can’t commit an
historic error over land problems.’ He warned that despite strong ef-
forts to end local officials‘ land grabs, farmers still often receive little
compensation for land loss (Buckley 2006). Decreasing rural underde-
velopment has become a major theme of central policy in the last few
years, and in 2006 the National People’s Congress launched a new na-
tionwide policy of xin nongcun (new villages), a policy which aims to
protect farmers’ interests. For the Chinese Communist Party, a political
organisation that owes its present dominion over the country to its sup-
posed role as the champion of China‘s poor and landless peasants who
were once dominated by local elites, the current resurgence of farmers
feeling that they are being exploited by elites must be very frustrating.
Changing legislation is necessary but no panacea
If China‘s leaders are to find solutions for dealing with the current
land loss conflicts and if China is to secure farmer’s land tenure secur-
ity, a deeper understanding of the causes behind the current land ac-
quisition conflicts is necessary. A primary cause, often discussed in the
literature, is China’s current land legislation.
A primary legal problem responsible for the ongoing land loss is that
China still has a socialist system in which the law prescribes that un-
less land is collectively owned, it is state owned. The socialist owner-
ship system, combined with the rule that most construction should
take place on state-owned land20, has created a state monopoly on
managing construction land. Ding has argued that such a monopoly
has enabled local governments to abuse their powers and profit from
the value gap between urban and rural land (Ding 2007:2). It should
be noted that there are many land conflicts in which state institutions
are not involved. In the cases studied in Yunnan, acquisition problems
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existed without state interference and were solely the result of collective
institutions and the Village Committee (VC), the village self-elected
body of government, which is not part of the state structure.
Ambiguous ownership rights are a second legal cause for concern.
Ho has blamed the ambiguous ownership rights – that exist because
the LML fails to clarify who exactly owns China‘s rural land21 – for the
continuing land ownership conflicts. Collectively owned land, which
covers most of China’s agricultural land, is operated and managed by
the cun jiti jingji zuzhi (VC economic organisation) or by the cunmin
weiyuan (the VC members) (LML § 10). The law adds that land that has
been owned collectively so far by two or more collective organisations
within the village shall be managed by such sub-village organisations,
which in most areas are called xiaozu (small group) or zirancun (natur-
al village) (id.). The law further provides that land which already be-
longs to the township (or town) shall be operated and managed by
such a township (or town) (id.). Because of China’s turbulent land his-
tory and the differing operations of the communes that preceded the
present land rights system, there is a large degree of ambiguity about
which collective unit used to own the land. This original ambiguity has
been left intact by the LML. As a result, there have been many conflicts
between natural villages, administrative villages, and township level
leaders about who owns the land and, as a result, who can control pro-
cedures of land expropriation (Ho 2001, 2003). Ho argues that town-
ship governments especially have been able to use the ambiguity of the
past to profit from village land that they should not be allowed to man-
age and acquire (Ho 2001). The argument is convincing and clearly
present in the cases Ho studied concerning conflicts occurring before
2000. However, it is less clear whether the ambiguity of ownership is
highly influential in the recent surge of land loss conflicts studied in
this chapter, which largely concern the loss of land use rights. In the
cases studied in Yunnan, vague ownership rights were not influential
in the ongoing acquisition abuses, nor were they the basis of land loss
conflicts in any of the recent cases reported in the Chinese media or in
scholarly studies on such recent land loss conflicts as those studied
here. Land loss conflicts involving township governments in the cases
studied here concerned governments that embezzled villagers’ compen-
sation, as happened in Xiaocun village in Yunnan (Van Rooij 2006b:
Ch. 9). In these cases, township officials were able to do so in their
role as intermediary between the villagers and the district government,
but not out of a legal claim based on ownership.22
The law’s use of the vague term of ‘gonggong liyi’ (public interests) as
a prerequisite for land expropriations forms the third legal problem
(LML § 2.4).23 Current analysis holds that this vague term has made it
easier for predatory local governments to expropriate farmers‘ land leg-
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ally (Ding 2007:7; Subrahmanyan 2004). Therefore, as some scholars
have advised, it is sensible to create a better definition of ‘public inter-
ests’, limiting the possibilities for legal land loss for non-public interest
purposes.24 However, such a change of legislation is unlikely to stop
all or even a substantial part of the ongoing land loss conflicts at hand.
In the land loss cases in Yunnan, governments and the VC leadership
did not try to legitimise their actions with this term. In Licun village,
outright illegal commercial construction for non-public purposes has
been done on land leased from land use rights holders without any re-
ference to the law’s public interests (Van Rooij 2006b:Ch. 9). The VC
leadership never did so, because their practice of renting the land to
enterprises without first converting the land ownership to the state was
in clear violation of the LML anyway (LML § 63). Clearly, Licun’s lea-
ders did not fear engaging in an illegal practice (Van Rooij 2006b:Ch.
9). And likewise, even when the state or local VCs acquired land for
clearly public purposes such as building a road in Xiaocun, or a school
or a temple in Jiacun village, villagers rallied in protest nonetheless (id.
at Ch. 7). In those cases, the protest was not directed against the pur-
pose of land use but against the compensation farmers were to receive.
The existing regulation on compensation for arable land loss is the
fourth and most important legal concern discussed here.25 Ever since
the adoption of the LML26 there has been criticism about the provi-
sions for compensation of farmers‘ loss of land. First of all, there is a
certain lack of clarity in the law concerning the scope of application of
compensation rules and the exact procedure for distributing compensa-
tion from the village collective to households. On the one hand, the
RLCL provides that households whose land use rights are expropriated
(zhengyong) or occupied (zhanyong)27 should receive compensation. On
the other hand, the LML and its 1998 State Council Implementing
Regulations provide rules about the procedure and approximate
amounts of compensation payable. However, these rules seem only to
apply to cases in which farmers lose their land use rights when the
land is expropriated (zhengyong) (LML § 47). They do not stipulate
whether these rules apply to cases where land is lost for construction
for collective purposes. Another unclear point concerning compensa-
tion is that the 1998 Implementing Regulations provide that compen-
sation belongs to the collective economy (1998 State Council LML Im-
plementing Regulations, art. 26), without specifying exactly how it is
to be distributed to farmers who have lost their land use rights. Both
points of uncertainty undermine farmers’ right to compensation, espe-
cially in cases in which their land is taken by VCs, or in which the VC
refuses to transfer the compensation paid to the households that have
lost their land. Perhaps the most cynical aspect of the current compen-
sation norms is that they do not apply to illegal situations in which
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land has been taken for construction without going through the proper
procedures, such as occurred in Licun and Jiacun.
The 2007 Property Law has not solved these issues and actually may
have made matters worse. Article 132 states that in case of state expro-
priations, land use rights holders are entitled to compensation. Here
the new law nearly repeats the RLCL, but with one important differ-
ence. The new law only provides for compensation in case of expropria-
tion by the state (Property Law § 132 and 42),28 and not as the RLCL
does in case of construction, by the collective without such expropria-
tion. It seems that on this issue further clarification is needed in all
three laws. The best option would be to grant land use rights holders a
right to compensation, providing clear standards as well as procedures
for negotiations and payment, regardless of the manner in which their
land has been taken, whether through expropriation or not, in a legal
manner or in violation of the law.
Another problem concerns the legal procedure for compensation. At
present, China‘s LML only provides that farmers are to be consulted
about the land requisitioning and the compensation to be paid (LML §
48). Thus, farmers are not directly involved in bargaining about the
compensation amount and have no formal legal instrument for stop-
ping land acquisition when they do not agree with the amount of com-
pensation offered. An important and logical change would be to grant
farmers rights of negotiation about compensation prior to the land ac-
quisition approval.29 In local Beijing municipal regulations, farmers
have gotten a stronger voice in the compensation negotiation process
as the local rules require that a written agreement between the requisi-
tioning unit and the rural collective economic institutions or village
committees is required, governing the compensation amount and pro-
cedures (Subrahmanyan 2004). However, whether such changes in the
law will affect current practice remains to be seen. Even the existing
procedure is not well implemented, as recent research found that only
twenty per cent of the farmers who are about to lose their land use
rights have received the legally mandated prior notice about compensa-
tion (Zhu et al. 2006). This shows that even if negotiations become ob-
ligatory in the law, many land developers are still able to start construc-
tion without following the procedure, whether it is the duty to provide
information at present or the duty to enter into negotiations in the fu-
ture. In addition, our study of negotiations about compensation for col-
lective construction on arable land in Jiacun village in Yunnan demon-
strates that even if farmers are able to enter into negotiations with de-
velopers and the VC leadership they still rally in protest, sometimes
just to get more compensation (Van Rooij 2006b:Ch. 7). Therefore, the
issue of compensation is not so much one of procedure but predomi-
nantly one of the amount of compensation paid.
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Most of the protests concern the amount of compensation.30 Zhu et
al.’s data demonstrate that 67 per cent of the farmers whose land has
been expropriated is unsatisfied with the amount of compensation re-
ceived (Zhu et al. 2006). Thus, it seems perfectly logical to blame the
existing statutory minimum amounts for compensation, as most ana-
lysts have done. As previously stated, an initial problem is that when
the law is followed to the letter, the current compensation minima only
apply to land loss cases involving expropriation by the state, and not
cases where farmers lose their land use rights for collective construc-
tion. In addition, China‘s statutory compensation minima for land ac-
quisition are based on the idea that farmers should be compensated
sufficiently to continue to provide for their livelihoods for a set amount
of years in a fashion to which they have been accustomed.31 Current
compensation minima are therefore not based on the economic value
of the land acquired, and the fairness of current compensation minima
is questionable. First of all, the statutory minima at present may not al-
ways be enough to enable farmers to retain the same standard of liv-
ing, as the law, for example, does not allow for raised costs of living,
especially for farmers who, having lost their land and their main
sources of income, have to leave rural areas and get by in much more
expensive urban centres (Chan 2003:145). Second, the compensation
minima are unfair as they do not relate to the value of the land once it
is acquired for construction purposes (Chan 2003:33, 144; Fan et al.
2003).32 It seems reasonable that farmers should be allowed to share
in the immense wealth the land conversions bring. Guo’s research
from Yunnan has shown that many farmers there have rallied in pro-
test against land expropriation cases, not so much because they dis-
agreed with the overall amount of compensation but because they
thought it unfair when compared to the amount of money that land de-
velopers were making (Guo 2001b). Such feelings of unfairness were
also at stake in my own research in Jiacun village in Yunnan where
farmers rallied in protest when a school was built, not because the
compensation was insufficient to sustain their original income, which
it was not, but because it was lower than what a temple construction
project had paid their fellow villagers a year earlier (Van Rooij 2006b:
Ch. 7).
The amount of compensation is thus a problem that needs to be ad-
dressed in the law. At present, there have been efforts, both in local
legislation in Beijing as well as in national policy documents and legal
interpretations, and supposedly in the new draft LML, to incorporate
higher compensation minima which are not solely linked to output va-
lue. In a Beijing local initiative, for example, local rules offer a mini-
mum compensation standard that is to be set ‘based on the agricultural
output value, land location, and compensation for resettlement, as well
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as adjusted according to social and economic development‘ (Subrah-
manyan 2004). A true change that would link compensation to land
market value seems to remain difficult to accomplish. First, there may
not be sufficient support to make such a change in the national legisla-
tion, and second, as long as the land market is not well developed, it
remains difficult to determine a fair price on which to base such com-
pensation (Ding 2007).
It is doubtful, however, whether a change in legislation over the
amount of compensation will solve the existing land disputes. The pro-
blem remains that even the existing laws with their relatively low mini-
mum standards for compensation are widely violated. Such cases in-
clude farmers who have received sub-minimum compensation, such as
those in Licun (Van Rooij 2006b:Ch. 9), and situations in which the
compensation, even if it may have been offered in compliance with the
law, has been embezzled by elites that have acted as intermediaries be-
tween the farmers and the land developers. Research in Shandong pro-
vince found, for example, that in cases in which compensation is paid,
only 15-30 per cent ends up with the farmers, while the rest is kept by
the VC, and that there were even cases where farmers received nothing
(Zhao 2003). This also happened in Xiaocun village in Yunnan where
township officials embezzled part of the compensation offered by high-
er level governments to local farmers.
In sum, although the current land loss conflicts can be attributed to
the text of the law and a change in the law would lead to amelioration,
in many cases the problem is largely related to how the law functions
in practice. Therefore, land loss conflicts cannot be explained merely
through a legal analysis. Neither can all such land conflicts be solved
through changes in legislation. Land acquisition conflicts will continue,
unless other factors are taken into account. This chapter will continue,
therefore, by looking at the ways in which the law functions in practice
and the non-legal factors that have influenced the ongoing land dis-
putes.
Understanding land loss: Incentives and pressures
Land loss conflicts first occur when local governments,33 VCs, and/or
commercial land developers stand to benefit from land transactions. In
China, these benefits derive from the wide gap between the value of
land used for agricultural purposes, based on the agricultural output,
and land used for construction purposes based on the real estate mar-
ket (Subrahmanyan 2004). In Licun village in Yunnan, for example,
the local VC was able to enrich themselves by leasing rural land use
rights for 12,000 RMB/mu and then leasing it out as construction land
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for 80,000-90,000 RMB/mu. In Fujian province a local government
paid 10,000 RMB/mu to farmers and then resold their land use rights
to developers for a minimum of 200,000 RMB/mu, and in some cases
even up to 750,000 RMB/mu. In another case Hangzhou farmers were
paid 160,000 RMB/mu in compensation, while the land use rights
were then sold for housing for 2 to 4 million RMB/mu (Ding 2007:4-
6). The biggest value gap in China exists on the outskirts of cities,
where the high-value urban construction land encroaches hungrily
upon the adjacent rural plots, and it is exactly in these peri-urban areas
where most land conflicts take place. World Bank land expert John
Bruce compares going from urban to rural land in terms of its value to
falling off a cliff (Subrahmanyan 2004). Bruce argues that the only so-
lution to ongoing land loss conflicts is decreasing this incentive and de-
creasing the value gap between rural and urban land (id.). One way of
doing so would be by making the construction land value the basis for
compensation of rural land lost. The value gap is central in any under-
standing of conflicts related to land-grabbing. The gap explains why
there is such a struggle for land.
An additional manner in which VCs and local governments, espe-
cially township and sometimes district level governments, benefit from
the land transactions comes from the money that can be made from il-
legally diverting compensation funds. In Xiaocun, the township leader-
ship embezzled part of the compensation that the district government
had to pay local farmers (Van Rooij 2006b:Ch. 9; Zhao 2003). Ironi-
cally, this could mean that if farmers are able to negotiate a higher
compensation from land developers, local governments have a greater
incentive for embezzling such funds and thus as a result for participat-
ing in land acquisitions with more land conflicts.
The fact that local governments and VCs are increasingly pressed for
funding exacerbates the incentive for profiting from land transactions
created by the land value gap and the possibility to embezzle compen-
sation. While Deng Xiaoping’s post-1978 reforms led to decentralisa-
tion and extra local tax revenue, they also increased local government
expenses as the local tasks and the local bureaucracy increased. The
1993 Tax Reforms had a major impact, giving local governments more
tasks without additional revenues. Consequently, local governments
have faced increasing budgetary deficits (Ding 2007:5). Land leasing is
an increasingly important form of local government revenue. Ding pro-
vides the example of Hangzhou city (3 million inhabitants) where
twenty per cent of the municipal city’s budget was derived from land
revenues. ‘Revenues generated from land can account to 60 per cent
of total fiscal incomes of local governments’ (Ding 2007). For village le-
vel authorities the situation is different, yet similar. VCs, the directly
elected bodies of village self-government, are not part of the state bu-
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reaucracy and thus do not receive state funding related to taxes. As
such, these local officials who often have to spend considerable time in
village management must be paid from local income. In all of the Yun-
nan villages studied here, such income was largely related to profits
made on land deals. Thus, local leadership is directly paid through
money made from land acquisitions. A related problem is that local
governments have lately lost tax revenue opportunities. This happened
when the central government first decreased and then later abolished
rural taxes, in order to lighten peasants‘ burdens. In many commu-
nities, especially purely rural ones where local governments cannot tax
industry, local fees or other taxes have for a long time continued to be
levied in spite of the central level reforms.34 However, once these new
reforms take root and local governments can no longer tax their farm-
ers, they will be further pressed to make use of income related to the
farmers’ land. Ironically, this might mean that the tax measures
adopted to protect farmers could actually cause them to lose their land.
An additional local government pressure that explains increasing
land loss conflicts arises from a need to develop arable land because
such governments have to demonstrate local economic growth. Eco-
nomic growth, whether in the form of urbanisation or industrialisa-
tion, requires land conversions for building roads, factories, or hous-
ing. 35 Within China‘s system of governance, the centre exercises con-
trol over local governments through a vertical management system.
Under this system, local governments are evaluated based on certain
performance indicators. If they do well, local government leaders can
receive bonuses and promotions, and if they fail they may be fined.36
In the evaluation system (kaohe), economic growth and social stability
are always the two main yardsticks against which success or failure are
measured (Edin 2003; Huang 1996).37
In sum, the land value gap, the lack of local state and VC revenues,
and the pro-growth pressure and strategy can explain why land preda-
tors, in these cases local governments or VC leaders, have engaged in
land transactions as a result of which farmers have lost land use rights
without satisfactory compensation. This cannot explain, though, how
land predators have been able to grab land, often in clear violation of
the law, without successful opposition by those aggrieved or by the
state whose laws and policies are aimed to prevent and stop such
abuses. In other words, why have the land predators not been stopped,
especially now that both local farmers and the central state have made
it clear that they want these practices to end? In the next two sections
we will discuss possibilities for keeping land predators at bay, first by
discussing the farmers’ options for redressing these situations, and sec-
ond by discussing the state’s efforts at punishing land predators who
have violated the law.
LAND LOSS AND CONFLICT IN CHINA 449
Empowerment: What can farmers do? Legal and factual remedies
Given the existing strong incentives and needs, only an effective sys-
tem of checks and balances can stop ongoing land abuses in China.
Such a system can exist in one of two manners, and would ideally exist
in both. First it can exist in a bottom-up manner, making local govern-
ments and land developers accountable to citizens and grass-roots orga-
nisations. Second, it can exist in a top-down manner, when higher level
state institutions are able to control local governments and land develo-
pers in such a way that they refrain from unfair land appropriations.
This section will address the bottom-up system and look at the actions
land-grab victims can take when faced with an unfair land acquisition.
It will also discuss farmers‘ legal and extra-legal options for controlling
land loss without satisfactory compensation.
A first observation is that judicial options – initiating civil or admin-
istrative litigation against unlawful behaviour of land developers or lo-
cal government – have not been used much or with much success. In
the cases from peri-urban Kunming, the case of Yunnan studied, as
well as in the cases from other parts of China discussed so far, farmers
who lost their land did not turn to the courts, but instead resorted to
extra-legal factual measures to address their grievances.38 This observa-
tion is supported by nationwide data on legal address for land-takings
which demonstrated that only 0.9 per cent of the aggrieved farmers
filed a lawsuit for more compensation (Zhu et al. 2006). Clearly, going
to court has not been a preferred option for land-loss victims.
A lack of legal and rights awareness is seen as a primary reason why
few farmers have gone to court.39 Especially in more remote areas, lit-
eracy is still low, making legal awareness even more problematic. In
addition, in many cases farmers are informed of their rights by local
governments and local leaders who may not always tell them the full
content of such rights. On the other hand, farmers are increasingly
well informed about their rights. First, the central state has initiated
nationwide legal education campaigns (pufa) in which special attention
has been paid to the 1998 Land Management Act and the 2003 Rural
Land Contract Law, giving local governments little opportunity to dis-
tort the flow of information. Research has also demonstrated that farm-
ers have increased knowledge of their land rights and know about the
30-year land use right regulations and the fact that these cannot be vio-
lated at will (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002). Peri-urban Kunming villagers
illustrate this. When asked about their land and their land rights, local
farmers there proudly talk about the 30-year land rights policy. Even in
areas where the level of knowledge was traditionally not high, there are
village activists who have started to study land legislation and land poli-
cies and who have used their self-obtained knowledge to start protests.
450 BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ
In one Yunnan case, a district government initially forced a village to
provide 100 mu of arable land for a landscape theme park. When this
land was not duly compensated and another 100 mu was to be requisi-
tioned, one of the local farmers went to the local city bookshop to get
books about the existing land laws. Through self-study, he learned
about their rights, which eventually led to extra-legal protest.40
So if farmers have an increasing legal awareness, why do they not
turn to the courts for protection? An initial answer to this question
may be that successful civil and administrative litigation requires hir-
ing a lawyer to take up the case.41 Without a lawyer to defend their case
and prepare such defence in accordance with China‘s increasingly
complex procedural rules, most undereducated peasants do not stand a
chance in court. One problem is that lawyers in China are highly risk
averse and do not like taking on sensitive cases (Michelson 2006).
Lawyers are therefore not inclined to take cases against local govern-
ments, whether civil or administrative, especially if they concern vola-
tile, highly politicised matters such as land acquisitions (Peerenboom
2002a). In addition, farmers are not ideal clients, as they have little
money to pay for a well-prepared defence, and their cases do not have
a high potential for winning to start with. As lawyers in China are
struggling to make ends meet, they tend to refuse cases with a low fee
potential (id.). Lawyers’ lack of independence from local governments
further exacerbates matters, as lawyers do not wish to upset this rela-
tionship. Lawyers’ fees form another obstacle for farmers, who often
barely made a living when they still had their land. In the peri-urban
Kunming villages in Yunnan, which are not poor by local standards,
villagers rarely go to court, as they state that getting a lawyer is just too
expensive. Only in cases such as divorce, when there is no alternative,
do they go to court. In some areas legal aid clinics, especially at univer-
sities, have been set-up to help aggrieved citizens get their rights de-
fended. In one Hunan case, a team of Tsinghua University lawyers got
involved when residents who had protested a forced eviction from their
homes had been detained without grounds (Fu 2004). Beijing-based
lawyers in particular have become increasingly active in helping vic-
tims of national scandals, probably because of the fame such cases
bring them.42
In the Hunan case, lawyers did not initiate litigation but sought ne-
gotiations instead, while petitioning higher levels of government. This
shows that even if land-loss victims find legal aid, going to court is not
always the preferred option. The reason for this is that the chances of
winning a case against a local government or against land developers
with good local connections are slim. Courts are paid and partly mana-
ged by their local governments and have tended not to bite the hand
that feeds them. In addition, the context of judicial corruption and per-
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sonal favours (guanxi) further denies poor peasants success in the
courtroom. One problem is that the courts, like lawyers, have refused
to take on land cases, claiming not to have jurisdiction or that litigants
do not have a right of standing (Phan 2005:634). However, even if liti-
gants are able to get their case tried in court, research about adminis-
trative law practice has demonstrated that the government has a much
higher chance of winning (Peerenboom 2002a; Pei 1997). In a large
number of cases, the court never reached a verdict, and plaintiffs in-
stead settled with local governments and repealed their suits. Pei has
argued that this has become part of citizens’ strategies of getting the
most out of administrative litigation. Such a strategy developed because
the plaintiff’s chance of winning a case is slim, while local govern-
ments are afraid of losing a case,43 even though this rarely happens.
Citizens have thus initiated administrative litigation in order to boost
their negotiation power, in which they can threaten to pursue the case
through to a verdict, unless some of the grievances are addressed (Pei
1997). Even if citizens do win a case in court, whether administrative
or civil, such a winning verdict does not necessarily mean that they get
their land back or that they get compensation. Executing judgments
has been notoriously difficult in China, especially against powerful lo-
cal actors (Chen 2002; Clarke 1996; Peerenboom 2002b).
Given these formidable obstacles to judicial remedies, aggrieved
farmers have turned to other options available to them. An important
method has been to send a formal letter of petition complaining about
the local abuses to a higher level of government or part of the higher
level bureaucracy. Such petitioning is a Chinese legacy that has contin-
ued throughout the communist era until today (O’Brien and Li 1995).
All of China‘s bureaucracies have specialised bureaus complete with
service counters to receive citizens’ petitions. In Kunming one can see
long lines of complainants waiting to hand in their petition to officials
they hope can help them.
For land-loss cases petitioning the higher-level government, the state
land resource management bureau or the construction bureau has be-
come popular. Petitioning has been used much more widely than for-
mal litigation. In Beijing, for example, the total number of real estate-
related cases in court in 2003 was 3,948, while the petitions about
land-related abuses in the first half of 2004 to the Ministry of Con-
struction alone already numbered 18,620 (Phan 2005:634). In the
cases studied from peri-urban Kunming in Yunnan, none of the ag-
grieved farmers attempted to petition higher-level governments about
the matter. This is not to say that such petitioning does not occur in
Yunnan province. In Qincun, a village some 200 kilometres south of
Kunming, villagers lost several 100 Mu of arable land to a landscape
theme park development project without satisfactory compensation.
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Dissatisfied, one of the local villagers bought some legal books and
found that their rights had been violated. When a second batch of land
was to be taken, he tried to petition municipal and provincial level gov-
ernments to stop the local township and district authorities from tak-
ing the land without paying in full. The district authorities reacted by
arresting this local champion of the people, whom local villagers had
started calling their own ‘Deng Xiaoping’ and placing him under ar-
rest. This shows that petitioning is not devoid of danger, nor does it
guarantee a successful intervention in the local context.44
The Qincun petition-related arrest is not an uncommon phenomen-
on in China. In Shishan village, in Fujian province, Lin Zengxu, a local
land petitioner, was arrested by a local police squad of twelve men as
he napped one afternoon. The police gave Lin a severe beating and
wanted to take him away to jail. However, family, neighbours and
friends were able to fight off the police and rescue the man who had
for years tried to stop illegal land-grabbing and get higher compensa-
tion for farmers losing their land. Lin later escaped to Beijing (Cody
2004). Also in Fujian province, in Qingkou Town, another leader of a
peasant protest movement against illegal land seizures, who had filed a
higher-level petition, Xiao Xiangjin, tried to escape the police when
they came to lift him from his bed in the middle of the night. At first,
he was able to flee, though later, when boarding a plane to Beijing to
submit a petition to the central government, he was detained and ques-
tioned at Fuzhou airport. Upon his return in Fuzhou, he was arrested
and sent to a ‘re-education through labour’ (laojiao) camp ‘for having
entertained prostitutes four times in his home and office at Qingkou’
(id.). Only the provincial level authorities would have been able to de-
tain Xiao Xiangjin at Fuzhou airport, which shows how high up the lo-
cal protectionism in these kind of cases can run. If even the provincial
level authorities are involved in protecting and covering up local land
abuses, farmers have nowhere to go other than Beijing. Recently, even
there, many petitioners have been detained or sent straight back in a
central level effort to control some of the land-related protests (Phan
2005).
Even if higher-level authorities are willing to receive a petition and
support the grievance made, the petition’s impact on the local situation
has often proved to be limited. When superior authorities are called in
to investigate local scandals, a temporary measure may be taken. How-
ever, once the higher authorities leave and in some cases the press at-
tention for the case subsides, the local elites may return to old practices
while punishing those who have betrayed them (Peerenboom 2006).45
An extreme case of this involved Li Changping, at the time a township
party secretary in Hubei province, who wrote a complaint letter to
prime minister Zhu Rongji about how local governments, from the vil-
LAND LOSS AND CONFLICT IN CHINA 453
lage to the district, had been maltreating local peasants. Li’s letter was
at first successful as Zhu Rongji send a personal investigative team to
Li’s district, and the team made strong recommendations for changes
to be implemented locally. However, as time passed, and subsequent
central-level missions felt satisfied that a real change had been made,
local power holders were able to reassert their influence. This was best
evidenced by the fact that Li Changping felt threatened in Hubei Pro-
vince and had to move elsewhere, losing his position and home (Li
2002a).
Since the late 1990s, China‘s peasants have also been able to use vil-
lage elections to voice their dissatisfaction with land-takings and seek
amelioration by installing new leadership. The central government set
up a system of self-government at the rural grass-roots in 1987.46 Dur-
ing the 1990s the officers in the self-government were increasingly
elected democratically, especially after the 1998 new Organic Law on
Village Committees introduced truly direct elections with more candi-
dates than positions (id.). Such elections have sometimes been used by
farmers against land malpractices. As previously discussed, Jiacun vil-
lage in Yunnan is an example where villagers tried to nominate a men-
tally disabled person to partake in the elections as their village leader.
Although their nomination finally failed because of the nominee’s
mental handicap, the attempted nomination did send a clear signal to
the incumbent village leader to pay attention to the villagers’ demands.
In Jiacun there is now a good working system of fenhong (literally divid-
ing the red) which allows all villagers to share in the land-related prof-
its, providing farmers with a per capita income of 2,000 RMB a year,
which increases according to land revenue increases (Van Rooij 2006b:
Ch. 7). In Qincun village in Yunnan, farmers did successfully elect a
new leader when they found that their old leaders had not secured suf-
ficient compensation from state land developers. Their new leader ac-
tively tried to get more compensation when a new batch of land was to
be taken and was even arrested when he filed a petition with a higher-
level government.47 However, elections have not been a successful tool
to voice land-related concerns in all cases. As we saw in Licun village
in Yunnan, for example, farmers who lost their land without satisfac-
tory compensation have not tried to use the elections. They state that
the local elite that has just taken their land also dominates the election
process, and farmers stand no way to win against the families who
have controlled the village for decades and have strong connections
with government officials at higher levels. Similarly, elections offer no
protection against land-takings by higher-level authorities as they are
not directly elected. In the Xiaocun village, where the township-level
government had embezzled compensation funds, remedy through elec-
tion was not possible (Van Rooij 2006b:Ch. 9). Given the weak legal
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and participatory options farmers have against land-takings, in many
cases they either do nothing or rise in physical protest. Licun village in
Yunnan is a good example of the first scenario: even though the local
elites have robbed local farmers of their land without paying satisfac-
tory compensation, and even though it was the elites and not the com-
munity who benefited from the money made in these transactions,
farmers have done nothing. When interviewed, they express cynicism
and helplessness. None of them believes that going to court, petition-
ing, or elections will change existing power relationships. So far, their
dissatisfaction has been kept inside. In Licun no active protest has
erupted (Van Rooij 2006b).
Meanwhile, in many other villages in Kunming and China, helpless
villagers have initiated protests, sometimes of a violent nature. There
have been different reasons for protesting and different methods of
protest. Some protests are initiated by villagers when they find out
about unfair land-takings. This happened in the cases observed in
Xiaocun and Jiacun village in Yunnan. In other cases, violence erupts
when villagers protest against the imprisonment of one of their peti-
tioners, as happened in the Dongwei case in Guangdong. One method
of protest involves surrounding the leadership headquarters so that no
one can enter or leave the building. This happened, for example, in Jia-
cun village in Yunnan when villagers felt they had been unduly com-
pensated for land lost for the construction of a Buddhist temple.48 An-
other method is going to the city to demand attention for the matter.
One such case occurred on August 20, 2004, in Beijing, when hun-
dreds of farmers blocked the capital‘s traffic with their bicycles and
rickshaws in a desperate effort to vent their frustration about a new de-
velopment project for the city’s new rich seizing their land (Cody
2004). In other cases, protesters block or sabotage the construction
project that is to take place on their land. This happened, for example,
in Jiacun village where villagers cut the power lines of a new school
construction project they felt they had not been properly compensated
for.
Protests have led to violence. Ang writes: ‘The clashes have become
increasingly violent, with injuries sustained on both sides and huge
amounts of damage done to property as protesters vent their frustra-
tion in the face of indifferent or bullying authorities’ (Ang 2005). Ca-
therine Baber, deputy Asia director at Amnesty International states:
‘The increasing number of such disputes over land use across rural
China and the use of force to resolve them suggest an urgent need for
the Chinese authorities to focus on developing effective channels for
dispute resolution’ (id.).
In conclusion, farmers have had weak weapons against land abuses.
Judicial and other institutional options have not been able to protect
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them from land-takings. Farmers are left with no alternatives but ac-
ceptance or outright protest, sometimes even combined with violence.
There are two important points to be made. First, from the cases stu-
died in Kunming, activism seems to occur in places where farmers
have sufficient autonomy from local leadership. In Jiacun and Qincun
where farmers were most active, local income was to a large extent re-
lated to non-local sources, sources independent of the local leaders in-
volved in the land abuses. In contrast, Licun villagers, who have not
done anything against much clearer and worse land-takings, mainly de-
pend on agriculture that is largely controlled by the local elites. A sec-
ond observation is that most of the action against land-takings is of a
disorganised or at least of a locally organised type. There has not been
a national or even provincial or municipal organisation in which ag-
grieved farmers try to combine their weak positions into larger, stron-
ger institutions to fight those who have taken their land. This is not
surprising given China‘s current political context, in which local pro-
test is condoned as long as it does not directly criticise the central gov-
ernment or become a larger organisation that can indirectly threaten
the party’s supremacy.
Street-level bureaucracy: The important role of state enforcement
and its failure due to local protectionism
In order to deal with land-loss conflicts, the state has instituted a sys-
tem of laws and regulations combined with an enforcement system to
punish and stop violations of such norms. The state has established an
institutional land management structure at all levels of administration
from the centre in Beijing to the township level. Informally, the state
bureaucracy even penetrates into China‘s 1 million villages and even
larger number of sub-villages. There VC leaders are responsible for im-
plementation of the land law, supposedly working under the supervi-
sion of the township-level governmental land bureau.
So far, most studies of land conflicts have paid scant attention to the
role these state institutions have played in the land-loss conflicts. As
detailed above, part of the problem may be that the norms themselves
are insufficient to protect farmers; however, an equally important pro-
blem is that the existing norms are violated – and thus also future
amended and improved norms. There is an enforcement problem,
which is especially serious now that we know that farmers themselves
have not been successful in securing their rights.
The enforcement is largely left to the State Land Resource Protection
Bureaus (SLBs). The law provides for different sanctions for various
violations related to the LML‘s norms for protecting farmers from un-
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fair takings. The sanctions mainly cover the unprocedural taking of
land, for which violators can be ordered to give back such land, to pay
back illegal proceeds, to pay fines related to the illegal proceeds, and in
extreme cases even be criminally prosecuted through the criminal jus-
tice system (LML § 73, 77, 76).
If the Chinese state wishes to squash illegal or unfair land-takings,
why has it not been able to do so? The main problem is a lack in verti-
cal reach. Here it is important to understand China‘s current grass-
roots system of governance. In China’s current system, local state insti-
tutions are to a large extent independent of control either by higher-le-
vel state organs or by local citizens. The lack of state vertical control
over local-level bureaucracies results from the fragmentation of govern-
mental power that originated in the post-1978 reform programme.49
Cohen writes, ‘contrary to American images of the PRC as a ruthlessly
effective authoritarian regime whose writ runs from the Standing
Committee of the Politburo in Beijing to the most remote hamlet, in
many respects contemporary Chinese government resembles a series
of feudal baronies more than a totalitarian dictatorship’ (Cohen 2001).
As a result of the post-1978 de facto devolutionary governance set-up,
local governments are largely autonomous of higher levels of adminis-
tration. The Kunming Land Bureau is subordinate to the provincial
SLB and the provincial government. In practice, of these two ‘masters’
the provincial government is the strongest, because it controls the bu-
reau’s budget and leadership appointments (see next sections).50 Law
enforcement is largely left to bureaus (SLBs) that reside under the low-
est local governments at township and district levels. Such bureaus
used to be paid and staffed by the local government. Thus, they are ill
equipped to enforce the law against such local governments who are in
many cases directly involved in illegal land practices. As a result, enfor-
cement has been weak as local land bureaus protected the interests of
the local elites, a practice called ‘difang baohu zhuyi’ (local protection-
ism).
A second problem is that the enforcement bureaus lack the legal
authority to act against some compensation violations. For cases in
which compensation was not paid in compliance with legal standards,
either because the amount of compensation offered and paid was be-
low the legal standards or the amount of compensation promised was
not paid in full, the land bureau has no clear enforcement authority.
Only if compensation is embezzled can the embezzler be prosecuted
and fined (LML § 79, Criminal Code § 271, 272, 382, 384, 342). In other
cases, the bureau has no direct enforcement authority. In such cases,
the Kunming SLB explained that they will try to negotiate a better com-
pensation for the farmers with the land-grabbing actors. In order to ex-
ercise power in such negotiations, the land bureau in Kunming has
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used its authority over land use approval as leverage by denying ap-
proval until full compensation or more satisfactory compensation is
paid.51
Apart from the local protectionism and the lack of legal enforcement
authority, enforcement bureaus suffer from internal problems. The
first problem is that they lack funding. Deficient funding has partly
caused goal displacement, as enforcement bureaus have had to engage
in entrepreneurialism in order to pay their staff. They do so through
shiye danwei, semi-subordinate agencies who carry out consultancy and
other commercial activities. The Kunming SLB’s enforcement depart-
ment has a staff of 22, of which only sixteen are paid through regular
funds.52 The other six must thus be paid through other means.53 Be-
cause of the meagre funding, the Kunming SLB enforcement division
lacks staff and cars to carry out their inspection work properly for such
a large region. Second, the quality of the staff is problematic for enfor-
cement. Land Bureaus have had problems in attracting the right kind
of staff. In the post-Cultural Revolution 1980s and early 1990s, China,
and especially peripheral provinces such as Yunnan, did not have a
large number of university graduates at the Bachelor (benke), let alone
the Master (suoshi) level. The predecessors of the SLBs were established
during this period. Therefore, they had to start by employing staff with
a lower level of education, with at most professional two-year degrees
(dazhuan) or several years of working experience (cf. Li 2004:167; Tang
et al. 1997:869). Recently, staff educational standards have been raised,
especially for enforcement personnel: all new staff must have passed
the civil servants exam, for which a Bachelor’s degree is compulsory.
Moreover, enforcement agents also need an enforcement permit, which
requires extra training.54 The Kunming SLB has recently been able to
attract two new enforcement agents with a Master’s degree. Third,
weak personnel incentives and controls further explain China’s ineffec-
tive enforcement performance regarding land-taking. The internal
structure and management procedures in the land bureaus are insuffi-
cient to ensure job conformity of enforcement agents.55 Consequently,
bureaus risk their agents shirking their duties. Finally, land bureaus
are largely centrally managed institutions in which the bureau’s leader-
ship has a final (direct or indirect) influence on almost all major per-
sonnel decisions (except for their own positions) (Van Rooij 2006b).
This has strengthened local protectionism, because local governments,
through their power over appointing the powerful bureau leadership,
have a strong indirect influence on all bureau personnel decisions.
The central government has recognised the need to improve its per-
formance and strengthen its action against illegal land-takings. This is
no easy task as it faces formidable obstacles such as local protection-
ism, weak bureaus, and difficult enforcement procedures. As for other
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enforcement problems,56 the state has organised political campaigns to
enhance the enforcement of land law. The first campaigns were orga-
nised in 1997 and 1998, mainly attempting to stop further loss of ara-
ble land and to prepare for the introduction of the 1998 LML. In 2003
another campaign was organised to stop ongoing illegal and irregular
land practices, especially to stop the further development of economic
development zones, which were an important reason for farmers los-
ing their land. Nationwide data reported just after the campaigns of
late 2003 and early 2004 were optimistic. According to those reports,
the campaign detected more than 170,000 illegal land-use cases, in
128,000 of which sanctions were issued (Editorial 2004b).57 Further-
more, during the campaign, 732 governmental officials received inter-
nal disciplinary sanctions (chufen) for their involvement in these cases,
and 134 individuals were prosecuted under criminal law. Similarly, na-
tional reports proudly announced that the campaign had been success-
ful in curbing the illegal land used for so-called development zones. Of
the 5,658 development zones that existed, 2,046 (over 35 per cent),
were disbanded during the 2003 campaigns (Editorial 2003b). Further-
more, the Ministry of National Land Resources published nine model
violation cases, five in November and four in December, which it had
detected and severely punished, just as the campaign had planned (Edi-
torial 2004a). These national data are not the full story, however. The
validity of the data presented in the reports is doubtful, like that of any
data in China.58 An indication of this is found in our fieldwork. When
we first started our research in Kunming in January 2004, the 2003
campaign had just ended. By that time, the 2003 campaign had not af-
fected local villages such as Jiacun, Licun, and Xiaocun, as the national
reports would lead us to believe. Some of the violations discussed
above were still ongoing in early 2004, and the 2003 campaigns had
not stopped them or even addressed them in any way. In one of the
townships where research was carried out, Kouxiang Township, a de-
velopment zone still existed in 2004. Even though the 2003 campaign
aimed to curb all further development of such zones, especially by
township governments, the Kouxiang government proudly explained
their development zone work to me in May 2004.59
Apart from the campaigns, the central government also tried to ad-
dress the many land-loss conflicts through a reform, recentralising the
devolutionary land enforcement structures. In this reform, called the
‘vertical management reform’, the provincial level’s control over land
management and enforcement is to be strengthened (Ye 2004:6). The
reform has just started, and from Kunming we know that there the
lowest levels of land management administration, city district level bu-
reaus, were converted into offices directly subordinate to the municipal
level SLB, which will allocate their resources and appoint their person-
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nel.60 In Jiacun Township, the newly vertically reformed SLB Township
office is worried about its new inspection responsibility. As one of the
agents told me, ‘In the past our work was easy, we just did what our
township government wanted, but now we have to inspect for the Dis-
trict SLB, and they do not want to consider our local conditions. We
fear that there will be conflicts between our new superiors and our lo-
cal leaders’. The vertical management reform has not taken away the
conflict of interests and powers that lies at the heart of local protection-
ism so it seems. The question is whether the recentralised land bu-
reaus will be strong enough to enforce the law against local elites such
as township-level governments and VC leaders.
Conclusion
If land tenure legalisation is seen as the process where possession (in-
cluding use) and management (power to decide) of a tract of land is in-
corporated into the legal system, whereby the rights and obligations of
individuals and collective entities are defined, China‘s 1998 LML and
the 2003 RLCL are legalisation projects. Although the implementation
of both laws, in terms of awareness of the new rights, as well as the
signature of land contracts and the issuance of land certificates is re-
markable, the sharp rise in land-loss conflicts warns that land tenure
security is still lacking, perhaps even more so than before. In China it
seems that land tenure legalisation has increased the breadth and the
duration of land use rights with the 1998 and 2003 laws, but it has
done so without increasing the assurance. The single largest threat to
farmers’ security in exercising their new rights is the widespread and
often illegal taking of their land without satisfactory compensation.
Land-loss conflicts continue in China for a number of reasons. They
occur first of all because the value gap between arable land and con-
struction land makes land conversion and thus forced land acquisitions
highly profitable. Current legislation is to blame as it fails to provide
clarity on the circumstances under which land can be taken away from
farmers and on who originally owns such land. In addition, current
legislation fails to provide standards of compensation that are satisfac-
tory and fails to give farmers sufficiently strong rights to negotiate for
compensation they deem sufficient. Legislative problems are further
exacerbated because of the weak checks and balances on local govern-
ments and VCs that engage in land acquisition practices; neither farm-
ers themselves nor the state have been successful in guaranteeing that
land acquisition is done according to present legal standards. Given the
current weak checks and balances and the resultant weak implementa-
tion of law, it is doubtful whether changes in legislation alone are suffi-
460 BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ
cient to decrease current land-loss conflicts. It seems rather that legisla-
tive changes should be combined with measures that help to enhance
implementation. Such measures should be a combination of improving
state law enforcement action against violations of the law, and increas-
ing possibilities for access to justice for aggrieved farmers.
Behind the weak checks and balances, and thus a major cause for
the ongoing land-loss conflicts, are not so much legal or socio-legal
problems, but rather political problems related to the existing power re-
lations. At present, elites consisting of VC leaders, various local govern-
ments, and land developers have been able to co-opt many of the ar-
rangements that have been introduced to protect weak and poor farm-
ers. When sufficiently powerful, such elites have influenced the
functioning of courts and lawyers; they have influenced the effective-
ness of petitions and law enforcement; they have even undermined lo-
cal VC elections meant to directly affect their power and the account-
ability of VC leadership. At its heart, the current land-loss crisis is thus
one of power, involving weak farmers and strong elites. Future reforms
should be directed at such power imbalances, and as with any institu-
tional change adopted, the risk of elite co-optation should be consid-
ered.
Enhancing land tenure security in China therefore involves empow-
erment of the weak and poor. Such empowerment first involves enhan-
cing their access to the legal system. Some scholars and practitioners
working on general issues of access to justice in a context of develop-
ment, including Anderson and the UNDP, look for broad access to jus-
tice solutions that involve reforms in the state sector, including chan-
ging current legislation to better represent the interests of the poor and
weak, decreasing costs of litigation, stimulating the independence of
the courts, and enhancing the capabilities for enforcing court judge-
ments (Anderson 2003; UNDP 2004a). Given the extent of current
power asymmetries in China, such methods may not be sufficient. Per-
haps more radical empowerment options that go beyond improving ac-
cess to justice61 are necessary, reforms that would directly affect the
power relations. Here Golub’s work is important, which argues that
apart from work on legislation and legal assistance, direct work on
changing the power relations and thus empowering the poor is impor-
tant (Golub 2000, 2006; Golub and McClymont 2000). He argues
that to achieve this, the role of civil society is essential, while work
should also focus on general development activities such as literacy
training, strengthening community organisation, and legal awareness
promotion. For the case of land-loss conflicts in China, one could think
of several measures, including allowing farmers more freedom to orga-
nise themselves, allowing NGOs more freedom of operation in repre-
senting the interests of the disenfranchised, installing direct elections
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at higher levels of government, at least at the township62 and probably
also at the district level, and in general granting greater freedom of as-
sociation, speech, and press. While there is no indication that at pre-
sent the CCP is willing to introduce such reforms, the seriousness of
current protest and social unrest related to land-loss cases may in time
convince the CCP leadership to take such steps.
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and the percentage of villages without such redistributions had dropped to about 70
per cent (Zhu et al. 2006:794).
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by the possessor of a land parcel to manage, and use the parcel, dispose of its pro-
duce and engage in transactions, including the temporary or permanent transfers
without hindrance or interference from any person or corporate identity, on a contin-
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ernments refer to all sub-national levels of governments, but in many cases especially
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further supported by our fieldwork in neighbouring villages in which the facts of the
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views with the Kunming land bureau, Department of Compensation officials.
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11 Our findings here contrast with those of Pastor and Tan (2000:511) who argue that
free elections can be a source of stability in the village. In Liujia and surrounding vil-
lages, elections have been highly contentious and have been used to vent dissatisfac-
tion. Periods of election are quite unstable and unruly here. Ordinarily, protests con-
sist of petition letters or physical action, but as we see here election can also be used
to protest (cf. O’Brien and Li 1995). For an overview of how the village election sys-
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tem was set up in the 1980s and 1990s, see O’Brien 1994. Another case of election
as a form of protest is described in Liu 2000b.
12 O’Brien (1996:43) has noted that protest in China is a question of forum shopping at
as many fora as possible.
13 This is much less than farmers get in Liujia village. Liujia farmers get about 5,000-
10,000 per year per Mu.
14 This phenomenon of local governments or VCs making high profits on land deals
has been widely reported. See for example Ding 2007; Phan 2005; Subrahmanyan
2004.
15 See LML § 49, as well as § 26 of the 1998 State Council LML Implementing Regula-
tions. Since the 2007 Property Law this has changed, as it regulates that compensa-
tion be paid to the holder of land rights. See § 132 Property Law.
16 This division depends on the type of case. There is quite some legal ambiguity on
this point. Until 2007, the law (RCLC art. 16.2) stipulated on the one hand that land
use rights holders are entitled to compensation, while on the other hand the 1998
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22 The new property law has not clarified the ownership issue. See Ping et al., this vo-
lume.
23 Farmers can also lose their land use rights to the collective if the collective needs
farmland for gonggong sheshi (public facilities) or gongyi shiye (public utilities). LML §
65.
24 Such a change was not made in the 2007 Property Law. See Ping et al., this volume.
A reason cited by Chinese scholars working for China’s Ministry of National Land
Resources is that a strict definition is not yet possible in China’s current rapid devel-
opmental situation (Fan et al. 2003:33).
25 The LML provides for a standard of compensation six to ten times the annual average
output value of the three proceeding years and a resettlement fee of four to six times
average annual output. The law also provides absolute combined compensation maxi-
ma of no higher than fifteen times annual output or when approved by provincial
authorities no higher than 30 times the annual output of the land compensated. The
specific standards are determined at the provincial level. Both Village Committees
and farmers are to be consulted in the requisition compensation. Compensation pay-
ment shall be made public, and the new act explicitly states that it is forbidden to
embezzle or divert compensation funds (LML § 47, 48, 49).
26 Even during the LML amendment approval process, there was criticism. During the
law-making process, commentators, including local governments, complained that
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be done in public. Finally, some thought that monetary compensation was not suffi-
cient and farmers should be helped in finding new employment. In reaction, the
NPC Legal Committee held that the amount of the compensation fee is a difficult is-
sue and that circumstances vary from place to place. Therefore, the committee found
that it is impossible to improve the draft to cover all points raised concerning com-
pensation. The Committee did make suggestions for changing the draft to allow for
more transparency by instituting a hearing, making payment of fees public, and a
rule that local governments should do their best to help farmers who have lost their
land to start enterprises. These suggestions made it into the final law (NPC Legal
Committee 1998:316).
27 The word zhanyong (occupation) in this clause indicates the revocation of household
land use rights by the village collective according to the legislative explanation issued
with the RLCL (NPC SC Legal Affairs Office 2002:45).
28 It uses the word zhengshou, which literally means to levy or impose, but which ac-
cording to the legislative interpretation of the law means that the state takes collective
or private property (Wang 2007:87).
29 Again this has not been done in the new Property Law of 2007. See Ping et al., this
volume.
30 Phan states that the process of expropriation has been a vital problem for farmers.
We are not convinced by the support she provides for this conclusion. In our view,
the process is often only mentioned in order to get better compensation. This opi-
nion is based on the cases studied in Kunming, where as long as satisfactory com-
pensation was pai,d nobody cared for the correct procedures, which were often not
followed anyway (cf. Phan 2005).
31 For more detail, see note 419.
32 Ding notes, however, that compensation based on market value requires well-defined
property rights and functioning real estate markets, both of which China at present
lacks (Ding 2007:8).
33 Mostly district and township levels of governments. For an overview of different le-
vels of state administration, see note 402.
34 Good examples can be found in Chen and Chun who have detailed how farmers in
Anhui have attempted to protest against illegal tax practices, a situation in many
ways similar to the land-grabbing discussed here (Chen and Chun 2004).
35 Because of China’s legacy of a planned economy and the economic decentralisation
since 1978 in which local governments got to own and invest in local enterprises, lo-
cal governments have retained close ties with local industry and thus also benefit
themselves from local economic development, which then forms an important reven-
ue for China’s poor local bureaucracies (Phan 2005; also quoting Zhang 2002).
36 For more detail see Chou 2005: 45-47.
37 For the link between this and weak enforcement see Liu 2000a: 1.
38 Of course there have been some instances where citizens have made use of courts.
Examples can be found in Phan (2005: 633) who details urban acquisition cases from
Liaoning in which neighbourhood organisations have made use of legal aid support
to get their rights asserted.
39 For a good study of legal awareness in China from the 1990s, see Gao 2000. For a
more recent study about urban awareness and litigiousness, see Michelson 2003.
40 Based on an interview with a local Yunnan researcher, April 2006. For similar exam-
ples of how local self-study has led to protest, see Chen and Chun 2004.
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41 Having a lawyer as a representative is not compulsory in China’s civil and adminis-
trative procedure. The law dictates that citizens have the right to be represented by
one. Civil Procedure Code § 49, 58, Administrative Litigation Law § 29.
42 Good examples are the Sun Zhigang case where a team of Beijing lawyers was able
to influence the State Council to revoke regulations on detaining citizens without
proper papers and the Songhua pollution case where a team of Beijing lawyers tried
to file a public interest litigation suit.
43 Due to the harm this causes their reputation as undisputed leaders, locally represent-
ing the CCP.
44 Based on interviews with local researchers in April 2006.
45 Peerenboom provides data from several provinces showing how rare effective re-
sponses to petitions are.
46 For an overview of this process see Liu 2000a; Manion 1996; O’Brien 1994; O’Brien
and Li 2000; Shi 1999; Xu 1997.
47 Based on interviews with local researchers, April 2006.
48 It is interesting to note that this manner of protest was also used by Falungong
members in 1999 when they surrounded the CCP headquarters, Zhongnanhai (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2002).
49 Lieberthal and Lampton have used the term ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ to de-
scribe this phenomenon (Lampton 1987; Lieberthal 1992, 1995; Lieberthal and Ok-
senberg 1988).
50 Most literature on environmental enforcement in China recognises these issues. See
for example Jahiel 1997, 1998 (reprinted in 2000); Ma and Ortolano 2000; Sinkule
and Ortolano 1995.
51 Interview with Kunming Land Bureau, 3 December 2004.
52 Based on an interview with enforcement staff of the Kunming SLB.
53 It is not clear how this is done as Kunming informants refused to explain at the time
of interview.
54 Based on interviews with SLB enforcement and personnel staff, autumn 2004.
55 For an elaborate account of this problem, see Van Rooij 2006b: Ch. 13.
56 See, for example, the enforcement of pollution control regulation, Van Rooij 2006a.
57 For older reports see Editorial 2003a.
58 The problem of positive bottom-up reporting is well known in China. A lack of ac-
countability and transparency makes it difficult for higher levels to get trustworthy
information from subordinate departments.
59 For details, see Van Rooij 2006b: Ch. 14.
60 Based on an interview with the Kunming SLB, Personnel Department, 3 December
2004. This is also what the State Council Notice of 2004 orders SLBs to do (Council
2004).
61 Gready and Elsnor (2005) call the access to justice-based forms of empowerment the
legal reflex.
62 There have been experiments with this already (Li 2002b).
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17 Peri-urban land tenure legalisation: A tale of
two districts1
Ye Jianping and Wu Jian
Introduction
In this study we will take a closer look at two peri-urban areas in China
that illustrate land tenure insecurity and illegal tenure situations in
such areas, and also look at subsequent state attempts to legalise illegal
tenure and to take a pro-active stance in policy formulation that at-
tempts to prevent the development of illegal tenure and achieve ba-
lanced rural-urban development. The first case is the Bao’an district in
Shenzhen city, in which we focus on illegal land use by farmers and
on the government’s attempt to bring this phenomenon to an end by
recognising and legalising illegal land use, as well as by construction.
The second case is the Dongli District of the Tianjin municipality. It is
the pilot site of a national project, called the Small Cities and Towns
Project, which aims to prevent the development of new situations of il-
legal tenure and to achieve balanced urban-rural economic develop-
ment, controlled urbanisation, the protection of tenure security, and
the capitalisation of farmers’ fixed assets.
Before delving into the details of these cases, we present a very brief
review of the rural land tenure structure in China, the key processes
leading to urbanisation, and the problems this brings. The interplay of
these factors sets the stage for our discussion of the governmental ef-
forts in the two case studies to legalise illegal land tenure and prevent
the development of new illegal tenure situations.
Rural areas and the drive for urbanisation
Rural land tenure and rights
The preceding country study provides an overview of the evolution of
land tenure in the People’s Republic of China. It specifically shows the
changes in the rural land tenure regime: when the Chinese Commu-
nist Party came to power in 1949, private ownership was soon replaced
with collective ownership, which in turn subsequently gave way to the
Household Responsibility System – a type of contracted land use right
– and to further attempts to strengthen tenure security through the in-
troduction of policies and laws, in particular the Rural Land Contract-
ing Law (RLCL). Apart from cultivated land, another equally valuable
asset held by farmers in China is their rural houses. According to law,
farmers own their houses, but the land on which these houses are
built, named the Rural Residential Land Site (RRLS), belongs to the
collective. Figure 17.1 is a graphical representation of the dualist rural
land system in China. By dualist we mean that land is owned by the
collective as long as it is used by the collective – for agriculture, farm-
ers’ residences, or collective enterprises – but needs to be requisitioned
by the government when the land is converted to other uses.
Urbanisation
China displays a huge income gap between the urban and rural popu-
lations. There is also a virtual absence of medical and education facil-
ities in rural areas. This can partly be explained by unbalanced develop-
ment polices that have favoured cities over rural areas. As a result,
coastal cities and cities in the east have witnessed one of the most
amazing economic growth phenomena in history. Recognising the
plight of the rural poor, the agenda of the Communist Party now aims
to let the rural population share in the fruits of economic growth. This
is seen not only as a humane side of development but also as a key to
ensuring social stability. The solution they envisage lies in increased
urbanisation, which is one of the key measures that the government is
currently advocating to improve the livelihoods of China’s 800 million
farmers.
In the last decades, rapid industrialisation and the flow of interna-
tional capital into China have already brought about urbanisation. Chi-
na’s economic development since 1978 has been miraculous, with an
annual GDP growth of over ten per cent and the urbanisation rate hav-
ing increased from 17.9 per cent in 1978 to 41.7 per cent in 2004. In a
period of 26 years the urban population has increased by 366 million,
and it is forecast that in 2020 the urbanisation rate will reach 60 per
cent, i.e. an urban population increase of a further 360 million. Cur-
rently, there are 660 cities in China with a total population of 520 mil-
lion, while some 800 million people live in rural areas. Even if the cur-
rent urbanisation rate remains stable, 20 million rural residents will be
moving into the cities every year. In 2000, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party and the State Council issued Opinions on Pro-
moting the Healthy Development of Small Cities and Towns, which
stated: ‘The timing and condition are mature for expediting the process
of urbanisation. To seize the opportunity, it is time to direct the healthy
development of small towns. This should be an important task for cur-
rent and future rural reform and development.’2
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Figure 17.1 Graphical representation of the Chinese rural land tenure system
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However, urbanisation is a double-edged sword. Manufacturing-led ur-
banisation will inevitably bring about encroachment on agricultural
land. Thus, choosing the right way for urbanisation to progress is of
crucial importance. China is the most populous country in the world.
Although food security and self-sufficiency have always been high on
the political and economic agenda of the Communist Party, China’s
0.11 ha of land per capita is less than half of the world’s average of
0.23 ha (MLR 1999). According to the 11th National Five-Year Plan, by
the end of 2010, the total arable land area should not fall below 18 bil-
lion mu3 (Xinhua News Net 2007-4-12). Rapid urbanisation, industria-
lisation, population growth, and natural disasters are all culpable for
arable land loss in China. A total cropland area of nearly 10 million ha
was converted into built-up, forest/pastures, or horticultural lands, or
was destroyed by disasters in the years between 1987 and 2000. And
even after taking into account the land area added by land reclamation
and rehabilitation of abandoned lands, the net loss of cropland area is
still a stunning 4.5 million ha during that period (Tan 2005:187).
According to statistics from the Ministry of Land and Natural Re-
sources (MLR), in 2006 the area of cultivated land that was used for
construction purposes was 3.878 million mu (258,500 ha) (Xinhua
News Net). The major part of this land is situated in peri-urban areas.
These areas have experienced the most dynamic economic growth as a
result of urban sprawl and industrialisation, which enhances the need
for land to accommodate more people and on which to build factories.
For instance, a frenzy of ‘enclosure’ spread quickly in many Chinese ci-
ties in the early 2000s. Local governments, at different administrative
levels, were competing with one another to establish ‘economic devel-
opment zones’ – designated industrial zones that attract both domestic
and foreign investment with favourable policies, such as land leased
below the market price. Although these zones sped up economic devel-
opment, they also took up a substantial amount of good quality farm-
land in peri-urban areas. In addition, many of these zones set up by lo-
cal governments were illegal, and consequently the land given to land
users was also illegal. The central government was soon alarmed by
the loss of farmland and called an immediate halt to these practices.
By the end of 2006, the number of development zones was reduced
from 6,877 to 1,568, and the total area designated for this purpose de-
creased accordingly from 38,600 km to 9,949 km.
Land requisition and rural conflicts
Between 1990 and 2002, 66.3 million farmers lost their agricultural
land through requisitioning by the state. Naturally this brings about ru-
ral conflicts. It is thus not surprising that among the 130 cases of ma-
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jor rural conflicts since 2004, 87 are land related (Southern Weekend
2004-09-02). According to Guo, ‘land expropriation has been one of
the “externalities of development”, primarily responsible for the prolif-
eration of rural conflicts in China’ (Guo 2001a). In order to prevent
further violence, prime minister Wen Jiabao urged, ‘We must protect
the democratic rights and provide material benefits to rural citizens’
(NY Times, 2006-1-20). It is worth mentioning here that the root of
the resentment of, or resistance to, land expropriation is not just a reac-
tion on the part of the farmers to protect themselves against infringe-
ments of their tenure security and rights. The roots of rural conflicts
can also be attributed to the rise in rights consciousness among farm-
ers as well as their increasing expectations and demands of compensa-
tion for requisitioned land. Two-thirds of the farmers affected by land-
taking are not satisfied with the amount of compensation they receive
(Zhu et al. 2006). The land’s value multiplies many times after its con-
version from farmland to construction land and as a result of public in-
vestment in infrastructure and facilities such as water and electricity.
Therefore, farmers are usually unhappy with the compensation even if
the amount is not low when compared to the land’s agricultural pro-
ductivity – which is the land valuation method used. However, the
farmers want to share in the land price appreciation. This is a contro-
versial issue among policy-makers and academics because there is no
‘market’ for rural land to provide a benchmark value. Farmland’s value
only materialises after it has been requisitioned and become state-
owned and re-zoned for development. Unlike in a market economy,
where the value of land is appraised from a third-party perspective by a
professional company, in China no such company exists, and as a re-
sult the government gauges the value of rural land based on the agri-
cultural productivity of the land (Zweig 2000:128).4
Farmers’ resentment toward compensation packages is understand-
able, because for many of them, land is a life-long insurance. Losing
farmland implies the possible loss of sustainable livelihood. Although
the law stipulates that after land requisition farmers‘ standard of living
should not decrease, it is sometimes difficult for farmers to retain the
same standard of living due to the lack of training and work opportu-
nities, without which the compensation package alone cannot sustain
them for long.
Illegal land markets
After the conversion of collective farmland into state-owned construc-
tion land, land will be eligible for paid transfer on the land markets.
Land users will get the land through bidding or auction and pay a
land-transfer fee to the government. However, if a collective organisa-
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tion, be it a village or township, illegally rents out collective land to ur-
ban land users without going through the ownership conversion pro-
cess, the collective organisation can earn rent while the new land users
pay a lower rent than for state-owned land. Thus, an incentive is pre-
sent for both the land user and the collective to enter into illegal trans-
actions. An eye-catching event frequently reported in the Chinese med-
ia in recent times illustrates this issue. House prices in major Chinese
cities have increased by leaps and bounds during the last few years.
Some peri-urban collectives in Beijing (and in other major cities such
as Guangzhou) snatched the opportunity and began to build on collec-
tive-owned land. This is forbidden by law, as farmland can only be used
for agricultural purposes, RRLS, or collective enterprises. For non-agri-
cultural purposes, including construction use, land has to be requisi-
tioned and become state-owned before it can be leased to land users
for 40, 50, or 70 years, depending on the type of land use. Of the ap-
proximately 400 residential real-estate projects currently selling resi-
dential plots in Beijing, eighteen per cent percent, or 72 project sites,
which cover a total area of about 7.2 million m, are found on collective
land.5 Houses built on collective land are much cheaper than those
built on state-owned land since real-estate developers do not pay the
government for the conversion of land from collective to state-owned.
The Bureau of Land in Beijing has called a halt to the sale of such ‘ille-
gal houses’, but it has not come up with a solution as to how to deal
with those houses that have already been sold, especially given the fact
that some of the transactions took place years before. This presents a
dilemma for the government: on the one hand, if it accepts those resi-
dents living on collective land, collectives and house buyers will be en-
couraged to build and buy such houses; on the other hand, if it evicts
the residents and demolishes the building, social unrest and conflict
will be unavoidable.
In the following sections two attempts to deal with such situations
are presented: the first is an example of ex-post legalisation, and the
second illustrates government efforts to prevent the creation of new il-
legal land use and constructions through policy-making. They allow a
closer look at government policy responses to the challenges posed by
land use conversion and land tenure in peri-urban areas.
Case 1: Bao’an District, Shenzhen City
Setting the scene
In 1980, four cities, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen were de-
signated as ‘special economic zones’. These cities served as ‘experimen-
tal sites’ for market-led economic reform and open-door policy. In fact,
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the first experiment with a market-based, ‘paid’ urban land use system
took place in Shenzhen.6 In less than three decades, Shenzhen has
transformed itself from a small, tranquil fishing village into one of the
most vibrant Chinese cities in terms of economic development and in-
novation. In 2005, its GDP exceeded 64 billion US dollars, and its
GDP per capita was 8000 US dollars, the highest GDP in China.
Shenzhen consists of six districts: Futian, Luohu, Nanshan, Yantian,
Bao’an, and Longgang. In this study, our area of focus is Bao’an district
which covers an area of 733 km. As urban land can hardly supply the
land needed for economic development, land users are lured to peri-ur-
ban areas with collective agricultural land. Farmers or rural collectives
welcome these land users, as they can reap higher gains from land
rented out than from agricultural production.
In Bao’an city we find many ‘illegal’ land use practices. Not only is
the use of rural land for construction purposes illegal (not having gone
through the due conversion procedures from collective to state owner-
ship), but the structures, both industrial and residential, built on such
unconverted land are also considered illegal. The Bao’an government
has sought to legalise illegal land use and illegal buildings. They have
divided the illegal land use and buildings into three categories based
on the date they came into existence: before March 5, 1999; between
March 5, 1999 and October 31, 2003; and after October 31, 2003. For
each category, they set the conditions for legalisation, and the longer
the illegal land use and buildings date back, the less stringent the con-
ditions are.
Social and economic factors behind illegal land use
The rapid pace of industrialisation and urbanisation in Shenzhen
drives a gradual encroachment on the rural land on which farmers‘ li-
velihood has depended for generations. The requisition of rural land
and its conversion into state-owned construction land make farmers
feel threatened about their future livelihood. One interviewee told us:
‘We feel that we need to take preemptive action to make money from
land. If we don’t do it, the land will eventually be converted to state-
owned land. If we make enough money from renting out land now, we
can save enough for social security the day we lose the land.’7 Cashing
in on land is regarded as a potential source of social security by farm-
ers, which is needed because the compensation paid by the govern-
ment is regarded as insufficient by the farmers.
The RLCL grants farmers 30 years land use rights for agricultural
production. However, within this period, the government can requisi-
tion agricultural land in the name of ‘public interest’, which is not de-
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fined in the Land Management Law (LML). Faced with insecure tenure,
it is only rational for farmers to engage in rent-seeking activities.
With the open-door policy, many enterprises – domestic, foreign and
joint venture – flocked into Bao’an. This drove up the demand for sites
for manufacturing plants, but the government’s response to this de-
mand was slow, and this created a breeding ground for illegal land use
practices. In the economically developed areas, towns and villages are
competing with one another to set up industrial zones to attract manu-
facturing. But the conversion process from collective land to state land
is costly in terms of time and money. A higher land price implies a dis-
advantage in attracting investment. Consequently, many villages and
towns do not follow the conversion process.
Manufacturers started to rent collective land without going through
the time-consuming process of converting collective land to state land.
Furthermore, the economic boom attracted a huge number of migrant
workers to Bao’an. This group of people needs cheap, affordable, and
temporary housing. A worker told the researcher that an average work-
er earns about 1000 yuan per month. After deducting 300 yuan for liv-
ing expenses, they don’t have much left for housing, as they need to
save most of the remaining 700 yuan to send back home.8 In re-
sponse, farmers started to build temporary houses on their rural land
to rent out. Houses fetch eight to ten yuan per m per month. Hence,
farmers have strong incentives to build and rent out multi-storey build-
ings rather than farm the land. One landlord built a five-storey build-
ing with a floor area of 500 m on his own rural residential land site.
He invested 260,000 yuan in the building (he owns the land, so this
costs him nothing), and he charges his tenants eight to ten yuan/m
per month which yields him a monthly income of about 4,000-5,000
yuan.9 In sharp contrast, the annual agricultural income from 1 mu of
land (666 m) is only around 2,000 yuan.
Law enforcement
The magnitude of the illegal land use problem is shown by the estima-
tions in Table 17.1 and 17.2. A large number of illegal land use cases,
however, are not detected, investigated, or demolished. This can be
seen in Table 17.3 which shows the illegal floor surface area demol-
ished in Bao’an District between 1994 and 2003. The area demolished
is only a tiny fraction of the total area of illegal construction. Effective
monitoring and prevention of illegal land use are seriously hampered
by the lack of enforcement staff. The investigation team of the Land
Bureau consists of only nineteen people, and they have to patrol an
area of 700km. In addition, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to demolish buildings that are already in use. Resistance from building
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owners who have invested heavily and from tenants whose eviction will
result in homelessness often forces law enforcers to back off. This
leaves law enforcement to deal only with buildings that are still in the
process of construction and owners who are less ‘thorny’ or ‘trouble-
some’.10
Formalisation and recognition of illegal land use and constructions
The Shenzhen government has been issuing regulations and orders to
prevent illegal land use since as early as 1982, but it is obvious that
these regulations have not had much impact. It has become virtually
Table 17.1 Illegal residential building and land area up to March 1, 2003
Town Number of
reported cases
Estimated building
surface area (m²)
Estimated land
area(m²)
Xi Xiang 13,622 5,797,502 1,879,385
Fu Yong 9,516 5,091,242 1,604,244
Sha Jing 15,697 4,799,438 2,117,925
Song Gang 10,240 4,565,158 1,443,304
Gong Ming 11,583 4,892,129 1,338,208
Shi Yan 5,316 2,140,282 760,466
Long Hua 12,247 5,830,421 2,143,594
Guan Lan 7,013 2,852,763 903,951
Xin An 3,925 1,936,055 482,128
Guang Ming 746 22,0357 151,687
Total 89,905 38,125,347 12,824,892
Source: Shenzhen Bao’An District Office for Dealing with Illegal Residential and Production
Operation Buildings
Table 17.2 Illegal operation and production site building and land area up to
March 1, 2003
Town Number of
reported cases
Estimated building
area (m²)
Estimated land
area(m²)
Xi Xiang 871 3,154,428 2,088,450
Fu Yong 2090 8,378,301 2,403,384
Sha Jing 3289 13,120,309 6,071,696
Song Gang 4152 9,350,057 5,423,524
Gong Ming 5073 12,806,589 5,442,116
Shi Yan 1224 2,760,768 2,635,989
Long Hua 2043 5,542,725 3,198,624
Guan Lan 2224 4,854,437 9,595,574
Xin An 234 785,786 18,297
Guang Ming 82 351,283 606,026
Total 21,282 61,104,683 37,483,680
Source: Shenzhen Bao’An District Office for Dealing with Illegal Residential and Production
Operation Buildings
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impossible to demolish all the illegal buildings, due to their large num-
ber, fierce resistance from building owners, the lack of enforcement
staff, and the government’s inclination to maintain a ‘harmonious so-
cialist society’. In March 2002, the Shenzhen municipal government
issued Implementing Regulations for Dealing with Illegal Construc-
tions for Production and Operation Purposes in Shenzhen Special Eco-
nomic Development Zone. In line with the spirit of the regulations of
the municipal government, in September 2002, Bao’an district govern-
ment issued two ordinances regarding the legalisation criteria and im-
plementation procedures for illegal housing and for other types of con-
struction (i.e. constructions for manufacturing and other operation pur-
poses), respectively. These two ordinances manifest the will of the
Bao’an government to solve illegal land use problems by legalising the
illegal buildings. The Bao’an government decided to divide illegal land
use and constructions into three categories in the hope of solving the
problem of illegal land use and constructions once and for all:
1) Illegal land use and buildings dating back to March 5, 1999. Cases
in this category are defined as ‘historical legacy’ and are all recog-
nised as legal.
2) Illegal land use and structures created between March 5, 1999, and
October 31, 2003. If the land falls within the perimeters of the ur-
ban zone designated in the urban planning document,11 the land
can be converted to state-owned construction land, provided that
members of the collective who currently use the land pay the neces-
sary fees for this change of tenure regime and land use type (i.e.
the land conversion fee); the land use and the structures will then
be recognised as legal. Land and buildings that fall outside the zone
Table 17.3 Illegal floor surface area demolished from 1994 to 2003
Year Area dismantled
(m²)
Fine
(10,000 yuan)
1994 8,000 55
1995 46,000 360
1996 36,750 199
1997 1,300,000 350
1998 780,000 700
1999 860,000 -
2000 1,345,885 -
2001 936,500 2,086
2002 1,346,600 594
2003# 1,851,294 2,083
# For the year 2003, the figure we have is for January to September.
Source: Wang, Shanhua. Notice on Collective Land Management in Bao’an District (official
document)
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designated for urban development are to be demolished, and mem-
bers of the collective who currently use the land are to be fined.
3) Illegal land use and structures created after October 31, 2003. Land
that falls within the urban zone can still be converted to state-
owned land, but besides having to pay the routine conversion fees
to the government, a fine will also be levied on the collective mem-
ber. Buildings that fall outside of the zone are not only to be demol-
ished unconditionally, but the collective member will also be fined
more heavily than for illegal land use before October 31, 2003.
There are some conditions attached to the legalisation process. First,
the ‘illegal’ land user must be a collective member. For instance, a
piece of collective land ‘rented’ by an urban entrepreneur for building
a factory cannot be legalised. In addition, the following categories of
land cannot be formalised even if they predate March 5, 1999: land
that occupies parts of a road, public square, greenbelt, high-tension
electrical wire; land that is located in an area that seriously impedes ur-
ban development; land in a zone of basic farmland protection; land
used for temporary construction structures. The purpose of these con-
ditions is to remove any potential barriers to infrastructure and plan-
ning. Most of the land used illegally and the illegal structures qualify
for legalisation, as they are occupied by members of the collective and
fall outside of the conditions listed above.
For legalisation, land used illegally and land on which illegal struc-
tures are built needs to be surveyed (the fee is about five yuan for each
m surveyed); then certificates of registration will be issued, which re-
cognise the legality of the property. Interestingly, in the appendix of
the certificate, it will be stamped ‘in violation of the law’. A staff mem-
ber in the certification office explained to us: ‘The certificates that these
owners get are legal and protected by law. But according to Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone Real Estate Registration Ordinance, to be is-
sued a certificate of registration, the registration receiver must submit
a number of certificates which should have been issued by the relevant
government departments covering each stage of building construction.
These certificates, which include a building permit, construction per-
mit, building completion certificate, etc., represent a formal and legal
procedure for the realisation of a real estate project. Since the owners
of illegal buildings do not have these certificates, they would not be is-
sued the certificate of registration if the ‘amnesty’ had not been given
by Bao’an district government. The ‘in violation of the law’ stamp does
not in any way diminish the rights enjoyed by the newly legalised own-
ers; it merely serves as a ‘distinguishing indication’ from ordinary legal
owners’.12
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Summary
In a time of rapid urbanisation and fast economic growth, farmers are
prohibited from benefiting from the lucrative business of converting
land from agricultural to nonagricultural uses owing to the dualist land
tenure structure. However, rational action on the part of farmers and
the ineffectiveness of the state regulatory apparatus inevitably give rise
to illegal rent-seeking behaviour. As a result, farmers began to illegally
construct buildings on their agricultural land or rural residential land
site. Illegal land use and illegal buildings have become a permanent
feature of the peri-urban landscape over a period of more than one dec-
ade, and it has become virtually impossible to demolish the buildings
and re-convert the land to agriculture, as the administrative and social
costs are too high. Left with no other feasible alternatives, the Bao’an
government recognises illegal land use. But fearing that recognition
without conditions would encourage further illegal behaviour, the gov-
ernment decided that only illegal land use and structures dating back
to before March 1999 would be unconditionally legalised, while for
two other categories conditions would be stricter and fines higher. In
contrast to the Bao’an case, the next case we examine is an example of
a pro-active strategy devised by the national government to formalise
and stabilise rural land tenure so as to avoid the creation of illegal land
use and constructions such as in Bao’an.
Case 2: Dongli District, Tianjin Municipality
Setting the scene
In 2007 the government initiated the ‘Land Exchange Program‘ of the
‘Small Cities and Towns Project’. This project aims to achieve a balance
among urbanisation, the need for more construction land, farmers‘
tenure security, and their desire to capitalise on their land asset, which
is a conundrum the government has to solve if it wants to pursue
healthy economic growth and achieve social harmony. The second case
study looks at the first national pilot project of the Land Exchange Pro-
gram, whose policy formulation process has been finished, and which
soon will be put into action.
The first pilot experiment of the Land Exchange Program will be car-
ried out in the town of Huaming in the Dongli district of the munici-
pality of Tianjin.13 Huaming town is located between the Tianjin city
centre and Tianjin Binhai New District – an industrial zone in Tianjin
that was recently created by the State Council, which is to serve as the
engine of economic growth for north China. Huaming covers an area
of 150.6 km, which is about one-third of the area of Dongli district. Tia-
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nijin is also one of the most developed cities in China. Dongli is a sub-
urban district, situated in the east of the city. It occupies an area of 477
km. The district has a total population of 300,400, of which 196,000
are registered as rural residents.14
Small Cities and Towns (SCT) project
The Small Cities and Towns (SCT) project refers to the development of
new towns in rural areas. It is hoped that with SCT development, sec-
ondary and tertiary industries will be installed. As a consequence, some
rural population will be transferred out of agriculture, and farmers‘ liv-
ing conditions (in terms of education, social security, lifestyle, etc.) will
converge with that of their urban counterparts. Urbanisation is an in-
evitable process in which various pull and push factors prompt impor-
tant migration flows to the cities. Due to the meagre incomes from me-
nial jobs in cities, low levels of education, and the dualist urban-rural
household registration system, the vast majority of migrants is not
really absorbed by the cities. They become what is popularly known as
‘floating population’ – an immense number of rural workers migrate to
cities to work but cannot settle there on a permanent basis. The gov-
ernment devised the SCT plan to promote the development of inter-
mediary towns that are to act as a buffer zone preventing the inflow of
large numbers of rural migrants to major cities and thereby averting
the formation of urban slums and the consequent risk of social in-
stability. At the same time, these small cities and towns are to become
engines of growth to propel the industrialisation and modernisation of
rural areas. In 2004 the Ministry of Construction with five other min-
istries selected 1887 SCTs out of more than 20,000 as strategic devel-
opment poles. A key element of the SCT project is the Land Exchange
Program on which we will focus here.
The Land Exchange Program in a nutshell
We have seen in Figure 17.1 that land in China can be divided into two
broad categories according to the way it may be used: land that may be
used for agricultural purposes and land that may be used for construc-
tion. Agricultural land belongs to the collectives, and only state-owned
land can legally be used for construction purposes (art. 43 Land Man-
agement Law).15 The law allows for the conversion of agricultural land
into construction land through a set of procedures. Agricultural land
has to be first requisitioned by the state and become state-owned, then
the state leases the land to new users. The most important transforma-
tion that takes place during this process is the change in land owner-
ship: collective-owned land becomes state-owned land. The land-use
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conversion process is tedious, however, and its duration and cost incite
illegal land use. Commercial land users often opt for the faster and
cheaper, although illegal, construction on collectively owned land, and
there also exists a vibrant illegal residential housing rental market.
With the Land Exchange Program, the government devised a plan to
address these problems and to avoid loss of farmland resulting from
urban expansion. As there is no strict planning requirement such as
plot ratio on rural houses, the extensive use of RRLS has been quite
common.16 The government plan is to move farmers out of their rural
houses into high-rise buildings that allow for a much more intensive
land use. By doing so, RRLS becomes state-owned. Although the con-
struction of high-rise buildings will initially take up some agricultural
land, this loss will be made up by reconverting part of RRLS into agri-
cultural land. The remaining part of RRLS will remain state-owned
and will be used for construction purposes. As a result, not only the to-
tal cultivated land area is maintained but also more construction land
is released owing to the exchange between extensively used RRLS and
intensive land-use houses. Figure 17.2 is a graphical representation of
the exchange process.
As the Land Exchange Program requisitions and converts all land at
once, it prevents commercial land users from circumventing the te-
dious land conversion process, and thus decreases the incidence of ille-
gal land use. The project is furthermore expected to destroy a part of
the illegal residential housing rental market, as it takes away RRLS. As
mentioned, it is often the case that only RRLS are extensively used.
Farmers’ dwellings usually occupy only a portion of the RRLS. The re-
maining part of the RRLS is occupied by a courtyard. In many such
courtyards, illegal houses have been built and rented to migrant work-
ers. Some families also have more than one RRLS, which gives them
the opportunity to rent houses out to migrants. Other people have left
the rural areas but still keep their RRLS and rent it out for a profit. By
transferring farmers to high-rise buildings and taking away their RRLS
and rural houses, this illegal rental market is cut off.
Our concern here is the trajectory of property rights during this pro-
cess. Figure 17.3 replicates Figure 17.2, but the exchange is now repre-
sented in terms of ownership rights: collectively owned agricultural
land is requisitioned for the construction of high-rise buildings and be-
comes state-owned. The government then proposes to exchange apart-
ments in these high-rise buildings for collectively owned RRLS and the
farmers‘ private houses. Consequently, RRLS becomes state-owned.
Part of that land is then reconverted to agricultural uses to keep the to-
tal area of cultivated land unchanged; this part of the land returns to
the collective ownership. The remaining part of the land that is re-
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leased through the exchange remains state-owned and is then leased
by government to commercial users.
The method of exchange
There are three subjects of exchange: the villagers, the villagers’ com-
mittees, and the government.17 The objects of the exchange are the vil-
lager’s rural residential land site and apartments in a newly urbanised
area. There are in fact two exchange actions taking place more or less
concurrently during this process. The first is between the villagers’
committee and the government: the villagers’ committee exchanges
with the government the ownership of RRLS (and constructions on it)
for ownership of the apartment units in high-rise buildings and use
Figure 17.2 The exchange process
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right of the land on which the new building is erected. The second ex-
change action is between villagers and the villagers’ committee: villa-
gers exchange with the committee the ownership of rural houses and
use right of RRLS for ownership of a new dwelling in a high-rise build-
ing. The need for this two-step procedure is due to the transformation
of ownership involved. The collective is considered as the representa-
tive of the farmers and their interests.18 Although land belongs to the
collective, farmers have established use rights in the land. Therefore,
the collective needs to gain approval from/reach an agreement with the
farmers before proceeding to exchange it with the state.
When villagers give up their RRLS, they in fact give up two rights:
the use right of RRLS and the ownership of their rural houses. The
first step of the exchange process therefore consists of the government
paying compensation for these two rights. For RRLS compensation,
the RRLS area per capita is used as basis for calculating a compensa-
tion standard. Total RRLS area is divided by the number of people in
the village in order to obtain the RRLS area per capita. Accordingly,
each household will get a sum that corresponds to the compensation
price for RRLS per capita times the number of people in the house-
hold. For value appraisal of the rural houses, professional agencies will
Figure 17.3 Transformation of ownership during the exchange process
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be hired. Rural houses are of different types and quality: mud brick
house, brick house, bungalow, storied building. The appraisal standard
for each type has to be decided before any assessment takes place.
Thus: compensation for each household = compensation for RRLS/ca-
pita x no. of persons in the household + house compensation
In the second step of the exchange process, village households can
use the compensation money to buy apartments in the new high-rise
buildings. Under the SCT exchange scheme it is planned that each
household will be allocated 80m of new housing space in the high-rise
building.19 The price of 1 m of the new apartment is set at 2,300 yuan,
which is its construction cost. Therefore, the cost of 80m is 184,000
yuan. Compensation received from selling RRLS and rural houses var-
ies for each household due to the difference in number of persons in a
household and the value of the house. In general, households receive
around 300,000 yuan. Therefore, the compensation level is well above
the cost of the new residence. An additional, hidden compensation
component comes from the house price itself. The market price for 1
m of the same quality apartment in the vicinity of Huaming would cost
about 3,500 yuan. By selling the houses at construction cost (2300
yuan/m), a rural household stands to gain 1200 yuan for each m.
Farmers only receive the compensation for their RRLS after their re-
quisitioned rural houses have been torn down, and they have proven
that they have an alternative legal shelter. The purpose of this prerequi-
site is twofold. First, it prevents farmers from selling their rural houses
for immediate cash without securing a stable residence. Unsettled
farmers might cause social instability and contribute to the growth of
urban slums, as has happened in many developing countries. Second,
the demolition of rural houses as a prerequisite is intended to avoid
farmers refusing to move out once they have cashed their compensa-
tion.
Discourse and reality of exchange
(i) The purposes of exchange
The official purpose of the Land Exchange Program is to speed up and
better manage the urbanisation process and the establishment of satel-
lite towns in the periphery of cities.20 A concurrent official goal is to
ameliorate the houses and living conditions of rural residents and let
them enjoy the spillover effects of the urbanisation process. Although
both aspects are targeted in the Land Exchange Program, the pro-
gramme in reality also seems to be highly geared towards getting more
land for construction. For example, in Huaming town, RRLS takes up
7,794 mu of land, of which 3,475 mu is to be re-cultivated to make up
for the agricultural land that will be used to construct new houses:
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2,983 mu of land will be used to build urban houses that will accom-
modate the farmers who vacate their rural residence; the other 492 mu
will be used for public facilities, including schools, museums, and the
new administrative centres. Living in the SCT will thus allow residents
to have access to better public facilities, education, medical care, and
services that were previously the privilege of urban residents. The Land
Exchange Program will also generate 4,319 mu surplus land. This land
will be leased by the government to commercial users to develop a
real-estate sector, industrial zones, and other commercial establish-
ments. This land would otherwise not have been available, at least not
legally, for construction to accommodate further economic growth and
industrialisation. Huaming town is only a pilot programme; many
more towns will probably follow its footsteps, providing the govern-
ment with substantial amounts of land to set up economic develop-
ment or industrial zones from which commercial users may rent land
with easy access.
(ii) The principles of exchange
In theory, the project abides by the following principles: equality, volun-
tary participation, mutual benefit, and strict protection of cultivated
land. ‘Equality’ means that the government, villager’s committees, and
villagers enjoy equal status in the Land Exchange Program. ‘Voluntary
participation’ implies that villagers are not coerced by administrative or-
ders to take part in the program. ‘Mutual benefit’ means that all parties
involved in the exchange will benefit from it in a win-win situation.
The ‘strict protection of cultivated land’ principle means that there
should be no encroachment on cultivated land which is regarded as an
important source of food security, and thus the livelihood of China‘s
vast population.
In reality, the exchange is not a voluntary process, but it appears to
be voluntary because it receives almost no resistance. The economic in-
centives given to farmers make them happy and willing to take part.
Interviews conducted by the authors show that the farmers are gener-
ally happy with the exchange and that they are willing to participate for
the following reasons: first, they believe that the Land Exchange Pro-
gram will diminish their dependency on farmland, as it will enhance
urbanisation and therefore increase opportunities to derive income
from other sources such as jobs in village and township enterprises;
second, most farmers look forward to the new lifestyle, since living in
a high-rise building serves as a symbol of status. A few years ago when
high-rise buildings existed only in the urban areas, only the rich could
afford them; third, farmers are generally happy with the compensation
level and below-market price of the new apartment unit.
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Another pervasive trope in official documents on the Land Exchange
Program is the ‘democratic principle’. Words like ‘respecting farmers‘
wishes’ and ‘democratic decision process’ surface again and again in
the speeches of officials. However, nowhere can there be found con-
crete procedures or examples of how the democratic process will be car-
ried forward, and so it seems more rhetoric than reality. This does not
imply that farmers are forced into entering the Land Exchange Pro-
gram. Talking with farmers reveals that they do think the programme
is beneficial to them in terms of better living conditions and more li-
quid assets. However, farmers’ acquiescence to and support for the pro-
gramme is quite different from the presumption that the programme
is the result of a democratic process.
It is not surprising that the state puts such a strong emphasis on ‘de-
mocracy‘. The Communist Party has been reforming and trying to
make its rule democratic, or to at least appear democratic. One of the
most notable reforms is the election of grassroots leaders, i.e. village
leaders. Land is one of the thorniest issues, and mishandling of it
could severely undermine the Party’s rule. Therefore, the ‘democratic’
rhetoric is as important as the actual policy itself.
An examination of policy papers regarding the Land Exchange Pro-
gram reveals that ‘bottom-up’ initiatives are hardly mentioned. Instead,
in the authors’ opinion, the development of SCT is primarily a top-
down initiative aimed at solving the urban-rural dualist structure and
absorbing the vast rural population in an era of rapid economic
growth. The exchange is just a strategic step in achieving the develop-
ment of SCT.
Also with regard to the principle of mutual benefit, one should make
a caveat. Though it is true that the market values of RRLS and houses
are very low, as claimed in the official discourse, and farmers thus sub-
stantially gain from the Land Exchange Program, it has to be borne in
mind that the low market value of rural residential land is solely due to
the prohibition of its circulation by law. If the government were to al-
low the free transaction of rural houses, the price farmers would get
for them would exceed the value that they are now being paid by the
government by a large margin. Through the Land Exchange Program –
despite the rhetoric of mutual benefit – the state is thus in fact captur-
ing the rent that belongs to farmers.
(iii) The legality of exchange
The Land Exchange Program entails a significant transformation of
property rights. First, collectively owned agricultural land is trans-
formed into state-owned residential land. Second, collectively owned
RRLS is exchanged for state-owned land and then partly leased to com-
mercial users for construction and partly reconverted to collectively
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owned agricultural land. But what are the legal foundations for these
transformations? No laws refer to the Land Exchange Program. The
only governmental document that lends somewhat partial support to
the exchange is a policy directive entitled Opinions About Standardisa-
tion of the Combination of Increase in City and Town Construction
Land and Decrease in Rural Construction Land in Experimental Sites,
released in October 2005 by the Ministry of Land and Natural Re-
sources. Acknowledging that the increase in construction land inevita-
bly involves the expropriation of agricultural land, this directive recom-
mends that current rural construction land (in our case RRLS) be culti-
vated to keep the total area of cultivated land unchanged. This policy
document does not, however, provide an explicit foundation for the
transformation of property rights involved.
Before the actual resettlement of farmers can take place, the govern-
ment has to requisition agricultural land to build new houses. The leg-
ality of this requisition is questioned. According to the LML, agricultur-
al land can be converted to construction land for public interest pur-
poses through a requisitioning by the state. The LML does not,
however, define what constitutes public interest. It is a vague, ambigu-
ous, and ill-defined concept (Ding 2004). Can government-led requisi-
tion in the case of the Exchange Program be defined as public interest
oriented? On the one hand, the requisition of agricultural land can be
seen as public interest driven, since the agricultural land requisitioned
was a prerequisite for the Land Exchange Program to start, and this
programme can be seen as a public project. On the other hand, a pub-
lic interest project should not be a profit-making activity. The Land Ex-
change Program will eventually be a profit-generating activity. Through
the Land Exchange Program, the government will get additional land,
which will be leased to commercial users. The Land Exchange Program
thus calls for a re-examination and re-definition of ‘public interest’ in
the realm of land requisition in future Chinese laws (op. cit.).
With regard to the second transformation, neither the LML nor any
other law gives a legal foundation for the requisitioning of RRLS and
rural houses to be converted into agricultural and construction land.
The legality of this conversion is therefore also being questioned.
Effects of exchange
(i) The capitalisation of residential land
An additional effect of the Land Exchange Program is the capitalisation
of rural residential land. We have seen that rural land belongs to the
collective, and farmers are allocated personal use rights in RRLS for an
unspecified period of time. Although farmers own their rural houses,
they do not have full disposal rights: they can only transact the houses
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with fellow village members, and law prohibits the sale of land to non-
collective members or the use of land for purposes other than their
own residence. Houses are usually one of the most valuable assets that
farmers hold, but it is essentially an illiquid asset. Limited liquidity
consequently makes rural houses under-priced during circulation with-
in the collective circle and dead capital outside that circle. Through the
Land Exchange Program, rural houses will be exchanged for new apart-
ments in small cities and towns, which are classified as ‘commodity
housing’. As the name implies, this type of housing is a market com-
modity which can be transacted on the housing market, and its price is
more or less determined by market factors. Owners of this type of
housing can transact freely – either by renting or by sale – in the real-
estate property market. Thus, what farmers get after the exchange is
an apartment unit built on state-owned land. Although farmers still
only own the apartment and not the land, their property is much more
valuable than rural houses because now they can rent, sell, or mort-
gage it. Moreover, the newly passed Property Law stipulates that the
lease of the state-owned land on which commodity housing is built will
be renewed automatically for another 70 years after the current land
lease expires. Such a long period of leasehold of the land, combined
with the right to transact the house, gives commodity housing owners
more or less the equivalent right that is enjoyed by owners in a free-
hold system. In this manner, ‘dead capital’ – rural houses – is brought
to life in the form of urban apartments with market value. As a liquid
commodity, farmers can now enjoy the returns from their houses
through sale, renting, and the appreciation in value. In addition, they
could mortgage the apartment when in need of capital. As said above,
it should be kept in mind that rural housing was only a ‘dead’ asset be-
cause the law prohibited its free circulation. Therefore, it is nothing
but the state and the property rights arrangement it imposes that make
rural houses illiquid.
(ii) Tenure security
In 1998, the policy to grant the 30-year use right of agricultural land
policy was adopted in the new version of the LML. In August 2002,
the Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC)
adopted the ground-breaking Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL), re-
placing the single article of the LML that had dealt with farmers‘ land-
tenure rights with detailed stipulations regarding farmers’ land rights
and dispute resolution mechanisms. The far-reaching and monumental
importance and significance of RLCL in recasting farmer’s tenure
rights were succinctly summarised by the Rural Development Institute
immediately following its adoption by the NPC in August 2002: ‘RLCL
is the first modern Chinese law to deal exclusively with the issue of ru-
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ral land tenure, and it represents a breakthrough for the land-tenure
rights of China‘s 210 million farm families’ (Rural Development Insti-
tute 2002).
In the Land Exchange Program, the farmers‘ contractual rights to
agricultural land are not affected. Individual farmers’ share of con-
tracted land will not be affected since the total agricultural land area
will remain unchanged upon the completion of the programme. From
this perspective, tenure security of farmers’ agricultural land is guaran-
teed. Nevertheless, the requisition of RRLS and rural houses may serve
as an alarm bell for tenure security. If collective RRLS and personal
houses can be requisitioned so easily, there is no reason to believe that
agricultural land may not one day also be requisitioned for one reason
or another, such as the possible future expansion of SCT. Lack of ten-
ure security is dangerous, as it will not only discourage farmers from
investing time, labour, and inputs in the land, but also gives them the
motivation to carry out informal activities, such as building and renting
out ‘illegal houses’ to maximise their economic returns from land.
Celebrated jurist Wang Liming rightly calls attention to the necessity of
turning contractual rights to agricultural land into real rights. He ela-
borates, ‘If the contractual management right cannot be a real right,
but only a right in contract, it can hardly become a long-term stable
property right, and the contractors can hardly defend themselves
against unlawful interference and damage’ (Wang 2006:320).
Summary
With the Small Cities and Towns Project and the Land Exchange Pro-
gram, the Chinese government has devised an innovative strategy to
speed up the urbanisation process and solve the problems arising from
land shortages and the urban-rural dualist tenure system. It is not the
perfect strategy, as it is a top-down administrative measure without due
participation from farmers who are largely excluded from sharing the
economic benefits arising from the economic development taking place
on the formerly collective peri-urban land. That being said, the innova-
tion of this policy plan should also be acknowledged. It juggles consid-
erably well the issues of urbanisation, industrialisation, farmers’ wel-
fare, and the attempt to dismantle institutional rigidities and barriers
that have bred illegal land use.
Conclusion
The weakness of China‘s current land tenure system is increasingly
being challenged and ‘the original justifications for maintaining the
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system no longer appear to be as true as they were twenty years ago’
(Lohmar 2006:99). The first case discussed in this chapter is at the
forefront of land tenure issues. It is a manifestation of the current land
tenure system being challenged through the recognition and formalisa-
tion of illegal land tenure. The second case demonstrates a general
strategy toward economic development and urbanisation, of which ru-
ral land tenure issues are a major component. It displays a practical re-
sponse to the challenges, with an innovative strategy to prevent the
problems arising from the urban-dualist tenure system.
Although both interventions have a number of positive effects, these
cases also clearly reveal the importance and complexity of land tenure
issues in a fast-growing economy that lacks standardised and well-de-
fined land tenure institutions. They bring to the fore, furthermore, that
for a thorough overhaul of the land tenure system, the ‘two-tiered’ gov-
ernment-regulated collective land and market-based state-owned land
tenure regimes need to converge to form a unified, market-based, agri-
cultural and non-agricultural land market.
Notes
1 This paper is based on researchers’ fieldwork trips in Shenzhen and Tianjin in 2004,
2006 and 2007. During these trips, the researchers carried out semi-structured in-
depth interviews with local farmers, government officials and local media reporters.
The authors also collected necessary data from relevant district government depart-
ments. The names of interviewees are not mentioned in the paper to protect their
privacy.
2 The titles of ordinances and sentences in official document sometimes are crafted in
very bureaucratic language and tone. We attempt to translate word-by-word so as to
keep it close to the original language.
3 1 ha = 15 mu.
4 According to article 47 of the Land Management Law (amended in 1998), compensa-
tion for requisitioned land has three components: compensation for land, resettle-
ment compensation and compensation for land attachments and young crops. Com-
pensation for land should be six to ten times the average annual output value of re-
quisitioned land in the preceding three years; compensation for resettlement per
person affected is set at four to six times the average annual output value of requisi-
tioned land in the preceding three years. However, resettlement compensation per
hectare of land should not exceed fifteen times the average annual output value of re-
quisitioned land in the preceding three years. The total amount of land and resettle-
ment compensation, subject to the approval of provincial authority, can be increased
to no more than 30 times of average output value of prior three years in an attempt
to maintain the living standard of affected farmers.
5 See statistical survey carried out by the well-known real estate agency, ZhongDa-
HengJi (Xinjingbao newspaper 2007-06-26).
6 ‘Paid’ land use system distinguishes this type of land use system from the pre-1982
land system in which all urban land was state-owned, and the government allocated
it to users free of charge. In 1982, Shenzhen became the first city to implement the
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paid land use system, i.e. land users pay an upfront amount of land use fees to the
government in exchange for a land use right. During the term of leasehold, land
users can rent, sell (use rights), and mortgage the land.
7 Interviewee 12.
8 Interviewee 9.
9 Interviewee 2.
10 Interview with one law enforcement officer.
11 This zone outlines the designated spheres of construction land and agricultural land
in the city planning scheme. Agricultural land that falls within the sphere of con-
struction can be converted to construction land if all the due processes of converting
land from collective to state are carried out.
12 Interview with certification staff.
13 Five such projects are planned across three districts in Tianjin. The other four sites
are Xiaozhan town in Jinnan District, Daliang town, Houpubang village and Nan-
beixinzhuang village of Wuqing District.
14 Urban and rural household registration is a vestige of China’s urban-rural dualist di-
chotomy. It is a feature that was used and to some extent still is used to separate the
urban and rural population. Some provinces have begun to eliminate this divide by
abolishing rural household registration. The complete abolition of such a system still
has a long way to go in the foreseeable future. Different types of households enjoy
different rights. For example, the current social security system only covers urban re-
sidents.
15 There is an exception to this article: rural collective-owned land can be used as con-
struction land in the following cases: land used by rural town and village enterprises;
the construction of houses for rural residents (RRLS); rural public facilities (see Fig-
ure 17.1).
16 Article 62 of Land Management Law stipulates: Each rural household is entitled to
only one RRLS, and it surface area cannot exceed the standard stipulated by provin-
cial, autonomous regional and municipal government. In Tianjin the area of RRLS is
set at 167 m per household. But the actual occupied area can reach 200-300 m. The
reasons for this extensive use of land are manifold: some families are allocated two
RRLS through connection with village cadre; the lack of planning and monitoring
mechanism also contributed to this wasteful use of land, etc.
17 There are generally three criteria to qualify a person as a member of the collective
(commonly known as the villager): 1) his/her household registration is in the village;
2) she/he has a legal residence in the village; 3) she/he lives in the village. A villager
needs to fulfil all the three criteria in order to be a member of the collective, while
the first criterion is the most important one, as this has to do with the rural-urban
dualist household registration system.
18 As elucidated earlier, the villagers’ committee is not the ‘collective’ but is taken as the
‘collective’ by the state when dealing with collective matters.
19 In Huaming town the average number of persons per household is 3.2. Accordingly,
each person would receive 25 m of living area.
20 Official goals, principles, and methods of the Exchange Program are obtained from
government official documents such as project training manuals, minutes of confer-
ences; speeches given by officials, and interviews with government officials. However,
due to confidentiality of the documents and the requests of interviewees, the titles of
documents and the names and positions of officials are omitted.
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Government documents (in Chinese)
Tianjin Small Cities and Towns Experimental Site Training Class Materials Compilation, Dec.
2006.
Small Cities and Towns and New Countryside Planning and Construction Management Training
Class Materials Compilation by Tianjin Commission of Economic Development and Re-
form, June 2006.
On the Exchange of Rural Residential Land Site for Houses by The Exchange Project Team, July
2007.
Report on the Implementation of ‘the Exchange of Rural Residential Land Site for Houses’ in
Huaming Town to Promote the Construction of Small Cities and Towns by Dongli People’s
Government, Jan. 2007.
Understanding and Reflection during the Process of the Exchange of Rural Residential Land Site
for Houses in Huaming Demonstration Small Cites and Towns. A Report by Fu Jinqiang,
Director of the Bureau of Land Managements of Dongli District.
Using Scientific Development Perspective to Guide the Healthy Development of Small Cities and
Towns Experimental Site, a speech made by Zhu Zhixin, Deputy Director of National
Commission of Economic Development and Reform, during a working conference on
the Construction and Development of Small Cities and Towns Experimental Site. July,
2004.
Opinions About Standardisation of The Combination of Increase in City and Town Construction
Land and Decrease in Rural Construction Land in Experimental Sites by the Ministry of
Land and Natural Resources.
Newspaper articles
Nanfang Zhoumo Newspaper. ‘The Change of Focus of Protection of Farmers’ Rights: From
Tax and Fees Disputes to Land Rights Protection’ (in Chinese) 2004-09-02.
New York Times. ‘Chinese Premier Says Seizing Peasants‘ Land Provokes Unrest’ 2006-1-20
Xinhua News. ‘Ministry of Land and Natural Resources: The Area of Arable Land in Our Na-
tion has Decreased to 1.827 billion mu’,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-04/12/content_5968006.htm. (in Chinese)
2007-4-12
Xinjingbao Newspaper. ‘Beijing Calls a Halt to the Sale of Illegal ‘Small Property Rights’
Houses’ (in Chinese) 2007-6-26
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18 Land law in Indonesia
Herman Slaats, Erman Rajagukguk, Nurul Elmiyah,
Akhmad Safik
Introduction
Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago, consisting of five large is-
lands (from west to east: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Ir-
ian) and thousands of smaller islands. The distance from the most
northwestern top of Aceh on Sumatra to the eastern border with Papua
New Guinea is roughly 4,000 km (the distance between London and
Baghdad). Approximately 70 per cent of the Indonesian territory is offi-
cially qualified as ‘forest land’ over which no private property rights on
land can be registered. However, extensive areas have been, and still
are being, deforested by commercial large-scale logging, for small-scale
local agriculture, and for housing. For example, Palangkaraya, the capi-
tal city of Central Kalimantan, with a population of 160,000, is offi-
cially forest. The remaining 30 per cent of land is unevenly distributed:
‘some 69 per cent of the land is owned by sixteen per cent of the popu-
lation; and the average parcel size of a rural holding in the crowded is-
land of Java is shrinking from what is already a non-viable 0.85 ha.’
(Heryani and Grant 2004:5).
Indonesia‘s population of over 200 million is made up of many dis-
tinct ethnic, linguistic and religious groups which display a great vari-
ety of cultural characteristics and historically developed local/regional
land rights and tenure arrangements, which still have relevance today
in spite of overarching nationwide legislation and land policies under
colonial rule and after independence.
Approximately 120 million people live on Java, the smallest of the
large islands, which makes this island of 132,000 km2 one of the most
densely populated areas in the world (more than 900/km2). The other
islands are underpopulated. The majority of the population lives in ru-
ral conditions and depends on small-scale farming, cattle breeding,
and horticulture for their livelihood. The availability of land and access
to land are indispensable for them. Particularly for Java with its high
population pressure, this presents acute problems.
This chapter first outlines the main developments and characteristics
of the colonial and post-colonial land rights regimes. It then introduces
the foundation of independent Indonesian land law – the Basic Agrar-
ian Law of 1960 – and discusses some of its most significant elements.
These include: the notion of ‘state land’ and its various interpretations;
customary land rights and tenure arrangements and their position in
national law, policy, and practice; the effect of the ‘social function’ of
land on individual rights; land reform, obstacles to land reform, its fail-
ure, and recent attempts at re-introduction; the registration of land
rights, governmental projects to promote registration, and effects of re-
gistration. The next section identifies problems of decentralisation of
the previously strongly centralised national land management author-
ity. A few remarks on the relevance of Indonesian land law for non-
agrarian interests will be made in the following section. The conclu-
sion argues that the security the formal national legal system claims to
provide does not guarantee substantive security on the ground. On the
contrary: in spite of the formal recognition of traditional law (as de-
fined by the state), rural traditional land rights and tenure arrange-
ments, and their securities, usually lose out to claims based on national
law. Instead of such a formal recognition based on a generalised and
distorted definition of traditional law, genuine substantive recognition
would imply that national law is tailored so as to accommodate the rea-
lities of traditional land rights and tenure arrangements and to facili-
tate their development, basically confirming/sanctioning the securities
they provide.
Historical prelude
Officials of the privately owned Dutch East Indies Company (VOC: Ver-
eenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) set foot ashore the island of Java at
the end of the sixteenth century. During the first few decades the inter-
ests of the VOC were purely commercial: the trade of tropical agrarian
products for the market in Europe on the basis of equal relationships
with their counterparts: indigenous chiefs (Javanese radja’s, princes,
etc., and later also persons in authority from other islands in the archi-
pelago). The character of these relationships soon changed. The drive
for expansion of economic interests and the necessity to protect assets
against colonial competitors such as England, Spain, and Portugal al-
lowed the VOC to assume state-like administrative/imperialistic power
and to exercise sovereign rights. Gradually, a colonial practice devel-
oped that was geared toward the exploitation of resources and the
transfer of profits to the European investors and entrepreneurs (plan-
ters). The VOC operated on the basis of indirect rule and of the princi-
ple of non-intervention. They superimposed their authority over the ex-
isting indigenous feudal structures, which were left intact and used as
extensions of their administrative machinery. They refrained from in-
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tervening in indigenous organisations (unless their interests were at
stake) and simply used the indigenous feudal system, in which it was
common for local rulers to charge their subjects with levies in natura,
to extract the desired products. Copying that system, the VOC charged
the indigenous rulers. Conservatism, mismanagement and corruption
led to the bankruptcy of the VOC at the end of the eighteenth century.
Its debts and assets were taken over by the (then) Dutch Republic, and
the Indonesian archipelago formally became a colony of the state. The
Dutch ruled Indonesia until the beginning of the Second World War
(with the exception of the British interregnum from 1811 till 1815). Co-
lonial exploitation reached its summit under the Culture System of
compulsory cultivation of products for the European market in the
early nineteenth century. The Javanese farmers had to make one-fifth
of their paddy fields available for the cultivation of prescribed crops
which had to be concentrated on an area measuring the mathematical
total of the individual one-fifth plots. This implied a reshuffle of land
use/tenure which seriously affected the traditional land tenure and use
patterns. Growing criticism against excessive exploitation, uncontrolled
pursuit of profit, and the unrestrained exercise of power in the colony
led to the abolition of the Culture System and eventually to a mitigated
and more humane colonial policy. In 1870 the ‘Agrarian Law’ (Agrar-
ische Wet) and the ‘Agrarian Decree’ (or ‘Domain Statement’: Domein-
verklaring) were enacted, the impact of which still resonates today.
The purpose of these agrarian regulations was twofold: on the one
hand, they intended to facilitate access for non-Indonesian investors
and entrepreneurs to land for commercial enterprise, such as the estab-
lishment of plantations, whereas on the other hand, they guaranteed
the protection of indigenous land rights. The Domain Statement ruled
that all land to which no civil law ownership title could be proven was
to be considered domain of the state.1 Since customary rights were not
civil law titles and could not be registered, this rule implied that indi-
genous land fell in the category of ‘state domain’. In order to protect
and safeguard indigenous rights, a differentiation was made between
‘free domain’ – land free of native rights which would be available for
the state to issue long term lease concessions to (non-Indonesian) en-
trepreneurs – and so-called ‘unfree domain’ – land used by the native
population, in which the State could not issue any rights. Debates en-
sued in the Dutch parliament as to the interpretation of the terms
‘used by the indigenous population’: did it include areas which were
not apparently and not permanently in use, but which the indigenous
communities considered to belong to their territory, such as fallow land
and forest areas where they hunted and collected fire wood, building
materials, and other forest products? Supporters of an extensive inter-
pretation of ‘free domain’ had it that these areas were state domain and
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thus at the disposal of the government. Those who adhered to a restric-
tive interpretation supported the indigenous view that these lands be-
longed to the village territory. At the turn of the twentieth century, the
‘Ethical Policy’ of the colonial government embodied an explicit shift
from colonial exploitation to moral responsibility for native welfare,
and a focus on the preservation and protection of indigenous legal sys-
tems (adat). The Leiden adat law scholar Van Vollenhoven successfully
thwarted governmental plans for the unification and codification of na-
tive law, arguing that this would rob indigenous law of its essential
characteristics of flexibility and adaptability.
Dutch colonial rule effectively ended at the beginning of World War
II with the Japanese invasion of Indonesia and the internment of the
Dutch. The Japanese, pretending to assist ‘their Asian brothers’ in their
endeavour to set themselves free from colonial oppression, allowed the
nationalistic movement under the leadership of Sukarno to flourish.
Indonesia unilaterally declared independence in 1945 after a colonisa-
tion of more than three centuries.2 The impact of this historic event
was more drastic in the political domain, where it constituted a radical
break with the past, than it was in law as Dutch colonial law continued
to be applied, as parts still are, in one way or another pending replace-
ment by Indonesian legislation. The Dutch prisoners of war failed to
notice the social and political developments that were taking place and
the serious impact these would have; most of those who survived the
Japanese camps dreamt of the good old times and the restoration of
the old order. The Dutch eagerness after the war to restore colonial rule
and re-assume possession of plantations and other properties resulted
in two small-scale wars (‘police actions’) against the nationalistic rebels
and the failure of the negotiations between the Dutch government and
the young self-proclaimed Republic to establish peaceful relationships.
Only in 1949 did the Dutch recognise the independence of Indonesia.
In 1957 Indonesia expelled the last Dutch citizens and nationalised
their possessions.
A nationalistic, anti-colonial e´lan marked the early years of Indone-
sia‘s independence. Resistance against the common enemy – the
Dutch, trying to re-establish colonial rule/power – functioned as a cata-
lyst in the creation of national unity.3 The fight for independence and
the forging of the idea of one nation were the policy themes of Indone-
sia’s first president, Sukarno. The endeavour to forge a national unity
out of the patchwork quilt of ethnicities, cultures, and languages, and
cultivating the awareness among the population of being one Indone-
sian nation was not unsuccessful: within a few decades the Indonesian
language (adapted from Malay) became the lingua franca, and the no-
tion of being Indonesian settled among the population in general. In
the domain of law and legal policy, the nationalistic ambitions aimed
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at the abolition of the dualistic colonial (civil) law that was felt to be
discriminatory, and the creation of a new, genuine Indonesian law to
replace it. Land law was one of the first domains to be tackled.
Sukarno’s flirtation with communism and the disastrous effects of
his nationalistic, even isolationistic policy on the nation’s economy
were the main reasons why he was made to step down. His successor,
General Suharto, focused on economic restoration. Under his adminis-
tration of almost 30 years, a remarkable economic development was
achieved. Trade and industry flourished, foreign investment was at-
tracted. Indonesia was one of the ‘Asian Tigers’ until its economy col-
lapsed due to the financial crisis that afflicted many other Asian coun-
tries. Although this economic success improved the overall standard of
living of the population, its benefits were very unevenly distributed.
They mainly accumulated in the hands of a small group of elite: the
president, his family, and the cronies around them, as well as captains
of industry and the army. Relatively little trickled down, leading to a
slight but undeniable rise in the standard of living of the population at
large and the formation of a more prosperous middle class. The eco-
nomic success, however, was achieved by virtue of increasing social
and political repression, opportunistic policies, widespread corruption,
and selective application, if not abuse, of the law. Features like these
very much determined the way Suharto’s ‘New Order’ administration
dealt with land matters.
The Indonesian Basic Agrarian Law
Soon after the declaration of independence in 1945, a committee was
established for the drafting of a new land law. It took another three
committees and fifteen years altogether to arrive at the Undang-undang
Pokok Agraria (Basic Agrarian Law: BAL). The BAL abolished the colo-
nial regulations pertaining to land contained in the Agrarische Wet and
Domeinverklaring of 1870 and the Civil Code.4 It ended colonial dual-
ism and the distinction between ‘Western’ land subject to civil law and
‘indigenous’ land subject to customary law, and substituted the colonial
provisions with a set of unitary legal regulations (‘principles of land
law’) inspired by customary law concepts, principles and institutions in
58 articles which were to reflect the genuine Indonesian characteristics
and needs.
Some of the major underlying leading principles of BAL are: nation-
alism (non-Indonesians are excluded from land rights), socialism (all
Indonesians shall have access to a minimum of land), and ‘Indonesian-
ism’ (land law is based on traditional, customary law: adat). These char-
acteristics are reflected in the provisions:
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– that the Indonesian territory belongs to the Indonesian people as its
national wealth (art. 1) and is controlled/managed by the state, re-
presenting the people (tanah dikuasai oleh Negara) (art. 2);
– that the law pertaining to land is traditional (adat) law (art. 5), but
the communal rights – as far as actually existing – must be exer-
cised in accordance with national interest and law (art. 3);
– that rights in land have a social function (art. 6), i.e. that the exer-
cise of individual rights in land should not be detrimental to the so-
ciety;
– that only Indonesian subjects – men and women alike – can have
full property rights in land (hak milik; art. 9), implying the exclu-
sion of non-Indonesians;
– that maximum and minimum size of land ownership will be deter-
mined to guarantee the welfare of the population (BAL art. 17 and
Government Regulation in lieu of Law 56/1960);
– to guarantee legal security, land will be registered (art. 19)
Each of these provisions will be elaborated in the sections below; the
rule that only Indonesians can have property rights will be discussed
here. The BAL does not apply to land in areas officially qualified as for-
est: these are subject to the Forestry Law, the major implication of
which is that no private property rights can be registered in forest
areas. Whereas in many traditional land rights and tenure regimes re-
lations to land are predominantly communal in nature (Tjondronegoro
2003:4), the rights defined in the BAL are strictly individual. Although
the BAL refers to the notion of communal right (hak ulayat) (art. 3), it
is lacking in the catalogue of land rights that can exist (art. 16).
The term ulayat is derived from the West Sumatran Minangkabau
concept tanah ulayat that refers to ‘area’ (wilayah in Indonesian), viz.
the area or territory that the inhabitants of a village consider as belong-
ing to the community. It not only includes the built-up area of the vil-
lage and the gardens and fields, but may also include fallow land and
even forest.5 It is the very area of ‘unfree’ domain, the size of which
was the subject of intense debates during the colonial period. Under
different names this type of ‘communal land’ also exists in other ethnic
groups than the Minangkabau throughout Indonesia.6 The concept of
ulayat was transposed from the Minangkabau customary law level onto
the national level as shorthand for all regionally/locally different forms
of communal land rights.
Although the existence of ulayat rights are formally recognised in
the BAL (art. 3), their substantive recognition has been a problem. As
mentioned, communal rights are not included in the catalogue of
rights in the BAL, and neither the BAL nor other laws give regulations
for the documentation and registration of communal rights. Further-
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more, the recognition in the BAL is conditional: implementation of
ulayat rights, as far as they still exist, shall be in accordance with na-
tional and state interests and shall not be in variance with the law and
other regulations. But even ulayat rights that meet these requirements
do not have absolute validity. The Elucidation to the BAL (§ II(3)) ex-
plains that it is not justifiable to invoke ulayat rights if higher interests
require use of the land; it also cannot be tolerated that a community re-
pudiates – on the basis of its ulayat rights – the organised clearing of
forest areas if that is needed, for example, for food supply or for trans-
migration. The interests of a local community are subordinate to na-
tional and state interests.
Under Suharto’s centralised administration, it came to mean that vil-
lage communities were denied the possibility to invoke their ulayat
rights against concessions for large-scale commercial logging and other
forms of exploitation of ulayat land which were issued under the pre-
tence that these activities were of ‘general interest’. The neglect of cus-
tomary law and the tendency to restrict its scope of application were
supported by legislation, such as the Law on Foreign Investment7 that
favoured foreign investment to the detriment of the rights and interests
of local populations, and the Forestry Law that impeded the exercise of
communal land rights in forest areas.
As most of the existent implementing regulations of the BAL fail to
elaborate, and even contradict, the adat principles, the recognition of
customary land rights and customary systems of tenure has become a
critical element of contention (Heryani and Grant 2004:4). During Su-
harto’s ‘New Order’ administration, many among the policy-makers
and legislators preferred to cherish the opinion that adat law had com-
pletely faded away, or at least had changed to a degree that it could be
assumed to have become irrelevant. Their conclusion was usually
based on a comparison of the present-day rural land rights and tenure
arrangements and practices with early (colonial) studies of customary
law:8 if today’s conditions are found not to fit the old descriptions, they
are not considered to be customary (adat). This approach denies one of
the most essential characteristics of unwritten customary law – its flex-
ibility and adaptability (Ter Haar 1939) – and wrongly attributes legal/
normative significance to historical descriptions (Djojodigoeno and Tir-
tawinata 1940).
Review of the BAL, which has not been modified since its enactment
in 1960, was difficult until recently because of a strong band of formal-
ists who believe land law cannot be changed (Heryani and Grant
2004:4). Since the resignation of Suharto, these views are changing,
and a re-orientation towards customary law is occurring.
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‘State land’
The colonial ‘domain statement’ was considered to have served the in-
terests of colonial exploitation to the detriment of the Indonesian peo-
ple. Independent Indonesia rejected the colonial notion of the state as
the proprietor of ‘unused’ land and redefined the position of the state
with regard to land rights in terms of the public law (Harsono
1997:219) ‘right of the state to manage/control land’ for the benefit of
the nation (BAL art. 2: hak negara menguasai tanah, for short: taneh na-
gara – state land). The Elucidation to the BAL explains that this right
of the state can be understood as a kind of ‘communal right’ (ulayat) at
the highest level, i.e. of the entire Indonesian people,9 the scope of
which can be restricted by traditional communal rights, although these
may not be invoked to obstruct higher interests or hamper develop-
ment.10
Suharto’s ‘New Order’ administration applied a very restrictive inter-
pretation of traditional communal rights which virtually ruled them
out of existence. The train of thought underlying this approach is the
assumption that the BAL transferred the authority to manage land mat-
ters from the traditional communities to the state as the national com-
munity. The ‘community’ (i.e. the state) can then give user rights on
land to individuals (Indonesian citizens) but retains the power to re-
voke or annul these rights if this is desirable in the interest of the
‘community’. The traditional hak ulayat of the communities has been
absorbed by the ‘hak ulayat’ of the Indonesian nation, hence there is
no longer a basis for maintaining traditional communal lands, and
therefore all lands can be individualised (Lo¨ffler 1996:48 note 127,
quoting the draft version of Evers 1995). In spite of the recognition of
traditional communal rights (ulayat) in the BAL (art. 3), the revision of
the ‘state land’ concept did not reinstate traditional communities’ rights
over their original ulayat lands. The traditional hak ulayat was deemed
to have been superseded by a National Hak Ulayat, whereby the state/
government would henceforth fulfil the traditional role of village elders
and issue rights of use to Indonesian nationals (Evers 1995:7).
This approach materialised in the frequent expropriations – often
without consultation with the community and with or without ade-
quate compensation – of communal land for ‘general interest’ or ‘devel-
opment‘ purposes. More often than not, these were no more than pri-
vate interests of the president’s family and the elite surrounding him,
disguised and represented as ‘state interests’, like the construction of
golf links. One of the initial reactions of the population after the fall of
Suharto in 1999 was, not surprisingly, the re-occupation of land plots
that they claimed were unjustifiably taken from them, which they im-
mediately started ploughing and cultivating. In the meantime the gov-
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ernmental approach towards the role and significance of adat, in parti-
cular of communal land rights (ulayat), changed also, as will be elabo-
rated below.
Customary land rights and tenure arrangements
The BAL (art. 5) states that the agrarian law applicable to the earth,
water and air space is adat law (hukum adat: Indonesian customary
law).11 The Elucidation to the BAL (III(1)) explains that this provision
should be understood to mean that the new land law is based on cus-
tomary law. Either way it expresses the intention that the new land law
should be uniquely Indonesian, reflecting the cultural and normative
properties of the population. But in spite of the ideological intentions,
the relationship between customary law and the BAL (and other laws)
has been, and still is, very problematic and the subject of continuing
debates. This can be explained by three issues: the diversity and com-
plexity of local/regional forms of customary law; the assumption that
customary institutions and processes can be mimicked at the national
level; and the extensive interpretation of legal restrictions on the applic-
ability of customary law.
First of all there is not one single, uniform system of Indonesian
customary law: there is a great variety of very different regional and lo-
cal forms which are the product of long historical developments and
which reflect the cultural properties of the different communities.
Communities may be territorially organised, and the social organisa-
tion of others may be based on kinship, either patrilineal, parental, or
matrilineal. Many customary communities are hierarchically organised,
others have an egalitarian stratification. In many communities official
religions (particularly Islam) may have influenced or even replaced cus-
tomary (marriage and inheritance) arrangements; in others traditional
beliefs prevail. Factors like these account for the great regional and lo-
cal variety of customary land rights and tenure regimes.
Notwithstanding these variations, at a more abstract level most cus-
tomary land law and tenure regimes have some general characteristics
in common:
– village communities identify a certain area of unused land (fallow
land, community forest, etc.) beyond the built-up and cultivated
area as territory that is the communal right of the village commu-
nity (ulayat).
– land rights are usually not strictly individual rights but are often
embedded in the more inclusive rights/claims of a larger commu-
nity (family, ‘clan’, village); the idea of private property is unheard
of among some ethnic groups which practice communal farming
(Tjondronegoro 2003:3). Individuals have access to land by virtue of
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their belonging to the community. As such they are entitled to clear
a plot of fallow land and begin cultivating it. First cultivation of ‘va-
cant’ land creates an individual bond which intensifies by continu-
ous use. The community’s relationship, however, never disappears
completely: if, for example, the land is abandoned, the community’s
relationship is restored, and the land is available for cultivation by
other community members (Ter Haar 1939). Through inheritance,
individualised land becomes the common property of the less inclu-
sive community of heirs (‘re-communalisation’) (Von Benda-Beck-
mann 1979:150 ff).
– in most customary law systems land is not merely a commodity, it
is an element of a spiritual, metaphysical universe.
– they may not even have developed traditional provisions for selling
and buying land. Land used to be abundant: whoever needed land
could clear a plot in the community’s ulayat area. Under today’s in-
creased pressure on land, the need for transfers becomes acute and
is gradually becoming more accepted.
– within the small, traditional agrarian communities the villagers
know who is using which land and why; one used to be relatively
secure of one’s position regarding land: the ‘internal’ security (com-
munity) was strong. The ‘external’ security, the security of rights in
relation to community external actors (e.g. the state, banks, inves-
tors) is weak, however. These actors are not acquainted with cus-
tomary law or prefer not to care about it, and they usually refer to
the state’s land rights systems, which often do not cover the specific
properties of customary relations to land.
– customary law is usually unwritten and lacks a body of clearly for-
mulated rules; it is flexible and adaptive. Of central significance,
particularly in the more egalitarian stratified communities, are the
traditional decision-making processes in which the norms and prin-
ciples to be applied in concrete cases are created, maintained,
adapted, or even distorted.
A second cause of the problematic relationship between customary law
and the BAL is that the assumption underlying the BAL – customary
law can be lifted up to the national level and be used as a blueprint for
genuine Indonesian land law – is false. What in fact happens is that
the legislator and legal experts create something new, inspired by their
understanding of what customary law might be or should be. Besides
this argument of principle, there is the observation that the under-
standing of customary law in administrative and policy-making circles
is usually Java-centric.
Third, Suharto’s New Order administration tended to make condi-
tions for the recognition of customary law (BAL art. 5) more stringent
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and tried to deny its existence whenever possible. Customary law was
downplayed as ‘anachronistic and out of character in a modern market
driven economy’ (Heryani and Grant 2004). This was combined with
the fact that the determination of whether or not customary law and
customary law communities existed was not an empirical question but
an administrative decision. The recognition of adat and its applicability
were virtually reduced to zero. If adat rights could not be proven, the
land was automatically looked upon as state land and amenable to ‘na-
tional interests’ to which more weight was attached than to adat rights
(Lo¨ffler 1996:11).
The practice in the communities at the grassroots level, however, is
usually more viscous than governments, policy-makers, and legislators
might wish. Even after more than 40 years since the enactment of the
Basic Agrarian Law in 1960, customary land rights and tenure arrange-
ments are the primary normative framework in most rural agrarian
communities, adapted over time by the population to their needs and
circumstances. It cannot be denied that state-legislated rules have some
impact, particularly when people get entangled in court cases, but in
their minds people focus on the traditionally developed norms and
principles rather than on the legal rules of the state of which they
usually have little knowledge and understanding.
Realising that the traditional rights of customary law communities
have frequently been neglected and violated in the past, the approach
of the government towards customary law is changing. Under the post-
Suharto democratisation and decentralisation movement, the govern-
ment now endeavours to recognise and protect these rights. Notions
like ‘national interest’, ‘state interest’, and ‘higher interests of the so-
ciety’, which have been used for decades to override the exercise of cus-
tomary law, are now being questioned. Law 39/1999 regarding Human
Rights (art. 6) states that the differences and needs in customary law
communities must be observed and protected by the law, the public,
and the government, and that the cultural identity of customary law
communities should be protected, including their rights to communal
land. Furthermore, state institutions are beginning to pay attention to
customary law more substantively by defining what ‘customary law
communities’ are12 and by recognising some rights of such commu-
nities, e.g. the right to collect forest products for daily needs or to im-
prove their welfare, and the right to manage the forest according to
customary law if it is not contradictory to any legal regulations.13
The Indonesian Constitution recognised customary law commu-
nities for the first time in 2000 in the statement that: ‘The State shall
recognise and respect customary law community units and their tradi-
tional rights insofar as they are still in existence and are in accordance
with the development of the community and the principles of the Uni-
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tary State of the Republic of Indonesia, to be regulated in a Law’.14 Law
32/2004 on Regional Administration reconfirms the obligation of the
state to recognise and respect customary law communities and their
traditional rights (art.. 2(9)). At the same time, however, its article 203
(3), which states that local traditional rights are applicable if laid down
in a Regional Regulation, potentially restricts this recognition: if cus-
tomary law communities and their traditional rights are not defined in
a Regional Regulation, they do not have legal status. Their existence is
at best recognised as social fact. This may lead to the marginalisation
of not officially recognised customary communities, which tend to
come out as losers if conflicts over communal land occur with the state
or large enterprises.
Social function of land: Public interest vs. individual rights
The BAL (art. 6) states that all land rights have a social function, which
in the Elucidation to the BAL (II(4)) is explained to mean that the use
(or non-use) of land should not be in individual interests only; indivi-
dual and public interests should be in balance in order to achieve the
principal goals: prosperity, justice, and happiness for the entire peo-
ple.15
The exercise of the individual land rights listed in the BAL (art. 16)
is restricted accordingly. First, in order to avoid harming the public in-
terest, excessive ownership and control of land are prohibited (art. 7).
Possession of land in excess of a maximum to be prescribed in addi-
tional regulations will be expropriated against compensation for redis-
tribution (art. 17). Second, land rights can be revoked in the public in-
terest against proper compensation (art. 18). Two major problems de-
serve discussion here: the concept of ‘public interest’ and the question
of proper compensation.
Although ‘public interest’ is the touchstone for the restriction of the
exercise of individual rights, its meaning is not clear, as no definition
is given in the BAL. Later regulations involving restrictions of indivi-
dual rights are not very helpful either, as they contain no definition or
define the concept in vague terms, leaving room for interpretation.
What the BAL and these regulations have in common is the statement
that the public interest includes national and state interests, and/or in-
terest of the general public, and/or development.16 The various regula-
tions list a number of specific activities considered to be in the interest
of development (such as public roads, public hospitals, public market-
places), the number of which varies between seven and 21 in the conse-
cutive regulations, in addition to which the President reserves the right
to determine other forms of development activities if required for pub-
lic interest.17 One of the criteria for the determination of whether activ-
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ities are in the public interest is their commercial or non-commercial
character. Public interest activities were supposed to be non-commer-
cial. If the private sector is engineering government projects that sup-
port the public interest, or that are part of public and social facilities
construction, the procedure of expropriation in public interest can be
used.18 As previously mentioned, in the Suharto era ‘public interest’
came to be interpreted very broadly and arbitrarily. Under the umbrella
of ‘interest of the state’ and (economic) ‘development’, many projects
were carried out that could actually not be justified as being in the pub-
lic interest. Many plots of land that were officially expropriated for na-
tional development purposes in fact mainly benefited the ruling elite.
The BAL (art. 18) only mentions that land acquisition for public in-
terest necessitates proper compensation and delegates the formulation
of detailed procedural provisions to later laws and regulations. The
question of compensation includes at least three elements: determina-
tion of what is to be compensated, the form and the amount of com-
pensation. The physical and/or non-physical loss caused by the expro-
priation of land, buildings, vegetation, and/or other objects associated
with the land is what must be compensated. Compensation should pro-
vide a better socio-economic standard of living than before the land ac-
quisition.19 It is unclear whether and on what grounds compensation
of immaterial loss/damage can be claimed.20 Compensation may take
the form of money, replacement land, resettlement, a combination of
two or more of these forms, or other forms agreed upon by the parties
concerned.21 Resettlement of expropriated landowners has to be carried
out in such a way that they will be able to continue their business or
earn a livelihood as they did before.22 A titleholder who does not want
any of these options can be given compensation in the form of
shares.23 For the expropriation of communal land of a (village) commu-
nity (tanah ulayat), the compensation may be in the form of a public fa-
cility development or other forms that will benefit the local community
as a whole.24
The acquisition of land in the public interest must be done by way
of amicable negotiation (musyawarah) over the form and amount of
compensation between individual title holders (or representatives of
groups of title holders) and the official body concerned.25 A Land Ac-
quisition Committee must verify the rights on the land involved and
make proposals regarding the amount of compensation. The value has
to be established objectively without disadvantaging either party, where-
by the ‘local market price’ (the average price of sale and purchase trans-
actions of land/buildings/vegetation in the neighbourhood over a cer-
tain period of time) can be used as a guideline for the determination of
the value.26 If no agreement on the form and amount of compensation
can be reached between the government and the title-holding commu-
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nity members, the Land Acquisition Committee can set the amount of
compensation.27 Objections against the decision of the Land Acquisi-
tion Committee may be filed to the Regent/Mayor, the Governor, or the
Minister of Home Affairs. If the problems cannot be solved, the last
step will be a request to the President for revocation of the title on land
and objects on the land, signed by the Minister concerned and the
Minister of Justice and Human Rights.28
The multitude of the sometimes very detailed legal regulations
proved not to be a guarantee against infringements of land rights by
the government or government-supported private enterprises during
the Suharto administration. The rules were manipulated or simply ne-
glected and, as said above, under disguise of ‘development‘ and ‘public
interest’, many land expropriations occurred without proper consulta-
tion with landowners and with no or inadequate compensation. The re-
pressive regime and corrupt judiciary made redress virtually impossi-
ble.
Almost immediately after Suharto stepped down, a wave swept
through the country of spontaneous re-occupations of land plots that
were claimed to have been taken by the government illegally or against
inadequate compensation. The situation has significantly improved un-
der successive post-Suharto administrations. Additional regulations
have been enacted to redress the weaknesses in the legal system, and
the rules are implemented more prudently, taking into account the
needs of the population and their traditional institutions and proce-
dures. Nevertheless, there are still many problems in practice. One of
the major complaints today seems to be that the amount of compensa-
tion is almost always below the market price.
Land reforms
The implementation of provisions regarding maximum and minimum
size of land ownership prescribed by the BAL (art. 17) and determined
in Government Regulation in lieu of Law 56/1960 implied land re-
form. Land reform was most relevant – and needed – for Java, the most
densely populated island of Indonesia, with a population of around 42
million in 1960 (318/km2) and of more than 120 million currently
(909/ km2). Almost half of the farming households in Java (53.86 per
cent) had their own paddy-fields (sawah), 12.4 per cent were tenants or
sharecroppers on sawah owned by others, and 33.74 per cent of these
households worked as agricultural labourers (Hardjosudarmo 1970:65-
70).
Land use and ownership conditions in Java began to deteriorate after
the Second World War, when the worsening economic conditions
caused the value of land to increase, and inflation (ten to 25 per cent
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per month in 1962 (Soen 1968:61-62)) compelled many small farmers
to sell land. A middle class, virtually non-existent before the war,
emerged and began to invest in land. A trend developed towards the
accumulation of increasingly greater land holdings in the hands of a
small group of landowners. Economic pressure and fragmentation of
land through inheritance increased the disparity between the large
landholders and the small farmers. Statistics from 1957 show that 70
per cent of households in Java owned less than 0.5 hectare, 25 per cent
between 0.5 and one hectare, three per cent between one and two hec-
tares, 1.5 per cent between two and five hectares, and only 0.5 per cent
had five hectares or more at their disposal.
Furthermore, conditions of sharecropping arrangements in custom-
ary law worsened. Those conditions used to be based on the principle
of mutual aid. When the number of farmers who needed land became
larger than the area of land available, the relationship gradually devel-
oped into one of supply and demand in which customary considera-
tions of mutuality and justice played no role. It placed the sharecropper
in a disadvantageous position: his share might be half of the harvest if
he bore all production costs, but usually his share was not in balance
with the energy and expenses he spent in cultivating the land (Hu¨sken
1979:148).
In his State Address on Independence Day 1959, President Sukarno
announced a programme of land reform which he said would result in
a more equitable distribution of income among citizens and create a
social structure that would encourage a higher national production of
rice.29 Basically, the idea was to permit ownership of land only to those
who actually tilled the soil. This would simultaneously obliterate share-
cropping. The proposal met with opposition from various parties. Not
surprisingly, Islamic groups, supported by prominent Muslims and Is-
lamic schools (pesantren) who owned large tracts of land that might be
affected by the proposed system, opposed the idea. They argued that
shifting the ownership of land to the tiller was in variance with cus-
tomary law in which proprietary rights to land are inalienable divine
rights to be inherited by descendants. The Nationalist Party in turn op-
posed the proposal because many village officials, most of whom were
party members or supporters, controlled vast areas of land ‘in lieu of
salary’ (tanah bengkok) which they might lose under the new system.
And finally, although the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) propa-
gandised the idea of giving land to the tiller, they basically advocated
the complete abolition of private ownership rights and the establish-
ment of a collective system. President Sukarno reiterated that the Indo-
nesian land reform was not to be considered a communist land reform,
that rights of individual ownership would be maintained, and that peo-
ple still had permanent rights of ownership. In the end, a compromise
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was reached, consisting of the recognition of individual ownership of
real property up to a set maximum, even if the landowner did not till
the land himself, and the restriction of absentee land ownership.
These ideas are reflected in the BAL‘s provisions regarding maxi-
mum and minimum land ownership (artt. 7 and 17) and absentee own-
ership (artt. 10 and 24) that are the foundation of land reform legisla-
tion in Indonesia. They are formulated in very general terms and refer
to later laws for detailed regulation of the subjects. The BAL (art. 7)
prohibits ownership and control of land beyond certain limits. Land
owned in excess of the limits to be determined in later laws will be ta-
ken by the government against compensation for distribution among
those who need land (art. 17). The maximum and minimum limits
were set in a Government Regulation in lieu of Law 56/1960. The
maximum varied by region, depending on population density, between
fifteen hectares of paddy-fields (sawah) or twenty hectares of dry land
in underpopulated areas, and five hectares of sawah or six hectares of
dry land in highly populated areas, such as Java. The minimum size of
land holding was set at two hectares per household (art. 8). Failure to
comply with the rules regarding transfer land owned in excess of the
set maximum was able to evoke criminal sanction and lead to forfei-
ture of the right to compensation (art. 10).
BAL article 10 rules that those who hold a right to land have to work
or use it themselves (‘land-to-the-tiller principle’), and article 24 says
that the use of land by others than the owner will be restricted. The lat-
ter provision was elaborated in Government Regulation 224/1961 (art.
3) that determined that those who own land outside the sub-district of
residence or the adjacent sub-district shall transfer such land to an in-
habitant of the district where the land is situated.30 If one fails to com-
ply with this provision, the land will be expropriated against compensa-
tion and redistributed by the government.
Rules regarding compensation of landowners for the expropriation
of land owned in excess of the set maximum were determined in Gov-
ernment Regulation 224/1961. The compensation for the first five hec-
tares of expropriated land was ten times the annual net production; for
the second, third, and fourth plots of five hectares it was nine times;
any further excess land would be compensated with seven times the
annual net production.31 Farmers who received expropriated land had
to pay the government the equivalent of the compensation paid to for-
mer land owners, plus a ten per cent administration fee.32 It soon be-
came clear, however, that it would be impossible to implement the pro-
visions regarding maximum land ownership and to redistribute land
owned in excess.
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(i) Obstacles to land reform
As early as 1961 Ladejinsky, the architect of land reform in Japan, re-
ported several obstacles that hindered the smooth implementation of
land reform in Indonesia. First of all, he found that the provision of re-
distribution of land held by absentee landowners, and land exceeding
the maximum limit, could serve only a small number of farmers and
would not be sufficient to provide the many landless households with
land. Furthermore, the provision for minimum ownership was unrea-
listic because there was not enough land to guarantee that each house-
hold would receive the prescribed two hectares (Walinsky 1977:297).
Official records33 prove him right. These indicate that between 1963
and 1969 some 7.75 per cent of approximately five million landless fa-
milies received 0.43 hectare on average per household.34 Due to the
scarcity of available land, the policy of redistribution to all landless fa-
milies was not further enforced. The rule of minimum ownership was
adapted: farmers in densely populated areas who owned one hectare or
more would not receive any additional land, whereas those who owned
less than one hectare would receive additional land to increase their to-
tal to a maximum of one hectare. Farmers who did not themselves
own land would be given a plot of 0.5 hectare.35
Ladejinsky pointed at other obstacles, such as the long process of ob-
taining the excess land (there were no less than fifteen institutions
which had to approve applications), the selection of beneficiaries, and
the question of compensation to the old owners. He criticised the com-
position of the village land committees involved in the redistribution of
land and the selection of beneficiaries. Their membership was gener-
ally composed of the village heads and representatives of farmers orga-
nisations which almost always represented the interests of the large
landowners (Mortimer 1972:18).36 They often allowed for false report-
ing in the surveying of land. Landless peasants rarely had a voice in
matters affecting them. Laadejinsky claimed that, in order to be effec-
tive, the committee members needed to be elected by all concerned,
and in any case, landless peasants should make up the majority.37 Even
for well-meaning village land committees the categories of recipients
were too numerous and their categorisation too complicated to admin-
ister. They faced too many choices; a situation that was further compli-
cated by the fact that the land to be redistributed was, in most cases,
only a very small amount (Walinsky 1977:343-347).
Large landowners disliked the compensation system because the dif-
ference between the compensation paid by the government and the
market price was so great that expropriation was considered confisca-
tion. A parcel appraised by the government might in the market realise
seven to thirty times as much. In order to avoid expropriation, it be-
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came common practice among large landowners to fictitiously transfer
land to other family members by means of pre-dated transfer of titles,
so that officially they did not possess land beyond the maximum limit
(Adicondro 1980:2-3). Transfers to relatives were not necessarily a viola-
tion of the law as long as those relatives had cultivated the land as
tenants prior to the enactment of the law. But usually that was not the
case, and many transfers of land plots were faked, with the intent of
obscuring excess ownership and preventing expropriation.
To deal with the confusion and difficulties surrounding compensa-
tion, the government set up a land reform bond system in 1963:38 com-
pensation was to be given in the form of a ten per cent deposit to a sav-
ings account in the former landowner‘s name, and the remainder was
in the form of government bonds to be paid over twelve years at three
per cent interest per year.39 Due to the extremely rapid inflation be-
tween 1963 and 196540 and economic decline, compensation given to
former landowners thus amounted to a loss.
(ii) The fate of land reform
Between 1962 and 1965 land reform became the primary source of po-
litical conflict between Sukarno’s Nationalists and the Islamic parties
on the one hand, and the Communists on the other. Most of the land-
owners belonged either to the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) or to
the Islamic party Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Landless peasants, in spite of
their hard lives, mostly supported the parties or organisations of their
employers, on whom they depended. They were hesitant to join the
farmers’ organisation of the Communist Party (Utrecht 1976:273-282).
Some of the landowners, however, also supported the Communist
Party, financially or otherwise, in exchange for which they enjoyed pro-
tection against the forced ‘unilateral occupation’ of land (aksi sepihak)
by landless peasants at the instigation of the Communist Party. The
communists, who found that land reform developed too slowly and
was entirely manipulated, considered these ‘unilateral actions’ as just
and legal means of seriously implementing the BAL (Aidit 1964:21-22,
89-90). These actions created an extremely tense situation in which
the Communist Party confronted Islamic groups, the nationalists, and
the army. The conflict over land reform was no longer between land-
owners and landless peasants – it was now a case of communist
against anti-communists.
The political conflict culminated in the tragic attempted coup d’e´tat
in 1965 followed by a massive wave of violence that swept through the
country in which large numbers of members and followers of commu-
nist organisations, suspected sympathisers, and many innocent people
were murdered.41 Land reform came to be stigmatised as a product of
the communists. The implementation of land reform and the distribu-
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tion of excess and absentee land came to a stop, and many former
landowners reclaimed land plots that had been taken from them (Tjon-
dronegoro 2003:12). In this troubled period of social and political tur-
moil, one’s rights in land (and, for that matter, in other property) were
far from secure.
Since the mid-1970s there have been several attempts to restart the
realisation of land reform as required by the BAL and other regula-
tions.42 In 1982, for example, Land Reform Advisory Committees were
established at the national and regional (provincial/district) levels43 that
should, among other things, make an inventory of lands with absentee
owners and land exceeding maximum ownership for the purpose of re-
distribution.44 In the years thereafter, instances of reallocation of land
to landless families did indeed occur, but the total amount of reallo-
cated land and the size of individual plots were relatively insignificant
in relation to the actual needs. Besides, these allotments cannot be con-
sidered as instances of land reform redistribution, as the reallocated
plots were mostly taken from former colonial 75-year leases and state-
owned land. They did not originate from excess or absentee holdings.
Although these attempts demonstrate at least some degree of politi-
cal will on the part of the government at the time to provide land to
those in need, they also show that unless changes are made in the
maximum and minimum limits of ownership and unless the prohibi-
tion of absentee landownership is enforced, these good intentions will
not of themselves be sufficient to improve the lives of landless peasants
in Java, whose numbers have greatly increased since 1960.
(iii) New land reform programme in the post-Suharto ‘Reformation Era’
The situation remained virtually unchanged until September 2006,
when the Indonesian government announced a new policy of gradual
land reform to be implemented between 2007 and 2014 in order to im-
prove the living standard of economically weak groups. A total of 8.15
million hectares of land is to be distributed, 6 million of which is des-
tined for poor farmers who meet specific criteria. The size of the plot
to be distributed to each family varies, depending on the needs of the
families and the availability of land in the region45. The remaining 2.15
million hectares would be granted to small entrepreneurs under the
Right of Exploitation (Hak Guna Usaha) or the Right to Use (Hak Pa-
kai), which rights can be revoked by the state if the land is not used for
productive purposes.
The plans for this land redistribution policy were thoroughly com-
mented on and criticised. The Indonesian Legal Assistance Group
(PBHI) criticised the government’s intentions to allow the allocation of
land to entrepreneurs. They were of the opinion that, in the framework
of land reform, land should be distributed to tillers. They demanded
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that the government give priority to the needs of farmers and custom-
ary communities and revoke all laws and regulations that do not favour
them.46
The Indonesian Farmers Union Federation (FSPI) in turn argued
that the BAL was inadequate to realise the envisaged reforms and that
a new law was required whose provisions follow the principles of the
BAL 1960.47 They held the view that the structuring of land ownership
in the agricultural sector must begin from the implementation of the
land reform programme that includes ownership scale modification
and the division and fusion of farm operation units. They point to a
number of other conditions for success. First, the capacity of farmers
needs to be enhanced through educational programmes, subsidies, im-
provement of farming technology, fair distribution and trade systems,
and support to farmers’ organisations and farmers’ cooperatives. Sec-
ond, an inventory of unresolved land conflicts should be drawn up in
preparation of their settlement, and a systemic, organised and compre-
hensive conflict settlement mechanism should be formulated. Third,
land rights that have been violated should be restored, taking into con-
sideration the sense of justice of the people who have become victims.
Many of these critical arguments have come to play a role in the dis-
course about the restoration of the land rights situation in post-Suharto
Indonesia.
Registration of land rights
The BAL (art. 19) states that the government will register all land
throughout Indonesia ‘in order to guarantee legal security’. This provi-
sion has, however, remained a dead letter for a long time; registration
advanced at a snail’s pace. It was estimated in 1995, when Indonesia
engaged in a large World Bank-supported land registration project, that
only some seven to ten per cent of all land had been registered (Evers
1995:21; Walijatun and Grant 1996). Most of these registrations were
so-called ‘sporadic’ registrations, the expensive and time-consuming
standard procedure of registration of single plots of land at individual
request by Westerners during the colonial period and by urban elites
and companies after independence.
The agrarian population apparently felt no urge or was unable to
have their rights registered. They continued to manage their land
rights and tenure affairs under the traditional system they were famil-
iar with, which defined the communal and individual relations to land.
Amongst themselves, community members were relatively secure of
their land rights, and traditional decision-making mechanisms were
available for dealing with doubts and disputes. The ‘internal’ security
of traditional land rights and tenure regimes is jeopardised, however,
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when external parties (the state, companies, individuals) choose to lay
hands on land in the community’s territory. In the Suharto era this of-
ten happened without paying much attention to customary rights un-
der the political justification of ‘development‘. Traditional systems pro-
vided no security against such external infringements.
Traditional/customary land rights cannot as such be registered. They
have to be officially ‘released’ from the traditional context first through
a ‘Release of Adat Land Document’ (Surat Bukti Pelepasan Tanah Adat)
and converted into a legal right according to the BAL (Rieger et al.
2001:48)48 that seemed more or less equivalent to the relationship in
the traditional sphere. One of the major theoretical problems of this
procedure is that BAL rights are strictly individual, whereas customary
rights have communal characteristics. Even individual land rights and
tenure relations are usually embedded in the rights of a larger group of
relatives and co-villagers. These characteristics are lost in the conver-
sion into BAL rights. The low registration numbers of 1995 show that
the opportunity to transfer customary rights into BAL rights has not
been widely taken up.
(i) Promotion of registration
The government undertook several attempts to accelerate the registra-
tion of land. In 1984 the ‘National Agrarian Project’ (Proyek Nasional
Agraria: PRONA) was initiated. Farmers could apply for registration
under the project, which used the relatively expensive method of
‘sporadic’ registration but would be cheaper for applicants than an indi-
vidual registration at their own request because the government subsi-
dised the project. It resulted in an increase of registrations, but not to
the degree that was hoped for. One of the reasons for the disappointing
results was probably the fact that apparently political considerations
played a role in the selection and admission of applicants: supporters
of Suharto’s political party, Golkar, seemed to be favoured, antagonists
ignored. Furthermore, potential applicants often refrained from apply-
ing because they did not trust the government and its projects, and did
not believe that registration would benefit them.
A more effective measure was the Indonesian Land Administration
Project (LAP) that was launched in 1995 with the assistance of the
World Bank and the Australian government, modelled upon a similar
project in Thailand (Onchan et al. 1990; Slaats 1999; World Bank
2003c). It aimed at the systematic registration of all land throughout
Indonesia in 25 years. Unlike the normal procedure of ‘sporadic’ regis-
tration used in previous registration projects, LAP was based on ‘sys-
tematic’ registration, meaning that all inhabitants of a selected area
would be approached one-by-one, door-to-door as it were, by registra-
tion officials in order to determine which rights they had on land, to
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mark its border, to enter the data in the central record, and to issue cer-
tificates. The system is much more accurate and efficient, and thus
provides faster and cheaper registration, than previous projects.49 Sub-
stantive subsidisation by the government enabled the families/indivi-
duals in the selected areas to have a land plot registered at an extre-
mely low price of approximately USD 3 (the cost price would be around
USD 26) (World Bank 2004b:44).50
Initially, the implementation of the systematic registration project
was restricted to the densely populated Java, where customary land
rights regimes were considered to be non-existent or of too little rele-
vance to stand in the way of individualisation through titling and regis-
tration. Before registration could be started in the areas outside Java,
research had to be carried out to answer the question of whether com-
munal customary rights on land were still extant, and what that meant
for registration. Although the research took place in only four different
areas, among communities with very different cultural characteristics
and land rights regimes, its results suggest that throughout Indonesia
customary land regimes and communal rights on land still apply that
are not easily reconcilable with individualisation through registration.
The government was advised to acknowledge traditional communal
rights and respect the communities’ authority (Slaats 1997:12/1) and to
refrain from registration of individual plots in rural areas.
Ministerial Regulation 5/1999 was the first that confirmed the exis-
tence of traditional ulayat rights and made some substantive provi-
sions. Among other things it states that the authority to dispose of
ulayat land, by allowing other parties (including the state) access to it,
is in the hands of the traditional community concerned. In the years
thereafter a process of revitalisation and reinvention of adat set in,
which has been well received in government circles. Many district ad-
ministrations are designing (or have issued) adat land law regulations.
NGOs have joined the process and have significantly increased their ac-
tivities in the field of defending and promoting (putative) adat land
rights. Many land claims which had been suppressed under the ‘New
Order’ regime have now resurfaced and are often justified/reinforced
by reference to their adat status (Bakker 2005). The process, however,
also creates room for political opportunism by rent-seekers and power-
seekers to enlarge the scope of their authority or to obtain positions
they never had under the customary system (Bakker forthcoming).
The set-up of the project and its implementation were well consid-
ered. On the basis of available information (maps, aerial photographs,
population numbers, etc.), small workable areas were demarcated
where the actual registration activities would be carried out by officers
of the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), who had
been recruited in great numbers from all over Indonesia, and who had
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been trained for the job. These activities were divided into two types:
adjudication and survey. An adjudication team would visit the inhabi-
tants of the area, door-to-door, to establish whether they had land,
where it was located, and what kind of rights they had. If no valid offi-
cial documents of ownership were available, other written documents
and oral testimony by the applicant and other witnesses (formal and
informal local leaders, friends and neighbours) were allowed to prove
claimed rights. If a claimed plot appeared to be state land, the National
Land Agency would investigate the possibility of granting ownership
rights on that plot to the applicant.51 Applicants were requested to de-
marcate their land plots in the presence of the owners of neighbouring
plots. In case of disputed borders (or other disputes) which could not
be settled through mediation of the adjudication team, a plot would
not be registered for the time being until the dispute was settled in
court or otherwise. The results of the investigation of the adjudication
team were posted at the local land office so that each could be checked.
Objections could be submitted within 60 days. Then a survey team
would enter the field to measure the surface and exact location and po-
sition of each demarcated plot. The data of all teams were collected at
the office of the National Land Agency and entered into the land regis-
ter, after which, usually with some ceremony, certificates stating the
physical and legal properties of the land (and restrictions thereof) were
handed out to the entitled individuals.
Generally, the LAP was better organised and more transparent than
previous registration projects. Before registration was implemented in
an area, information on costs, rights and obligations, and the process
of registration was disseminated in public meetings with the popula-
tion, in which the participation of women was encouraged. The interim
results were published prominently in the village, and there was an op-
portunity to dispute the outcome of surveys. Certificates were usually
issued as promised. Instances of additional informal payments, unu-
sual delays in processing, exercise of administrative discretion, and
fraudulent documentation did occur, but far less often than in other
government-supported registration projects or under the system of
sporadic registration.
Due to the Asian economic crisis, the budget for the LAP was se-
verely reduced, implying that the implementation slowed down and
was restricted to primarily urban areas. Yet at the end of 2003 the
number of registered land plots was estimated to have risen to 27 per
cent (approximately 23 million out of 85 million of land plots; BPN
(National Land Agency) 2003).52 In order to register the remaining
plots within a relatively short period of time, the implementation pro-
cess had to be adapted. For the acceleration of land registration, the
government initiated the Land Management and Policy Development
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Project, whose target was the registration of 2.5 million plots during
the period of 2005-2009. In 2005, however, the project achieved only
75 per cent of the target (260,315 out of 315,000 plots; BPN (National
Land Agency) 2006:1).
(ii) Effect of registration
Registration of land rights is supposed to provide legal security (BAL
art. 19) and therefore enhance tenure security. After the registration
data have been processed, the title holder receives a certificate for each
of the registered land plots. The certificate is proof that a plot of land
has been registered and that the physical and legal data therein corre-
spond to the data in the measurement letter and the land book.53 It
does not, however, provide waterproof evidence of right, because regis-
tration is based on the ‘negative registration system’ in which the state
does not guarantee the accuracy of the registered data. Thus, a party
whose name is recorded as the title holder in the land book and on the
certificate is still at a risk of being sued by other parties claiming to
have a right to the land.54 The objective is to strike a balance between
the legal certainty of all parties who possess in good faith (with or with-
out registration).
The security certificates are supposed to offer is furthermore jeopar-
dised by the fact that not infrequently different people hold a certificate
for the same plot of land, in other words: several certificates on the
same plot of land are in circulation. Some of these are simple counter-
feits, but often the certificates are official (drawn up by an authorised
official) but fraudulent (‘bought’ through corruption). The phenomen-
on is so common that the Indonesians have a term for such certifi-
cates: aspal (asli palsu: original but false).
Besides providing security of title (as envisaged in the BAL art. 19),
the registration of land rights was assumed to have positive economic
effects. One of the underlying assumptions of LAP was that registered
land (certificates) could be used as collateral for bank loans to be in-
vested in agricultural activities. Under colonial and Indonesian law,
customary land rights could not be registered and used as collateral for
loans, and the opportunity to have these rights converted into BAL
rights was rarely used. The farmer population used to turn to relatives,
neighbours and semi-professional moneylenders for loans (usually very
expensive). They had virtually no access to institutional moneylenders,
as banks were not inclined to provide loans on unregistered land.
Law 4/1996 on Security Rights replaced the provisions of the colonial
Civil Code on mortgage (hypotheek) on land and other immovable prop-
erties that had been in force until then. Under the new law, unregistered
land (including customary land) could be used as collateral if simulta-
neously with the conferment of the security right, a request was made
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for registration of the land.55 On the one hand, this can be considered a
promising step ahead in the endeavour to speed up the registration of
land. On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether this option will
be frequently used given the costs of individual (sporadic) registration
requests.
Land registration seems to have increased the number of bank loans
to farmers with their land as collateral, also in rural areas,56 although
banks are hesitant to provide substantive loans in remote rural areas,
as collateral land may be unsaleable or have too little liquidation value.
On the other hand, it also happens that local branches of banks provide
petty loans to farmers on the basis of an unofficial written promise that
land (unregistered) will serve as security, or even without any security.
These transactions are usually short-term and expensive (high interest
rate) and based on trust and personal relationships. The institutional
moneylender thus enters the domain of unofficial borrowing from rela-
tives and other unofficial moneylenders whose services are still widely
used in rural customary law areas.
Given the above discussion of Indonesian land law and its develop-
ments, the remaining sections focus on two additional issues: the real-
location of authority in land matters in the framework of post-Suharto
decentralisation, and the question of the ability/inability of the BAL to
accommodate non-agrarian, modern industrial, and commercial inter-
ests (investments in land).
Decentralisation and land management authority
The administration of non-forest land is in the hands of the National
Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional).57 This agency has the
authority to issue rights on state land (right of exploitation: hak guna
usaha), is charged with the implementation of registration projects,
processes and records registration data (both from systematic and
sporadic registrations), and issues land certificates. By virtue of its
strictly centralised organisation and the repressive character of Suhar-
to’s New Order administration, the agency developed a powerful
authoritarian position in land matters, accompanied by an intimidating
display of power and rent-seeking (corruption).
Its position came under scrutiny after Suharto was forced to step
down in 1998, and his successor set in motion a process of democrati-
sation and decentralisation. In 1999, after more than 30 years of a
strong, centralised government, the authority in a number of domains,
including the administration of land, shifted from the centre to the
lower, regional administrative levels: the district (kabubaten) and cities/
municipalities.58 The land sector is for obvious reasons (see above) one
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of the domains which is coloured by the tug-of-war between the central
government, which tends to retain all authority over land matters, and
regional governments who like to have their say in land affairs.
The original plan for the devolution of all land affairs to the regional
level was modified: the National Land Agency was maintained as a cen-
tral agency, but its role was limited to legislation, performance stan-
dards, uniform land registration procedures, training, and the provi-
sion of some services (Heryani and Grant 2004:11). Presidential Regu-
lation 10/2006 on the National Land Agency, which ordered the
establishment of branch offices of the agency at the various regional le-
vels, provoked protest from regional government institutions.59 They
asserted that the regulation implicitly maintained the centralised struc-
ture of land administration and reduced regional autonomy, which is
in contradiction with the principle of Law 32/2004 that land issues are
fully under the authority of the regional government at the provincial,
district, and city level. They found that autonomy in land affairs was vi-
tal for districts and cities to develop spatial layout strategies and allo-
cate land, and requested the central government to immediately trans-
fer the authority in land affairs to the autonomous regions.
The All-Indonesia Association of Provincial Governments went even
further in its criticisms and proposed that the BAL be amended and be
brought into agreement with the principle of decentralisation in order
to be able to meet the demand for agrarian services necessitated by po-
pulation growth, advancement of science and technology, spatial layout
changes, and the securing of land rights, including communal and in-
dividual customary rights.
The influential non-governmental Agrarian Reform Consortium
(Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria), on the other hand, advocated that not
all authority should be given to the region, but that there should be a
balanced distribution of authority in land matters between the central
and regional governments. Agrarian reform requires a national policy.
If no attention is paid to agrarian reform and structural change within
governmental organisation, discussions about the distribution of
authority are a waste of energy. These disputes are ongoing, and the
distribution of authority in land affairs between the central and regio-
nal government is still not clear today.
Land law and non-agrarian interests (investments)
We have seen above that many critics advocate adapting various aspects
of the BAL. There are others who go even further and propose the
withdrawal of the BAL and its replacement with a new land law that
will answer the present-day requirements. They argue that the BAL pri-
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marily focuses on rural, agrarian relationships and interests, and that it
is not geared to accommodate non-agrarian, modern, economic (indus-
trial, commercial and investment) interests. They point at two obstacles
in the BAL. One is the provision of article 9(1) and 21 that only Indone-
sian subjects and government-acknowledged corporate bodies can have
property rights (hak milik) in land. It excludes not-recognised Indone-
sian corporate bodies, foreigners, and foreign corporations. This ar-
rangement stems from the isolationist policy under Indonesia‘s first
president, Sukarno, who opposed foreign investment and even with-
drew Indonesia from the United Nations, the IMF, and the World
Bank. For some time, foreign aid and foreign investments were re-
fused, except from socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union and
China. Sukarno was forced to abandon this policy of isolationism by
then general Suharto who made him accept a law to allow and facilitate
foreign investment.60 Although foreigners and foreign companies still
could not have full property rights (hak milik) in land, they were al-
lowed the legal opportunity to obtain one of the more restricted rights
(use rights, cultivation rights, rights of building). This, however, did
not solve the second obstacle: the relatively short duration of these re-
stricted land rights. The duration of 25 years (with the possibility of ex-
tension for another 25 years) for the Right to Cultivate (Hak Guna Usa-
ha) and 30 years for the Right to Building (Hak Guna Bangunan) was
insufficient for many entrepreneurs.
It was not until 1996 that an attempt was made to solve this pro-
blem by issuing a Government Regulation that extended the periods of
validity to 95 years for the Right to Cultivate, 80 years for the Right to
Building, and 70 years for the Right of Use (Hak Pakai). The Regula-
tion, moreover, allowed applying for the extension or renewal of the
right simultaneously with the initial granting request. This Govern-
ment Regulation solved the problem only partly because it was not of
the same status as a statute, and was not considered to provide suffi-
cient legal certainty.
The final solution lies in the Foreign Investment Law61 that Parlia-
ment accepted in March 2007. It formulates the provisions of Govern-
ment Regulation in a law which brings them in line with the provi-
sions in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and China,
where the land rights for investors range between 75 and 90 years. It
is hoped that this will attract the substantial domestic and foreign in-
vestments which are required to solve Indonesia‘s economic problems,
in which an increase of economic growth to 6.3 per cent is needed to
remedy an unemployment rate of more than ten per cent. 62
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Conclusion
Until the change in the colonial mentality under the ‘Ethical Policy’ of
the early twentieth century, the welfare of the indigenous Indonesian
population was not of major interest to the colonial government. A sys-
tem of social, economic, and legal dualism facilitated the efficient and
profitable exploitation of the country’s natural wealth by the colonial
government and foreign enterprises. The generated profits were ex-
ported to the homeland in Europe, while virtually no investments were
made in the indigenous economy. World War II brought an end to
Dutch colonial rule. The colonial economy had collapsed, and Indone-
sia found itself in the economic state of an underdeveloped agrarian
nation, which it had always been.
Young independent Indonesia wanted to do away with the discrimi-
natory dualistic colonial system and the laws that had served colonial
interests. The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (BAL) abolished colonial
regulations pertaining to land. The law formulated the basic principles
of a new national land law that was to express the specific Indonesian
cultural and normative characteristics and to serve the interests/aspira-
tions of its people. This is expressed in, among other things, the BAL‘s
reference to traditional law (adat) and traditional communal rights
(ulayat), and in the redefined position of the state. The intention of the
BAL to improve the economic position of the poor and landless pea-
sants is reflected in the provisions regarding the redistribution of land
owned in excess of the set maxima (land reform). Registration of land
rights was to guarantee legal security.
That many of the goals set out in the BAL have not been achieved is
partly due to the ambivalence and vagueness of the BAL itself. The re-
ference to traditional law (adat) and communal (village) rights (ulayat)
proved to be a legal formality that had no substantive consequences.
The strictly individual land rights defined in the BAL lack the charac-
teristics of communality inherent in traditional land tenure relation-
ships, and thereby weaken the prevailing systems of internal securities
of tradition-based land rights and tenure relationships in rural commu-
nities. Until recently, traditional rights have been virtually neglected,
since they usually come off worse when confronted with claims based
on BAL rights.
Land reform, unpopular amongst landowners in general, failed as it
became associated with communism. It was doomed to fail in the over-
populated island of Java where there was too little land available to pro-
vide so many farmer families with the prescribed minimum. Registra-
tion of land rights, anticipated in the BAL to provide legal security, re-
mained a dead letter for a long time. It apparently did not appeal to
the masses, as the low number of registrations before the 1995 intro-
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duction of systematic registration programmes indicates. Some tradi-
tional communities recorded the boundaries of their village territory
themselves to avoid the loss of village communal land as a conse-
quence of official registration. Even today many countrymen do not see
the benefit of title registration, and find their tradition-based internal
security satisfactory.
Besides the flaws in the BAL itself, the proliferation of often incon-
sistent lower regulations and poor implementation – if not abusive gov-
ernment practice – contributed to the failure to realise the promises of
the BAL. The ‘New Order’ regime of Indonesia‘s second president, Su-
harto, managed to improve the overall economic standard of the na-
tion. A reasonably well-off middle class emerged. However, the benefits
mainly accumulated among a small elite group around the president.
The masses of peasants and the poor enjoyed little of the economic im-
provement. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism marked the 30 years
of ‘New Order’ government. More often than not, the law seemed to be
used as a recipe of how to evade the rule of law, rather than as the ba-
sis for implementation, in order to serve the interests of the political
and economic elite in the guise of national or state interests. Many
communities and individuals lost land through expropriation against
no or inadequate compensation for purposes that cannot reasonably be
justified as general interest. Traditional land rights were most vulner-
able, but legal rights under the BAL were not exempt from infringe-
ment either. Social resistance was unthinkable under the repressive re-
gime, whereas appeal to justice was useless because of corruption and
the courts’ legalistic attitude and lack of affinity with traditional law.
Traditional landowners could be sure only of the insecurity of tradi-
tional land rights and tenure relationships against external claims. Ex-
ternal interventions contributed to the erosion of traditional land rights
and tenure securities.
The significance of registration, stepped up by the state-supported
large-scale Indonesian Land Administration Project, is questionable. It
may be beneficial in urban environments and for the small landowners
in Java where land ownership has become individualised over time. In
the rest of Indonesia, however, registration implies the transformation
of tradition-based land rights and tenure relationships into individual
BAL rights. Such transformations, in which the communalistic traits of
traditional relationships are embezzled, uncontrollably affect the fabric
of social relationships. The cancellation of the registration project in
areas outside Java, triggered by the Asian economic crisis, may be a
blessing in disguise. The land rights and tenure systems prevailing
there remained untouched and were (temporarily) left to take their
own course of development at their own speed.
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The post-Suharto developments give rise to optimism. Processes of
democratisation and decentralisation have set in, demanding a greater
measure of bureaucratic transparency and governmental responsibility.
The division of power between central and decentralised bodies is not
yet balanced, but the lower level authorities are closer to the constituen-
cies whose expectations they have to answer. They tend to pay more at-
tention to local conditions and demands. Many regional/local govern-
ments have issued regulations that give some form of recognition to
traditional land law that applies at the local level. Throughout the coun-
try land rights are claimed/reclaimed, rightly or wrongly, on the basis
of traditional claims.
The contention that the BAL unified land law is a formal legal argu-
ment that disregards the reality of the great diversity of local/regional
land rights and tenure arrangements that still exist on the ground de-
spite 40 years of national legislation. Recognition of this diversity is
the first step in a sound national land rights policy and the basis of
adequate, effective legislation.
The conditions of overpopulated Java require different land rights
provisions than other parts of the country. In Java, communalistic traits
of traditional land rights have almost completely disappeared; land
rights have become strongly individual. A shift from uneconomic/un-
tenable husbandry on fragmented land plots to decentralised/dispersed
labour-intensive industrialisation may be one of the means to alleviate/
tackle the economic problems of overpopulated Java. It may help to
stop and reverse the drift from the countryside to the city. The variety
of land rights and tenure systems elsewhere in the country are to a
greater or lesser degree still based on rules and practices that have
been handed down from generation to generation. This traditional law
is not merely a rigid relic of the past; it has continuously been adapted
to arising changes and challenges. It has survived in spite of imposed
national legal rules.
An adequate understanding and substantive recognition of these lo-
cal arrangements seem to be prerequisite for attempts to bridge the
gap between these arrangements and national law. Rather than top-
down imposition of law, a facilitative government policy that leaves
room for bottom-up incentives and takes account of the demographic
and environmental diversity may lead to more realistic and effective
legislation. Accepting the conditions prevailing in viable traditional
communities and taking them into account in national law develop-
ment policy might be more efficient and promising than neglecting
them or ruling them out of existence. Thus, the traditional decision-
making processes that are vital as the constituent source of norms in
tradition-oriented communities should be taken seriously by the legis-
lator as well as by external parties (e.g. enterprises) in their negotia-
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tions for land. Excessive traditional conditions, however, may require
marginal intervention by national law. For the settlement of rural inter-
nal community disputes as well as external disputes about land, tradi-
tional dispute-handling institutions and processes should be incorpo-
rated in Indonesia‘s adjudicative hierarchy as the fourth and lowest le-
vel.
Systematic registration of land under the nationwide land adminis-
tration project should refrain from registering individual plots in tradi-
tion-oriented communities and should be restricted to recording the
outer boundaries of the village territory, including communal lands
(ulayat), for protection against external infringements. Instead of cen-
tralised registration, land rights in tradition-oriented communities
should be recorded by a simple local documentation system that can
be easily accessed and controlled by title holders. The recorded data
can form the basis for higher-level registration, if desirable, and for
(semi)-institutional loans.
Facilitative policy also implies that people in communities that are
moving away from traditional rule and developing individual land
rights should be given the opportunity to subject themselves to the ap-
plication of statutory law (BAL). Indonesian land law, finally, should
provide for communal rights, both individual rights embedded in com-
munal rights (e.g. of kin groups) and village communal rights (ulayat).
Besides general cultural diversity, the diversification of land law would
thus be a significant expression of Indonesia‘s national motto ‘Bhinne-
ka Tunggal Ika’ (unity in diversity).
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19 Land registration programmes for Indonesia’s
urban poor: Need, reach, and effect in the
kampongs of Bandung
Gustaaf Reerink1
Introduction
The overall majority of Indonesia‘s urban poor reside in so-called kam-
pongs, traditional low-income settlements. Three categories of land ten-
ure are generally found in these settlements: formal, customary, and
informal. Dwellers with formal tenure have a property title to their
land on the basis of rights acknowledged by the 1960 Basic Agrarian
Law (BAL), which remains the general framework for Indonesian land
law.2 At the same time, customary tenure is still common in kampongs,
usually taking form in individual, inheritable adat ownership rights
(so-called hak milik adat). The BAL acknowledges communal rights (so-
called hak ulayat) – provided that certain requirements are met – but
not adat ownership rights. Still, the latter type of rights arguably have a
semi-formal status as they are acknowledged as legitimate claims for
legalisation, as will be discussed below. Adat ownership rights continue
to be applied in kampongs. Finally, a third category, informal land ten-
ure, is found in kampongs. Informal tenure is usually the result of
dwellers squatting land on which the state holds a direct state right of
avail (state land) or, less often, on which others have established private
rights. This category carries no legal status.
Both customary and informal tenure can be legalised. Customary
tenure can be legalised through the legal conversion of ‘old’ colonial
adat ownership rights, thus contributing to the BAL‘s aim of unifica-
tion, whereas informal tenure can be legalised by granting ‘new’ rights
over state land to its occupants.3 Indonesian land law does not ac-
knowledge the concept of adverse possession – acquisition of title by
occupation of land for a certain period under certain conditions. Infor-
mal tenure, therefore, cannot be legalised on grounds of extended oc-
cupation of land on which others have established private rights. Such
private rights may be forfeited, however, for instance through neglect
of the land. In this case, land passes to the state, over which it can
again grant ‘new’ rights (Harsono 2005).4
The legalisation of both customary and informal tenure requires the
registration of land, which can be done sporadically – registration of
one or several plots at the initiative of landholders – or systematically –
registration of several plots in the same area at the initiative of the gov-
ernment. Systematic registration is usually done in the framework of
large-scale land registration programmes. The first land registration
programme dates back to 1981, and several have followed. In 1994 the
Indonesian government started the World Bank and AusAid funded
Land Administration Project (LAP). It takes a De Soto approach of pro-
viding land titles to poor landholders at low cost, as well as institu-
tional reforms. The LAP and other programmes have resulted in the
registration of millions of land parcels, particularly in cities.
While impressive in scale, little is known about the contribution of
these programmes to their primary aim of enhancing legal security for
the urban poor. To fill this knowledge gap, this chapter presents an
analysis of the need, reach, and effect of systematic land registration in
the Indonesian city. It particularly focuses on land registration pro-
grammes in kampongs – settlements that form the home of hundreds
of thousands of low-income, customary or informal landholders – in
Bandung, Indonesia’s fourth-largest city and the capital of West Java. It
is based on quantitative as well as qualitative research methods, includ-
ing a survey, participant observation in kampongs, and interviews with
officials.5
The chapter first assesses whether low-income kampong dwellers are
actually able to do sporadic registration, thus evaluating the need for
large-scale land registration programmes. This is followed by a discus-
sion of systematic land registration in general, and the LAP in particu-
lar. It discusses the activities that have been carried out and studies the
extent to which low-income kampong dwellers actually have a chance to
participate in this project. Finally, and most importantly, the chapter as-
sesses the extent to which registration of land through programmes
such as the LAP contributes to the legal security of participants – by
providing them with legally valid titles that allow them to reside on the
land and which can stand the test of time – and also to their tenure se-
curity.
Integrative potential of sporadic registration
In practice, it has proven hard for landholders to register their land,
which means that Indonesia‘s contemporary land administration forms
the ‘bell jar’ De Soto is moving against. This is the result of several fac-
tors, including the stringent evidence requirements for the registration
of customary rights, which do not reflect the complex land relations in
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urban kampongs; a lack of political will to register rights of informal
landholders; maladministration and resulting barriers; and the negative
perceptions of landholders regarding the registration process.
Even after the 1961 Government Regulation – with its stringent doc-
umentary evidence requirements for the registration of old rights –
was replaced by the 1997 Government Regulation on Land Administra-
tion, evidence requirements still prove difficult for customary land-
holders to meet.6 This is especially the case in cities such as Bandung.
In urban areas, land is often purchased instead of inherited, and evi-
dence for such transactions are usually private contracts (surat zegel,
perjanjian jual-beli) or sales receipts (kwitansi jual-beli). These docu-
ments do not meet the evidence requirements for registration (The
Smeru Research Team 2002). Documents that do meet evidence re-
quirements, such as notary deeds of sale (akte jual beli), are generally
far more expensive, so it is difficult or practically impossible for low-in-
come dwellers to obtain them. Frequent purchases of land also make it
hard for landholders to prove that the land they live on has been inhab-
ited for at least twenty years (by themselves and possible previous land-
holders), which otherwise would allow them to register land on the ba-
sis of testimonial evidence.
In an interview with Republika daily, the Head of Bandung‘s Land
Office argues that land mostly remains unregistered because people
have no legal basis for occupying the land and thus cannot meet the
evidence requirements to obtain a certificate.7 The state could grant or
transfer rights to dwellers who do not meet evidence requirements, but
this statement already illustrates that there is no political will to do so.
Initial registration of real rights granted by the state on state land (re-
gistration of ‘new rights’) only occurs on a limited scale in Bandung.8
Instead, usage rights (hak pakai) or management rights (hak pengelo-
laan) are granted to public entities, which means that the state no long-
er has a direct right of avail (tanah yang langsung dikuasai oleh negara).9
The municipality, for instance, claims 51 per cent of the city’s land. It
could transfer the rights to this land to dwellers upon request for a
price decided upon by a municipal committee and agreed on by the
mayor and the municipal council.10 However, in practice this only oc-
curs on a limited scale. This can be explained by the fact that the mu-
nicipality leases out the land to an increasing number of residents, in-
cluding informal landholders, thus generating significant revenues
while at the same time keeping the land ‘available’ for future develop-
ment projects.11 Depending on the municipal spatial plan, land is
leased out for one, five, or ten years.12 Annulment of rights on ne-
glected land and redistribution of such land (after the state has re-
gained its direct right of avail) also seldom occur in Bandung, although
a lot of squatted land qualifies as such.13 Even if it were to occur, few
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kampong dwellers would probably be capable of registering their land,
due to the costs involved.
High costs, complexity, and tardiness of the registration process
form other obstacles to registration. These problems are to a large ex-
tent the result of weak performance and even maladministration of the
state institutions involved. The NLA in particular has a bad reputation
in this respect. It is generally considered one of Indonesia‘s worst-per-
forming public bodies. Exercising authority over 300 district land of-
fices, it ‘has been characterised as over-centralised, secretive and unre-
sponsive to landholders’ and the land registration process itself ‘is com-
plex, paper-intensive and manual’ (World Bank 2003a:45). Corruption
forms another serious problem. The NLA ‘has been used by prevailing
political and bureaucratic establishment for personal and political
gains’ (World Bank 2003a:45). So it is common that landholders
wishing to register their land have to pay bribes. These revenues are a
welcome addition to the modest salaries of NLA officials. Not surpris-
ingly, ‘registration fees are excessive, among the highest in the world’
(World Bank 2003a:45). Maladministration of the NLA also affects the
accuracy of the land register, a matter that we will discuss below.
The previously discussed problems can be illustrated by the results
of our survey among lower-income kampong dwellers in Bandung. We
asked respondents who in the past ten years had obtained a land certi-
ficate through sporadic registration about the costs and duration of the
procedure. On average, the respondents paid almost Rp. 1,600,000,
which for most lower-income kampong dwellers in Bandung is more
than a month’s income.14 The duration of the procedure varied be-
tween one and twelve months. However, on average it was relatively
short at 3.18 months.15
Perhaps more importantly, landholders have negative perceptions re-
garding the costs, complexity, and duration of registration and will
therefore not even try to obtain a certificate. We asked landholders with
a converted colonial land right why they had not yet registered their
land. Costs formed the foremost reason: 63.2 per cent of the respon-
dents were of the opinion that land registration is costly, and 23.1 per
cent of the respondents believed the procedure demands a lot of time
and trouble, arguing that they did not know how to obtain a certificate,
that the procedure is complex and takes a long time, or that they did
not have the energy to get it done. Only 3.2 per cent of the respondents
believed that a land certificate is useless. One of these respondents ex-
plained that he had not obtained a land certificate because he believed
that the land evidence he held, in his case a colonial tax document, is
more reliable.
We asked those respondents who believed that land registration was
too costly to make an estimation of costs and whether they thought
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these costs formed an official charge or involved bribes. On average,
they estimated that the costs of land registration would be almost Rp.
2,000,000.16 Notably, almost one-third of the respondents believed
that these costs involve bribes.17 Comparing these data with the actual
costs spent by title holders who had obtained a land certificate in the
past ten years, it seems that respondents were generally well informed,
which allows them to make a rational decision as to whether to register
their land.
The negative perceptions of Bandung‘s low-income kampong dwell-
ers about the NLA form no exception, as a 2007 survey of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Committee shows. Among 3,611 respondents from Jakarta, Bo-
gor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi, the NLA was considered one of the
two bodies (the other being the Department of Justice) with the least
integrity among 30 national public bodies. In particular, the services re-
lated to land registration were qualified as very poor, namely surveying
and certification.18
Considering the stringent evidence requirements for the registration
of customary rights, which do not reflect the complex land relations
(particularly in urban kampongs), the lack of political will to grant ‘new’
or transfer existing rights of public entities, high costs, complexity, and
tardiness of the registration process caused by poor administrative per-
formance, and the resulting negative perceptions of landholders re-
garding registration, it is clear that low-income kampong dwellers have
difficulty in undertaking sporadic registration. Here we see that it is ac-
tually the legal system itself that generates ‘extralegal’ tenure. Systema-
tic land registration programmes could be of help, provided they can
take away the barriers occurring in cases of sporadic registration. The
next paragraphs will take a closer look at these programmes, their
reach, and their effect.
Table 19.1 Reasons cited by customary landholders for not having a land certificate
Reason Percentage
Land registration is costly 63.2
Land registration is cumbersome 23.1
Trying to obtain a land certificate 4.2
Impossible to obtain a land certificate 3.2
A land certificate is useless 3.2
Other reasons 3.2
Note: n = 95
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Land registration programmes in Bandung
As a response to the slow process of land registration, at a relatively
early stage Indonesia initiated large-scale registration programmes. In
1981 the Indonesian government initiated the National Agrarian Op-
eration Project (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria or PRONA), a pro-
gramme that aimed at increasing legal certainty and security to particu-
larly economically weak landholders by mass registration and the reso-
lution of land disputes.19 In some regions Regional Agrarian
Operation Projects (Proyek Operasi Daerah Agraria or PRODA) were
launched, similar programmes that are financed by the regional gov-
ernments. Around 1988 the government intensified land registration
efforts. The number of registered parcels grew at about 1 million per
year. However, since the total number of parcels continued to grow
even faster, the Indonesian government would never have been able to
catch up (World Bank 1994:3-4). Therefore, the need for a more ambi-
tious approach was felt.
Renewed enthusiasm for the land registration approach, in which
De Soto played a catalytic role, also struck Indonesia. In 1994 the Indo-
nesian government and the World Bank started the Land Administra-
tion Project (LAP), which as part of a broader policy approach acceler-
ates land registration through systematic as well as sporadic registra-
tion (World Bank 1994). In total, 1.2 million land parcels in regencies
and municipalities in Java would be registered systematically, benefit-
ing about 4 million people, including about 100,000 families that were
estimated to be below the low-income line (World Bank 1994).20 An-
other goal of the project was to improve the institutional framework
for land administration, which included a systematic review and draft
of land laws and regulations and the training of NLA staff. Finally, the
project was meant to support the government of Indonesia to develop
long-term land management policies through the organisation of semi-
nars and workshops (World Bank 1994). The total costs of the project
were budgeted at USD 140.1 million (World Bank 1994).21 The succes-
sor of the LAP, the Land Management and Policy Development Project,
was initiated in 2004 and is scheduled to end in 2009.
The LAP was particularly beneficial for West Java. This province had
the lowest coverage of land registration in Java at the time the project
was initiated, namely thirteen per cent of all parcels (World Bank
1994). This was mainly caused by the large number of parcels, the ra-
pid increase in the number of parcels due to economic and population
growth, and the large number of informally occupied parcels (World
Bank 1994).22 For this and other reasons, 68 per cent of the planned
1.2 million certificates would be issued in two municipalities and four
regencies in West Java, including 101,500 ownership right (hak milik)
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certificates in Bandung (World Bank 1994). Although all eligible par-
cels were expected to be registered under the project, this has not been
the case in Bandung (World Bank 1994). Still, an impressive number
of parcels has been registered, even more than planned, namely
132,863 parcels, as Table 19.2 shows.
By comparison, sporadic registration in Bandung in about that same
period only led to a fraction of the number of parcels being registered
under the LAP, namely 4,630 parcels, as Table 19.3 shows.23
The NLA estimates that currently about 600,000 land parcels in
Bandung Municipality have been registered. Still 30 per cent or 5,019
hectares of all land remain unregistered, despite the fact that many oc-
cupants of this land meet the registration requirements.24 Thus, even
under current criteria, land registration programmes could still benefit
many landholders in Bandung Municipality.
Under these circumstances it is laudable that the World Bank con-
tinues with land registration. The successor of the LAP, the Land Man-
agement and Policy Development Project, is now well under way. It is
even more ambitious than LAP, with a stronger focus on land registra-
Table 19.2 Output land administration project in Bandung Municipality
Year Number of
municipal districts
Number of
municipal sub-districts
Number of
parcels
1996/1997 7 29 30,792
1997/1998 6 29 39,042
1998/1999 10 35 37,098
1999/2000 12 30 22,839
2000/2001 2 2 3,092
Total 37 125 132,863
Source: Internal document of the Bandung Municipality Land Office (titled ‘Daftar: Rekapitu-
lasi Pelaksanaan Proyek Administrasi Pertanahan di Kota Bandung Tahun 1996/1997 S/D Ta-
hun 2000/2001’)
Table 19.3 Output sporadic registration in Bandung Municipality
Year Registration of
customary rights
in number of parcels
Registration of new
rights on state
land in number of parcels
Total number
of parcels
1998 2,071 517 2,588
1999 182 557 739
2000 84 478 562
2001 32 301 333
2002 62 346 408
Total 2,431 2,199 4,630
Source: Internal document of the Bandung Municipality Land Office (Titled: ‘Laporan Bidang
Pengukuran dan Pendaftaran Tanah’)
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tion and institutional development (World Bank 2004b). Its goal is to
issue 2.5 million certificates in areas of high poverty and high econom-
ic potential through systematic registration (World Bank 2004b).
Aside from impressive results in numbers of registered parcels and
relatively low costs and short duration of the registration procedures,
the question remains whether LAP and other land registration pro-
grammes or any sporadic registration effort have reached low-income
groups and contributed to their legal security. So far, at least three stu-
dies have been done about the LAP, to which the remainder of this
chapter will also refer. The first was a World Bank commissioned eva-
luation by Hardjono, in collaboration with a number of local NGOs,
which had a qualitative character, using methods like focus group dis-
cussions and in-depth interviews with members of communities, and
was conducted in nine urban, peri-urban, and rural city quarters and
villages, including a city quarter in Bandung (Hardjono 1999). The sec-
ond study was also a World Bank commissioned evaluation, this time
conducted by the Indonesian research institute Smeru, which was
quantitative in nature, organising a comparative survey among LAP
and non-LAP participants in various villages and city quarters in four-
teen districts and cities, including a total of 110 respondents from two
city quarters in Bandung (The Smeru Research Team 2002). The third
study was a PhD research by Soehendera, who conducted qualitative
research in a low-income kampong in Central Jakarta‘s Rawa City Quar-
ter (Soehendera 2005). Specifically, Smeru evaluated the project posi-
tively in relation to the registration process itself, the economic and so-
cial impacts of the project, as well as wider socio-economic effects. The
current research does not fully support these conclusions, as will be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Reach of land registration programmes
Smeru concluded with regard to the LAP that ‘there has been a clear
bias towards locations in which most households are not well off’, and
Hardjono stated that ‘there was […] at least a very conscious effort to
ensure that the poor were not overlooked’ (Hardjono 1999; The Smeru
Research Team 2002). In the current research, however, the assess-
ment of whether the LAP and similar programmes have reached low-
income groups led to a mixed picture: some of the general obstacles
hindering sporadic registration discussed earlier have been overcome,
but not all.
Many low-income kampongs could not participate in the LAP because
of the location selection criteria. Locations were selected where lower-
income households formed the majority of households, no more than
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30 per cent of land parcels were registered through sporadic registra-
tion or other land registration programmes, and rapid urbanisation
was occurring. At the same time, locations where land registration was
expected to be difficult were avoided. So locations were selected where
many land transactions took place through Land Deed Officials (offi-
cials of the Sub-District Office or public notaries), where parcels with-
out certificates were concentrated instead of widely dispersed, and
where basic village maps were available and technical control points in
the national projection system already existed. In some areas other re-
quirements applied as well, such as the absence of major land dis-
putes. Areas involving conflicts over state land, especially, were avoided
(The Smeru Research Team 2002). However, these conditions often
characterise the poorest kampongs, which means that registration pro-
grammes often do not target settlements where most members of the
programmes’ target group reside.
As far as the programme was initiated in low-income kampongs,
stringent evidence requirements regarding the registration of custom-
ary rights and the lack of political will to grant new rights remained an
obstacle for landholders and particularly, for reasons discussed above,
for the poorest, when it came to registering their land through a pro-
gramme like the LAP. Hardjono concludes that landholders who could
not benefit from the LAP included those with inadequate proof of
claims and occupants of state land (Hardjono 1999).25 What she does
not conclude, and we do, is that lack of evidence is connected to lack of
financial means to obtain the right documents. Documents that meet
evidence requirements are expensive, and particularly for customary
landholders with low incomes, this may be a reason to have never ob-
tained them. Informal landholders to whom new rights could be
granted often squat land because they lack financial means.
Obstacles formed by costs, complexity, and tardiness of the registra-
tion process were in large part overcome by a land registration pro-
gramme such as the LAP. We asked title holders who had obtained a
land certificate through systematic registration in the past ten years
(through LAP and other land registration programmes) about the costs
of land registration and the duration of the procedure. On average, they
spent Rp. 78,000, which is only five per cent of the costs spent by title
holders who obtained their land certificate through sporadic registra-
tion.26 Moreover, the average duration of the systematic registration
procedure was shorter than sporadic registration, namely 2.2
months.27
Although these costs seem reasonable, they exceeded the official
charge and still prevented low-income dwellers from registering their
land through a programme like the LAP.28 According to Hardjono,
costs depended greatly on what participants needed from local officials
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in terms of documentation and legalisation (Hardjono 1999). To re-
mind the reader, it is likely that particularly poor customary land-
holders – those for whom this also forms the biggest burden – had to
obtain new documents in order to meet evidence requirements. Soe-
hendera argues that costs resulting from officials asking for bribes for
their services, as well as mediators having to be paid, prevented dwell-
ers in kampong Rawa from participating in the programme. As a result
of past experiences, residents also had negative (cost-related) percep-
tions regarding the registration process, particularly in relation to the
NLA. Those who did participate depended on informal networks and
patron-client relationships to get their land registered through the pro-
gramme (Soehendera 2005). In the location described by Hardjono
where landholders occupying state land could participate in the LAP,
they decided not to do so because of the tax that has to be paid upon
registration of new rights (Hardjono 1999:9, 40). Still, according to
the Smeru Research Team, 94.7 per cent of those who did participate
in the LAP said that the costs in terms of money, time, and effort were
small compared to the benefits of a land certificate (The Smeru Re-
search Team 2002). Hardjono even argued that middle- and upper-in-
come groups would be willing to pay ‘somewhat more’ to get their land
registered through the LAP (Hardjono 1999:40-1).
Obstacles similar to the ones discussed above mean that in Ban-
dung, too, land registration programmes like the LAP do not reach the
kampong dwellers with the lowest incomes. The average monthly in-
come of titleholders who obtained their certificate through a systematic
registration programme is lower than those who obtained it through
sporadic registration, namely around Rp. 1,600,000 versus Rp.
1,800,000.29 Yet their income is still much higher than that of cus-
tomary or informal landholders residing in the same kampongs, which
is Rp. 1,400,000 and Rp. 1,280,000, respectively.30 This difference of
income cannot be explained merely by the economic effects that regis-
tration is said to have.
Land registration and legal security
The last question that this chapter wishes to address is whether land
registration programmes have actually contributed to legal security for
kampong dwellers. Our research shows that this contribution remains
limited.
To be able to assess the effects of land registration programmes on
the legal security of customary and informal landholders, we first need
to consider their position before registration. Our research shows that
their tenure security is surprisingly strong, in the sense that they enjoy
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a high degree of administrative recognition. First, most landholders,
even informal landholders, have been living on the land for decades,
which means that the state has for a long time condoned non-formal
land tenure. Second, the state has improved the infrastructure in kam-
pongs and provided kampong dwellers with basic services, such as water,
electricity, and identity cards, which again demonstrates administrative
recognition. Third, and this is the most important point in this context,
most customary and even informal landholders hold state-issued, land-
related documentation. Customary landholders obviously hold colonial
tax assessment notices and other documentation issued – often re-
cently – by the state that they could use for registration. Yet even infor-
mal landholders have such documentation, often consisting of multiple
purpose letters (surat serba guna), clarification letters (surat keterangan),
or declaration letters (surat pernyataan) stating that they reside on the
land, usually issued by City Quarter Offices. The City Quarter Offices
do not have the competence to provide such documentation, at least
not under these circumstances.31 However, an interviewed City Quarter
Head explained that in practice they do. It is common for people to
come to the offices and ask for such documentation.32 Officials are re-
luctant to deny such a request, probably also because they can earn
some pocket money with it.
To what extent then do titleholders enjoy higher legal security than
informal or customary landholders? The difference is limited for at
least three reasons. First, there is the fact that a significant proportion
of Bandung‘s lower-income kampong dwellers with a land certificate
may not undertake derivate registration of their land. We asked title-
holders whether they would do so in case of future land transfers (see
Table 19.4). Generally, only 73.7 per cent of titleholders who had ob-
tained their land certificate through sporadic registration claimed they
would undertake derivative registration. Even fewer of the titleholders
who had obtained their land certificate through systematic registration
would do so, namely 52.4 per cent. If we take these two groups to-
gether and include titleholders whose land has already been registered
by earlier titleholders, the percentage of future derivative registration is
60.8 per cent. A significant percentage of 7.9 per cent, 26.2 per cent,
and 16.5 per cent respectively, would let a buyer of the land decide
whether to do derivative registration or not.
Hardjono, who also conducted research on this issue, argued that
few titleholders perform derivative registration because they do not un-
derstand the importance of it, Sub-District and City Quarter Offices are
willing to provide alternative land-related documentation, derivative re-
gistration involves substantial administrative costs and tax levies, and
the procedure demands time and trouble (Hardjono 1999:38-40). The
expenses for derivate registration, which likely also consist of bribes,
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particularly form an obstacle for titleholders who have obtained their
land certificate through systematic registration. After all, on average,
these titleholders have lower incomes than titleholders who have ob-
tained their land certificates through sporadic registration.
The low percentage of titleholders performing derivative registration
in case of future land transfers may not come as a surprise, but it is no
less worrisome. It means that despite initial land registration, many ti-
tleholders will again lack proper documentation to prove that they have
a right on the land in the future, which will affect their legal security.
Worse, the low percentage of derivative registration also means that the
register loses its accuracy. This affects not only titleholders who do not
undertake derivative registration, but any titleholder. After all, general
trust in the land register depends on its accuracy.
A second reason for the limited effect of current land registration
programmes on legal security is the result of public law requirements
regarding residential land. Residence is not legalised through land re-
gistration alone. Since 1929/1931 Bandung Municipality has a Building
Code, which requires a building permit for any building activity.33
Nowadays, various permits are needed to legally reside on land, namely
a Land Use Permit (Izin Peruntukan Penggunaan Tanah), a Building
Permit (Izin Mendirikan Bangunan), and a Building Use Permit (Izin
Penggunaan Bangunan).34
It is a troublesome process to obtain these permits, both in terms of
duration, costs, and administrative burden, with several municipal
agencies involved. The regulations are not clear about the duration of
application procedures, except for the Building Permit. If all require-
ments are fulfilled, the procedure for a Building Permit should take no
longer than nineteen days.35 The costs of obtaining the permits gener-
ally depend on the function, location, size of the plot and building, and
costs of surveying and mapping.36 These procedures are also often ac-
companied by substantial bribes, among other things because of the in-
Table 19.4 Estimation on derivative registration in case of future land transfers
Titleholders by
sporadic registration a
Titleholders by
systematic registration b
Titleholders total
(including land registered
by earlier titleholder) c
Derivative
registration
73.7 % 52.4 % 60.8 %
Derivative
registration if buyer
wants to
7.9 % 26.2 % 16.5 %
No derivative
registration
18.4 % 21.4 % 22.7 %
Note: a n = 38, b n = 44, c n = 97
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volvement of disreputable persons (oknum) and middlemen (calo), as
well as deviations from prescribed procedures.37 It is for this reason
that not only the NLA but also municipal agencies are commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘wet sector’ (sector basah). Besides, it is not uncommon
for the agencies to set additional non-financial requirements (Niessen
1999). The reputation of the agencies involved in issuing permits
seems in part the result of the complexity of the procedures on the one
hand and repressive powers of the agencies on the other hand. Based
on fieldwork in Bandung in the mid-1990s, Niessen hence concludes
that ‘the process is notorious for its tardiness, expense, and unpredict-
ability’ (Niessen 1999). These factors form an obstacle for applying for
a permit, particularly for low-income (and poorly educated) kampong
dwellers, all the more because they have strong negative perceptions re-
garding these procedures.38
Zoning, sub-division, and building requirements to obtain permits
as set out in the spatial planning and building regulations form an-
other obstacle for kampong dwellers. For instance, many kampongs are
located alongside a river or railway track. These locations are desig-
nated as protected areas, where no building is allowed.39 Zoning provi-
sions have been enacted, and the Mayor cannot temporarily allow resi-
dence in these areas. Furthermore, in most kampongs 80-90 per cent
of the land is covered with buildings, which exceeds the allowable
building rate.40 Finally, an average kampong house does not meet
building standards, including standards regarding facilities.41 There-
fore, many of the dwellers of these kampongs, including those who have
obtained a land certificate through a land registration programme, will
never be able to fully legalise their tenure.
Municipal building and spatial planning regulations set severe sanc-
tions for not meeting permit requirements. The Mayor of Bandung
Municipality can command closure, clearance or demolition of a build-
ing or prohibit its use.42 Despite the threat of such severe sanctions, it
may not come as a surprise that very few kampong dwellers have such
permits.43 We asked respondents from all tenure categories whether
they have a Building Permit (see Table 19.5). The overall majority of re-
spondents answered that they did not. The more formal the land ten-
ure status, the higher was the percentage of landholders with a build-
ing permit. So more titleholders had a Building Permit than informal
landholders. Yet, still 82.8 per cent of titleholders had no building per-
mit. This percentage was slightly higher with landholders who had ob-
tained their certificate through systematic registration, namely 84.1 per
cent. Despite land registration the overall majority of titleholders thus
did not meet the requirements to reside on the land.
We asked respondents from all tenure categories with no building
permit why they had not obtained one (see Table 19.6). Most believed
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that there was no need for a building permit. A considerable share of
these people were not even aware that they were under the obligation
to obtain a permit. Others argued that no one in the neighbourhood
had a permit, that their buildings were modest or located in an alley,
that their buildings had been constructed years ago, or that they held
other documentation allowing them to build on the land. The second
most important reason for not having a permit was that they consid-
ered the permit procedure to demand a lot of time and trouble. Re-
spondents argued that they did not know how to obtain a permit, that
the procedure was complex, or that they did not have the energy to get
it done. Relatively few respondents argued that they did not have a per-
mit because of the procedure’s costs. Depending on tenure status,
more (informal status) or fewer (formal status) respondents argued
that they did not have a building permit because they could not meet
the permit requirements.
The municipality seems to be aware of the dimension and causes of
the problem. An interviewed senior official of the Municipal Building
Service estimated that about 35 or 40 per cent of all buildings in Ban-
dung are constructed without a permit. Bandung’s municipal govern-
Table 19.5 Possession of building permit per land tenure category
Formal tenure Customary
tenure d
Informal
tenure e
Sporadic
registration a
Systematic
registration b
Total c
Building permit 16.2 % 13.6 % 14.1 % 2.1 % 1.9 %
Equivalent of
building permit
5.4 % 2.3 % 3.0 % 1.1 % 0.6 %
No building permit 78.4 % 84.1 % 82.8 % 96.8 % 97.5 %
Note: a n = 37 , b n = 44, c n = 99, d n = 94, e n = 161
Table 19.6 Reasons cited for not having a building permit
Formal tenure Customary
tenure d
Informal
tenure e
Sporadic
registration a
Systematic
registration b
Total c
No need of permit 50 % 61.5 % 59 % 60.4 % 48.4 %
Permit procedure is cumbersome 25 % 25.6 % 26.5 % 24.2 % 19.7 %
Permit procedure is costly 25 % 10.3 % 13.3 % 8.8 % 3.2 %
Do not meet requirements - 2.6 % 1.9 % 6.6 % 28.7 %
Note: a n = 28 , b n = 39, c n = 83, d n = 91, e n = 157
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ment now tries to make people aware of their obligations. It is imple-
menting an Integrated Legal Information (Penyuluhan Hukum Terpadu
or Lukumdu) programme at the city quarter level, where applicable laws
are being ‘socialised’.44 Apparently, the programme has had limited ef-
fect though.45 Although the number of building permits that are being
issued by the Municipal Building Service is on the increase, in the past
few years it had issued only about 3,000 building permits per year, as
Table 19.7 shows.
A third reason for the limited effect of current land registration pro-
grammes on legal security is related to the partial protection that the
land administration system offers, which is again the result of a combi-
nation of major weaknesses in the legal framework and maladministra-
tion.
The BAL creates a negative registration system combined with ele-
ments of a positive system, which means that a land certificate is not
conclusive, but only forms strong evidence regarding a land right. A
third party can dispute the right of a titleholder during the five years
after the certificate has been issued.46 In order to protect right holders
against such claims, the BAL recognises the concept of forfeiture of
rights. So the land right of a former right holder may be forfeited if he
has neglected the land for a certain period of time. This concept is also
meant to serve as an alternative for the concept of adverse possession
(Harsono 2005).
The legal framework thus has some weaknesses, but the main pro-
blems derive from maladministration. As previously discussed, the
NLA has a notorious reputation as a result of incompetence – both
from a technical and from an organisational perspective – and corrup-
tion.47 It is common for NLA officials to issue more than one certifi-
cate for the same plot of land. Indonesians even have specific names
for such certificates, such as sertifikat ganda (double certificate) or serti-
fikat aspal (original, but false certificate).48 In 2003 a former Head of
the Bandung Municipality Land Office was arrested for issuing a certi-
ficate to a third party to another person’s land plot.49 Aside from the
failure of titleholders to carry out derivative registration of their land,
Table 19.7 Number of building permits issued by the Municipal Building Service
Year Number of Permits
1998/1999 2,295
1999/2000 2,187
2000 2,830
2001 2,859
2002 3,195
2003 3,409
Source: Internal document from Bandung’s Municipal Building Department
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the issuing of double certificates further affects the reliability of the
land register.
As part of the evaluation of LAP, the World Bank concluded that the
institutional development component of the project ‘was less than suc-
cessful’ (World Bank 2004b). It is therefore reasonable to expect that
incompetence and corruption are not just problems of the past. Ironi-
cally, land registration programmes may increase these problems be-
cause the administration is not used to mass registration of land and
will hence impose an excessive burden (Payne 2001).
It is not the land administration system alone that offers partial pro-
tection, but land law generally. Whether land forms state or private
land, it always keeps a ‘social function’.50 This concept is said to be de-
rived from adat law and means that individual rights must be balanced
against the interests of the community (General Elucidation, chapter
II, under 4) (Fitzpatrick 1999). The state right of avail is a useful tool
to maintain the social function of land. The BAL creates several me-
chanisms for the state to annul land rights for the benefit of the com-
munity, such as mechanisms for land acquisition in the public interest,
annulment of rights on neglected land (tanah terlantar), and land re-
form.51 Rights on neglected land that can be annulled are real rights,
including state management rights and legal claims to hold the land
that have not yet become rights. Land is considered neglected if it is
not used in accordance with its physical condition or with the form
and goal of the right to which it is subject. This includes the use of
land that is not in accordance with spatial planning regulations, parti-
cularly if land is subdivided without permission, and the failure to ob-
tain a statutory land right.52 This again shows how important it is for
kampong dwellers to hold all of the required permits. However, they
may be saved by the provision that land will not be classified as ne-
glected land if the titleholder is in an economically weak position or be-
cause there is a conflict regarding the land.53 Land reform includes an-
nulment of land rights if a right holder has too much land or the land
qualifies as absentee land. Such land can also be redistributed to vul-
nerable groups. Land reform, however, only applies to agricultural
land.54 In all cases, the law contains certain safeguards that should pro-
tect landholders. It falls outside the scope of this chapter to discuss this
issue in more detail, but in view of past experiences, it is questionable
whether the Indonesian state takes these safeguards under considera-
tion.
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Conclusion
This chapter has explained why it is so difficult for kampong dwellers,
particularly the poorest, to register their land. Stringent evidence re-
quirements, a lack of political will to grant new rights to informal land-
holders, high costs, complexity, and tardiness of the registration pro-
cess as a result of poor administrative performance or even maladmin-
istration, along with related negative perceptions of kampong dwellers
regarding the registration process, ensure that sporadic land registra-
tion only occurs on a limited scale. There is thus a great need for sys-
tematic registration through land registration programmes.
Since 1981 the Indonesian government has initiated several land re-
gistration programmes. These programmes have been able to over-
come financial, bureaucratic, and time constraints and related negative
perceptions regarding the registration process. Nonetheless, on the ba-
sis of income data, it appears that in Bandung, land registration pro-
grammes such as the LAP do not reach the kampong dwellers with the
lowest incomes. This limited reach can be explained by the fact that
the LAP is only implemented in locations where registration is rela-
tively easy, which means that locations where many low-income dwell-
ers reside are ignored. Besides, some of the same obstacles occurring
in the case of sporadic land registration remain in force, namely the
stringent evidence requirements for initial registration and a lack of po-
litical will to grant new rights to informal landholders.
Land registration programmes in Bandung not only have a limited
reach, they also contribute little to legal security for kampong dwellers.
Assessing the tenure security of customary and informal landholders,
we can conclude that this is surprisingly strong, in the sense that they
enjoy a high degree of administrative recognition. At the same time
the legal security of title holders is limited for at least three reasons.
First, most kampong dwellers predict that they will not perform derivate
registration after a change in the legal status of the land. This can
probably be explained by the significant administrative costs involved
and – depending on the value/condition of the property – tax levies
that come with derivative registration. This not only means that future
titleholders will enjoy less legal security, but also that the register loses
its accuracy, which affects any titleholder in Indonesia. Second, few ti-
tleholders have the permits they need to legally reside on their land.
Besides a land certificate, people need spatial planning related permits,
consisting of a land use permit, building permit, and building use per-
mit. Again, the processes to obtain these permits are costly, complex,
and tardy. However, most people fail to obtain these permits because
they are not aware of the need to do so. Finally, the land administration
system and even land law in general are dispossessory in nature, which
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is again the result of major weaknesses in the legal framework and
maladministration.
The previously discussed findings teach us that land registration
does not inherently lead to legal security for landholders. This is often
overlooked in the tenure security debate, in which it is assumed that
registration automatically generates legal security for participants and
consequently enhances their tenure security. Whereas in the current
case registration did not lead to legal security, there are clear indica-
tions that it did increase the participants’ tenure security. Tenure secur-
ity ultimately depends on the way state authorities and third parties ac-
tually value the possession or lack of land certificates and other docu-
ments required to reside on land, for instance in case of land
acquisition, which is often influenced more by politics than by law. In
addition, the registration of land may strengthen the landholders’ per-
ceptions of tenure security. It falls outside the scope of this chapter to
discuss this in detail, but further data from the current research show
that in Post-New Order Bandung, the actual tenure security (measured
by interference from third parties) of low-income kampong dwellers
holding land certificates (but often not fulfilling other legal require-
ments) as well as their perception of tenure security are stronger than
among those who do not have such documents.55 This for instance also
means that the former invest more in their land and housing than the
latter (Reerink Forthcoming).
The Land Management and Policy Development Project addresses
some of the problems that have been identified in relation to systema-
tic land registration. In the project appraisal the World Bank recognises
the need of a land policy ‘as an integral element of a broader policy dia-
logue rather than as a string of narrowly oriented technical interven-
tions’ (World Bank 2004b). It wishes among other things to increase
the coherence and consistency of land administration and manage-
ment-related laws and regulations, promote institutional development,
and provide training and capacity building to all local governments
(World Bank 2004b). Yet as long as the other problems mentioned in
this chapter have not been addressed, even this programme will prob-
ably fall short of expectations.
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20 The mystery of formalising informal land
tenure in the forest frontier: The case of
Langkawana, Lampung, Indonesia
Myrna A. Safitri
Introduction
Land tenure in Indonesia has inspired Hernando De Soto (2000:170-
171) to restate the urgency of discovering local property arrangements
for transforming informal property rights – he prefers to use the term
extra-legal arrangements – into formal rights. Many have agreed with
De Soto that legalisation of property rights is central in creating more
security of tenure to land, and that this tenure security will induce
higher investments, which in turn will lead to economic growth and
poverty reduction (Dam 2006; Deininger 2003; Demsetz 1967).1 How-
ever, it remains to be seen how such legalisations can be successfully
carried out in areas that, like Indonesia, are characterised by a frag-
mented legal framework of land tenure; an imbalanced allocation of
land to the state, private companies, and people; and tight competition
for land rights amongst local people.
This chapter discusses the extent to which attempts to provide secur-
ity of land tenure for people through legalisation can be supportive of
either poverty alleviation or the transformation of land into capital in a
particular village of Lampung Province, Sumatra, Indonesia. The vil-
lage, named Langkawana, is inhabited by migrants from Java who have
been struggling for decades to obtain more security of tenure over their
land. The land is partly situated in an area designated as forest area
that is controlled by the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). The remaining
part is located outside the forest area and falls under the jurisdiction of
the National Land Agency (NLA). In the latter area, some villagers have
formally registered their land and acquired certificates of ownership;
however, in the former area no land rights can be granted to them.
The fact that all land within the forest areas is controlled by the MoF
has been a primary obstacle to people having their rights to land indivi-
dually registered. They can only obtain a community forestry license, a
government’s permit for temporarily using forestland. Unlike the right
of ownership, the community forestry license is not able to provide
people with full rights over the land. Interestingly, land markets in the
forest areas are more active than in non-forest areas. In addition, the
legalisation of land in forest areas, mostly used as agro-forest gardens,
contributes significantly to reducing village poverty.
These issues raise a number of questions. What is the effect of for-
malisation of land tenure – either through land titling or through the
granting of a community forestry license – on poverty alleviation and
the enhancement of a land market? What factors determine the linkage
between the formalisation of rights to land, tenure security, land trans-
actions, and poverty? This chapter discusses these issues by elaborating
the following points: (1) an overview of Indonesia‘s legislation regard-
ing land tenure in forest and non-forest areas; (2) land use in forest
and non-forest areas in Langkawana; (3) local norms and practices of
land tenure; (4) legalisation of informal land tenure in forest and non-
forest areas; and finally, (5) a comparative analysis concerning the im-
pact of different paths of legalisation of land tenure in forest and non-
forest areas on poverty reduction and land transactions.
Forest and non-forest areas in Indonesia‘s legislation
To understand land issues in Indonesia, one must consider the fact
that land has been classified into two legal categories, namely forest
areas (kawasan hutan) and non-forest areas. The forest areas cover all
lands the government, in this case the MoF, has declared as ‘forest
areas’, which may be forested or not. Indonesian forest areas cover 134
million hectares of land or approximately 60 per cent of the country’s
land (Ministry of Forestry 2008). The real forested land within the
areas, however, is only 86 million hectares. The remaining areas con-
sist of villages, agricultural land, roads, or plantations. The non-forest
areas are located beyond the forest areas. Similar to the forest areas,
the non-forest areas sometimes indicate land with natural forests as
well as land used for settlement, agricultural purposes, and the like.
The terms forest areas and non-forest areas illustrate how legal cate-
gories of land and forest are very often incompatible with ecological
conditions. Political considerations and administrative decisions drive
the MoF’s decisions in establishing forest areas. Thus, the forest areas
in Indonesia provide a good example of the phenomenon referred to as
‘political forests’ (Vandergeest and Peluso 2006:33) or as Scott (1998:4)
puts it, the ‘administrative ordering of nature’.
In Indonesia‘s legal system, all land and natural richness is adminis-
tered under a single law, namely the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL-Law 5/
1960). The BAL provides umbrella provisions, conveying basic princi-
ples and regulations in the field of land and natural resources (‘agraria’
is the BAL‘s term), whilst other detailed provisions can be found in
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other laws or regulations. An exception has been made for forests,
which are regulated not by the BAL, but by the Forestry Law (Law 41/
1999). This law distinguishes private and state forests. Private forests
are those with private land rights, while forests growing on land with-
out private land rights are designated as state forests. Forestry officials
and operational regulations of Law 41/1999 act from the assumption
that forest areas must be state forests. But since state forests by defini-
tion only occur on land without private land rights, the MoF’s assump-
tion of forest areas as state forests is an argument it has used to control
all the land in those areas.
The MoF’s control of forest areas has restrained people from obtain-
ing private land rights in forest areas, and only in non-forest areas can
such rights be acquired. These lands are administered directly by the
NLA on the basis of the BAL. Based on article 16 (1) of the BAL, the
NLA can issue land certificates to individual citizens, corporations, or
other legal bodies with the right to own (hak milik), right to commer-
cially cultivate (hak guna usaha-HGU), right to use buildings (hak guna
bangunan-HGB), and right to use (hak pakai). Government institutions
can be issued use rights for lands they use themselves, for instance
where the government has built offices. When the government man-
ages land on behalf of third parties, the government must be issued a
management right (hak pengelolaan). The management right is not a
private land right but is a kind of state control right that has been dele-
gated to certain government institutions (Parlindungan 1989; Sumard-
jono 2008:197-215). All government institutions must thus have land
certificates to manage certain lands. Interestingly, despite this require-
ment, the NLA does not issue any land right to the MoF. It is therefore
not clear which land rights the MoF holds on the 60 per cent of the
country’s land that they manage. This makes Indonesian land tenure
legally complicated.
Forest areas are divided into three functions: production, protection,
and conservation. When the main function is to generate forest pro-
ducts, the area is considered production forest, whilst protection forest
is forest area designed to protect life-supporting systems such as hy-
drology, flood prevention, erosion control, seawater intrusion preven-
tion, and soil fertility maintenance. Conservation forest is forest area to
be used primarily for preserving plant and animal diversity and its eco-
system (Law 41/1999, art.1 point 7,8,9). People have different degrees
of access to forest resources depending on the applicable forest func-
tion. As conservation forests are mainly intended to preserve biodiver-
sity and ecosystems, resource exploitations in these areas are highly re-
stricted and even forbidden in certain parts. In protection forests, one
can still utilise resources but to a limited degree. Production forests
provide the greatest access to forest resources.
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The MoF has the authority to determine the particular function of
the forests. A 2004 Government Regulation concerning Forestry Plan-
ning (GR 44/2004) elaborates sets of criteria and procedures in desig-
nating those functions; however, very few of these have been followed.
In several provinces, such as in Java and Sumatra, including Lampung,
the MoF simply confirmed the forest functions as they were estab-
lished by the Dutch colonial government. In other cases, as in Langka-
wana, the MoF did change the function of colonial forests, for instance
by changing protected forest to conservation forest, yet without follow-
ing the criteria and procedures mentioned above. Another way the
MoF has sometimes designated forest functions is by simply declaring
logging concession areas as production forests. In this way, and also by
granting logging concessions in other areas than production forests,
many logging concession areas have been issued without taking into
account ecological as well as social considerations in the forests, two of
the criteria mentioned in GR 44/2004.2
Although no private land right can be found in forest areas, people
can still access the land and forest resources. Law 41/1999 provides
several options for access rights to forest areas, including: adat forests,
or forests used for customary-based communities, village forests, for-
ests for specific purposes such as for conducting research and preser-
ving cultural heritages, and community forests (hutan kemasyarakatan).
The community forests allow people, either adat or non-adat commu-
nities, to manage parts of forest areas for a maximum period of 35
years. Nonetheless, the MoF does not allow the license to be used as a
basis for acquiring private rights on forest areas, as state forests must
be free from private ownership.
Langkawana in Lampung: Its historical and social landscape
Lampung, a province situated in the southeast of Sumatra Island, is
the gateway for land transportation from Java to Sumatra. The area’s
economy is geared toward agriculture and plantation, and its products
supply many big cities throughout Indonesia. The province is also
known for exporting coffee. Lampung can be seen as a miniature Indo-
nesia, as it is inhabited by a great diversity of ethnic groups: Lampung-
ese, Javanese, Sundanese, and some Minangs. Such ethnic heterogene-
ity is a result of a long history of migration, particularly when in 1905
the Dutch colonial authorities began to move Javanese to Lampung to
relieve Java of its high population density. Post-independence govern-
ments continued this policy, most notably under the New Order’s mas-
sive transmigration programmes of the 1970s-1980s. During this time
Lampung’s population experienced rapid growth. From 1971-1980, for
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instance, population growth reached 5.77 per cent annually, higher
than the national annual rate of 2.32 per cent (Safitri 1997).
Located in the west of Bandar Lampung, the capital of Lampung, is
the conservation forest Wan Abdulrahman Grand Forest Park. Before
being designated as a conservation forest by the MoF in 1992, it was a
protection forest, namely Register 19 of Mount Betung forest, having
been designated as a protection forest in 1941 by the Dutch colonial
government. Currently, the park covers an area of approximately
22,000 hectares and is surrounded by a number of villages, including
Langkawana.3 Even though it is a forest village, Langkawana is not re-
motely situated. It is easily accessible from Bandar Lampung. Adminis-
tratively, Langkawana is a village unit (kelurahan)4 under the territory
of Bandar Lampung Municipality. With a total area of 498 hectares, it
is populated by 760 families, or 2,709 people.
Langkawana consists of two different areas, namely the west and the
east. In the west, roughly 500 families reside within the forest borders,
whilst in the east the remaining 200 families reside in another neigh-
bourhood located closer to the city. In addition to the physical divide
between the west and east, there exists a social boundary as well. Wes-
tern Langkawana is the old settlement and the origin of Langkawana
village. It was once a sub-village unit (lingkungan)5 of Kelurahan Berin-
gin Raya before the municipality government of Bandar Lampung
changed it to an independent kelurahan in 2000. Nowadays, Langkawa-
na covers three sub-village units within its administrative territory, i.e.
Lingkungan I and II in the west, and Lingkungan III in the east. The in-
habitants of Lingkungan I and II are most notably agro-forest farmers,
whilst in Lingkungan III the residents are predominantly employed as
civil servants, private employees, and entrepreneurs.
Western Langkawana is a pluralistic community with different eth-
nic groups. Lingkungan I is inhabited mostly by Javanese who live in
Langkawana Bawah (Lowland Langkawana), whilst in Lingkungan II,
the Sundanese dominate the area called Langkawana Atas (Upland
Langkawana). Both ethnic groups have their own settlement history.
The Javanese came to Langkawana in the 1940s as labourers of a
Dutch rubber plantation operated on the border of Mount Betung. The
company supplied its labourers with housing in a location now known
as Langkawana Bawah. Each labourer was given a small house called a
bedeng. Every day the Javanese followed the same route from their be-
deng to the plantation without ever entering the forest. There are at
least two reasons why they never entered the forest. First, from the
1920s to 1940s, the Dutch colonial forestry administration was apply-
ing forest delineation and enforcing forestry law, especially in Lam-
pung. To avoid legal problems, the plantation administrators continu-
ously warned their Javanese labourers to keep away from the forest.
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Second, the Javanese labourers were more dependent on the plantation
than on the forest for their livelihood, and so they had no interest in
entering the forest. In the 1950s, however, the population in Langkawa-
na Bawah increased, and the Javanese had to search for additional land
for their housing. Consequently, they used the vacant land near the
plantation to build new houses. Within a short time, the Javanese set-
tlement expanded, and a hamlet called Dusun Langkawana was estab-
lished.
The Sundanese came to Langkawana in the 1950s. They migrated
from Banten, Western Java, to Lampung primarily due to poverty in
their home villages. In the Mount Betung protection forest, the Sunda-
nese found plenty of grass and vacant land, mistakenly thinking that
the land was unowned. Prior to the arrival of the Sundanese, the Lam-
pungese had utilised the land. These Lampungnese had formerly re-
sided in an area called Sukadanaham, around ten to fifteen kilometres
from Mount Betung, and had migrated into the forest to avoid the war
in the early years of the Japanese occupation (1942-1943), or about a
year after the Dutch designated Mount Betung as a protection forest.
After Indonesian Independence in 1945, the Lampungese went back to
their original village and left the land in the forest fallow and full of
grass (alang-alang, Imperata cylindrica).
When the Sundanese first came to Mount Betung and found the
land fallow, they built their small houses and planted food and peren-
nial crops there, creating a small hamlet consisting of five or seven
houses in the forest, called umbulan. The Sundanese pioneers obtained
their land by clearing the fallow land. At that time, a family could have
five to ten hectares of land depending on their ability to clear it. Soon
after the Sundanese settled on this land in the forest, the Lampungese,
one by one, came in and claimed the land for themselves. Considering
their vulnerable position as new migrants, the Sundanese never chal-
lenged these claims but rather paid the Lampungese for their claims.
Payment of compensation (ganti rugi) was the common term for indi-
cating land sales between the Lampungese and the Sundanese. Com-
pensation, however, did not guarantee the permanent transfer of land
rights, because multiple claims were made by the Lampungese to the
same plots. Consequently, the Sundanese paid for compensation sev-
eral times to different Lampungese. Only after the Sundanese popula-
tion increased did the claims of the Lampungese begin to wane and
eventually stop.
The Sundanese were the first to make agro-forest gardens in the
area. The Javanese followed their example and entered the forest in the
middle of the 1950s and the 1960s. By this time, the plantation com-
pany where they had worked as labourers had collapsed and finally
closed. For this reason, they were looking for an alternative source of
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income. Some of them went back to Java, while others remained in
Lampung and entered and cleared primary forest in Mount Betung.
Gradually, population pressure on the forest increased, and the forest
of Mount Betung began to be destroyed. Lampung Provincial Govern-
ment carried out reforestation projects in the early 1980s, part of the
grand policy of forest rehabilitation in Lampung. The Forest Services
assumed that reforestation would be successful if the forests were freed
from encroachments. Assisted by military forces, they relocated people
living in the forest, including those living in the Sundanese hamlets.
The Forest Services destroyed everyone’s gardens and planted Indian
rose wood (called Sonokeling in Bahasa Indonesia or Dalbergia latifolia
in Latin), a kind of commercial timber tree on those gardens. In 1982,
the Forest Services had relocated approximately 140 Sundanese fa-
milies and sent them to a transmigration area in the north of Lam-
pung. In 1986, the Forest Services would conduct the second phase of
relocation for the remaining 30 Sundanese families. Yet, these families
refused because they knew that this new home would be less than ideal
and doubted it would provide them with a better life. The transmigra-
tion areas in North Lampung were well known for their unproductive
land, and thus the Sundanese preferred not to be relocated to those
areas but to live on the border of the forest. They bought the land near
the forests from Javanese and Lampungese owners and then set up
their new settlements on the land, now known as Langkawana Atas.
Land use in forest and non-forest area
As legislation has divided land into forest and non-forest areas, in
Langkawana the villagers labelled forestland as tanah kawasan (land de-
signated as forest area), sometimes also called tanah kehutanan (land
owned by the forest services). For the non-forest area where the villa-
gers built their houses, they use the term tanah marga.
Tanah marga is originally a Lampungese term used to indicate terri-
torial sovereignty over both the villages as well as the land located be-
tween and around the villages. Prior to Dutch colonisation, marga
served as a territorial and socio-political unit of the indigenous Lam-
pungese. The Lampungese continued to call their land tanah marga
(the marga land), though the Dutch abolished the political unit of mar-
ga. Then in the 1920s, the Dutch revitalised the territorial unit of mar-
ga, the main aim of which was to use the marga system as a mechan-
ism for collecting revenues (Elmhirst 2001:298-299). After indepen-
dence, the socio-political unit of marga was once again abolished. With
Law 5/1979 on Village Government, Suharto’s New Order regime uni-
fied all traditional governments and converted them to new administra-
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tive units called desa or villages. In this process, margas were also trans-
formed into villages. Even though marga, as a socio-political and ad-
ministrative unit, has disappeared, the term ‘marga land’ is still used,
even by the migrants. Migrants and indigenes, however, mean different
things by this term. The indigenous Lampungese perceive marga land
as their traditional territories covering both forest and non-forest land.
For the migrants, the term ‘marga land’ refers to all non-state-owned
land, i.e. private lands located in non-forest areas.
Due to the fact that marga land lacks agricultural soil, villagers of
Langkawana use forest areas for their agro-forest gardens. Around 472
households in Western Langkawana have agro-forest gardens on al-
most 500 hectares of forest area. Survey results indicating the size of
land holdings in forest areas are displayed in Table 20.1.
Langkawana villagers are truly forest-dependent people, as they have
no agricultural land outside the forest. A simple survey of the house-
hold income of agro-forest farmers in Langkawana that I carried out in
2005, for example, illustrated that people believed their gardens,
planted with around 30 tree species, had contributed to at least 64 per
cent of their monthly income (see Table 20.2). The gardens produce
commercial commodities such as cocoa, coffee, and fruits. In addition,
Langkawana villagers use the forest for firewood, water supply, build-
ing materials, as well as herbal medicine. Their non-forestry income
comes from small-scale trades such as owning stalls and acting as
middlemen. Another source of income is to work temporarily as a
Table 20.1 Forest land tenure in Langkawana, 2004
Size of land Number of households Percentage
Less than 0.5 ha 177 37.39%
0.5 – 1 ha 144 30.59%
1 – 2 ha 88 18.70%
More than 2 ha 63 13.32%
Source: Data processed from Langkawana’s Forest User Groups (FUGs), 2004
Table 20.2 The household incomes of Langkawana agro-forest farmers, 2005
Size of forest gardens
Forestry-based income
(monthly)
Non-forestry income
(monthly)
(ha) IDR % IDR %
Less than 0.5 239,090 53% 213,800 47%
0.5 – 0.99 300,150 53% 267,630 47%
1 – 2 372,400 72% 143,790 28%
More than 2 685,450 77% 210,670 23%
Source: Field Survey, 2005
1 USD = app. IDR 10,000
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hired motorcyclist (pengojek) to transport people from the village to the
city.
Agro-forest gardens have contributed significantly to people’s liveli-
hood. Nevertheless, the farmers experienced many restrictions in using
their gardens, because they did not possess formal land titles. As men-
tioned previously, forest areas fall under the jurisdiction of the Forestry
Law, and thus no private land rights are recognised in these areas.
While people cannot acquire individual property rights over their agri-
cultural land, this is not the case for residential land located outside
the forest areas or in marga land. This land is under the BAL‘s jurisdic-
tion. According to the Kelurahan administration, 413 parcels, together
comprising 169.8 hectares of non-forest land, have already been regis-
tered and titles provided to the owners. In this calculation, 34 per cent
of non-forest or marga land in Langkawana has been registered. How-
ever, 157 hectares of the registered marga land is not owned by the
Langkawana villagers but belongs to a private foundation with the right
of commercial cultivation (HGU title). The 412 parcels of villagers that
have been registered only comprise 12.8 hectares. Consequently, of all
residential land owned by the villagers, only 3.8 per cent is registered
(see Table 20.3).
Local norms and practices of land tenure and land transactions
As noted, Langkawana’s land has been divided into either forest or
non-forest (marga) land. The villagers have developed their own norms
and practices of land tenure in both categories. Land, whether used for
residential purposes or gardens, is generally regarded as individually
owned. It can be acquired through land clearing, land sales, inheri-
tance, or land exchange. Land-clearing practices took place in the early
period of Langkawana’s settlement. The Sundanese and Javanese
cleared the formerly Lampungese gardens and sometimes primary for-
ests, marked borders on the land, and converted the land to plots. Land
ownership was obtained only after the cleared land had been cultivated
for a certain period. In addition to land-clearing, one can acquire land
through sales. Land sales occur both in forest and non-forest land. The
first wave of land sales took place when the Lampungese reclaimed
their fallow land that had been used by the Sundanese for their gar-
dens or housing. As mentioned above, the Sundanese bought the land
from the Lampungese claimants. The second wave of land sales oc-
curred when the Sundanese were relocated, and many of them sold
their land located in the forest to their neighbours or sometimes to
people from the city before they left for the transmigration areas in
North Lampung. Others who decided to stay looked elsewhere for their
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residential land. They became involved in land transactions with the
Lampungese, who at that time owned most of the land in the forest
frontier, now known as Langkawana village.
Inheritance has been used for transferring ownership from parents
to children. What makes inheritance unique in Langkawana is that it
takes place prior to the parent’s death. Both Javanese and Sundanese
use the principle of ‘musyawarah’ or consensus to divide the inheritable
property. There is no fixed formula to bequeath property. The division
results from negotiation among family members. Even though all
Langkawana’s villagers are Muslim, they do not use Islamic inheritance
law, since when dealing with inheritance, customary law is dominant.
There exists no significant difference in the inheritance systems of the
Sundanese and Javanese. In principle, there is no discrimination
among children – son or daughter – to inherit their parents’ property.
However, children can inherit property of varying quantity and quality,
depending on their parents’ wisdom and the condition of the property
itself. The oldest children living in the same village as their parents,
for example, may inherit more property or may have first priority in
choosing their inherited property. In contrast, the younger children or
children living in a different place may inherit a smaller share of the
property or no land at all.
Frequently, inheritance is assumed to be a key factor of land frag-
mentation in villages where land is limited. Land is continuously di-
vided among children until only very small parcels of land remain.
However, this is not the case in Langkawana. When people only own
one or a few small parcels of land, the land will be bequeathed to only
one or a few of the children, while the other children inherit no land.
As such, it can also happen that siblings inherit parcels of differing
size and quality. A young Javanese woman informed me that she had
inherited only a small piece of land of poor quality from her father.
The land was located far away from the village and situated on a hill.
As a result, she needed more time and additional labour inputs to culti-
vate the land. Consequently, she and her husband decided to disregard
the land and work hard towards buying another piece of land. They
purchased a parcel of land which was small but of better quality than
her inherited land. In her opinion, the inheritance system is not always
fair, since as the youngest child she was forced to accept less valuable
land than her siblings. However, she also voiced the opinion that their
father had made an honest attempt to divide the land fairly, yet unfor-
tunately he could not do much since he had limited land to divide.
Land exchange is another modus of acquiring ownership. Land ex-
change occurs when two parties agree to exchange their ownership
rights to a parcel of land. The reasons for doing so vary between the
parties. Usually, the exchange will occur if two interests are met. Pro-
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vided that one party feels unable to make the land more productive be-
cause of the distant location from home or limited labour to cultivate
the land, he or she can try to persuade the other party to exchange the
land. There exists no written documentation of land exchange agree-
ments, because all transactions are based on trust.
Various secondary rights can be derived from a parcel of land,
namely, sharecropping (bagi hasil), leasing (sewa), pledging (gadai;
gade), and cultivating another’s land for free (numpang tanam). One
can find these secondary rights mostly in forest gardens. Sharecrop-
ping takes place when one utilises and cultivates another’s land with-
out paying a sum of money in advance, but rather shares the harvested
crops with the landowner. Sharecropping habitually works based on
verbal agreements between the landowner and the sharecropper, deter-
mining the duration of the land use as well as the size of the crop-shar-
ing. In practice, there is no difference between the Javanese and Sun-
danese with regard to sharecropping practices. Sharecropping agree-
ments are typically valid for one year, after which period parties can
agree to renew it. The owner and the cultivator mostly share the crop
in an equal manner (people use the term of maro or paroh lahan for
this sharecropping system). Kano (1984:71) deduced that in the nine-
teenth century, sharecropping in Java was not the result of an imbal-
anced agrarian structure in which the functioning of the landlord sys-
tem and the relationship among farmers were based on class. In con-
trast, sharecropping was mostly based on mutual assistance among
neighbours and relatives, in which landowners allowed sharecropping
because they lacked the labour to cultivate the land. In a similar vein,
Rajagukguk found that in the 1980s sharecropping had nothing to do
with the phenomenon of the landless farmer but was caused by other
factors, such as the availability of labour, the time required to cultivate
land, and the interest in having additional income (Rajagukguk
1988:228). Parallel findings can be seen in Langkawana. One reason
for Sundanese and Javanese landowners’ involvement in sharecropping
is the lack of labour in their household to cultivate their own land. An-
other reason is the limited time people have for cultivation due to a
variety of reasons, including the distant location of gardens resulting
in the need to spend more time to reach the land. Meanwhile, share-
croppers are interested in cultivating others’ land because they desire
some additional income. They often do not come from landless house-
holds, but are trying to increase their area of productive land with lim-
ited financial resources.
Another popular tenancy agreement is the land lease. This agree-
ment allows the lessee to use the lessor’s agricultural land on the ad-
vance payment of an amount of cash money. The lessee and the lessor
agree on the rate of rent freely. However, they do consider the size of
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the land as well as the number and value of plants located on the land.
The larger the piece of land and the greater the number and value of
plants on the land, the higher the rental price will be. In terms of dura-
tion, people have different types of agreement. Some prefer to use
monthly or yearly agreements, while others prefer to use the harvest
season as the time limit of their agreement. Negotiation is an impor-
tant factor here.
Pledging or gadai refers to the agreement in which one borrows
money from another with land as the collateral. Subsequently, the len-
der has physical control of the land. He may cultivate, benefit, even
sharecrop or pledge the land to someone else. Like sharecropping, ga-
dai is one of the traditional land tenancy agreements in Javanese and
Sundanese villages. The Indonesian law on the maximum size of agri-
cultural land (Law 56/Prp/1960) remarks that land pledging is the
main cause of the unjust agrarian structure in villages, and so the law
intends to end land pledging. Article 7 of the law, for instance, men-
tions that anyone who controls another’s land for seven years or more
because of land pledging must return the land to the owner a month
after he/she harvests any plants currently on the land, without asking
for compensation from the landowner. Meanwhile, for pledging agree-
ments of less than seven years, or pledging that occurs after the enact-
ment of the law, a landowner can ask for the land any time after the
harvest season ends, but he/she should pay compensation to the
pledge right holder according to a certain formula of compensation.6
In practice, the law has had little effect. Hardjono (1987:113) assumes
that this can be explained by the fact that pledging is a well-established
local institution that has operated for centuries in Java. It has flour-
ished even in state-owned forestland near Langkawana village.
The last secondary right is numpang tanam: the right to cultivate an-
other’s land free of charge. This is also a traditional land tenure institu-
tion in Java. The right to use another’s land (hak menumpang) can ap-
ply, in most villages in Java, to agricultural land as well as housing
land. In Langkawana, land owners only grant numpang tanam on their
agricultural land. People can have hak menumpang only on fallow and
unused land (tanah bongkor or belukar) in which they can plant vegeta-
bles while clearing the land. They are not obliged to pay or share the
crops with the landowner. However, sharing may still be practised to
keep good relations or as a form of gratitude to the owner. Even though
the numpang tanam seems to be based mostly on social considerations,
it has economic implications as well. The numpang tanam demon-
strates a mutual symbiosis between the owners of the land and the cul-
tivators. The former uses the latter as free labourers to clear land and
to act as keepers of their property. Once the land owners are ready to
cultivate the land, they need no additional labour to clear the land. The
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activities of cultivators on the land also prevent illegal occupation of
the land. For the cultivators, the benefit is clear: they have the opportu-
nity to cultivate land other than their own. Not all cultivators are land-
less, and many of them have their own gardens. However, similar to
the practice of sharecropping, sometimes the cultivators need more
land for production because their own land is already completely
planted. When this occurs, numpang tanam would be their best option.
What can be learned from the Langkawana’s practices of land ten-
ure? First, land tenure has had a private-individual character. Lands
have clear borders and are generally regarded as owned by individual
villagers. The Sundanese and Javanese migrants have transplanted the
traditional norms and practices from their home areas to their new
land in Langkawana, including to state-owned forest land used as agro-
forest plots. The state’s and people’s property arrangements thus over-
lap. Second, land transactions have occurred since the beginning of
Langkawana history. Land transfers occur either permanently, as in the
case of land sales, inheritance, or exchange, or temporarily, as in the
case of pledging, leasing, and the like. This illustrates how land trans-
actions have been integrated into informal property arrangements. Yet,
an interesting question remains over the extent to which, as De Soto
believes, the legalisation of such informal property rights is able to en-
hance land transactions. This question will be further discussed below,
in the section on land transactions.
Legalising the extra-legal (1): Registration of residential land in
non-forest area
The first land registration of residential land in Langkawana took place
in the year 2000. A government-funded systematic land registration
project, entitled PRONA, was implemented in the village. At that time,
212 land parcels, totalling 8.2 hectares, were registered, and the rights
holders obtained certificates of their ownership rights. However, due to
limited funds the PRONA registered only 1.6 per cent of the total peo-
ple’s land in Langkawana (see Table 20.3). Trusting that the certificate
would provide legal certainty to their land, villagers were enthusiastic
to register their residential land. Soon after the PRONA project fin-
ished, villagers who had not been able to register their land under
PRONA indicated their interest in registering the land through spora-
dic registration with the Head of the Sub-Village Unit (kepala lingkun-
gan). The kepala lingkungan then consulted with the lurah. It was the
lurah, who is also a civil servant of the municipality government, who
had a significant role in the land registration process. A few months
after the PRONA, he lobbied some officials at the Land Office of Ban-
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dar Lampung Municipality (Kantor Pertanahan Kota Bandar Lampung)
and encouraged them to carry out non-PRONA or sporadic7 land regis-
tration in Langkawana. He was successful, and another 200 land par-
cels were then registered.
Of the group of villagers who registered their land, most expressed
their satisfaction with non-PRONA land registration. The only problem
was the additional cost. Officially, the cost of obtaining a land certifi-
cate was IDR 150,000 (USD 15); in reality, however, the villagers had to
pay twice as much. The officials of the Municipal Land Office as well
as the lurah argued that additional money, known as ‘cigarette money’
(uang rokok), was needed to cover the transportation and meal expenses
of the officials. After sporadic registration of the 200 parcels was fin-
ished, the land officials, again through the lurah, offered to help other
landowners to register the remaining land. However, they have not yet
responded, and the cost of land registration continues to be their main
obstacle. Some villagers, particularly those with a lower income, main-
tain that they dream of land certificates, but that they are unable to
save at least IDR 300,000 (USD 30) to register their residential land.
The result has been that only a small number of land parcels have
been registered. As said above, 34 per cent of all village land is regis-
tered. But of this registered land, the larger part is land with an HGU
title, which is owned by the Foundation of Racing Drivers. Land regis-
tered by villagers accounts for only 2.5 per cent of the total village land.
In Langkawana, the registration of residential land neither increased
the number of land transactions nor resulted in the more than 400
owners starting to use their registered residential property as formal or
informal credit collateral. Although they did, to a certain extent, invest
in their houses and their residential areas, this had much less impact
on poverty reduction than the investments in forest gardens. These is-
sues will be further discussed below.
Table 20.3 Registration of residential land in Langkawana
Land rights Parcels Hectare Percentage to total
residential land
Ownership rights
(PRONA)
212 8.2 2.4 %
Ownership rights
(Non-PRONA)
200 4.6 1.4 %
Unregistered land - 328.2 96.2 %
Source: Monografi Kelurahan Langkawana, 2003
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Legalising the extra-legal (2): A community forestry license for
agro-forest gardens
As mentioned above, since 1986, Wan Abdul Rahman Park has been
cleared of people’s plots and hamlets. The Sundanese have been re-
moved either to the transmigration areas in North Lampung or to
Langkawana village. Yet, this has not meant that agricultural activities
have ceased to exist. The Sundanese and Javanese in Langkawana con-
tinued their normal routines in the forest after the Forest Service and
military forces left the forest, and they re-cultivated their destroyed gar-
dens. The Forest Services conducted occasional forest inspections, and
forest rangers threatened the villagers with repercussions if they con-
tinued to farm. Nevertheless, the law was never enforced consistently,
and villagers could protect their gardens by bribing the rangers with
money, coffee, or fruits. Acting in accordance with the law, when they
caught villagers in the actual cultivation of forest gardens, the rangers
would seize their machetes. Nevertheless, the law was open to debate,
and the rangers offered people the chance to ‘negotiate the law’, mean-
ing to negotiate payment for the return of the machetes. Unbalanced
power relations between the people and forest rangers have fed this
sort of underground economic activity. The villagers must maintain
good personal relations with the rangers or risk the destruction of their
gardens. Just as Scott (1985) terms one weapon of the weak ‘everyday
forms of resistance’, as they engage in unequal power relations, the
Langkawana perform everyday forms of negotiation.
Besides inspections by forest rangers, cultivators also faced a con-
stant threat from within – theft by other villagers. In an environment
of full awareness of the fact that no one has a legal right to one’s gar-
den, the phrase ‘thieves cannot blame each other’ has gained great cur-
rency locally. Ensuing conflicts typically have been resolved through
mediation by village officials. Also common is what Nader and Todd
(1978:9) describe as the ‘lumping it’ strategy, in which claimants who
knowingly decide that the gain is too low and cost too high prefer to
ignore or avoid local conflicts. For Langkawana villagers, overt internal
conflict has high social costs. Ignoring conflict best preserves social
harmony, yet this is reached at the expense of tenure security over their
gardens.
In mid-1998, a research team from Jakarta that was seeking a site
for applied anthropological research arrived in Langkawana and chan-
ged the villagers’ lives. Along with a local university and NGO partners,
the researchers adopted the role of community organisers (COs) with
the aim of establishing Forest User Groups (FUGs). FUGs create and
enforce group rules to manage the forest, resolve internal conflicts,
and set up cooperation to protect the forests.
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The existence of FUGs and group rules have decreased conflicts over
the forest, including incidences of theft. The COs convinced the central
and provincial governments that the villagers were serious about pre-
serving their forest, and they were successful in encouraging the MoF
to issue a community forestry license to Langkawana villagers. In No-
vember 1999, the MoF issued a temporary community forestry license
to the Langkawana FUGs Association, allowing its members to use
492.75 hectares of forest land. Valid for five years, the license could be
extended as long as the groups demonstrated good forest management.
The community forestry license, which is basically a legal right to
manage, use, and benefit from state forest land, can be seen as a tool
for providing land tenure security to people. Although it is unable to
provide people with full security of tenure and private land rights such
as they can acquire on their residential land, the community forestry li-
cense made people’s forest gardens legally secure, albeit still in the sha-
dow of the state’s property. The Langkawana villagers realised that ask-
ing for land ownership of their forest gardens was something unachie-
vable and believed that the community forestry license was the most
realistic option and would protect their gardens.
In November 2004, the community forestry license in Langkawana
expired. Lampung Forest Service officials opted not to extend the li-
cense because in 2001 the MoF had changed the community forestry
legislation. The new legislation prohibited the issuance of community
forestry licenses in conservation forests. The Forest Services instead of-
fered people a one-year license to cultivate their gardens which was
based on a Provincial Regulation enacted in 2000 (Perda 7/2000). The
villagers refused to accept the situation and argued that they had de-
monstrated good forest management for five years and thus deserved
an extension, as the government had promised earlier. Yet the Forest
Services could do nothing, since the central government’s policy had
changed. So they convinced the villagers that the new one-year license
would also provide them with tenure security over their land, as long
as they agreed to be supervised by the Forest Services and paid a levy.
Provincial Regulation 7/2000 has been used to collect such levies on
forest products, including on agro-forest products in Lampung. The de-
centralisation process implemented in 2001 inspired the Lampung pro-
vincial government to seek as much revenue as possible, which in-
cluded revenue from the agro-forest farmers. After enacting the Provin-
cial Regulation 7/2000, the forestry officials persuaded the agro-forest
farmers in Langkawana to pay the new forestry levy. The community
forestry license was not extended in 2004, but people continued paying
the levies. Clearly, the levies became illegal. Nevertheless, both the offi-
cials and communities have their reasons to continue this transaction.
For the officials, mobilising communities to pay the levy is important
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to boost their career prospects, as their performance is judged accord-
ing to the amount of levy they collect. The villagers, in their turn, be-
lieve that the levies they pay provide a certain measure of tenure secur-
ity over their agro-forest gardens.
Poverty alleviation, land registration and community forestry
license
Land registration and community forestry license are two examples of
legalising the informal land tenure in Langkawana. The two have had
different paths of legalisation because forest land and non-forest land
are two different legal categories. People can obtain individual owner-
ship rights over their residential land located in non-forest areas. Mean-
while for their plots situated in forest areas, they can acquire a commu-
nity forestry license. The degree of tenure security of the two options
certainly varies; however, the more interesting question is how the im-
plementation of these options influences poverty alleviation in Langka-
wana.
In Langkawana, the greatest contribution to the villagers household
economy originates from their agro-forest gardens located in the forest
areas, not from their residential lands. The latter only meet people’s
housing needs, whilst the former provide cash incomes. Thus, commu-
nity forestry is a good point of departure for assessing the extent to
which land legalisation affects poverty reduction in Langkawana. The
community forestry license protected the agro-forest gardens from out-
side interference. This increased people’s investment in the land. Prior
to obtaining a community forestry license, the Langkawana villagers
preferred to plant coffee, vegetables, and non-perennial crops such as
bananas and beans; however, once they acquired a community forestry
license they diversified and planted more perennial and cash-producing
crops. Planting such perennial crops as cacao, durians, and rubber, the
more popular plants in the agro-forest gardens, illustrates the farmers‘
growing investment of labour and time.
The agro-forest gardens comprise approximately 60 per cent of
household incomes. People use their forest-based incomes to send
their children to school, build brick houses to replace their bamboo
houses, buy motorcycles, and the like. This indicates a change in the
economy of the village. Table 20.4 shows some economic indicators in
1998 and in 2005, as stated by the people. It shows that people’s qual-
ity of life has improved significantly during this period, which coin-
cides with the higher tenure security of people’s forest gardens.
Incomes from the agro-forest gardens represent a substantial contri-
bution to the villagers’ livelihood in Langkawana. In addition, the forest
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provides clean fresh water, construction materials, herbal medicines,
and the like. All these products from the forests must be included
when conducting poverty assessments in forest surrounding villages.
Unfortunately, many poverty alleviation policies and programmes in
Indonesia, although they are implemented in the forest frontier, largely
neglect forest factors such as these (Wollenberg et al. 2004:3). Trapped
into legal categories of forest and non-forest land, the policies and pro-
grammes follow the incorrect assumption that natural forests play no
role in people’s agricultural activities and livelihood strategies. As pre-
viously stated, Wan Abdulrahman Grand Forest Park offers many pro-
ductive lands as well as sources of economically valuable products. This
has made the forest a significant factor in poverty reduction in Langka-
wana. As a result, in Langkawana, the legalisation of forest gardens
through a community forestry license had a greater impact on people’s
livelihood than the legalisation through registration of residential lands
in non-forest areas. The Langkawana case thus shows that legalisation
of informal land rights has a greater effect when it targets land that is
highly productive than when it targets unproductive land
Therefore, it is important to assess the productivity of land. Such an
assessment must consider economic and social values of land, which
are derived from physical, social, economic and legal factors (Gwartney
2008). Physical attributes such as the location and fertility of land, for
example, are important factors in determining the productivity of the
land. Social attributes of the land include, for example, the amount of
family labour that can be used to make the land more productive, and
the social norms that enable or prohibit access to the land. Economic
factors refer to the existing and prospective economic value of re-
sources available on the land. Meanwhile, legal attributes of the land
Table 20.4 Village economic indicators in Langkawana, 1998-2005
Indicators 1998 2005
Stalls 19 26
Middlemen 9 14
Brick houses 90 130
Cars 4 6
Motorcycles 20 65
Toilets 25 130
Education:
Drop out from elementary schools 65 33
Attendance elementary schools 800 821
Attendance junior high schools 552 534
Attendance senior high schools 420 463
Attendance university 2 6
Source: Field Survey and Field Notes, 2005
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refer to the legal rights of people to the land and resources. All these
attributes alter people’s perceptions regarding the land.
If the possession of legalised productive land is a key factor in redu-
cing poverty, the question follows that if the land has been distributed
unfairly, how then can such productive land be provided to more peo-
ple? Here another complexity emerges. When the majority of land has
been allocated as state forests, and most agricultural land in non-forest
areas belongs to private companies, where can the common people
farm? The situation in Langkawana clearly illustrates this issue. Ap-
proximately 30 per cent of non-forest land is under the HGU title of a
private foundation. In the entire province of Lampung, the number
reaches 12.5 per cent. Due to city development, agricultural land has
also been converted into private real estate. This shows how strong the
competition for land is in non-forest areas. In such a situation, people
with less economic power will be easily marginalised, as has happened
to approximately 500 families in western Langkawana. Most of them
cannot afford agricultural land outside forest areas, even though they
know that such land will provide them with more legal security, as they
are able to obtain full ownership rights to this land.
Thus, while Langkawana villagers have a strong desire to obtain
more security in land tenure by purchasing agricultural land outside
the forest, very few of them can transform their forestry-based assets to
buy land in non-forest areas. The tight competition of the land market
outside the forest has pushed them further into the forest. Thus, pro-
viding people with more secure land rights on forest land is a key to re-
ducing poverty, as long as there is no land redistribution of non-forest
areas. The legalisation of forest land and the redistribution of non-for-
est land are thus two complementary strategies to enhance the liveli-
hoods of the Langkawana villagers.
Land transactions
A central argument of the advocates of legalisation is that the integra-
tion of extra-legal property into the formal legal system will enhance
the market and increase the number of property transactions. It is gen-
erally thought that individual property rights will most strongly en-
hance the property market. In this section, we will discuss what makes
land transactions occur, on what type of land they occur, and under
what property arrangements.
The Langkawana villagers have engaged in land transactions ever
since they came to Lampung. In the history of Langkawana, two big
waves of land transactions occurred. The first wave consisted of the
transactions between the Sundanese migrants and the Lampungese in
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the beginning of the Sundanese’s settlement in Mount Betung (1940s-
1950s). The second wave of land transactions occurred following the re-
location projects which removed people from the forest in the 1980s.
After the first relocation in 1982, for example, the Sundanese, who
were forced to relocate to the transmigration areas in North Lampung,
sold their housing land and plots either to their neighbours or to outsi-
ders. Then, when the second relocation occurred in 1986, the remain-
ing Sundanese who refused to be relocated to North Lampung pur-
chased land in the forest frontier where they then built their houses.
The manner in which those who were relocated acquired new land was
highly dependent on their kinship networks and financial resources, as
well as their personal preference of residence. Those having sufficient
money to buy land could go anywhere and thus had more options in
choosing their housing land. Most of them preferred to buy land situ-
ated near their former homes or gardens in the forest. The marga land
in Langkawana Atas was the best location to access their forest gardens.
Meanwhile, those who lacked money were dependent upon their rela-
tives to either live in their homes free of charge (tumpangan) or to ne-
gotiate the purchase of their relatives’ land at a lower price. Those who
had no opportunities to acquire land in Langkawana went to another
village, and some even returned to their home villages in Java.
After 1986, there have been occasional land transactions, in particu-
lar of forest land. Interestingly, the number of land transactions de-
clined after people obtained their community forestry license, which
provided them with better tenure security. And not only did land sales
decline, other forms of land transactions, such as land leases, also
dropped significantly. This phenomenon, which will be accounted for
later, is in contradiction to the common assumption that increasing
tenure security will enhance the land market (Deininger 2003:115;
Place, Roth, and Hazell 1994:17). Despite the declining number of land
transactions in forest areas, land transactions as well as informal access
to credit through pledging occurred more often in forest areas than in
non-forest areas, although the latter is able to provide people with more
legal security. This can be explained by looking through the eyes of
Langkawana villagers. First, residential land is not seen as a marketable
commodity, and most land sales therefore occur in plots located in for-
est land. In the people’s view, having no plots is less risky than having
no land at all for housing. With no plots, they can still survive by rent-
ing land or sharecropping with other villagers. There is no tradition of
renting land for housing in Langkawana. Thus, people must have their
own land for building their houses. This makes people eager to defend
their ownership right on residential land. In addition, people strongly
believe that selling their housing land characterizes them as losers be-
cause of their inability to defend their primary safety net. Second, land
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transactions predominantly occur when people are unable to make
their land more productive. Lack of labour inputs in people’s house-
hold with which to cultivate the land or the remote location of land are
two general reasons for transferring ownership or renting the land.
How selective people are in selling their land can be seen, for instance,
in a land transaction case below that involved a Langkawana villager
and an outsider.
A Langkawana villager, Karsaya, was trapped in a big debt. He
did not have sufficient money to pay all his debt. Then, he
decided to sell one of his parcels of land in the forest situated
far away from his house in Langkawana. For him, the land was
not so productive because of its distant location. He persuaded
his brother-in law living in another village to buy the land. The
brother in-law had no agricultural land both in the forest and in
non-forest land. He was very interested in purchasing the land
because it was situated near to his village. The transaction, final-
ly, took place. Karsaya received IDR five millions for his 1.75 ha
of uncultivated land. His brother-in law obtained a parcel of agri-
cultural land to support his livelihood. For both parties, the
transaction was a clear expression of mutual help among rela-
tives.
Land transactions are driven by complex factors, and tenure security is
only one of them. The situation in Langkawana has shown that en-
hanced tenure security will have no effect on land transactions when
people regard their land primarily as a safety net, and will only sell it
in situations of serious distress. The Sundanese and Javanese migrants
in Langkawana prefer to keep as much land as possible in their hands
rather than to sell it. Only in certain conditions where they fail to ob-
tain alternatives for cash money do they sell their land. In the absence
of state services, people sell, lease, or pledge their land due to their
need for money for education and health costs, as well as for celebrat-
ing their children‘s wedding parties. They prefer to transact land with
relatives and neighbours. In these transactions, economic concerns are
not always the primary motive, since they are also attracted by the so-
cial mechanism of mutual help (tolong-menolong) with relatives and
neighbours. As the motive for land transaction is often laden with so-
cial considerations of mutual help, the seller can frequently buy back
the land. This makes land transactions with relatives or neighbours the
preferred method.
Let us now try to explain why an increase in tenure security –
through the community forestry license – led to a decline rather than
an increase in land transactions in forest areas. When people consider
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a transfer of land, they prefer to part with lands that they are unable to
make more productive and that are insecure in tenure. The Langkawa-
na villagers reason that the more productive the land, the greater the
profits they can expect, and the less willing they are to engage in a land
transaction. While land productivity is dependent on labour supply and
accessibility, expected profits are also based on people’s perception of
their security in cultivating the land. Tenure security and land profit-
ability can be thought of as a two-sided coin. The less tenure security,
the less one can count on profits from the land in the future, and the
more people will be willing to transfer the land. Land transactions are
a mechanism of transferring economic and legal risks to others. The
other way around, higher tenure security creates incentives to make
the land more productive, which in turn makes it less likely that people
will transfer their land. This can explain why the number of land sales
and land rents in Langkawana’s agro-forest gardens declined following
the community forestry license. The license provided people with more
tenure security and made them feel safe to cultivate their land, which
created less intention to sell the land.
Another explanation for the low number of land transactions lies in
the existence of local norms that prohibit land transactions to outsi-
ders. The Langkawana villagers set up their Forest User Groups prior
to obtaining the community forestry license. The groups crafted local
norms in relation to forest use, including the prohibition of transfer-
ring land to people who do not reside in the village. The norms have
effectively prevented land transactions with outsiders.
Similar to what has happened with the land transactions, access to
credit is not determined solely by legal security. Residential lands in
Langkawana are never used as formal or informal credit collateral. Peo-
ple prefer to engage in pledging of their agro-forest plots rather than
their residential lands. The fact that there is no bank or formal credit
institution willing to provide them with credit is one factor. However,
the leading factor is people’s reluctance to use their housing land as
collateral. The perception of housing land as their primary safety net
has dissuaded them from doing so. Thus, they prefer to use their agro-
forest plots in the forest areas as collateral. The only possible way to
use forest land as collateral is through informal credit mechanisms,
such as pledging to their relatives or neighbours.
Langkawana’s experience has pointed out that the absence or limited
availability of basic public services determines the land market. People
see their land as a safety net and prefer to hang on to it as long as pos-
sible, only selling it in times of serious distress. In such a situation the
enhancement of tenure security through the legalisation of land rights
will not have much effect on the land market.8
570 MYRNA A. SAFITRI
Conclusions
The orthodox view of land law and land tenure holds a linear assump-
tion of land tenure security, investment, poverty reduction, and market-
isation. It is widely believed that the legalisation of informal land rights
will increase the degree of land tenure security, which in turn will re-
sult in more land and labour investments, higher productivity, land ca-
pitalisation, and poverty alleviation. It is furthermore assumed that the
highest level of tenure security can be acquired through the titling and
registration of individual property rights in land. This is thus seen as
the best legalisation process to enhance land markets and reduce pov-
erty. This view has inspired legal and economic discourses, as well as
foreign aid projects for legal and economic reform in less developed
countries. Indonesia is one of the countries where this vision has in-
formed land management.
In this chapter I have described two different legalisation processes
in Langkawana, a village in the forest frontier of Lampung. The first
involved the registration of individual property rights in residential
non-forest land. Although this legalisation enhanced the legal status
and the tenure security of the land, it did not lead to an increased use
of the land as collateral for loans nor to a higher number of land trans-
actions. Langkawana villagers do not consider their residential land as
a marketable commodity, but as an asset that needs to be held onto at
all costs. Legalisation of the villagers’ residential land did not change
this attitude.
The second legalisation process involved the granting of a commu-
nity forestry license on forest land. Although this did not provide the
villagers with individual titles, it did enhance their tenure security, i.e.
the extent to which the villagers felt assured of their ability to access
their land, to manage and use it, and to effectively exclude others.9 As
a result, people invested more time and labour in their forest gardens,
diversified their crops, and planted more perennial and cash-producing
crops. This led to a significant improvement of the people’s quality of
life. Interestingly, after the granting of the community forestry license,
the number of market transactions decreased. Although this contra-
dicts the abovementioned theory, it can logically be explained by the
fact that villagers prefer not to sell secure and productive land. The
greater the profits that can be expected from land, the less willing peo-
ple are to transfer their land. The less tenure security, the less one can
count on profits from the land in the future, and the more people will
be willing to transfer the land. Higher tenure security, on the other
hand, creates incentives to make the land more productive, which in
turn makes it less likely that people will transfer their land. In Langka-
wana, the community forestry license provided people with more ten-
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ure security and made them feel safe to cultivate their land, which cre-
ated less intention to sell the land.
The above case thus shows that legalisation of land rights does not
always lead to marketisation and poverty reduction. As the case of
Langkawana shows, the people’s decision to take part in land transac-
tions is determined by their perception of land and the contribution of
land to their household economy. The legal status of land is merely
one factor, but not the major one, in determining land transactions. In
addition, registration of individual property rights in residential land in
non-forest areas has had less impact on people’s livelihood and their le-
vel of poverty than legalisation of forest gardens through a community
forestry license. The relationship between legalisation of land tenure
and poverty reduction will be determined not only by the kind of rights
– individual or communal rights, ownership or use rights – granted to
the people but also by the quality of lands on which these rights are
granted. In other words, it will have a greater effect on poverty reduc-
tion to target lands that are highly productive than to target lands that
are unproductive. However, in a country like Indonesia – where all for-
est land has been designated state land – the legalisation of productive
forest land is nearly impossible. Programmes of land legalisation there-
fore need to be preceded by a land reform programme. Unfortunately,
this has been neglected by the proponents of simplistic projects of land
legalisation.
Notes
1 Broadly defined, tenure security refers to the extent to which a holder of a parcel of
land feels assured (both in the short and longer term) of his ability to access his land,
to manage and use it, and to effectively exclude others.
2 In 1987 the MoF recognized that of 50 million hectares of forest concessions, only 75
per cent were located in production forests. Others could be found in protection and
conservation forests. Many of them were even located outside the forest areas, in this
case on people’s land (Safitri, Bangun, and Philippus 1999:4). This led the logging
companies to become engaged in conflicts with local communities.
3 To protect the privacy of my informants, the village’s name has been changed.
4 According to the elucidation of article 127 of Law 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy, ke-
lurahan is a working area of a village chief (lurah). This area is located within a sub-
district (kecamatan) territory. A kelurahan differs from a village (desa) in terms of its
degree of autonomy. The village is politically and economically more autonomous.
The village head (kepala desa) is elected directly by the villagers. The village has its
own assets and authority to manage them. In contrast, the kelurahan is led by a lurah
who is an appointed civil servant and is responsible to the mayor or head of the dis-
trict (bupati). For this reason, the kelurahan is defined as a working territory of a lur-
ah rather than as an autonomous social, political, as well as economic unit of the
people.
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5 Lingkungan is part of kelurahan territory, headed by a kepala lingkungan. Unlike the
lurah, the kepala lingkungan is not a civil servant. He/she is appointed by the lurah
after considering the people’s aspiration. People elect their kepala lingkungan, then
nominate the elected person to the lurah. The kepala lingkungan is accountable to the
lurah.
6 According to Law 56/Prp/1960, the formula is (7+1/2) – pledge duration  the loan.
7 Government Regulation 24/1997 on Land Registration divides the registration into
two: systematic and sporadic registration. The systematic land registration is a gov-
ernment-led land registration project which is conducted in certain areas as deter-
mined by the National Land Agency. The sporadic registration refers to people-driven
land administration.
8 Nevertheless, the fear of land transfers is the official explanation for the MoF’s reluc-
tance to grant land rights over forest areas to the people. They claim that they fear
that land transfers will immediately follow the granting of land rights. Therefore, in
all community forestry regulations, there has always been a clause of not allowing
people to obtain land rights. Certainly, this reduces the degree of legal tenure security
of the community forestry.
9 See footnote 594 for the definition of tenure security.
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